2 * Copyright (c) 1997-2007 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
3 * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
17 * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
18 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
19 * without specific prior written permission.
21 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
22 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
23 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
24 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
25 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
26 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
27 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
28 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
29 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
30 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
36 #define MAX_TIME ((time_t)((1U << 31) - 1))
39 _kdc_fix_time(time_t **t)
45 if(**t == 0) **t = MAX_TIME; /* fix for old clients */
49 realloc_method_data(METHOD_DATA *md)
52 pa = realloc(md->val, (md->len + 1) * sizeof(*md->val));
61 set_salt_padata(METHOD_DATA *md, Salt *salt)
64 realloc_method_data(md);
65 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = salt->type;
66 der_copy_octet_string(&salt->salt,
67 &md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value);
72 _kdc_find_padata(const KDC_REQ *req, int *start, int type)
74 if (req->padata == NULL)
77 while((size_t)*start < req->padata->len){
79 if(req->padata->val[*start - 1].padata_type == (unsigned)type)
80 return &req->padata->val[*start - 1];
86 * This is a hack to allow predefined weak services, like afs to
87 * still use weak types
91 _kdc_is_weak_exception(krb5_principal principal, krb5_enctype etype)
93 if (principal->name.name_string.len > 0 &&
94 strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "afs") == 0 &&
95 (etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
96 || etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4
97 || etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5))
104 * Detect if `key' is the using the the precomputed `default_salt'.
108 is_default_salt_p(const krb5_salt *default_salt, const Key *key)
110 if (key->salt == NULL)
112 if (default_salt->salttype != key->salt->type)
114 if (krb5_data_cmp(&default_salt->saltvalue, &key->salt->salt))
120 * return the first appropriate key of `princ' in `ret_key'. Look for
121 * all the etypes in (`etypes', `len'), stopping as soon as we find
122 * one, but preferring one that has default salt
126 _kdc_find_etype(krb5_context context, krb5_boolean use_strongest_session_key,
127 krb5_boolean is_preauth, hdb_entry_ex *princ,
128 krb5_enctype *etypes, unsigned len,
129 krb5_enctype *ret_enctype, Key **ret_key)
133 krb5_enctype enctype = ETYPE_NULL;
137 /* We'll want to avoid keys with v4 salted keys in the pre-auth case... */
138 ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context, princ->entry.principal, &def_salt);
142 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
144 if (use_strongest_session_key) {
145 const krb5_enctype *p;
146 krb5_enctype clientbest = ETYPE_NULL;
150 * Pick the strongest key that the KDC, target service, and
151 * client all support, using the local cryptosystem enctype
152 * list in strongest-to-weakest order to drive the search.
154 * This is not what RFC4120 says to do, but it encourages
155 * adoption of stronger enctypes. This doesn't play well with
156 * clients that have multiple Kerberos client implementations
157 * available with different supported enctype lists.
160 /* drive the search with local supported enctypes list */
161 p = krb5_kerberos_enctypes(context);
162 for (i = 0; p[i] != ETYPE_NULL && enctype == ETYPE_NULL; i++) {
163 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, p[i]) != 0)
166 /* check that the client supports it too */
167 for (j = 0; j < len && enctype == ETYPE_NULL; j++) {
168 if (p[i] != etypes[j])
170 /* save best of union of { client, crypto system } */
171 if (clientbest == ETYPE_NULL)
173 /* check target princ support */
174 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, p[i], &key);
177 if (is_preauth && !is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
182 if (clientbest != ETYPE_NULL && enctype == ETYPE_NULL)
183 enctype = clientbest;
184 else if (enctype == ETYPE_NULL)
185 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
186 if (ret == 0 && ret_enctype != NULL)
187 *ret_enctype = enctype;
188 if (ret == 0 && ret_key != NULL)
192 * Pick the first key from the client's enctype list that is
193 * supported by the cryptosystem and by the given principal.
195 * RFC4120 says we SHOULD pick the first _strong_ key from the
196 * client's list... not the first key... If the admin disallows
197 * weak enctypes in krb5.conf and selects this key selection
198 * algorithm, then we get exactly what RFC4120 says.
200 for(key = NULL, i = 0; ret != 0 && i < len; i++, key = NULL) {
202 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[i]) != 0 &&
203 !_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->entry.principal, etypes[i]))
206 while (hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, etypes[i], &key) == 0) {
207 if (key->key.keyvalue.length == 0) {
208 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
213 if (ret_enctype != NULL)
214 *ret_enctype = etypes[i];
216 if (is_preauth && is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
223 krb5_free_salt (context, def_salt);
228 _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname (PrincipalName *pn)
230 pn->name_type = KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL;
231 pn->name_string.len = 1;
232 pn->name_string.val = malloc(sizeof(*pn->name_string.val));
233 if (pn->name_string.val == NULL)
235 pn->name_string.val[0] = strdup("anonymous");
236 if (pn->name_string.val[0] == NULL) {
237 free(pn->name_string.val);
238 pn->name_string.val = NULL;
245 _kdc_r_log(kdc_request_t r, int level, const char *fmt, ...)
250 s = kdc_log_msg_va(r->context, r->config, level, fmt, ap);
256 _kdc_set_e_text(kdc_request_t r, const char *e_text)
259 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0, "%s", e_text);
263 _kdc_log_timestamp(krb5_context context,
264 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
266 KerberosTime authtime, KerberosTime *starttime,
267 KerberosTime endtime, KerberosTime *renew_till)
269 char authtime_str[100], starttime_str[100],
270 endtime_str[100], renewtime_str[100];
272 krb5_format_time(context, authtime,
273 authtime_str, sizeof(authtime_str), TRUE);
275 krb5_format_time(context, *starttime,
276 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
278 strlcpy(starttime_str, "unset", sizeof(starttime_str));
279 krb5_format_time(context, endtime,
280 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
282 krb5_format_time(context, *renew_till,
283 renewtime_str, sizeof(renewtime_str), TRUE);
285 strlcpy(renewtime_str, "unset", sizeof(renewtime_str));
287 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
288 "%s authtime: %s starttime: %s endtime: %s renew till: %s",
289 type, authtime_str, starttime_str, endtime_str, renewtime_str);
298 static krb5_error_code
299 pa_pkinit_validate(kdc_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
301 pk_client_params *pkp = NULL;
302 char *client_cert = NULL;
305 ret = _kdc_pk_rd_padata(r->context, r->config, &r->req, pa, r->client, &pkp);
306 if (ret || pkp == NULL) {
307 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
308 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PKINIT PA-DATA -- %s",
313 ret = _kdc_pk_check_client(r->context,
320 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "PKINIT certificate not allowed to "
321 "impersonate principal");
325 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "PKINIT pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
326 r->client_name, client_cert);
329 ret = _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(r->context, r->config, pkp, r->client,
330 r->sessionetype, &r->req, &r->request,
331 &r->reply_key, &r->session_key, &r->outpadata);
333 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Failed to build PK-INIT reply");
337 ret = _kdc_add_inital_verified_cas(r->context, r->config,
342 _kdc_pk_free_client_param(r->context, pkp);
353 static krb5_error_code
354 make_pa_enc_challange(krb5_context context, METHOD_DATA *md,
361 EncryptedData encdata;
366 krb5_us_timeofday (context, &p.patimestamp, &usec);
370 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ENC_TS_ENC, buf, buf_size, &p, &len, ret);
374 krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
376 ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
378 KRB5_KU_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC,
387 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncryptedData, buf, buf_size, &encdata, &len, ret);
388 free_EncryptedData(&encdata);
392 krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
394 ret = krb5_padata_add(context, md, KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE, buf, len);
400 static krb5_error_code
401 pa_enc_chal_validate(kdc_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
403 krb5_data pepper1, pepper2, ts_data;
404 KDC_REQ_BODY *b = &r->req.req_body;
405 EncryptedData enc_data;
406 krb5_enctype aenctype;
412 heim_assert(r->armor_crypto != NULL, "ENC-CHAL called for non FAST");
414 if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
415 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
416 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0, "ENC-CHALL doesn't support anon");
420 ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
421 pa->padata_value.length,
425 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
426 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
431 pepper1.data = "clientchallengearmor";
432 pepper1.length = strlen(pepper1.data);
433 pepper2.data = "challengelongterm";
434 pepper2.length = strlen(pepper2.data);
436 krb5_crypto_getenctype(r->context, r->armor_crypto, &aenctype);
438 for (i = 0; i < r->client->entry.keys.len; i++) {
439 krb5_crypto challangecrypto, longtermcrypto;
440 krb5_keyblock challangekey;
443 k = &r->client->entry.keys.val[i];
445 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &k->key, 0, &longtermcrypto);
449 ret = krb5_crypto_fx_cf2(r->context, r->armor_crypto, longtermcrypto,
450 &pepper1, &pepper2, aenctype,
452 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, longtermcrypto);
456 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &challangekey, 0,
461 ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData(r->context, challangecrypto,
462 KRB5_KU_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT,
468 ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data,
472 krb5_data_free(&ts_data);
474 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challangecrypto);
475 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
476 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
481 if (abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > r->context->max_skew) {
482 char client_time[100];
484 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challangecrypto);
486 krb5_format_time(r->context, p.patimestamp,
487 client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
489 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
490 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "Too large time skew, "
491 "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
493 (unsigned)abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
494 r->context->max_skew,
497 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
501 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
503 ret = make_pa_enc_challange(r->context, &r->outpadata,
505 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challangecrypto);
509 set_salt_padata(&r->outpadata, k->salt);
510 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
511 ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &k->key, &r->reply_key);
515 if (i < r->client->entry.keys.len)
516 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
518 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
523 static krb5_error_code
524 pa_enc_ts_validate(kdc_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
526 EncryptedData enc_data;
535 if (r->req.req_body.kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
536 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
537 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "ENC-TS doesn't suport anon");
541 ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
542 pa->padata_value.length,
546 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
547 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
552 ret = hdb_enctype2key(r->context, &r->client->entry,
553 enc_data.etype, &pa_key);
556 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "No key matching entype");
557 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
558 if(krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, enc_data.etype, &estr))
562 "No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s",
563 enc_data.etype, r->client_name);
566 "No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s",
567 estr, r->client_name);
569 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
574 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &pa_key->key, 0, &crypto);
576 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
577 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
578 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
579 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
583 ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (r->context,
585 KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP,
588 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, crypto);
590 * Since the user might have several keys with the same
591 * enctype but with diffrent salting, we need to try all
592 * the keys with the same enctype.
595 krb5_error_code ret2;
596 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
598 ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context,
599 pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
602 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA -- %s "
603 "(enctype %s) error %s",
604 r->client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype", msg);
605 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
608 if(hdb_next_enctype2key(r->context, &r->client->entry,
609 enc_data.etype, &pa_key) == 0)
612 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
614 if (r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
615 r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status(r->context, r->clientdb, r->client,
616 HDB_AUTH_WRONG_PASSWORD);
618 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
621 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
622 ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data,
626 krb5_data_free(&ts_data);
628 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
629 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
633 if (abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > r->context->max_skew) {
634 char client_time[100];
636 krb5_format_time(r->context, p.patimestamp,
637 client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
639 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
640 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "Too large time skew, "
641 "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
643 (unsigned)abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
644 r->context->max_skew,
648 * The following is needed to make windows clients to
649 * retry using the timestamp in the error message, if
650 * there is a e_text, they become unhappy.
653 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
656 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
658 set_salt_padata(&r->outpadata, pa_key->salt);
660 ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &pa_key->key, &r->reply_key);
664 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
667 _kdc_r_log(r, 2, "ENC-TS Pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
668 r->client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype");
682 #define PA_ANNOUNCE 1
683 #define PA_REQ_FAST 2 /* only use inside fast */
684 krb5_error_code (*validate)(kdc_request_t, const PA_DATA *pa);
687 static const struct kdc_patypes pat[] = {
690 KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ, "PK-INIT(ietf)", PA_ANNOUNCE,
694 KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN, "PK-INIT(win2k)", PA_ANNOUNCE,
698 { KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ, "PK-INIT(ietf)", 0, NULL },
699 { KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN, "PK-INIT(win2k)", 0, NULL },
701 { KRB5_PADATA_PA_PK_OCSP_RESPONSE , "OCSP", 0, NULL },
703 KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP , "ENC-TS",
708 KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE , "ENC-CHAL",
709 PA_ANNOUNCE | PA_REQ_FAST,
712 { KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP , "REQ-ENC-PA-REP", 0, NULL },
713 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST, "FX-FAST", PA_ANNOUNCE, NULL },
714 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_ERROR, "FX-ERROR", 0, NULL },
715 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_COOKIE, "FX-COOKIE", 0, NULL }
719 log_patypes(krb5_context context,
720 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
723 struct rk_strpool *p = NULL;
727 for (n = 0; n < padata->len; n++) {
728 for (m = 0; m < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); m++) {
729 if (padata->val[n].padata_type == pat[m].type) {
730 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%s", pat[m].name);
734 if (m == sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]))
735 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", padata->val[n].padata_type);
736 if (p && n + 1 < padata->len)
737 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
739 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "out of memory");
744 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "none");
746 str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
747 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Client sent patypes: %s", str);
756 _kdc_encode_reply(krb5_context context,
757 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
758 const krb5_data *req_buffer,
759 krb5_crypto armor_crypto, uint32_t nonce,
760 KDC_REP *rep, EncTicketPart *et, EncKDCRepPart *ek,
762 int skvno, const EncryptionKey *skey,
763 int ckvno, const EncryptionKey *reply_key,
774 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTicketPart, buf, buf_size, et, &len, ret);
776 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
777 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode ticket: %s", msg);
778 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
779 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
783 krb5_abortx(context, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
785 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, skey, etype, &crypto);
787 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
788 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
789 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
793 ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
799 &rep->ticket.enc_part);
801 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
803 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
804 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encrypt data: %s", msg);
805 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
811 krb5_keyblock *strengthen_key = NULL;
812 KrbFastFinished finished;
814 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "FAST armor protection");
816 memset(&finished, 0, sizeof(finished));
817 krb5_data_zero(&data);
819 finished.timestamp = kdc_time;
821 finished.crealm = et->crealm;
822 finished.cname = et->cname;
824 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Ticket, data.data, data.length,
825 &rep->ticket, &len, ret);
828 if (data.length != len)
829 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
831 ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, armor_crypto,
832 KRB5_KU_FAST_FINISHED, 0,
833 data.data, data.length,
834 &finished.ticket_checksum);
835 krb5_data_free(&data);
839 ret = _kdc_fast_mk_response(context, armor_crypto,
840 rep->padata, strengthen_key, &finished,
842 free_Checksum(&finished.ticket_checksum);
847 free_METHOD_DATA(rep->padata);
849 rep->padata = calloc(1, sizeof(*(rep->padata)));
850 if (rep->padata == NULL) {
851 krb5_data_free(&data);
856 ret = krb5_padata_add(context, rep->padata,
858 data.data, data.length);
863 * Hide client name of privacy reasons
865 rep->crealm[0] = '\0';
866 free_PrincipalName(&rep->cname);
867 rep->cname.name_type = 0;
870 if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep && !config->encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep)
871 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncASRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
873 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTGSRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
875 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
876 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
877 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
880 if(buf_size != len) {
882 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
883 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
884 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
886 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, reply_key, 0, &crypto);
888 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
890 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
891 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
894 if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep) {
895 krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
897 KRB5_KU_AS_REP_ENC_PART,
903 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
905 krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
907 rk_is_subkey ? KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SUB_KEY : KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION,
913 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(TGS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
915 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
917 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
918 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
919 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
922 if(buf_size != len) {
924 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
925 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
926 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
929 reply->length = buf_size;
934 * Return 1 if the client have only older enctypes, this is for
935 * determining if the server should send ETYPE_INFO2 or not.
939 older_enctype(krb5_enctype enctype)
942 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
943 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
944 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
945 case ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
946 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5:
947 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56:
949 * The following three is "old" windows enctypes and is needed for
950 * windows 2000 hosts.
952 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_MD4:
953 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD:
954 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD_EXP:
965 static krb5_error_code
966 make_etype_info_entry(krb5_context context, ETYPE_INFO_ENTRY *ent, Key *key)
968 ent->etype = key->key.keytype;
971 ALLOC(ent->salttype);
973 if(key->salt->type == hdb_pw_salt)
974 *ent->salttype = 0; /* or 1? or NULL? */
975 else if(key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt)
978 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "unknown salt-type: %d",
980 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
982 /* according to `the specs', we can't send a salt if
983 we have AFS3 salted key, but that requires that you
984 *know* what cell you are using (e.g by assuming
985 that the cell is the same as the realm in lower
988 ALLOC(ent->salttype);
989 *ent->salttype = key->salt->type;
992 * We shouldn't sent salttype since it is incompatible with the
993 * specification and it breaks windows clients. The afs
994 * salting problem is solved by using KRB5-PADATA-AFS3-SALT
995 * implemented in Heimdal 0.7 and later.
997 ent->salttype = NULL;
999 krb5_copy_data(context, &key->salt->salt,
1002 /* we return no salt type at all, as that should indicate
1003 * the default salt type and make everybody happy. some
1004 * systems (like w2k) dislike being told the salt type
1007 ent->salttype = NULL;
1013 static krb5_error_code
1014 get_pa_etype_info(krb5_context context,
1015 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1016 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey)
1018 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
1025 pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
1029 ret = make_etype_info_entry(context, &pa.val[0], ckey);
1031 free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
1035 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
1036 free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
1039 ret = realloc_method_data(md);
1044 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO;
1045 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len;
1046 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf;
1054 extern int _krb5_AES_string_to_default_iterator;
1056 static krb5_error_code
1057 make_etype_info2_entry(ETYPE_INFO2_ENTRY *ent, Key *key)
1059 ent->etype = key->key.keytype;
1062 if (ent->salt == NULL)
1064 *ent->salt = malloc(key->salt->salt.length + 1);
1065 if (*ent->salt == NULL) {
1070 memcpy(*ent->salt, key->salt->salt.data, key->salt->salt.length);
1071 (*ent->salt)[key->salt->salt.length] = '\0';
1075 ent->s2kparams = NULL;
1077 switch (key->key.keytype) {
1078 case ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
1079 case ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
1080 ALLOC(ent->s2kparams);
1081 if (ent->s2kparams == NULL)
1083 ent->s2kparams->length = 4;
1084 ent->s2kparams->data = malloc(ent->s2kparams->length);
1085 if (ent->s2kparams->data == NULL) {
1086 free(ent->s2kparams);
1087 ent->s2kparams = NULL;
1090 _krb5_put_int(ent->s2kparams->data,
1091 _krb5_AES_string_to_default_iterator,
1092 ent->s2kparams->length);
1094 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
1095 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
1096 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
1097 /* Check if this was a AFS3 salted key */
1098 if(key->salt && key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt){
1099 ALLOC(ent->s2kparams);
1100 if (ent->s2kparams == NULL)
1102 ent->s2kparams->length = 1;
1103 ent->s2kparams->data = malloc(ent->s2kparams->length);
1104 if (ent->s2kparams->data == NULL) {
1105 free(ent->s2kparams);
1106 ent->s2kparams = NULL;
1109 _krb5_put_int(ent->s2kparams->data,
1111 ent->s2kparams->length);
1121 * Return an ETYPE-INFO2. Enctypes are storted the same way as in the
1122 * database (client supported enctypes first, then the unsupported
1126 static krb5_error_code
1127 get_pa_etype_info2(krb5_context context,
1128 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1129 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey)
1131 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
1137 pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
1141 ret = make_etype_info2_entry(&pa.val[0], ckey);
1143 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
1147 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO2, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
1148 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
1151 ret = realloc_method_data(md);
1156 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO2;
1157 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len;
1158 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf;
1167 log_as_req(krb5_context context,
1168 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1169 krb5_enctype cetype,
1170 krb5_enctype setype,
1171 const KDC_REQ_BODY *b)
1173 krb5_error_code ret;
1174 struct rk_strpool *p;
1178 p = rk_strpoolprintf(NULL, "%s", "Client supported enctypes: ");
1180 for (i = 0; i < b->etype.len; i++) {
1181 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, b->etype.val[i], &str);
1183 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%s", str);
1186 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", b->etype.val[i]);
1187 if (p && i + 1 < b->etype.len)
1188 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
1190 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "out of memory");
1195 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "no encryption types");
1201 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, cetype, &cet);
1203 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, setype, &set);
1205 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using %s/%s", cet, set);
1211 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using enctypes %d/%d",
1215 str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
1216 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s", str);
1221 unparse_flags(KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options), asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
1222 fixedstr, sizeof(fixedstr));
1224 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Requested flags: %s", fixedstr);
1229 * verify the flags on `client' and `server', returning 0
1230 * if they are OK and generating an error messages and returning
1231 * and error code otherwise.
1235 kdc_check_flags(krb5_context context,
1236 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1237 hdb_entry_ex *client_ex, const char *client_name,
1238 hdb_entry_ex *server_ex, const char *server_name,
1239 krb5_boolean is_as_req)
1241 if(client_ex != NULL) {
1242 hdb_entry *client = &client_ex->entry;
1245 if (client->flags.locked_out) {
1246 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1247 "Client (%s) is locked out", client_name);
1248 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1251 if (client->flags.invalid) {
1252 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1253 "Client (%s) has invalid bit set", client_name);
1254 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1257 if(!client->flags.client){
1258 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1259 "Principal may not act as client -- %s", client_name);
1260 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1263 if (client->valid_start && *client->valid_start > kdc_time) {
1264 char starttime_str[100];
1265 krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_start,
1266 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
1267 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1268 "Client not yet valid until %s -- %s",
1269 starttime_str, client_name);
1270 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
1273 if (client->valid_end && *client->valid_end < kdc_time) {
1274 char endtime_str[100];
1275 krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_end,
1276 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
1277 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1278 "Client expired at %s -- %s",
1279 endtime_str, client_name);
1280 return KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP;
1283 if (client->pw_end && *client->pw_end < kdc_time
1284 && (server_ex == NULL || !server_ex->entry.flags.change_pw)) {
1285 char pwend_str[100];
1286 krb5_format_time(context, *client->pw_end,
1287 pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
1288 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1289 "Client's key has expired at %s -- %s",
1290 pwend_str, client_name);
1291 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
1297 if (server_ex != NULL) {
1298 hdb_entry *server = &server_ex->entry;
1300 if (server->flags.locked_out) {
1301 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1302 "Client server locked out -- %s", server_name);
1303 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1305 if (server->flags.invalid) {
1306 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1307 "Server has invalid flag set -- %s", server_name);
1308 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1311 if(!server->flags.server){
1312 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1313 "Principal may not act as server -- %s", server_name);
1314 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1317 if(!is_as_req && server->flags.initial) {
1318 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1319 "AS-REQ is required for server -- %s", server_name);
1320 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1323 if (server->valid_start && *server->valid_start > kdc_time) {
1324 char starttime_str[100];
1325 krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_start,
1326 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
1327 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1328 "Server not yet valid until %s -- %s",
1329 starttime_str, server_name);
1330 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET;
1333 if (server->valid_end && *server->valid_end < kdc_time) {
1334 char endtime_str[100];
1335 krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_end,
1336 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
1337 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1338 "Server expired at %s -- %s",
1339 endtime_str, server_name);
1340 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP;
1343 if (server->pw_end && *server->pw_end < kdc_time) {
1344 char pwend_str[100];
1345 krb5_format_time(context, *server->pw_end,
1346 pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
1347 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1348 "Server's key has expired at -- %s",
1349 pwend_str, server_name);
1350 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
1357 * Return TRUE if `from' is part of `addresses' taking into consideration
1358 * the configuration variables that tells us how strict we should be about
1363 _kdc_check_addresses(krb5_context context,
1364 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1365 HostAddresses *addresses, const struct sockaddr *from)
1367 krb5_error_code ret;
1369 krb5_boolean result;
1370 krb5_boolean only_netbios = TRUE;
1373 if(config->check_ticket_addresses == 0)
1376 if(addresses == NULL)
1377 return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
1379 for (i = 0; i < addresses->len; ++i) {
1380 if (addresses->val[i].addr_type != KRB5_ADDRESS_NETBIOS) {
1381 only_netbios = FALSE;
1385 /* Windows sends it's netbios name, which I can only assume is
1386 * used for the 'allowed workstations' check. This is painful,
1387 * but we still want to check IP addresses if they happen to be
1392 return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
1394 ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (context, from, &addr);
1398 result = krb5_address_search(context, &addr, addresses);
1399 krb5_free_address (context, &addr);
1408 send_pac_p(krb5_context context, KDC_REQ *req)
1410 krb5_error_code ret;
1411 PA_PAC_REQUEST pacreq;
1415 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PA_PAC_REQUEST);
1419 ret = decode_PA_PAC_REQUEST(pa->padata_value.data,
1420 pa->padata_value.length,
1425 i = pacreq.include_pac;
1426 free_PA_PAC_REQUEST(&pacreq);
1433 _kdc_is_anonymous(krb5_context context, krb5_principal principal)
1435 if (principal->name.name_type != KRB5_NT_WELLKNOWN ||
1436 principal->name.name_string.len != 2 ||
1437 strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_WELLKNOWN_NAME) != 0 ||
1438 strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], KRB5_ANON_NAME) != 0)
1444 require_preauth_p(kdc_request_t r)
1446 return r->config->require_preauth
1447 || r->client->entry.flags.require_preauth
1448 || r->server->entry.flags.require_preauth;
1456 static krb5_error_code
1457 add_enc_pa_rep(kdc_request_t r)
1459 krb5_error_code ret;
1465 r->et.flags.enc_pa_rep = r->ek.flags.enc_pa_rep = 1;
1467 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &r->reply_key, 0, &crypto);
1471 ret = krb5_create_checksum(r->context, crypto,
1473 r->request.data, r->request.length,
1475 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, crypto);
1479 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Checksum, cdata.data, cdata.length,
1480 &checksum, &len, ret);
1481 free_Checksum(&checksum);
1484 heim_assert(cdata.length == len, "ASN.1 internal error");
1486 if (r->ek.encrypted_pa_data == NULL) {
1487 ALLOC(r->ek.encrypted_pa_data);
1488 if (r->ek.encrypted_pa_data == NULL)
1491 ret = krb5_padata_add(r->context, r->ek.encrypted_pa_data,
1492 KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP, cdata.data, cdata.length);
1496 return krb5_padata_add(r->context, r->ek.encrypted_pa_data,
1497 KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST, NULL, 0);
1505 _kdc_as_rep(kdc_request_t r,
1508 struct sockaddr *from_addr,
1511 krb5_context context = r->context;
1512 krb5_kdc_configuration *config = r->config;
1513 KDC_REQ *req = &r->req;
1514 KDC_REQ_BODY *b = NULL;
1517 krb5_enctype setype;
1520 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
1524 METHOD_DATA error_method;
1527 memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
1528 memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et));
1529 memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek));
1530 error_method.len = 0;
1531 error_method.val = NULL;
1534 * Look for FAST armor and unwrap
1536 ret = _kdc_fast_unwrap_request(r);
1544 flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
1546 if(b->sname == NULL){
1547 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1548 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "No server in request");
1550 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
1555 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->server_princ, &r->server_name);
1558 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1559 "AS-REQ malformed server name from %s", from);
1562 if(b->cname == NULL){
1563 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1564 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "No client in request");
1566 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
1573 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->client_princ, &r->client_name);
1576 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1577 "AS-REQ malformed client name from %s", from);
1581 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s",
1582 r->client_name, from, r->server_name);
1588 if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context, r->client_princ)) {
1589 if (!b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
1590 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Anonymous ticket w/o anonymous flag");
1591 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1594 } else if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
1595 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1596 "Request for a anonymous ticket with non "
1597 "anonymous client name: %s", r->client_name);
1598 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1606 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, r->client_princ,
1607 HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags, NULL,
1608 &r->clientdb, &r->client);
1609 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1610 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "client %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy",
1614 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1615 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r->client_name, msg);
1616 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1617 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1620 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, r->server_princ,
1621 HDB_F_GET_SERVER|HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT | flags,
1622 NULL, NULL, &r->server);
1623 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1624 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy",
1628 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1629 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r->server_name, msg);
1630 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1631 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1635 memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et));
1636 memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek));
1639 * Select a session enctype from the list of the crypto system
1640 * supported enctypes that is supported by the client and is one of
1641 * the enctype of the enctype of the service (likely krbtgt).
1643 * The latter is used as a hint of what enctypes all KDC support,
1644 * to make sure a newer version of KDC won't generate a session
1645 * enctype that an older version of a KDC in the same realm can't
1649 ret = _kdc_find_etype(context, config->as_use_strongest_session_key, FALSE,
1650 client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, &sessionetype,
1653 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1654 "Client (%s) from %s has no common enctypes with KDC "
1655 "to use for the session key",
1661 * Pre-auth processing
1668 log_patypes(context, config, req->padata);
1670 /* Check if preauth matching */
1672 for (n = 0; !found_pa && n < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); n++) {
1673 if (pat[n].validate == NULL)
1675 if (r->armor_crypto == NULL && (pat[n].flags & PA_REQ_FAST))
1678 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1679 "Looking for %s pa-data -- %s", pat[n].name, r->client_name);
1681 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, pat[n].type);
1683 ret = pat[n].validate(r, pa);
1685 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1686 "%s pre-authentication succeeded -- %s",
1687 pat[n].name, r->client_name);
1689 et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
1695 if ((found_pa == 0 && require_preauth_p(r)) || b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
1698 for (n = 0; n < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); n++) {
1699 if ((pat[n].flags & PA_ANNOUNCE) == 0)
1701 ret = krb5_padata_add(context, &error_method,
1702 pat[n].type, NULL, 0);
1708 * If there is a client key, send ETYPE_INFO{,2}
1710 ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
1711 config->preauth_use_strongest_session_key, TRUE,
1712 client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, NULL, &ckey);
1717 * - If the client only knows about old enctypes, then send
1718 * both info replies (we send 'info' first in the list).
1719 * - If the client is 'modern', because it knows about 'new'
1720 * enctype types, then only send the 'info2' reply.
1722 * Before we send the full list of etype-info data, we pick
1723 * the client key we would have used anyway below, just pick
1727 if (older_enctype(ckey->key.keytype)) {
1728 ret = get_pa_etype_info(context, config,
1729 &error_method, ckey);
1733 ret = get_pa_etype_info2(context, config,
1734 &error_method, ckey);
1739 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
1740 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/PA-PK-AS-REQ");
1744 if (r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
1745 r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status(context, r->clientdb, r->client,
1749 * Verify flags after the user been required to prove its identity
1750 * with in a preauth mech.
1753 ret = _kdc_check_access(context, config, r->client, r->client_name,
1754 r->server, r->server_name,
1755 req, &error_method);
1760 * Selelct the best encryption type for the KDC with out regard to
1761 * the client since the client never needs to read that data.
1764 ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config,
1765 r->server, r->server_name,
1770 if(f.renew || f.validate || f.proxy || f.forwarded || f.enc_tkt_in_skey
1771 || (f.request_anonymous && !config->allow_anonymous)) {
1772 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1773 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Bad KDC options");
1782 rep.msg_type = krb_as_rep;
1784 ret = copy_Realm(&r->client->entry.principal->realm, &rep.crealm);
1787 ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname, r->client->entry.principal);
1791 rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
1792 copy_Realm(&r->server->entry.principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
1793 _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname,
1794 r->server->entry.principal);
1795 /* java 1.6 expects the name to be the same type, lets allow that
1796 * uncomplicated name-types. */
1797 #define CNT(sp,t) (((sp)->sname->name_type) == KRB5_NT_##t)
1798 if (CNT(b, UNKNOWN) || CNT(b, PRINCIPAL) || CNT(b, SRV_INST) || CNT(b, SRV_HST) || CNT(b, SRV_XHST))
1799 rep.ticket.sname.name_type = b->sname->name_type;
1802 et.flags.initial = 1;
1803 if(r->client->entry.flags.forwardable && r->server->entry.flags.forwardable)
1804 et.flags.forwardable = f.forwardable;
1805 else if (f.forwardable) {
1806 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be forwardable");
1807 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1810 if(r->client->entry.flags.proxiable && r->server->entry.flags.proxiable)
1811 et.flags.proxiable = f.proxiable;
1812 else if (f.proxiable) {
1813 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be proxiable");
1814 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1817 if(r->client->entry.flags.postdate && r->server->entry.flags.postdate)
1818 et.flags.may_postdate = f.allow_postdate;
1819 else if (f.allow_postdate){
1820 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be postdate");
1821 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1825 /* check for valid set of addresses */
1826 if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context, config, b->addresses, from_addr)) {
1827 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Bad address list in requested");
1828 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
1832 ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep.cname, &et.cname);
1835 ret = copy_Realm(&rep.crealm, &et.crealm);
1843 start = et.authtime = kdc_time;
1845 if(f.postdated && req->req_body.from){
1846 ALLOC(et.starttime);
1847 start = *et.starttime = *req->req_body.from;
1848 et.flags.invalid = 1;
1849 et.flags.postdated = 1; /* XXX ??? */
1851 _kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
1854 /* be careful not overflowing */
1856 if(r->client->entry.max_life)
1857 t = start + min(t - start, *r->client->entry.max_life);
1858 if(r->server->entry.max_life)
1859 t = start + min(t - start, *r->server->entry.max_life);
1861 t = min(t, start + realm->max_life);
1864 if(f.renewable_ok && et.endtime < *b->till){
1866 if(b->rtime == NULL){
1870 if(*b->rtime < *b->till)
1871 *b->rtime = *b->till;
1873 if(f.renewable && b->rtime){
1877 if(r->client->entry.max_renew)
1878 t = start + min(t - start, *r->client->entry.max_renew);
1879 if(r->server->entry.max_renew)
1880 t = start + min(t - start, *r->server->entry.max_renew);
1882 t = min(t, start + realm->max_renew);
1884 ALLOC(et.renew_till);
1886 et.flags.renewable = 1;
1890 if (f.request_anonymous)
1891 et.flags.anonymous = 1;
1895 copy_HostAddresses(b->addresses, et.caddr);
1898 et.transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
1899 krb5_data_zero(&et.transited.contents);
1901 /* The MIT ASN.1 library (obviously) doesn't tell lengths encoded
1902 * as 0 and as 0x80 (meaning indefinite length) apart, and is thus
1903 * incapable of correctly decoding SEQUENCE OF's of zero length.
1905 * To fix this, always send at least one no-op last_req
1907 * If there's a pw_end or valid_end we will use that,
1908 * otherwise just a dummy lr.
1910 ek.last_req.val = malloc(2 * sizeof(*ek.last_req.val));
1911 if (ek.last_req.val == NULL) {
1915 ek.last_req.len = 0;
1916 if (r->client->entry.pw_end
1917 && (config->kdc_warn_pwexpire == 0
1918 || kdc_time + config->kdc_warn_pwexpire >= *r->client->entry.pw_end)) {
1919 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_PW_EXPTIME;
1920 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *r->client->entry.pw_end;
1923 if (r->client->entry.valid_end) {
1924 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_ACCT_EXPTIME;
1925 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *r->client->entry.valid_end;
1928 if (ek.last_req.len == 0) {
1929 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_NONE;
1930 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = 0;
1933 ek.nonce = b->nonce;
1934 if (r->client->entry.valid_end || r->client->entry.pw_end) {
1935 ALLOC(ek.key_expiration);
1936 if (r->client->entry.valid_end) {
1937 if (r->client->entry.pw_end)
1938 *ek.key_expiration = min(*r->client->entry.valid_end,
1939 *r->client->entry.pw_end);
1941 *ek.key_expiration = *r->client->entry.valid_end;
1943 *ek.key_expiration = *r->client->entry.pw_end;
1945 ek.key_expiration = NULL;
1946 ek.flags = et.flags;
1947 ek.authtime = et.authtime;
1949 ALLOC(ek.starttime);
1950 *ek.starttime = *et.starttime;
1952 ek.endtime = et.endtime;
1953 if (et.renew_till) {
1954 ALLOC(ek.renew_till);
1955 *ek.renew_till = *et.renew_till;
1957 copy_Realm(&rep.ticket.realm, &ek.srealm);
1958 copy_PrincipalName(&rep.ticket.sname, &ek.sname);
1961 copy_HostAddresses(et.caddr, ek.caddr);
1965 * Check and session and reply keys
1968 if (r->session_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) {
1969 ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, r->sessionetype, &r->session_key);
1974 if (r->reply_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) {
1975 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Client have no reply key");
1976 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
1980 ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&r->session_key, &et.key);
1984 ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&r->session_key, &ek.key);
1989 * Add signing of alias referral
1992 if (f.canonicalize) {
1993 PA_ClientCanonicalized canon;
1996 krb5_crypto cryptox;
1999 memset(&canon, 0, sizeof(canon));
2001 canon.names.requested_name = *b->cname;
2002 canon.names.mapped_name = r->client->entry.principal->name;
2004 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ClientCanonicalizedNames, data.data, data.length,
2005 &canon.names, &len, ret);
2008 if (data.length != len)
2009 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
2011 /* sign using "returned session key" */
2012 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &et.key, 0, &cryptox);
2018 ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, cryptox,
2019 KRB5_KU_CANONICALIZED_NAMES, 0,
2020 data.data, data.length,
2021 &canon.canon_checksum);
2023 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, cryptox);
2027 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ClientCanonicalized, data.data, data.length,
2029 free_Checksum(&canon.canon_checksum);
2032 if (data.length != len)
2033 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
2035 pa.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_CLIENT_CANONICALIZED;
2036 pa.padata_value = data;
2037 ret = add_METHOD_DATA(&r->outpadata, &pa);
2043 if (r->outpadata.len) {
2046 if (rep.padata == NULL) {
2050 ret = copy_METHOD_DATA(&r->outpadata, rep.padata);
2056 if (send_pac_p(context, req)) {
2060 ret = _kdc_pac_generate(context, r->client, &p);
2062 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
2067 ret = _krb5_pac_sign(context, p, et.authtime,
2068 r->client->entry.principal,
2069 &skey->key, /* Server key */
2070 &skey->key, /* FIXME: should be krbtgt key */
2072 krb5_pac_free(context, p);
2074 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
2079 ret = _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(context, &et,
2080 KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC,
2082 krb5_data_free(&data);
2088 _kdc_log_timestamp(context, config, "AS-REQ", et.authtime, et.starttime,
2089 et.endtime, et.renew_till);
2091 /* do this as the last thing since this signs the EncTicketPart */
2092 ret = _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(context,
2096 r->client->entry.principal,
2103 log_as_req(context, config, r->reply_key.keytype, setype, b);
2106 * Add REQ_ENC_PA_REP if client supports it
2109 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP);
2111 ret = add_enc_pa_rep(r);
2113 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
2114 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "add_enc_pa_rep failed: %d: %s", ret, msg);
2115 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
2124 ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config, NULL,
2125 r->armor_crypto, req->req_body.nonce,
2126 &rep, &et, &ek, setype, r->server->entry.kvno,
2127 &skey->key, r->client->entry.kvno,
2128 &r->reply_key, 0, &r->e_text, reply);
2133 if (datagram_reply && reply->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) {
2134 krb5_data_free(reply);
2135 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG;
2136 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Reply packet too large");
2143 * In case of a non proxy error, build an error message.
2145 if(ret != 0 && ret != HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE){
2146 kdc_log(context, config, 10, "as-req: sending error: %d to client", ret);
2147 ret = _kdc_fast_mk_error(context,
2152 r->client_princ, r->server_princ,
2159 free_EncTicketPart(&et);
2160 free_EncKDCRepPart(&ek);
2162 if (error_method.len)
2163 free_METHOD_DATA(&error_method);
2164 if (r->outpadata.len)
2165 free_METHOD_DATA(&r->outpadata);
2166 if (r->client_princ) {
2167 krb5_free_principal(context, r->client_princ);
2168 r->client_princ = NULL;
2170 if (r->client_name) {
2171 free(r->client_name);
2172 r->client_name = NULL;
2174 if (r->server_princ){
2175 krb5_free_principal(context, r->server_princ);
2176 r->server_princ = NULL;
2178 if (r->server_name) {
2179 free(r->server_name);
2180 r->server_name = NULL;
2183 _kdc_free_ent(context, r->client);
2185 _kdc_free_ent(context, r->server);
2186 if (r->armor_crypto) {
2187 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, r->armor_crypto);
2188 r->armor_crypto = NULL;
2190 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
2191 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->session_key);
2196 * Add the AuthorizationData `data´ of `type´ to the last element in
2197 * the sequence of authorization_data in `tkt´ wrapped in an IF_RELEVANT
2201 _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(krb5_context context,
2204 const krb5_data *data)
2206 krb5_error_code ret;
2209 if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
2210 tkt->authorization_data = calloc(1, sizeof(*tkt->authorization_data));
2211 if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
2212 krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOMEM, "out of memory");
2217 /* add the entry to the last element */
2219 AuthorizationData ad = { 0, NULL };
2220 AuthorizationDataElement ade;
2223 ade.ad_data = *data;
2225 ret = add_AuthorizationData(&ad, &ade);
2227 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "add AuthorizationData failed");
2231 ade.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT;
2233 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthorizationData,
2234 ade.ad_data.data, ade.ad_data.length,
2236 free_AuthorizationData(&ad);
2238 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "ASN.1 encode of "
2239 "AuthorizationData failed");
2242 if (ade.ad_data.length != size)
2243 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
2245 ret = add_AuthorizationData(tkt->authorization_data, &ade);
2246 der_free_octet_string(&ade.ad_data);
2248 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "add AuthorizationData failed");