2 * Copyright (c) 1997-2007 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
3 * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
17 * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
18 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
19 * without specific prior written permission.
21 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
22 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
23 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
24 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
25 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
26 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
27 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
28 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
29 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
30 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
36 #define MAX_TIME ((time_t)((1U << 31) - 1))
39 _kdc_fix_time(time_t **t)
45 if(**t == 0) **t = MAX_TIME; /* fix for old clients */
49 realloc_method_data(METHOD_DATA *md)
52 pa = realloc(md->val, (md->len + 1) * sizeof(*md->val));
61 set_salt_padata(METHOD_DATA *md, Salt *salt)
64 realloc_method_data(md);
65 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = salt->type;
66 der_copy_octet_string(&salt->salt,
67 &md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value);
72 _kdc_find_padata(const KDC_REQ *req, int *start, int type)
74 if (req->padata == NULL)
77 while((size_t)*start < req->padata->len){
79 if(req->padata->val[*start - 1].padata_type == (unsigned)type)
80 return &req->padata->val[*start - 1];
86 * This is a hack to allow predefined weak services, like afs to
87 * still use weak types
91 _kdc_is_weak_exception(krb5_principal principal, krb5_enctype etype)
93 if (principal->name.name_string.len > 0 &&
94 strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "afs") == 0 &&
95 (etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
96 || etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4
97 || etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5))
104 * Detect if `key' is the using the the precomputed `default_salt'.
108 is_default_salt_p(const krb5_salt *default_salt, const Key *key)
110 if (key->salt == NULL)
112 if (default_salt->salttype != key->salt->type)
114 if (krb5_data_cmp(&default_salt->saltvalue, &key->salt->salt))
120 * return the first appropriate key of `princ' in `ret_key'. Look for
121 * all the etypes in (`etypes', `len'), stopping as soon as we find
122 * one, but preferring one that has default salt
126 _kdc_find_etype(krb5_context context, krb5_boolean use_strongest_session_key,
127 krb5_boolean is_preauth, hdb_entry_ex *princ,
128 krb5_enctype *etypes, unsigned len,
129 krb5_enctype *ret_enctype, Key **ret_key)
133 krb5_enctype enctype = ETYPE_NULL;
137 /* We'll want to avoid keys with v4 salted keys in the pre-auth case... */
138 ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context, princ->entry.principal, &def_salt);
142 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
144 if (use_strongest_session_key) {
145 const krb5_enctype *p;
146 krb5_enctype clientbest = ETYPE_NULL;
150 * Pick the strongest key that the KDC, target service, and
151 * client all support, using the local cryptosystem enctype
152 * list in strongest-to-weakest order to drive the search.
154 * This is not what RFC4120 says to do, but it encourages
155 * adoption of stronger enctypes. This doesn't play well with
156 * clients that have multiple Kerberos client implementations
157 * available with different supported enctype lists.
160 /* drive the search with local supported enctypes list */
161 p = krb5_kerberos_enctypes(context);
162 for (i = 0; p[i] != ETYPE_NULL && enctype == ETYPE_NULL; i++) {
163 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, p[i]) != 0)
166 /* check that the client supports it too */
167 for (j = 0; j < len && enctype == ETYPE_NULL; j++) {
168 if (p[i] != etypes[j])
170 /* save best of union of { client, crypto system } */
171 if (clientbest == ETYPE_NULL)
173 /* check target princ support */
174 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, p[i], &key);
177 if (is_preauth && !is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
182 if (clientbest != ETYPE_NULL && enctype == ETYPE_NULL)
183 enctype = clientbest;
184 else if (enctype == ETYPE_NULL)
185 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
186 if (ret == 0 && ret_enctype != NULL)
187 *ret_enctype = enctype;
188 if (ret == 0 && ret_key != NULL)
192 * Pick the first key from the client's enctype list that is
193 * supported by the cryptosystem and by the given principal.
195 * RFC4120 says we SHOULD pick the first _strong_ key from the
196 * client's list... not the first key... If the admin disallows
197 * weak enctypes in krb5.conf and selects this key selection
198 * algorithm, then we get exactly what RFC4120 says.
200 for(key = NULL, i = 0; ret != 0 && i < len; i++, key = NULL) {
202 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[i]) != 0 &&
203 !_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->entry.principal, etypes[i]))
206 while (hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, etypes[i], &key) == 0) {
207 if (key->key.keyvalue.length == 0) {
208 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
213 if (ret_enctype != NULL)
214 *ret_enctype = etypes[i];
216 if (is_preauth && is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
223 krb5_free_salt (context, def_salt);
228 _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname (PrincipalName *pn)
230 pn->name_type = KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL;
231 pn->name_string.len = 1;
232 pn->name_string.val = malloc(sizeof(*pn->name_string.val));
233 if (pn->name_string.val == NULL)
235 pn->name_string.val[0] = strdup("anonymous");
236 if (pn->name_string.val[0] == NULL) {
237 free(pn->name_string.val);
238 pn->name_string.val = NULL;
245 _kdc_r_log(kdc_request_t r, int level, const char *fmt, ...)
250 s = kdc_log_msg_va(r->context, r->config, level, fmt, ap);
256 _kdc_set_e_text(kdc_request_t r, const char *e_text)
259 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0, "%s", e_text);
263 _kdc_log_timestamp(krb5_context context,
264 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
266 KerberosTime authtime, KerberosTime *starttime,
267 KerberosTime endtime, KerberosTime *renew_till)
269 char authtime_str[100], starttime_str[100],
270 endtime_str[100], renewtime_str[100];
272 krb5_format_time(context, authtime,
273 authtime_str, sizeof(authtime_str), TRUE);
275 krb5_format_time(context, *starttime,
276 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
278 strlcpy(starttime_str, "unset", sizeof(starttime_str));
279 krb5_format_time(context, endtime,
280 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
282 krb5_format_time(context, *renew_till,
283 renewtime_str, sizeof(renewtime_str), TRUE);
285 strlcpy(renewtime_str, "unset", sizeof(renewtime_str));
287 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
288 "%s authtime: %s starttime: %s endtime: %s renew till: %s",
289 type, authtime_str, starttime_str, endtime_str, renewtime_str);
298 static krb5_error_code
299 pa_pkinit_validate(kdc_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
301 pk_client_params *pkp = NULL;
302 char *client_cert = NULL;
305 ret = _kdc_pk_rd_padata(r->context, r->config, &r->req, pa, r->client, &pkp);
306 if (ret || pkp == NULL) {
307 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
308 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PKINIT PA-DATA -- %s",
313 ret = _kdc_pk_check_client(r->context,
320 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "PKINIT certificate not allowed to "
321 "impersonate principal");
325 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "PKINIT pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
326 r->client_name, client_cert);
329 ret = _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(r->context, r->config, pkp, r->client,
330 r->sessionetype, &r->req, &r->request,
331 &r->reply_key, &r->session_key, &r->outpadata);
333 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Failed to build PK-INIT reply");
337 ret = _kdc_add_inital_verified_cas(r->context, r->config,
342 _kdc_pk_free_client_param(r->context, pkp);
353 static krb5_error_code
354 make_pa_enc_challange(krb5_context context, METHOD_DATA *md,
361 EncryptedData encdata;
366 krb5_us_timeofday (context, &p.patimestamp, &usec);
370 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ENC_TS_ENC, buf, buf_size, &p, &len, ret);
374 krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
376 ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
378 KRB5_KU_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC,
387 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncryptedData, buf, buf_size, &encdata, &len, ret);
388 free_EncryptedData(&encdata);
392 krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
394 ret = krb5_padata_add(context, md, KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE, buf, len);
400 static krb5_error_code
401 pa_enc_chal_validate(kdc_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
403 krb5_data pepper1, pepper2, ts_data;
404 KDC_REQ_BODY *b = &r->req.req_body;
405 EncryptedData enc_data;
406 krb5_enctype aenctype;
412 heim_assert(r->armor_crypto != NULL, "ENC-CHAL called for non FAST");
414 if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
415 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
416 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0, "ENC-CHALL doesn't support anon");
420 ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
421 pa->padata_value.length,
425 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
426 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
431 pepper1.data = "clientchallengearmor";
432 pepper1.length = strlen(pepper1.data);
433 pepper2.data = "challengelongterm";
434 pepper2.length = strlen(pepper2.data);
436 krb5_crypto_getenctype(r->context, r->armor_crypto, &aenctype);
438 for (i = 0; i < r->client->entry.keys.len; i++) {
439 krb5_crypto challangecrypto, longtermcrypto;
440 krb5_keyblock challangekey;
443 k = &r->client->entry.keys.val[i];
445 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &k->key, 0, &longtermcrypto);
449 ret = krb5_crypto_fx_cf2(r->context, r->armor_crypto, longtermcrypto,
450 &pepper1, &pepper2, aenctype,
452 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, longtermcrypto);
456 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &challangekey, 0,
461 ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData(r->context, challangecrypto,
462 KRB5_KU_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT,
468 ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data,
472 krb5_data_free(&ts_data);
474 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challangecrypto);
475 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
476 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
481 if (abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > r->context->max_skew) {
482 char client_time[100];
484 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challangecrypto);
486 krb5_format_time(r->context, p.patimestamp,
487 client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
489 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
490 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "Too large time skew, "
491 "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
493 (unsigned)abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
494 r->context->max_skew,
497 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
501 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
503 ret = make_pa_enc_challange(r->context, &r->outpadata,
505 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challangecrypto);
509 set_salt_padata(&r->outpadata, k->salt);
510 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
511 ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &k->key, &r->reply_key);
515 if (i < r->client->entry.keys.len)
516 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
518 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
523 static krb5_error_code
524 pa_enc_ts_validate(kdc_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
526 EncryptedData enc_data;
535 if (r->req.req_body.kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
536 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
537 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "ENC-TS doesn't suport anon");
541 ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
542 pa->padata_value.length,
546 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
547 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
552 ret = hdb_enctype2key(r->context, &r->client->entry,
553 enc_data.etype, &pa_key);
556 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "No key matching entype");
557 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
558 if(krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, enc_data.etype, &estr))
562 "No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s",
563 enc_data.etype, r->client_name);
566 "No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s",
567 estr, r->client_name);
569 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
574 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &pa_key->key, 0, &crypto);
576 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
577 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
578 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
579 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
583 ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (r->context,
585 KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP,
588 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, crypto);
590 * Since the user might have several keys with the same
591 * enctype but with diffrent salting, we need to try all
592 * the keys with the same enctype.
595 krb5_error_code ret2;
596 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
598 ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context,
599 pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
602 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA -- %s "
603 "(enctype %s) error %s",
604 r->client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype", msg);
605 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
608 if(hdb_next_enctype2key(r->context, &r->client->entry,
609 enc_data.etype, &pa_key) == 0)
612 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
614 if (r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
615 r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status(r->context, r->clientdb, r->client,
616 HDB_AUTH_WRONG_PASSWORD);
618 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
621 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
622 ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data,
626 krb5_data_free(&ts_data);
628 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
629 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
633 if (abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > r->context->max_skew) {
634 char client_time[100];
636 krb5_format_time(r->context, p.patimestamp,
637 client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
639 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
640 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "Too large time skew, "
641 "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
643 (unsigned)abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
644 r->context->max_skew,
648 * The following is needed to make windows clients to
649 * retry using the timestamp in the error message, if
650 * there is a e_text, they become unhappy.
653 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
656 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
658 set_salt_padata(&r->outpadata, pa_key->salt);
660 ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &pa_key->key, &r->reply_key);
664 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
667 _kdc_r_log(r, 2, "ENC-TS Pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
668 r->client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype");
682 #define PA_ANNOUNCE 1
683 #define PA_REQ_FAST 2 /* only use inside fast */
684 krb5_error_code (*validate)(kdc_request_t, const PA_DATA *pa);
687 static const struct kdc_patypes pat[] = {
690 KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ, "PK-INIT(ietf)", PA_ANNOUNCE,
694 KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN, "PK-INIT(win2k)", PA_ANNOUNCE,
698 { KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ, "PK-INIT(ietf)", 0, NULL },
699 { KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN, "PK-INIT(win2k)", 0, NULL },
701 { KRB5_PADATA_PA_PK_OCSP_RESPONSE , "OCSP", 0, NULL },
703 KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP , "ENC-TS",
708 KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE , "ENC-CHAL",
709 PA_ANNOUNCE | PA_REQ_FAST,
712 { KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP , "REQ-ENC-PA-REP", 0, NULL },
713 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST, "FX-FAST", PA_ANNOUNCE, NULL },
714 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_ERROR, "FX-ERROR", 0, NULL },
715 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_COOKIE, "FX-COOKIE", 0, NULL }
719 log_patypes(krb5_context context,
720 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
723 struct rk_strpool *p = NULL;
727 for (n = 0; n < padata->len; n++) {
728 for (m = 0; m < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); m++) {
729 if (padata->val[n].padata_type == pat[m].type) {
730 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%s", pat[m].name);
734 if (m == sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]))
735 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", padata->val[n].padata_type);
736 if (p && n + 1 < padata->len)
737 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
739 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "out of memory");
744 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "none");
746 str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
747 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Client sent patypes: %s", str);
755 static krb5_error_code
756 add_enc_pa_rep(krb5_context context,
757 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
758 EncTicketPart *et, EncKDCRepPart *ek,
759 const krb5_data *req_buffer,
760 const krb5_keyblock *reply_key)
768 et->flags.enc_pa_rep = ek->flags.enc_pa_rep = 1;
770 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, reply_key, 0, &crypto);
772 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
773 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
774 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
778 ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, crypto,
780 req_buffer->data, req_buffer->length,
782 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
786 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Checksum, cdata.data, cdata.length,
787 &checksum, &len, ret);
788 free_Checksum(&checksum);
792 if (ek->encrypted_pa_data == NULL) {
793 ALLOC(ek->encrypted_pa_data);
794 if (ek->encrypted_pa_data == NULL)
797 ret = krb5_padata_add(context, ek->encrypted_pa_data,
798 KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP, cdata.data, cdata.length);
802 ret = krb5_padata_add(context, ek->encrypted_pa_data,
803 KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST, NULL, 0);
813 _kdc_encode_reply(krb5_context context,
814 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
815 const krb5_data *req_buffer,
816 krb5_crypto armor_crypto, uint32_t nonce,
817 KDC_REP *rep, EncTicketPart *et, EncKDCRepPart *ek,
819 int skvno, const EncryptionKey *skey,
820 int ckvno, const EncryptionKey *reply_key,
831 if (req_buffer && rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep) {
832 ret = add_enc_pa_rep(context, config,
833 et, ek, req_buffer, reply_key);
838 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTicketPart, buf, buf_size, et, &len, ret);
840 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
841 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode ticket: %s", msg);
842 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
843 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
847 krb5_abortx(context, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
849 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, skey, etype, &crypto);
851 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
852 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
853 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
857 ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
863 &rep->ticket.enc_part);
865 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
867 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
868 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encrypt data: %s", msg);
869 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
875 krb5_keyblock *strengthen_key = NULL;
876 KrbFastFinished finished;
878 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "FAST armor protection");
880 memset(&finished, 0, sizeof(finished));
881 krb5_data_zero(&data);
883 finished.timestamp = kdc_time;
885 finished.crealm = et->crealm;
886 finished.cname = et->cname;
888 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Ticket, data.data, data.length,
889 &rep->ticket, &len, ret);
892 if (data.length != len)
893 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
895 ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, armor_crypto,
896 KRB5_KU_FAST_FINISHED, 0,
897 data.data, data.length,
898 &finished.ticket_checksum);
899 krb5_data_free(&data);
903 ret = _kdc_fast_mk_response(context, armor_crypto,
904 rep->padata, strengthen_key, &finished,
906 free_Checksum(&finished.ticket_checksum);
911 free_METHOD_DATA(rep->padata);
913 rep->padata = calloc(1, sizeof(*(rep->padata)));
914 if (rep->padata == NULL) {
915 krb5_data_free(&data);
920 ret = krb5_padata_add(context, rep->padata,
922 data.data, data.length);
927 * Hide client name of privacy reasons
929 rep->crealm[0] = '\0';
930 free_PrincipalName(&rep->cname);
931 rep->cname.name_type = 0;
934 if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep && !config->encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep)
935 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncASRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
937 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTGSRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
939 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
940 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
941 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
944 if(buf_size != len) {
946 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
947 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
948 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
950 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, reply_key, 0, &crypto);
952 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
954 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
955 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
958 if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep) {
959 krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
961 KRB5_KU_AS_REP_ENC_PART,
967 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
969 krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
971 rk_is_subkey ? KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SUB_KEY : KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION,
977 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(TGS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
979 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
981 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
982 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
983 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
986 if(buf_size != len) {
988 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
989 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
990 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
993 reply->length = buf_size;
998 * Return 1 if the client have only older enctypes, this is for
999 * determining if the server should send ETYPE_INFO2 or not.
1003 older_enctype(krb5_enctype enctype)
1006 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
1007 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
1008 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
1009 case ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
1010 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5:
1011 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56:
1013 * The following three is "old" windows enctypes and is needed for
1014 * windows 2000 hosts.
1016 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_MD4:
1017 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD:
1018 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD_EXP:
1029 static krb5_error_code
1030 make_etype_info_entry(krb5_context context, ETYPE_INFO_ENTRY *ent, Key *key)
1032 ent->etype = key->key.keytype;
1035 ALLOC(ent->salttype);
1037 if(key->salt->type == hdb_pw_salt)
1038 *ent->salttype = 0; /* or 1? or NULL? */
1039 else if(key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt)
1042 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "unknown salt-type: %d",
1044 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1046 /* according to `the specs', we can't send a salt if
1047 we have AFS3 salted key, but that requires that you
1048 *know* what cell you are using (e.g by assuming
1049 that the cell is the same as the realm in lower
1052 ALLOC(ent->salttype);
1053 *ent->salttype = key->salt->type;
1056 * We shouldn't sent salttype since it is incompatible with the
1057 * specification and it breaks windows clients. The afs
1058 * salting problem is solved by using KRB5-PADATA-AFS3-SALT
1059 * implemented in Heimdal 0.7 and later.
1061 ent->salttype = NULL;
1063 krb5_copy_data(context, &key->salt->salt,
1066 /* we return no salt type at all, as that should indicate
1067 * the default salt type and make everybody happy. some
1068 * systems (like w2k) dislike being told the salt type
1071 ent->salttype = NULL;
1077 static krb5_error_code
1078 get_pa_etype_info(krb5_context context,
1079 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1080 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey)
1082 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
1089 pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
1093 ret = make_etype_info_entry(context, &pa.val[0], ckey);
1095 free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
1099 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
1100 free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
1103 ret = realloc_method_data(md);
1108 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO;
1109 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len;
1110 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf;
1118 extern int _krb5_AES_string_to_default_iterator;
1120 static krb5_error_code
1121 make_etype_info2_entry(ETYPE_INFO2_ENTRY *ent, Key *key)
1123 ent->etype = key->key.keytype;
1126 if (ent->salt == NULL)
1128 *ent->salt = malloc(key->salt->salt.length + 1);
1129 if (*ent->salt == NULL) {
1134 memcpy(*ent->salt, key->salt->salt.data, key->salt->salt.length);
1135 (*ent->salt)[key->salt->salt.length] = '\0';
1139 ent->s2kparams = NULL;
1141 switch (key->key.keytype) {
1142 case ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
1143 case ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
1144 ALLOC(ent->s2kparams);
1145 if (ent->s2kparams == NULL)
1147 ent->s2kparams->length = 4;
1148 ent->s2kparams->data = malloc(ent->s2kparams->length);
1149 if (ent->s2kparams->data == NULL) {
1150 free(ent->s2kparams);
1151 ent->s2kparams = NULL;
1154 _krb5_put_int(ent->s2kparams->data,
1155 _krb5_AES_string_to_default_iterator,
1156 ent->s2kparams->length);
1158 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
1159 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
1160 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
1161 /* Check if this was a AFS3 salted key */
1162 if(key->salt && key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt){
1163 ALLOC(ent->s2kparams);
1164 if (ent->s2kparams == NULL)
1166 ent->s2kparams->length = 1;
1167 ent->s2kparams->data = malloc(ent->s2kparams->length);
1168 if (ent->s2kparams->data == NULL) {
1169 free(ent->s2kparams);
1170 ent->s2kparams = NULL;
1173 _krb5_put_int(ent->s2kparams->data,
1175 ent->s2kparams->length);
1185 * Return an ETYPE-INFO2. Enctypes are storted the same way as in the
1186 * database (client supported enctypes first, then the unsupported
1190 static krb5_error_code
1191 get_pa_etype_info2(krb5_context context,
1192 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1193 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey)
1195 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
1201 pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
1205 ret = make_etype_info2_entry(&pa.val[0], ckey);
1207 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
1211 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO2, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
1212 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
1215 ret = realloc_method_data(md);
1220 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO2;
1221 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len;
1222 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf;
1231 log_as_req(krb5_context context,
1232 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1233 krb5_enctype cetype,
1234 krb5_enctype setype,
1235 const KDC_REQ_BODY *b)
1237 krb5_error_code ret;
1238 struct rk_strpool *p;
1242 p = rk_strpoolprintf(NULL, "%s", "Client supported enctypes: ");
1244 for (i = 0; i < b->etype.len; i++) {
1245 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, b->etype.val[i], &str);
1247 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%s", str);
1250 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", b->etype.val[i]);
1251 if (p && i + 1 < b->etype.len)
1252 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
1254 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "out of memory");
1259 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "no encryption types");
1265 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, cetype, &cet);
1267 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, setype, &set);
1269 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using %s/%s", cet, set);
1275 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using enctypes %d/%d",
1279 str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
1280 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s", str);
1285 unparse_flags(KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options), asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
1286 fixedstr, sizeof(fixedstr));
1288 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Requested flags: %s", fixedstr);
1293 * verify the flags on `client' and `server', returning 0
1294 * if they are OK and generating an error messages and returning
1295 * and error code otherwise.
1299 kdc_check_flags(krb5_context context,
1300 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1301 hdb_entry_ex *client_ex, const char *client_name,
1302 hdb_entry_ex *server_ex, const char *server_name,
1303 krb5_boolean is_as_req)
1305 if(client_ex != NULL) {
1306 hdb_entry *client = &client_ex->entry;
1309 if (client->flags.locked_out) {
1310 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1311 "Client (%s) is locked out", client_name);
1312 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1315 if (client->flags.invalid) {
1316 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1317 "Client (%s) has invalid bit set", client_name);
1318 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1321 if(!client->flags.client){
1322 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1323 "Principal may not act as client -- %s", client_name);
1324 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1327 if (client->valid_start && *client->valid_start > kdc_time) {
1328 char starttime_str[100];
1329 krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_start,
1330 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
1331 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1332 "Client not yet valid until %s -- %s",
1333 starttime_str, client_name);
1334 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
1337 if (client->valid_end && *client->valid_end < kdc_time) {
1338 char endtime_str[100];
1339 krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_end,
1340 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
1341 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1342 "Client expired at %s -- %s",
1343 endtime_str, client_name);
1344 return KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP;
1347 if (client->pw_end && *client->pw_end < kdc_time
1348 && (server_ex == NULL || !server_ex->entry.flags.change_pw)) {
1349 char pwend_str[100];
1350 krb5_format_time(context, *client->pw_end,
1351 pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
1352 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1353 "Client's key has expired at %s -- %s",
1354 pwend_str, client_name);
1355 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
1361 if (server_ex != NULL) {
1362 hdb_entry *server = &server_ex->entry;
1364 if (server->flags.locked_out) {
1365 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1366 "Client server locked out -- %s", server_name);
1367 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1369 if (server->flags.invalid) {
1370 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1371 "Server has invalid flag set -- %s", server_name);
1372 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1375 if(!server->flags.server){
1376 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1377 "Principal may not act as server -- %s", server_name);
1378 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1381 if(!is_as_req && server->flags.initial) {
1382 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1383 "AS-REQ is required for server -- %s", server_name);
1384 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1387 if (server->valid_start && *server->valid_start > kdc_time) {
1388 char starttime_str[100];
1389 krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_start,
1390 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
1391 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1392 "Server not yet valid until %s -- %s",
1393 starttime_str, server_name);
1394 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET;
1397 if (server->valid_end && *server->valid_end < kdc_time) {
1398 char endtime_str[100];
1399 krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_end,
1400 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
1401 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1402 "Server expired at %s -- %s",
1403 endtime_str, server_name);
1404 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP;
1407 if (server->pw_end && *server->pw_end < kdc_time) {
1408 char pwend_str[100];
1409 krb5_format_time(context, *server->pw_end,
1410 pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
1411 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1412 "Server's key has expired at -- %s",
1413 pwend_str, server_name);
1414 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
1421 * Return TRUE if `from' is part of `addresses' taking into consideration
1422 * the configuration variables that tells us how strict we should be about
1427 _kdc_check_addresses(krb5_context context,
1428 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1429 HostAddresses *addresses, const struct sockaddr *from)
1431 krb5_error_code ret;
1433 krb5_boolean result;
1434 krb5_boolean only_netbios = TRUE;
1437 if(config->check_ticket_addresses == 0)
1440 if(addresses == NULL)
1441 return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
1443 for (i = 0; i < addresses->len; ++i) {
1444 if (addresses->val[i].addr_type != KRB5_ADDRESS_NETBIOS) {
1445 only_netbios = FALSE;
1449 /* Windows sends it's netbios name, which I can only assume is
1450 * used for the 'allowed workstations' check. This is painful,
1451 * but we still want to check IP addresses if they happen to be
1456 return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
1458 ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (context, from, &addr);
1462 result = krb5_address_search(context, &addr, addresses);
1463 krb5_free_address (context, &addr);
1472 send_pac_p(krb5_context context, KDC_REQ *req)
1474 krb5_error_code ret;
1475 PA_PAC_REQUEST pacreq;
1479 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PA_PAC_REQUEST);
1483 ret = decode_PA_PAC_REQUEST(pa->padata_value.data,
1484 pa->padata_value.length,
1489 i = pacreq.include_pac;
1490 free_PA_PAC_REQUEST(&pacreq);
1497 _kdc_is_anonymous(krb5_context context, krb5_principal principal)
1499 if (principal->name.name_type != KRB5_NT_WELLKNOWN ||
1500 principal->name.name_string.len != 2 ||
1501 strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_WELLKNOWN_NAME) != 0 ||
1502 strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], KRB5_ANON_NAME) != 0)
1508 require_preauth_p(kdc_request_t r)
1510 return r->config->require_preauth
1511 || r->client->entry.flags.require_preauth
1512 || r->server->entry.flags.require_preauth;
1521 _kdc_as_rep(kdc_request_t r,
1524 struct sockaddr *from_addr,
1527 krb5_context context = r->context;
1528 krb5_kdc_configuration *config = r->config;
1529 KDC_REQ *req = &r->req;
1530 const krb5_data *req_buffer = &r->request;
1531 KDC_REQ_BODY *b = NULL;
1534 krb5_enctype setype;
1537 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
1541 METHOD_DATA error_method;
1543 memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
1544 memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et));
1545 memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek));
1546 error_method.len = 0;
1547 error_method.val = NULL;
1550 * Look for FAST armor and unwrap
1552 ret = _kdc_fast_unwrap_request(r);
1560 flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
1562 if(b->sname == NULL){
1563 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1564 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "No server in request");
1566 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
1571 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->server_princ, &r->server_name);
1574 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1575 "AS-REQ malformed server name from %s", from);
1578 if(b->cname == NULL){
1579 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1580 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "No client in request");
1582 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
1589 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->client_princ, &r->client_name);
1592 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1593 "AS-REQ malformed client name from %s", from);
1597 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s",
1598 r->client_name, from, r->server_name);
1604 if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context, r->client_princ)) {
1605 if (!b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
1606 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Anonymous ticket w/o anonymous flag");
1607 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1610 } else if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
1611 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1612 "Request for a anonymous ticket with non "
1613 "anonymous client name: %s", r->client_name);
1614 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1622 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, r->client_princ,
1623 HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags, NULL,
1624 &r->clientdb, &r->client);
1625 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1626 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "client %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy",
1630 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1631 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r->client_name, msg);
1632 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1633 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1636 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, r->server_princ,
1637 HDB_F_GET_SERVER|HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT | flags,
1638 NULL, NULL, &r->server);
1639 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1640 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy",
1644 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1645 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r->server_name, msg);
1646 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1647 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1651 memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et));
1652 memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek));
1655 * Select a session enctype from the list of the crypto system
1656 * supported enctypes that is supported by the client and is one of
1657 * the enctype of the enctype of the service (likely krbtgt).
1659 * The latter is used as a hint of what enctypes all KDC support,
1660 * to make sure a newer version of KDC won't generate a session
1661 * enctype that an older version of a KDC in the same realm can't
1665 ret = _kdc_find_etype(context, config->as_use_strongest_session_key, FALSE,
1666 client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, &sessionetype,
1669 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1670 "Client (%s) from %s has no common enctypes with KDC "
1671 "to use for the session key",
1677 * Pre-auth processing
1685 log_patypes(context, config, req->padata);
1687 /* Check if preauth matching */
1689 for (n = 0; !found_pa && n < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); n++) {
1690 if (pat[n].validate == NULL)
1692 if (r->armor_crypto == NULL && (pat[n].flags & PA_REQ_FAST))
1695 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1696 "Looking for %s pa-data -- %s", pat[n].name, r->client_name);
1698 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, pat[n].type);
1700 ret = pat[n].validate(r, pa);
1702 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1703 "%s pre-authentication succeeded -- %s",
1704 pat[n].name, r->client_name);
1706 et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
1712 if ((found_pa == 0 && require_preauth_p(r)) || b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
1715 for (n = 0; n < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); n++) {
1716 if ((pat[n].flags & PA_ANNOUNCE) == 0)
1718 ret = krb5_padata_add(context, &error_method,
1719 pat[n].type, NULL, 0);
1725 * If there is a client key, send ETYPE_INFO{,2}
1727 ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
1728 config->preauth_use_strongest_session_key, TRUE,
1729 client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, NULL, &ckey);
1734 * - If the client only knows about old enctypes, then send
1735 * both info replies (we send 'info' first in the list).
1736 * - If the client is 'modern', because it knows about 'new'
1737 * enctype types, then only send the 'info2' reply.
1739 * Before we send the full list of etype-info data, we pick
1740 * the client key we would have used anyway below, just pick
1744 if (older_enctype(ckey->key.keytype)) {
1745 ret = get_pa_etype_info(context, config,
1746 &error_method, ckey);
1750 ret = get_pa_etype_info2(context, config,
1751 &error_method, ckey);
1756 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
1757 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/PA-PK-AS-REQ");
1761 if (r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
1762 r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status(context, r->clientdb, r->client,
1766 * Verify flags after the user been required to prove its identity
1767 * with in a preauth mech.
1770 ret = _kdc_check_access(context, config, r->client, r->client_name,
1771 r->server, r->server_name,
1772 req, &error_method);
1777 * Selelct the best encryption type for the KDC with out regard to
1778 * the client since the client never needs to read that data.
1781 ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config,
1782 r->server, r->server_name,
1787 if(f.renew || f.validate || f.proxy || f.forwarded || f.enc_tkt_in_skey
1788 || (f.request_anonymous && !config->allow_anonymous)) {
1789 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1790 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Bad KDC options");
1799 rep.msg_type = krb_as_rep;
1801 ret = copy_Realm(&r->client->entry.principal->realm, &rep.crealm);
1804 ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname, r->client->entry.principal);
1808 rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
1809 copy_Realm(&r->server->entry.principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
1810 _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname,
1811 r->server->entry.principal);
1812 /* java 1.6 expects the name to be the same type, lets allow that
1813 * uncomplicated name-types. */
1814 #define CNT(sp,t) (((sp)->sname->name_type) == KRB5_NT_##t)
1815 if (CNT(b, UNKNOWN) || CNT(b, PRINCIPAL) || CNT(b, SRV_INST) || CNT(b, SRV_HST) || CNT(b, SRV_XHST))
1816 rep.ticket.sname.name_type = b->sname->name_type;
1819 et.flags.initial = 1;
1820 if(r->client->entry.flags.forwardable && r->server->entry.flags.forwardable)
1821 et.flags.forwardable = f.forwardable;
1822 else if (f.forwardable) {
1823 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be forwardable");
1824 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1827 if(r->client->entry.flags.proxiable && r->server->entry.flags.proxiable)
1828 et.flags.proxiable = f.proxiable;
1829 else if (f.proxiable) {
1830 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be proxiable");
1831 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1834 if(r->client->entry.flags.postdate && r->server->entry.flags.postdate)
1835 et.flags.may_postdate = f.allow_postdate;
1836 else if (f.allow_postdate){
1837 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be postdate");
1838 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1842 /* check for valid set of addresses */
1843 if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context, config, b->addresses, from_addr)) {
1844 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Bad address list in requested");
1845 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
1849 ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep.cname, &et.cname);
1852 ret = copy_Realm(&rep.crealm, &et.crealm);
1860 start = et.authtime = kdc_time;
1862 if(f.postdated && req->req_body.from){
1863 ALLOC(et.starttime);
1864 start = *et.starttime = *req->req_body.from;
1865 et.flags.invalid = 1;
1866 et.flags.postdated = 1; /* XXX ??? */
1868 _kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
1871 /* be careful not overflowing */
1873 if(r->client->entry.max_life)
1874 t = start + min(t - start, *r->client->entry.max_life);
1875 if(r->server->entry.max_life)
1876 t = start + min(t - start, *r->server->entry.max_life);
1878 t = min(t, start + realm->max_life);
1881 if(f.renewable_ok && et.endtime < *b->till){
1883 if(b->rtime == NULL){
1887 if(*b->rtime < *b->till)
1888 *b->rtime = *b->till;
1890 if(f.renewable && b->rtime){
1894 if(r->client->entry.max_renew)
1895 t = start + min(t - start, *r->client->entry.max_renew);
1896 if(r->server->entry.max_renew)
1897 t = start + min(t - start, *r->server->entry.max_renew);
1899 t = min(t, start + realm->max_renew);
1901 ALLOC(et.renew_till);
1903 et.flags.renewable = 1;
1907 if (f.request_anonymous)
1908 et.flags.anonymous = 1;
1912 copy_HostAddresses(b->addresses, et.caddr);
1915 et.transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
1916 krb5_data_zero(&et.transited.contents);
1918 /* The MIT ASN.1 library (obviously) doesn't tell lengths encoded
1919 * as 0 and as 0x80 (meaning indefinite length) apart, and is thus
1920 * incapable of correctly decoding SEQUENCE OF's of zero length.
1922 * To fix this, always send at least one no-op last_req
1924 * If there's a pw_end or valid_end we will use that,
1925 * otherwise just a dummy lr.
1927 ek.last_req.val = malloc(2 * sizeof(*ek.last_req.val));
1928 if (ek.last_req.val == NULL) {
1932 ek.last_req.len = 0;
1933 if (r->client->entry.pw_end
1934 && (config->kdc_warn_pwexpire == 0
1935 || kdc_time + config->kdc_warn_pwexpire >= *r->client->entry.pw_end)) {
1936 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_PW_EXPTIME;
1937 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *r->client->entry.pw_end;
1940 if (r->client->entry.valid_end) {
1941 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_ACCT_EXPTIME;
1942 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *r->client->entry.valid_end;
1945 if (ek.last_req.len == 0) {
1946 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_NONE;
1947 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = 0;
1950 ek.nonce = b->nonce;
1951 if (r->client->entry.valid_end || r->client->entry.pw_end) {
1952 ALLOC(ek.key_expiration);
1953 if (r->client->entry.valid_end) {
1954 if (r->client->entry.pw_end)
1955 *ek.key_expiration = min(*r->client->entry.valid_end,
1956 *r->client->entry.pw_end);
1958 *ek.key_expiration = *r->client->entry.valid_end;
1960 *ek.key_expiration = *r->client->entry.pw_end;
1962 ek.key_expiration = NULL;
1963 ek.flags = et.flags;
1964 ek.authtime = et.authtime;
1966 ALLOC(ek.starttime);
1967 *ek.starttime = *et.starttime;
1969 ek.endtime = et.endtime;
1970 if (et.renew_till) {
1971 ALLOC(ek.renew_till);
1972 *ek.renew_till = *et.renew_till;
1974 copy_Realm(&rep.ticket.realm, &ek.srealm);
1975 copy_PrincipalName(&rep.ticket.sname, &ek.sname);
1978 copy_HostAddresses(et.caddr, ek.caddr);
1982 * Check and session and reply keys
1985 if (r->session_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) {
1986 ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, r->sessionetype, &r->session_key);
1991 if (r->reply_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) {
1992 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Client have no reply key");
1993 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
1997 ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&r->session_key, &et.key);
2001 ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&r->session_key, &ek.key);
2006 * Add signing of alias referral
2009 if (f.canonicalize) {
2010 PA_ClientCanonicalized canon;
2013 krb5_crypto cryptox;
2016 memset(&canon, 0, sizeof(canon));
2018 canon.names.requested_name = *b->cname;
2019 canon.names.mapped_name = r->client->entry.principal->name;
2021 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ClientCanonicalizedNames, data.data, data.length,
2022 &canon.names, &len, ret);
2025 if (data.length != len)
2026 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
2028 /* sign using "returned session key" */
2029 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &et.key, 0, &cryptox);
2035 ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, cryptox,
2036 KRB5_KU_CANONICALIZED_NAMES, 0,
2037 data.data, data.length,
2038 &canon.canon_checksum);
2040 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, cryptox);
2044 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ClientCanonicalized, data.data, data.length,
2046 free_Checksum(&canon.canon_checksum);
2049 if (data.length != len)
2050 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
2052 pa.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_CLIENT_CANONICALIZED;
2053 pa.padata_value = data;
2054 ret = add_METHOD_DATA(&r->outpadata, &pa);
2060 if (r->outpadata.len) {
2063 if (rep.padata == NULL) {
2067 ret = copy_METHOD_DATA(&r->outpadata, rep.padata);
2073 if (send_pac_p(context, req)) {
2077 ret = _kdc_pac_generate(context, r->client, &p);
2079 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
2084 ret = _krb5_pac_sign(context, p, et.authtime,
2085 r->client->entry.principal,
2086 &skey->key, /* Server key */
2087 &skey->key, /* FIXME: should be krbtgt key */
2089 krb5_pac_free(context, p);
2091 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
2096 ret = _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(context, &et,
2097 KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC,
2099 krb5_data_free(&data);
2105 _kdc_log_timestamp(context, config, "AS-REQ", et.authtime, et.starttime,
2106 et.endtime, et.renew_till);
2108 /* do this as the last thing since this signs the EncTicketPart */
2109 ret = _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(context,
2113 r->client->entry.principal,
2120 log_as_req(context, config, r->reply_key.keytype, setype, b);
2126 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP);
2131 ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config, req_buffer,
2132 r->armor_crypto, req->req_body.nonce,
2133 &rep, &et, &ek, setype, r->server->entry.kvno,
2134 &skey->key, r->client->entry.kvno,
2135 &r->reply_key, 0, &r->e_text, reply);
2140 if (datagram_reply && reply->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) {
2141 krb5_data_free(reply);
2142 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG;
2143 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Reply packet too large");
2150 * In case of a non proxy error, build an error message.
2152 if(ret != 0 && ret != HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE){
2153 kdc_log(context, config, 10, "as-req: sending error: %d to client", ret);
2154 ret = _kdc_fast_mk_error(context,
2159 r->client_princ, r->server_princ,
2166 free_EncTicketPart(&et);
2167 free_EncKDCRepPart(&ek);
2169 if (error_method.len)
2170 free_METHOD_DATA(&error_method);
2171 if (r->outpadata.len)
2172 free_METHOD_DATA(&r->outpadata);
2173 if (r->client_princ) {
2174 krb5_free_principal(context, r->client_princ);
2175 r->client_princ = NULL;
2177 if (r->client_name) {
2178 free(r->client_name);
2179 r->client_name = NULL;
2181 if (r->server_princ){
2182 krb5_free_principal(context, r->server_princ);
2183 r->server_princ = NULL;
2185 if (r->server_name) {
2186 free(r->server_name);
2187 r->server_name = NULL;
2190 _kdc_free_ent(context, r->client);
2192 _kdc_free_ent(context, r->server);
2193 if (r->armor_crypto) {
2194 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, r->armor_crypto);
2195 r->armor_crypto = NULL;
2197 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
2198 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->session_key);
2203 * Add the AuthorizationData `data´ of `type´ to the last element in
2204 * the sequence of authorization_data in `tkt´ wrapped in an IF_RELEVANT
2208 _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(krb5_context context,
2211 const krb5_data *data)
2213 krb5_error_code ret;
2216 if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
2217 tkt->authorization_data = calloc(1, sizeof(*tkt->authorization_data));
2218 if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
2219 krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOMEM, "out of memory");
2224 /* add the entry to the last element */
2226 AuthorizationData ad = { 0, NULL };
2227 AuthorizationDataElement ade;
2230 ade.ad_data = *data;
2232 ret = add_AuthorizationData(&ad, &ade);
2234 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "add AuthorizationData failed");
2238 ade.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT;
2240 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthorizationData,
2241 ade.ad_data.data, ade.ad_data.length,
2243 free_AuthorizationData(&ad);
2245 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "ASN.1 encode of "
2246 "AuthorizationData failed");
2249 if (ade.ad_data.length != size)
2250 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
2252 ret = add_AuthorizationData(tkt->authorization_data, &ade);
2253 der_free_octet_string(&ade.ad_data);
2255 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "add AuthorizationData failed");