2 * Copyright (c) 1997-2007 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
3 * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
17 * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
18 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
19 * without specific prior written permission.
21 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
22 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
23 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
24 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
25 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
26 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
27 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
28 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
29 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
30 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
36 #define MAX_TIME ((time_t)((1U << 31) - 1))
39 _kdc_fix_time(time_t **t)
45 if(**t == 0) **t = MAX_TIME; /* fix for old clients */
49 realloc_method_data(METHOD_DATA *md)
52 pa = realloc(md->val, (md->len + 1) * sizeof(*md->val));
61 set_salt_padata(METHOD_DATA *md, Salt *salt)
64 realloc_method_data(md);
65 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = salt->type;
66 der_copy_octet_string(&salt->salt,
67 &md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value);
72 _kdc_find_padata(const KDC_REQ *req, int *start, int type)
74 if (req->padata == NULL)
77 while((size_t)*start < req->padata->len){
79 if(req->padata->val[*start - 1].padata_type == (unsigned)type)
80 return &req->padata->val[*start - 1];
86 * This is a hack to allow predefined weak services, like afs to
87 * still use weak types
91 _kdc_is_weak_exception(krb5_principal principal, krb5_enctype etype)
93 if (principal->name.name_string.len > 0 &&
94 strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "afs") == 0 &&
95 (etype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
96 || etype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4
97 || etype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5))
104 * Detect if `key' is the using the the precomputed `default_salt'.
108 is_default_salt_p(const krb5_salt *default_salt, const Key *key)
110 if (key->salt == NULL)
112 if (default_salt->salttype != key->salt->type)
114 if (krb5_data_cmp(&default_salt->saltvalue, &key->salt->salt))
121 is_anon_as_request_p(kdc_request_t r)
123 KDC_REQ_BODY *b = &r->req.req_body;
126 * Versions of Heimdal from 0.9rc1 through 1.50 use bit 14 instead
127 * of 16 for request_anonymous, as indicated in the anonymous draft
128 * prior to version 11. Bit 14 is assigned to S4U2Proxy, but S4U2Proxy
129 * requests are only sent to the TGS and, in any case, would have an
130 * additional ticket present.
132 return b->kdc_options.request_anonymous ||
133 (b->kdc_options.cname_in_addl_tkt && !b->additional_tickets);
137 * return the first appropriate key of `princ' in `ret_key'. Look for
138 * all the etypes in (`etypes', `len'), stopping as soon as we find
139 * one, but preferring one that has default salt.
143 _kdc_find_etype(krb5_context context, krb5_boolean use_strongest_session_key,
144 krb5_boolean is_preauth, hdb_entry_ex *princ,
145 krb5_principal request_princ, krb5_enctype *etypes, unsigned len,
146 krb5_enctype *ret_enctype, Key **ret_key,
147 krb5_boolean *ret_default_salt)
151 krb5_enctype enctype = (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL;
152 const krb5_enctype *p;
156 /* We'll want to avoid keys with v4 salted keys in the pre-auth case... */
157 ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context, request_princ, &def_salt);
161 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
163 if (use_strongest_session_key) {
166 * Pick the strongest key that the KDC, target service, and
167 * client all support, using the local cryptosystem enctype
168 * list in strongest-to-weakest order to drive the search.
170 * This is not what RFC4120 says to do, but it encourages
171 * adoption of stronger enctypes. This doesn't play well with
172 * clients that have multiple Kerberos client implementations
173 * available with different supported enctype lists.
176 /* drive the search with local supported enctypes list */
177 p = krb5_kerberos_enctypes(context);
179 p[i] != (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL && enctype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL;
181 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, p[i]) != 0 &&
182 !_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->entry.principal, p[i]))
185 /* check that the client supports it too */
186 for (k = 0; k < len && enctype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL; k++) {
188 if (p[i] != etypes[k])
191 /* check target princ support */
193 while (hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, NULL,
195 if (key->key.keyvalue.length == 0) {
196 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
201 if (is_preauth && ret_key != NULL &&
202 !is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
209 * Pick the first key from the client's enctype list that is
210 * supported by the cryptosystem and by the given principal.
212 * RFC4120 says we SHOULD pick the first _strong_ key from the
213 * client's list... not the first key... If the admin disallows
214 * weak enctypes in krb5.conf and selects this key selection
215 * algorithm, then we get exactly what RFC4120 says.
217 for(i = 0; ret != 0 && i < len; i++) {
219 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[i]) != 0 &&
220 !_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->entry.principal, etypes[i]))
225 hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, NULL,
226 etypes[i], &key) == 0) {
227 if (key->key.keyvalue.length == 0) {
228 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
233 if (is_preauth && ret_key != NULL &&
234 !is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
240 if (enctype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL) {
242 * if the service principal is one for which there is a known 1DES
243 * exception and no other enctype matches both the client request and
244 * the service key list, provide a DES-CBC-CRC key.
246 if (ret_key == NULL &&
247 _kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->entry.principal, ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC)) {
249 enctype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC;
251 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
256 if (ret_enctype != NULL)
257 *ret_enctype = enctype;
260 if (ret_default_salt != NULL)
261 *ret_default_salt = is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key);
264 krb5_free_salt (context, def_salt);
269 _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname (PrincipalName *pn)
271 pn->name_type = KRB5_NT_WELLKNOWN;
272 pn->name_string.len = 2;
273 pn->name_string.val = calloc(2, sizeof(*pn->name_string.val));
274 if (pn->name_string.val == NULL)
277 pn->name_string.val[0] = strdup(KRB5_WELLKNOWN_NAME);
278 if (pn->name_string.val[0] == NULL)
281 pn->name_string.val[1] = strdup(KRB5_ANON_NAME);
282 if (pn->name_string.val[1] == NULL)
288 free_PrincipalName(pn);
290 pn->name_type = KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN;
291 pn->name_string.len = 0;
292 pn->name_string.val = NULL;
298 _kdc_r_log(kdc_request_t r, int level, const char *fmt, ...)
303 s = kdc_log_msg_va(r->context, r->config, level, fmt, ap);
309 _kdc_set_e_text(kdc_request_t r, const char *e_text)
312 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0, "%s", e_text);
316 _kdc_log_timestamp(krb5_context context,
317 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
319 KerberosTime authtime, KerberosTime *starttime,
320 KerberosTime endtime, KerberosTime *renew_till)
322 char authtime_str[100], starttime_str[100],
323 endtime_str[100], renewtime_str[100];
325 krb5_format_time(context, authtime,
326 authtime_str, sizeof(authtime_str), TRUE);
328 krb5_format_time(context, *starttime,
329 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
331 strlcpy(starttime_str, "unset", sizeof(starttime_str));
332 krb5_format_time(context, endtime,
333 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
335 krb5_format_time(context, *renew_till,
336 renewtime_str, sizeof(renewtime_str), TRUE);
338 strlcpy(renewtime_str, "unset", sizeof(renewtime_str));
340 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
341 "%s authtime: %s starttime: %s endtime: %s renew till: %s",
342 type, authtime_str, starttime_str, endtime_str, renewtime_str);
351 static krb5_error_code
352 pa_pkinit_validate(kdc_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
354 pk_client_params *pkp = NULL;
355 char *client_cert = NULL;
358 ret = _kdc_pk_rd_padata(r->context, r->config, &r->req, pa, r->client, &pkp);
359 if (ret || pkp == NULL) {
360 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
361 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PKINIT PA-DATA -- %s",
366 ret = _kdc_pk_check_client(r->context,
373 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "PKINIT certificate not allowed to "
374 "impersonate principal");
378 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "PKINIT pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
379 r->client_name, client_cert);
382 ret = _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(r->context, r->config, pkp, r->client,
383 r->sessionetype, &r->req, &r->request,
384 &r->reply_key, &r->session_key, &r->outpadata);
386 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Failed to build PK-INIT reply");
390 ret = _kdc_add_initial_verified_cas(r->context, r->config,
395 _kdc_pk_free_client_param(r->context, pkp);
406 static krb5_error_code
407 make_pa_enc_challange(krb5_context context, METHOD_DATA *md,
414 EncryptedData encdata;
419 krb5_us_timeofday (context, &p.patimestamp, &usec);
423 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ENC_TS_ENC, buf, buf_size, &p, &len, ret);
427 krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
429 ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
431 KRB5_KU_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC,
440 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncryptedData, buf, buf_size, &encdata, &len, ret);
441 free_EncryptedData(&encdata);
445 krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
447 ret = krb5_padata_add(context, md, KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE, buf, len);
453 static krb5_error_code
454 pa_enc_chal_validate(kdc_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
456 krb5_data pepper1, pepper2, ts_data;
457 int invalidPassword = 0;
458 EncryptedData enc_data;
459 krb5_enctype aenctype;
465 heim_assert(r->armor_crypto != NULL, "ENC-CHAL called for non FAST");
467 if (is_anon_as_request_p(r)) {
468 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
469 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0, "ENC-CHALL doesn't support anon");
473 ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
474 pa->padata_value.length,
478 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
479 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
484 pepper1.data = "clientchallengearmor";
485 pepper1.length = strlen(pepper1.data);
486 pepper2.data = "challengelongterm";
487 pepper2.length = strlen(pepper2.data);
489 krb5_crypto_getenctype(r->context, r->armor_crypto, &aenctype);
491 for (i = 0; i < r->client->entry.keys.len; i++) {
492 krb5_crypto challangecrypto, longtermcrypto;
493 krb5_keyblock challangekey;
496 k = &r->client->entry.keys.val[i];
498 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &k->key, 0, &longtermcrypto);
502 ret = krb5_crypto_fx_cf2(r->context, r->armor_crypto, longtermcrypto,
503 &pepper1, &pepper2, aenctype,
505 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, longtermcrypto);
509 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &challangekey, 0,
514 ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData(r->context, challangecrypto,
515 KRB5_KU_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT,
519 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
520 krb5_error_code ret2;
525 ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, k->key.keytype, &str);
528 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decrypt ENC-CHAL -- %s "
529 "(enctype %s) error %s",
530 r->client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype", msg);
531 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
537 ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data,
541 krb5_data_free(&ts_data);
543 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challangecrypto);
544 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
545 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
550 if (labs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > r->context->max_skew) {
551 char client_time[100];
553 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challangecrypto);
555 krb5_format_time(r->context, p.patimestamp,
556 client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
558 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
559 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "Too large time skew, "
560 "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
562 (unsigned)labs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
563 r->context->max_skew,
566 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
570 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
572 ret = make_pa_enc_challange(r->context, &r->outpadata,
574 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challangecrypto);
578 set_salt_padata(&r->outpadata, k->salt);
579 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
580 ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &k->key, &r->reply_key);
587 if (r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
588 r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status(r->context, r->clientdb, r->client,
593 if (invalidPassword && r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status) {
594 r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status(r->context, r->clientdb, r->client,
595 HDB_AUTH_WRONG_PASSWORD);
596 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
599 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
604 static krb5_error_code
605 pa_enc_ts_validate(kdc_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
607 EncryptedData enc_data;
616 ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
617 pa->padata_value.length,
621 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
622 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
627 ret = hdb_enctype2key(r->context, &r->client->entry, NULL,
628 enc_data.etype, &pa_key);
631 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "No key matching entype");
632 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
633 if(krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, enc_data.etype, &estr))
637 "No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s",
638 enc_data.etype, r->client_name);
641 "No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s",
642 estr, r->client_name);
644 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
649 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &pa_key->key, 0, &crypto);
651 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
652 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
653 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
654 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
658 ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (r->context,
660 KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP,
663 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, crypto);
665 * Since the user might have several keys with the same
666 * enctype but with diffrent salting, we need to try all
667 * the keys with the same enctype.
670 krb5_error_code ret2;
671 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
673 ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context,
674 pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
677 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA -- %s "
678 "(enctype %s) error %s",
679 r->client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype", msg);
680 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
683 if(hdb_next_enctype2key(r->context, &r->client->entry, NULL,
684 enc_data.etype, &pa_key) == 0)
687 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
689 if (r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
690 r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status(r->context, r->clientdb, r->client,
691 HDB_AUTH_WRONG_PASSWORD);
693 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
696 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
697 ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data,
701 krb5_data_free(&ts_data);
703 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
704 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
708 if (labs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > r->context->max_skew) {
709 char client_time[100];
711 krb5_format_time(r->context, p.patimestamp,
712 client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
714 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
715 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "Too large time skew, "
716 "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
718 (unsigned)labs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
719 r->context->max_skew,
723 * The following is needed to make windows clients to
724 * retry using the timestamp in the error message, if
725 * there is a e_text, they become unhappy.
728 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
731 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
733 set_salt_padata(&r->outpadata, pa_key->salt);
735 ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &pa_key->key, &r->reply_key);
739 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
742 _kdc_r_log(r, 2, "ENC-TS Pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
743 r->client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype");
757 #define PA_ANNOUNCE 1
758 #define PA_REQ_FAST 2 /* only use inside fast */
759 krb5_error_code (*validate)(kdc_request_t, const PA_DATA *pa);
762 static const struct kdc_patypes pat[] = {
765 KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ, "PK-INIT(ietf)", PA_ANNOUNCE,
769 KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN, "PK-INIT(win2k)", PA_ANNOUNCE,
773 KRB5_PADATA_PKINIT_KX, "Anonymous PK-INIT", PA_ANNOUNCE,
777 { KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ, "PK-INIT(ietf)", 0, NULL },
778 { KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN, "PK-INIT(win2k)", 0, NULL },
779 { KRB5_PADATA_PKINIT_KX, "Anonymous PK-INIT", 0, NULL },
781 { KRB5_PADATA_PA_PK_OCSP_RESPONSE , "OCSP", 0, NULL },
783 KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP , "ENC-TS",
788 KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE , "ENC-CHAL",
789 PA_ANNOUNCE | PA_REQ_FAST,
792 { KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP , "REQ-ENC-PA-REP", 0, NULL },
793 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST, "FX-FAST", PA_ANNOUNCE, NULL },
794 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_ERROR, "FX-ERROR", 0, NULL },
795 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_COOKIE, "FX-COOKIE", 0, NULL }
799 log_patypes(krb5_context context,
800 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
803 struct rk_strpool *p = NULL;
807 for (n = 0; n < padata->len; n++) {
808 for (m = 0; m < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); m++) {
809 if (padata->val[n].padata_type == pat[m].type) {
810 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%s", pat[m].name);
814 if (m == sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]))
815 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", padata->val[n].padata_type);
816 if (p && n + 1 < padata->len)
817 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
819 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "out of memory");
824 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "none");
826 str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
827 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Client sent patypes: %s", str);
836 _kdc_encode_reply(krb5_context context,
837 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
838 krb5_crypto armor_crypto, uint32_t nonce,
839 KDC_REP *rep, EncTicketPart *et, EncKDCRepPart *ek,
841 int skvno, const EncryptionKey *skey,
842 int ckvno, const EncryptionKey *reply_key,
853 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTicketPart, buf, buf_size, et, &len, ret);
855 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
856 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode ticket: %s", msg);
857 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
861 krb5_abortx(context, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
863 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, skey, etype, &crypto);
865 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
866 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
867 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
872 ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
878 &rep->ticket.enc_part);
880 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
882 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
883 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encrypt data: %s", msg);
884 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
890 krb5_keyblock *strengthen_key = NULL;
891 KrbFastFinished finished;
893 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "FAST armor protection");
895 memset(&finished, 0, sizeof(finished));
896 krb5_data_zero(&data);
898 finished.timestamp = kdc_time;
900 finished.crealm = et->crealm;
901 finished.cname = et->cname;
903 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Ticket, data.data, data.length,
904 &rep->ticket, &len, ret);
907 if (data.length != len)
908 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
910 ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, armor_crypto,
911 KRB5_KU_FAST_FINISHED, 0,
912 data.data, data.length,
913 &finished.ticket_checksum);
914 krb5_data_free(&data);
918 ret = _kdc_fast_mk_response(context, armor_crypto,
919 rep->padata, strengthen_key, &finished,
921 free_Checksum(&finished.ticket_checksum);
926 free_METHOD_DATA(rep->padata);
928 rep->padata = calloc(1, sizeof(*(rep->padata)));
929 if (rep->padata == NULL) {
930 krb5_data_free(&data);
935 ret = krb5_padata_add(context, rep->padata,
937 data.data, data.length);
942 * Hide client name of privacy reasons
944 if (1 /* r->fast_options.hide_client_names */) {
945 rep->crealm[0] = '\0';
946 free_PrincipalName(&rep->cname);
947 rep->cname.name_type = 0;
951 if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep && !config->encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep)
952 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncASRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
954 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTGSRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
956 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
957 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
958 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
961 if(buf_size != len) {
963 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
964 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
965 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
967 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, reply_key, 0, &crypto);
969 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
971 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
972 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
975 if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep) {
976 krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
978 KRB5_KU_AS_REP_ENC_PART,
984 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
986 krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
988 rk_is_subkey ? KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SUB_KEY : KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION,
994 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(TGS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
996 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
998 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
999 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
1000 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1003 if(buf_size != len) {
1005 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
1006 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
1007 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1010 reply->length = buf_size;
1015 * Return 1 if the client have only older enctypes, this is for
1016 * determining if the server should send ETYPE_INFO2 or not.
1020 older_enctype(krb5_enctype enctype)
1023 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
1024 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
1025 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
1026 case ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
1027 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5:
1028 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56:
1030 * The following three is "old" windows enctypes and is needed for
1031 * windows 2000 hosts.
1033 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_MD4:
1034 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD:
1035 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD_EXP:
1046 static krb5_error_code
1047 make_etype_info_entry(krb5_context context,
1048 ETYPE_INFO_ENTRY *ent,
1050 krb5_boolean include_salt)
1052 ent->etype = key->key.keytype;
1053 if (key->salt && include_salt){
1055 ALLOC(ent->salttype);
1057 if(key->salt->type == hdb_pw_salt)
1058 *ent->salttype = 0; /* or 1? or NULL? */
1059 else if(key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt)
1062 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "unknown salt-type: %d",
1064 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1066 /* according to `the specs', we can't send a salt if
1067 we have AFS3 salted key, but that requires that you
1068 *know* what cell you are using (e.g by assuming
1069 that the cell is the same as the realm in lower
1072 ALLOC(ent->salttype);
1073 *ent->salttype = key->salt->type;
1076 * We shouldn't sent salttype since it is incompatible with the
1077 * specification and it breaks windows clients. The afs
1078 * salting problem is solved by using KRB5-PADATA-AFS3-SALT
1079 * implemented in Heimdal 0.7 and later.
1081 ent->salttype = NULL;
1083 krb5_copy_data(context, &key->salt->salt,
1086 /* we return no salt type at all, as that should indicate
1087 * the default salt type and make everybody happy. some
1088 * systems (like w2k) dislike being told the salt type
1091 ent->salttype = NULL;
1097 static krb5_error_code
1098 get_pa_etype_info(krb5_context context,
1099 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1100 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey,
1101 krb5_boolean include_salt)
1103 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
1110 pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
1114 ret = make_etype_info_entry(context, &pa.val[0], ckey, include_salt);
1116 free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
1120 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
1121 free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
1124 ret = realloc_method_data(md);
1129 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO;
1130 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len;
1131 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf;
1139 extern int _krb5_AES_SHA1_string_to_default_iterator;
1140 extern int _krb5_AES_SHA2_string_to_default_iterator;
1142 static krb5_error_code
1143 make_s2kparams(int value, size_t len, krb5_data **ps2kparams)
1145 krb5_data *s2kparams;
1146 krb5_error_code ret;
1149 if (s2kparams == NULL)
1151 ret = krb5_data_alloc(s2kparams, len);
1156 _krb5_put_int(s2kparams->data, value, len);
1157 *ps2kparams = s2kparams;
1161 static krb5_error_code
1162 make_etype_info2_entry(ETYPE_INFO2_ENTRY *ent,
1164 krb5_boolean include_salt)
1166 krb5_error_code ret;
1168 ent->etype = key->key.keytype;
1169 if (key->salt && include_salt) {
1171 if (ent->salt == NULL)
1173 *ent->salt = malloc(key->salt->salt.length + 1);
1174 if (*ent->salt == NULL) {
1179 memcpy(*ent->salt, key->salt->salt.data, key->salt->salt.length);
1180 (*ent->salt)[key->salt->salt.length] = '\0';
1184 ent->s2kparams = NULL;
1186 switch (key->key.keytype) {
1187 case ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
1188 case ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
1189 ret = make_s2kparams(_krb5_AES_SHA1_string_to_default_iterator,
1190 4, &ent->s2kparams);
1192 case KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128:
1193 case KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192:
1194 ret = make_s2kparams(_krb5_AES_SHA2_string_to_default_iterator,
1195 4, &ent->s2kparams);
1197 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
1198 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
1199 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
1200 /* Check if this was a AFS3 salted key */
1201 if(key->salt && key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt)
1202 ret = make_s2kparams(1, 1, &ent->s2kparams);
1214 * Return an ETYPE-INFO2. Enctypes are storted the same way as in the
1215 * database (client supported enctypes first, then the unsupported
1219 static krb5_error_code
1220 get_pa_etype_info2(krb5_context context,
1221 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1222 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey,
1223 krb5_boolean include_salt)
1225 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
1231 pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
1235 ret = make_etype_info2_entry(&pa.val[0], ckey, include_salt);
1237 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
1241 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO2, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
1242 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
1245 ret = realloc_method_data(md);
1250 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO2;
1251 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len;
1252 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf;
1257 newer_enctype_present(struct KDC_REQ_BODY_etype *etype_list)
1261 for (i = 0; i < etype_list->len; i++) {
1262 if (!older_enctype(etype_list->val[i]))
1268 static krb5_error_code
1269 get_pa_etype_info_both(krb5_context context,
1270 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1271 struct KDC_REQ_BODY_etype *etype_list,
1272 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey,
1273 krb5_boolean include_salt)
1275 krb5_error_code ret;
1279 * When the AS server is to include pre-authentication data in a
1280 * KRB-ERROR or in an AS-REP, it MUST use PA-ETYPE-INFO2, not
1281 * PA-ETYPE-INFO, if the etype field of the client's AS-REQ lists
1282 * at least one "newer" encryption type. Otherwise (when the etype
1283 * field of the client's AS-REQ does not list any "newer" encryption
1284 * types), it MUST send both PA-ETYPE-INFO2 and PA-ETYPE-INFO (both
1285 * with an entry for each enctype). A "newer" enctype is any enctype
1286 * first officially specified concurrently with or subsequent to the
1287 * issue of this RFC. The enctypes DES, 3DES, or RC4 and any defined
1288 * in [RFC1510] are not "newer" enctypes.
1290 * It goes on to state:
1291 * The preferred ordering of the "hint" pre-authentication data that
1292 * affect client key selection is: ETYPE-INFO2, followed by ETYPE-INFO,
1293 * followed by PW-SALT. As noted in Section 3.1.3, a KDC MUST NOT send
1294 * ETYPE-INFO or PW-SALT when the client's AS-REQ includes at least one
1298 ret = get_pa_etype_info2(context, config, md, ckey, include_salt);
1302 if (!newer_enctype_present(etype_list))
1303 ret = get_pa_etype_info(context, config, md, ckey, include_salt);
1313 log_as_req(krb5_context context,
1314 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1315 krb5_enctype cetype,
1316 krb5_enctype setype,
1317 const KDC_REQ_BODY *b)
1319 krb5_error_code ret;
1320 struct rk_strpool *p;
1324 p = rk_strpoolprintf(NULL, "%s", "Client supported enctypes: ");
1326 for (i = 0; i < b->etype.len; i++) {
1327 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, b->etype.val[i], &str);
1329 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%s", str);
1332 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", b->etype.val[i]);
1333 if (p && i + 1 < b->etype.len)
1334 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
1336 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "out of memory");
1341 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "no encryption types");
1347 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, cetype, &cet);
1349 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, setype, &set);
1351 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using %s/%s", cet, set);
1357 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using enctypes %d/%d",
1361 str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
1362 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s", str);
1367 unparse_flags(KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options), asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
1368 fixedstr, sizeof(fixedstr));
1370 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Requested flags: %s", fixedstr);
1375 * verify the flags on `client' and `server', returning 0
1376 * if they are OK and generating an error messages and returning
1377 * and error code otherwise.
1381 kdc_check_flags(krb5_context context,
1382 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1383 hdb_entry_ex *client_ex, const char *client_name,
1384 hdb_entry_ex *server_ex, const char *server_name,
1385 krb5_boolean is_as_req)
1387 if(client_ex != NULL) {
1388 hdb_entry *client = &client_ex->entry;
1391 if (client->flags.locked_out) {
1392 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1393 "Client (%s) is locked out", client_name);
1394 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1397 if (client->flags.invalid) {
1398 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1399 "Client (%s) has invalid bit set", client_name);
1400 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1403 if(!client->flags.client){
1404 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1405 "Principal may not act as client -- %s", client_name);
1406 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1409 if (client->valid_start && *client->valid_start > kdc_time) {
1410 char starttime_str[100];
1411 krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_start,
1412 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
1413 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1414 "Client not yet valid until %s -- %s",
1415 starttime_str, client_name);
1416 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
1419 if (client->valid_end && *client->valid_end < kdc_time) {
1420 char endtime_str[100];
1421 krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_end,
1422 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
1423 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1424 "Client expired at %s -- %s",
1425 endtime_str, client_name);
1426 return KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP;
1429 if (client->flags.require_pwchange &&
1430 (server_ex == NULL || !server_ex->entry.flags.change_pw)) {
1431 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1432 "Client's key must be changed -- %s", client_name);
1433 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
1436 if (client->pw_end && *client->pw_end < kdc_time
1437 && (server_ex == NULL || !server_ex->entry.flags.change_pw)) {
1438 char pwend_str[100];
1439 krb5_format_time(context, *client->pw_end,
1440 pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
1441 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1442 "Client's key has expired at %s -- %s",
1443 pwend_str, client_name);
1444 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
1450 if (server_ex != NULL) {
1451 hdb_entry *server = &server_ex->entry;
1453 if (server->flags.locked_out) {
1454 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1455 "Client server locked out -- %s", server_name);
1456 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1458 if (server->flags.invalid) {
1459 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1460 "Server has invalid flag set -- %s", server_name);
1461 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1464 if(!server->flags.server){
1465 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1466 "Principal may not act as server -- %s", server_name);
1467 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1470 if(!is_as_req && server->flags.initial) {
1471 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1472 "AS-REQ is required for server -- %s", server_name);
1473 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1476 if (server->valid_start && *server->valid_start > kdc_time) {
1477 char starttime_str[100];
1478 krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_start,
1479 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
1480 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1481 "Server not yet valid until %s -- %s",
1482 starttime_str, server_name);
1483 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET;
1486 if (server->valid_end && *server->valid_end < kdc_time) {
1487 char endtime_str[100];
1488 krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_end,
1489 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
1490 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1491 "Server expired at %s -- %s",
1492 endtime_str, server_name);
1493 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP;
1496 if (server->pw_end && *server->pw_end < kdc_time) {
1497 char pwend_str[100];
1498 krb5_format_time(context, *server->pw_end,
1499 pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
1500 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1501 "Server's key has expired at -- %s",
1502 pwend_str, server_name);
1503 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
1510 * Return TRUE if `from' is part of `addresses' taking into consideration
1511 * the configuration variables that tells us how strict we should be about
1516 _kdc_check_addresses(krb5_context context,
1517 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1518 HostAddresses *addresses, const struct sockaddr *from)
1520 krb5_error_code ret;
1522 krb5_boolean result;
1523 krb5_boolean only_netbios = TRUE;
1526 if(config->check_ticket_addresses == 0)
1529 if(addresses == NULL)
1530 return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
1532 for (i = 0; i < addresses->len; ++i) {
1533 if (addresses->val[i].addr_type != KRB5_ADDRESS_NETBIOS) {
1534 only_netbios = FALSE;
1538 /* Windows sends it's netbios name, which I can only assume is
1539 * used for the 'allowed workstations' check. This is painful,
1540 * but we still want to check IP addresses if they happen to be
1545 return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
1547 ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (context, from, &addr);
1551 result = krb5_address_search(context, &addr, addresses);
1552 krb5_free_address (context, &addr);
1560 _kdc_check_anon_policy (krb5_context context,
1561 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1562 hdb_entry_ex *client,
1563 hdb_entry_ex *server)
1565 if (!config->allow_anonymous){
1566 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1567 "Request for anonymous ticket denied by local policy");
1568 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1579 send_pac_p(krb5_context context, KDC_REQ *req)
1581 krb5_error_code ret;
1582 PA_PAC_REQUEST pacreq;
1586 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PA_PAC_REQUEST);
1590 ret = decode_PA_PAC_REQUEST(pa->padata_value.data,
1591 pa->padata_value.length,
1596 i = pacreq.include_pac;
1597 free_PA_PAC_REQUEST(&pacreq);
1607 static krb5_error_code
1608 generate_pac(kdc_request_t r, Key *skey)
1610 krb5_error_code ret;
1614 ret = _kdc_pac_generate(r->context, r->client, &p);
1616 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
1623 ret = _krb5_pac_sign(r->context, p, r->et.authtime,
1624 r->client->entry.principal,
1625 &skey->key, /* Server key */
1626 &skey->key, /* FIXME: should be krbtgt key */
1628 krb5_pac_free(r->context, p);
1630 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
1635 ret = _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(r->context, &r->et,
1636 KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC,
1638 krb5_data_free(&data);
1648 _kdc_is_anonymous(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal principal)
1650 return krb5_principal_is_anonymous(context, principal, KRB5_ANON_MATCH_ANY);
1654 require_preauth_p(kdc_request_t r)
1656 return r->config->require_preauth
1657 || r->client->entry.flags.require_preauth
1658 || r->server->entry.flags.require_preauth;
1666 static krb5_error_code
1667 add_enc_pa_rep(kdc_request_t r)
1669 krb5_error_code ret;
1675 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &r->reply_key, 0, &crypto);
1679 ret = krb5_create_checksum(r->context, crypto,
1681 r->request.data, r->request.length,
1683 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, crypto);
1687 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Checksum, cdata.data, cdata.length,
1688 &checksum, &len, ret);
1689 free_Checksum(&checksum);
1692 heim_assert(cdata.length == len, "ASN.1 internal error");
1694 if (r->ek.encrypted_pa_data == NULL) {
1695 ALLOC(r->ek.encrypted_pa_data);
1696 if (r->ek.encrypted_pa_data == NULL)
1699 ret = krb5_padata_add(r->context, r->ek.encrypted_pa_data,
1700 KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP, cdata.data, cdata.length);
1704 return krb5_padata_add(r->context, r->ek.encrypted_pa_data,
1705 KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST, NULL, 0);
1713 _kdc_as_rep(kdc_request_t r,
1716 struct sockaddr *from_addr,
1719 krb5_context context = r->context;
1720 krb5_kdc_configuration *config = r->config;
1721 KDC_REQ *req = &r->req;
1722 KDC_REQ_BODY *b = NULL;
1725 krb5_enctype setype;
1726 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
1729 int i, flags = HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ;
1730 METHOD_DATA error_method;
1732 krb5_boolean is_tgs;
1734 memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
1735 error_method.len = 0;
1736 error_method.val = NULL;
1739 * Look for FAST armor and unwrap
1741 ret = _kdc_fast_unwrap_request(r);
1743 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "FAST unwrap request from %s failed: %d", from, ret);
1751 flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
1753 if(b->sname == NULL){
1754 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1755 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "No server in request");
1757 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
1762 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->server_princ, &r->server_name);
1765 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1766 "AS-REQ malformed server name from %s", from);
1769 if(b->cname == NULL){
1770 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1771 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "No client in request");
1773 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
1780 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->client_princ, &r->client_name);
1783 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1784 "AS-REQ malformed client name from %s", from);
1788 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s",
1789 r->client_name, from, r->server_name);
1791 is_tgs = krb5_principal_is_krbtgt(context, r->server_princ);
1797 if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context, r->client_princ) &&
1798 !is_anon_as_request_p(r)) {
1799 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Anonymous client w/o anonymous flag");
1800 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1808 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, r->client_princ,
1809 HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags, NULL,
1810 &r->clientdb, &r->client);
1811 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1812 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "client %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy",
1815 } else if (ret == HDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM) {
1816 char *fixed_client_name = NULL;
1818 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->client->entry.principal,
1819 &fixed_client_name);
1824 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "WRONG_REALM - %s -> %s",
1825 r->client_name, fixed_client_name);
1826 free(fixed_client_name);
1828 ret = _kdc_fast_mk_error(context, r,
1832 KRB5_KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM,
1836 &r->client->entry.principal->realm,
1841 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1842 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r->client_name, msg);
1843 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1844 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1847 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, r->server_princ,
1848 HDB_F_GET_SERVER | flags | (is_tgs ? HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT : 0),
1849 NULL, NULL, &r->server);
1850 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1851 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy",
1855 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1856 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r->server_name, msg);
1857 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1858 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1863 * Select a session enctype from the list of the crypto system
1864 * supported enctypes that is supported by the client and is one of
1865 * the enctype of the enctype of the service (likely krbtgt).
1867 * The latter is used as a hint of what enctypes all KDC support,
1868 * to make sure a newer version of KDC won't generate a session
1869 * enctype that an older version of a KDC in the same realm can't
1873 ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
1874 is_tgs ? config->tgt_use_strongest_session_key
1875 : config->svc_use_strongest_session_key,
1876 FALSE, r->client, r->client_princ,
1877 b->etype.val, b->etype.len,
1878 &r->sessionetype, NULL, NULL);
1880 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1881 "Client (%s) from %s has no common enctypes with KDC "
1882 "to use for the session key",
1883 r->client_name, from);
1888 * Pre-auth processing
1894 log_patypes(context, config, req->padata);
1896 /* Check if preauth matching */
1898 for (n = 0; !found_pa && n < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); n++) {
1899 if (pat[n].validate == NULL)
1901 if (r->armor_crypto == NULL && (pat[n].flags & PA_REQ_FAST))
1904 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1905 "Looking for %s pa-data -- %s", pat[n].name, r->client_name);
1907 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, pat[n].type);
1909 ret = pat[n].validate(r, pa);
1911 krb5_error_code ret2;
1913 krb5_boolean default_salt;
1916 * If there is a client key, send ETYPE_INFO{,2}
1918 ret2 = _kdc_find_etype(context,
1919 config->preauth_use_strongest_session_key,
1920 TRUE, r->client, r->client_princ, b->etype.val,
1921 b->etype.len, NULL, &ckey, &default_salt);
1923 ret2 = get_pa_etype_info_both(context, config, &b->etype,
1924 &error_method, ckey, !default_salt);
1930 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1931 "%s pre-authentication succeeded -- %s",
1932 pat[n].name, r->client_name);
1934 r->et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
1939 if (found_pa == 0) {
1942 krb5_boolean default_salt;
1944 for (n = 0; n < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); n++) {
1945 if ((pat[n].flags & PA_ANNOUNCE) == 0)
1947 ret = krb5_padata_add(context, &error_method,
1948 pat[n].type, NULL, 0);
1954 * If there is a client key, send ETYPE_INFO{,2}
1956 ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
1957 config->preauth_use_strongest_session_key, TRUE,
1958 r->client, r->client_princ,
1959 b->etype.val, b->etype.len, NULL,
1960 &ckey, &default_salt);
1962 ret = get_pa_etype_info_both(context, config, &b->etype,
1963 &error_method, ckey, !default_salt);
1969 * send requre preauth is its required or anon is requested,
1970 * anon is today only allowed via preauth mechanisms.
1972 if (require_preauth_p(r) || is_anon_as_request_p(r)) {
1973 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
1974 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/PA-PK-AS-REQ");
1979 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
1980 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Doesn't have a client key available");
1983 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
1984 ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &ckey->key, &r->reply_key);
1989 if (r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status) {
1990 r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status(context, r->clientdb, r->client,
1995 * Verify flags after the user been required to prove its identity
1996 * with in a preauth mech.
1999 ret = _kdc_check_access(context, config, r->client, r->client_name,
2000 r->server, r->server_name,
2001 req, &error_method);
2005 if (is_anon_as_request_p(r)) {
2006 ret = _kdc_check_anon_policy(context, config, r->client, r->server);
2008 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Anonymous ticket requests are disabled");
2012 r->et.flags.anonymous = 1;
2016 * Select the best encryption type for the KDC with out regard to
2017 * the client since the client never needs to read that data.
2020 ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config,
2021 r->server, r->server_name,
2026 if(f.renew || f.validate || f.proxy || f.forwarded || f.enc_tkt_in_skey) {
2027 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
2028 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Bad KDC options");
2037 rep.msg_type = krb_as_rep;
2039 if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context, r->client_princ)) {
2040 Realm anon_realm = KRB5_ANON_REALM;
2041 ret = copy_Realm(&anon_realm, &rep.crealm);
2042 } else if (f.canonicalize || r->client->entry.flags.force_canonicalize)
2043 ret = copy_Realm(&r->client->entry.principal->realm, &rep.crealm);
2045 ret = copy_Realm(&r->client_princ->realm, &rep.crealm);
2048 if (r->et.flags.anonymous)
2049 ret = _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname(&rep.cname);
2050 else if (f.canonicalize || r->client->entry.flags.force_canonicalize)
2051 ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname, r->client->entry.principal);
2053 ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname, r->client_princ);
2057 rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
2058 if (f.canonicalize || r->server->entry.flags.force_canonicalize)
2059 ret = copy_Realm(&r->server->entry.principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
2061 ret = copy_Realm(&r->server_princ->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
2064 if (f.canonicalize || r->server->entry.flags.force_canonicalize)
2065 _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname,
2066 r->server->entry.principal);
2068 _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname,
2070 /* java 1.6 expects the name to be the same type, lets allow that
2071 * uncomplicated name-types. */
2072 #define CNT(sp,t) (((sp)->sname->name_type) == KRB5_NT_##t)
2073 if (CNT(b, UNKNOWN) || CNT(b, PRINCIPAL) || CNT(b, SRV_INST) || CNT(b, SRV_HST) || CNT(b, SRV_XHST))
2074 rep.ticket.sname.name_type = b->sname->name_type;
2077 r->et.flags.initial = 1;
2078 if(r->client->entry.flags.forwardable && r->server->entry.flags.forwardable)
2079 r->et.flags.forwardable = f.forwardable;
2080 if(r->client->entry.flags.proxiable && r->server->entry.flags.proxiable)
2081 r->et.flags.proxiable = f.proxiable;
2082 else if (f.proxiable) {
2083 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be proxiable");
2084 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
2087 if(r->client->entry.flags.postdate && r->server->entry.flags.postdate)
2088 r->et.flags.may_postdate = f.allow_postdate;
2089 else if (f.allow_postdate){
2090 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be postdate");
2091 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
2095 /* check for valid set of addresses */
2096 if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context, config, b->addresses, from_addr)) {
2097 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Bad address list in requested");
2098 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
2102 ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep.cname, &r->et.cname);
2105 ret = copy_Realm(&rep.crealm, &r->et.crealm);
2113 start = r->et.authtime = kdc_time;
2115 if(f.postdated && req->req_body.from){
2116 ALLOC(r->et.starttime);
2117 start = *r->et.starttime = *req->req_body.from;
2118 r->et.flags.invalid = 1;
2119 r->et.flags.postdated = 1; /* XXX ??? */
2121 _kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
2124 /* be careful not overflowing */
2126 if(r->client->entry.max_life)
2127 t = start + min(t - start, *r->client->entry.max_life);
2128 if(r->server->entry.max_life)
2129 t = start + min(t - start, *r->server->entry.max_life);
2131 t = min(t, start + realm->max_life);
2134 if(f.renewable_ok && r->et.endtime < *b->till){
2136 if(b->rtime == NULL){
2140 if(*b->rtime < *b->till)
2141 *b->rtime = *b->till;
2143 if(f.renewable && b->rtime){
2147 if(r->client->entry.max_renew)
2148 t = start + min(t - start, *r->client->entry.max_renew);
2149 if(r->server->entry.max_renew)
2150 t = start + min(t - start, *r->server->entry.max_renew);
2152 t = min(t, start + realm->max_renew);
2154 ALLOC(r->et.renew_till);
2155 *r->et.renew_till = t;
2156 r->et.flags.renewable = 1;
2162 copy_HostAddresses(b->addresses, r->et.caddr);
2165 r->et.transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
2166 krb5_data_zero(&r->et.transited.contents);
2168 /* The MIT ASN.1 library (obviously) doesn't tell lengths encoded
2169 * as 0 and as 0x80 (meaning indefinite length) apart, and is thus
2170 * incapable of correctly decoding SEQUENCE OF's of zero length.
2172 * To fix this, always send at least one no-op last_req
2174 * If there's a pw_end or valid_end we will use that,
2175 * otherwise just a dummy lr.
2177 r->ek.last_req.val = malloc(2 * sizeof(*r->ek.last_req.val));
2178 if (r->ek.last_req.val == NULL) {
2182 r->ek.last_req.len = 0;
2183 if (r->client->entry.pw_end
2184 && (config->kdc_warn_pwexpire == 0
2185 || kdc_time + config->kdc_warn_pwexpire >= *r->client->entry.pw_end)) {
2186 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_PW_EXPTIME;
2187 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *r->client->entry.pw_end;
2188 ++r->ek.last_req.len;
2190 if (r->client->entry.valid_end) {
2191 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_ACCT_EXPTIME;
2192 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *r->client->entry.valid_end;
2193 ++r->ek.last_req.len;
2195 if (r->ek.last_req.len == 0) {
2196 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_NONE;
2197 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = 0;
2198 ++r->ek.last_req.len;
2200 r->ek.nonce = b->nonce;
2201 if (r->client->entry.valid_end || r->client->entry.pw_end) {
2202 ALLOC(r->ek.key_expiration);
2203 if (r->client->entry.valid_end) {
2204 if (r->client->entry.pw_end)
2205 *r->ek.key_expiration = min(*r->client->entry.valid_end,
2206 *r->client->entry.pw_end);
2208 *r->ek.key_expiration = *r->client->entry.valid_end;
2210 *r->ek.key_expiration = *r->client->entry.pw_end;
2212 r->ek.key_expiration = NULL;
2213 r->ek.flags = r->et.flags;
2214 r->ek.authtime = r->et.authtime;
2215 if (r->et.starttime) {
2216 ALLOC(r->ek.starttime);
2217 *r->ek.starttime = *r->et.starttime;
2219 r->ek.endtime = r->et.endtime;
2220 if (r->et.renew_till) {
2221 ALLOC(r->ek.renew_till);
2222 *r->ek.renew_till = *r->et.renew_till;
2224 ret = copy_Realm(&rep.ticket.realm, &r->ek.srealm);
2227 ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep.ticket.sname, &r->ek.sname);
2232 copy_HostAddresses(r->et.caddr, r->ek.caddr);
2236 * Check and session and reply keys
2239 if (r->session_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) {
2240 ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, r->sessionetype, &r->session_key);
2245 if (r->reply_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) {
2246 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Client have no reply key");
2247 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
2251 ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&r->session_key, &r->et.key);
2255 ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&r->session_key, &r->ek.key);
2259 if (r->outpadata.len) {
2262 if (rep.padata == NULL) {
2266 ret = copy_METHOD_DATA(&r->outpadata, rep.padata);
2272 if (send_pac_p(context, req) && !r->et.flags.anonymous) {
2273 generate_pac(r, skey);
2276 _kdc_log_timestamp(context, config, "AS-REQ", r->et.authtime, r->et.starttime,
2277 r->et.endtime, r->et.renew_till);
2280 krb5_principal client_principal;
2282 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context, &client_principal,
2283 rep.cname, rep.crealm);
2287 /* do this as the last thing since this signs the EncTicketPart */
2288 ret = _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(context,
2296 krb5_free_principal(context, client_principal);
2301 log_as_req(context, config, r->reply_key.keytype, setype, b);
2304 * We always say we support FAST/enc-pa-rep
2307 r->et.flags.enc_pa_rep = r->ek.flags.enc_pa_rep = 1;
2310 * Add REQ_ENC_PA_REP if client supports it
2314 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP);
2317 ret = add_enc_pa_rep(r);
2319 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
2320 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "add_enc_pa_rep failed: %s: %d", msg, ret);
2321 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
2330 ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config,
2331 r->armor_crypto, req->req_body.nonce,
2332 &rep, &r->et, &r->ek, setype, r->server->entry.kvno,
2333 &skey->key, r->client->entry.kvno,
2334 &r->reply_key, 0, &r->e_text, reply);
2339 * Check if message too large
2341 if (datagram_reply && reply->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) {
2342 krb5_data_free(reply);
2343 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG;
2344 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Reply packet too large");
2351 * In case of a non proxy error, build an error message.
2353 if (ret != 0 && ret != HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE && reply->length == 0) {
2354 ret = _kdc_fast_mk_error(context, r,
2361 &r->client_princ->name : NULL,
2363 &r->client_princ->realm : NULL,
2370 free_EncTicketPart(&r->et);
2371 free_EncKDCRepPart(&r->ek);
2372 free_KDCFastState(&r->fast);
2374 if (error_method.len)
2375 free_METHOD_DATA(&error_method);
2376 if (r->outpadata.len)
2377 free_METHOD_DATA(&r->outpadata);
2378 if (r->client_princ) {
2379 krb5_free_principal(context, r->client_princ);
2380 r->client_princ = NULL;
2382 if (r->client_name) {
2383 free(r->client_name);
2384 r->client_name = NULL;
2386 if (r->server_princ){
2387 krb5_free_principal(context, r->server_princ);
2388 r->server_princ = NULL;
2390 if (r->server_name) {
2391 free(r->server_name);
2392 r->server_name = NULL;
2395 _kdc_free_ent(context, r->client);
2397 _kdc_free_ent(context, r->server);
2398 if (r->armor_crypto) {
2399 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, r->armor_crypto);
2400 r->armor_crypto = NULL;
2402 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
2403 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->session_key);
2408 * Add the AuthorizationData `data´ of `type´ to the last element in
2409 * the sequence of authorization_data in `tkt´ wrapped in an IF_RELEVANT
2413 _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(krb5_context context,
2416 const krb5_data *data)
2418 krb5_error_code ret;
2421 if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
2422 tkt->authorization_data = calloc(1, sizeof(*tkt->authorization_data));
2423 if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
2424 krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOMEM, "out of memory");
2429 /* add the entry to the last element */
2431 AuthorizationData ad = { 0, NULL };
2432 AuthorizationDataElement ade;
2435 ade.ad_data = *data;
2437 ret = add_AuthorizationData(&ad, &ade);
2439 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "add AuthorizationData failed");
2443 ade.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT;
2445 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthorizationData,
2446 ade.ad_data.data, ade.ad_data.length,
2448 free_AuthorizationData(&ad);
2450 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "ASN.1 encode of "
2451 "AuthorizationData failed");
2454 if (ade.ad_data.length != size)
2455 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
2457 ret = add_AuthorizationData(tkt->authorization_data, &ade);
2458 der_free_octet_string(&ade.ad_data);
2460 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "add AuthorizationData failed");