2 * Copyright (c) 1997-2007 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
3 * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
17 * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
18 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
19 * without specific prior written permission.
21 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
22 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
23 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
24 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
25 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
26 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
27 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
28 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
29 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
30 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
36 #define MAX_TIME ((time_t)((1U << 31) - 1))
39 _kdc_fix_time(time_t **t)
45 if(**t == 0) **t = MAX_TIME; /* fix for old clients */
49 realloc_method_data(METHOD_DATA *md)
52 pa = realloc(md->val, (md->len + 1) * sizeof(*md->val));
61 set_salt_padata(METHOD_DATA *md, Salt *salt)
64 realloc_method_data(md);
65 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = salt->type;
66 der_copy_octet_string(&salt->salt,
67 &md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value);
72 _kdc_find_padata(const KDC_REQ *req, int *start, int type)
74 if (req->padata == NULL)
77 while((size_t)*start < req->padata->len){
79 if(req->padata->val[*start - 1].padata_type == (unsigned)type)
80 return &req->padata->val[*start - 1];
86 * This is a hack to allow predefined weak services, like afs to
87 * still use weak types
91 _kdc_is_weak_exception(krb5_principal principal, krb5_enctype etype)
93 if (principal->name.name_string.len > 0 &&
94 strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "afs") == 0 &&
95 (etype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
96 || etype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4
97 || etype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5))
104 * Detect if `key' is the using the the precomputed `default_salt'.
108 is_default_salt_p(const krb5_salt *default_salt, const Key *key)
110 if (key->salt == NULL)
112 if (default_salt->salttype != key->salt->type)
114 if (krb5_data_cmp(&default_salt->saltvalue, &key->salt->salt))
120 * return the first appropriate key of `princ' in `ret_key'. Look for
121 * all the etypes in (`etypes', `len'), stopping as soon as we find
122 * one, but preferring one that has default salt.
126 _kdc_find_etype(krb5_context context, krb5_boolean use_strongest_session_key,
127 krb5_boolean is_preauth, hdb_entry_ex *princ,
128 krb5_principal request_princ, krb5_enctype *etypes, unsigned len,
129 krb5_enctype *ret_enctype, Key **ret_key,
130 krb5_boolean *ret_default_salt)
134 krb5_enctype enctype = (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL;
135 const krb5_enctype *p;
139 /* We'll want to avoid keys with v4 salted keys in the pre-auth case... */
140 ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context, request_princ, &def_salt);
144 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
146 if (use_strongest_session_key) {
149 * Pick the strongest key that the KDC, target service, and
150 * client all support, using the local cryptosystem enctype
151 * list in strongest-to-weakest order to drive the search.
153 * This is not what RFC4120 says to do, but it encourages
154 * adoption of stronger enctypes. This doesn't play well with
155 * clients that have multiple Kerberos client implementations
156 * available with different supported enctype lists.
159 /* drive the search with local supported enctypes list */
160 p = krb5_kerberos_enctypes(context);
162 p[i] != (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL && enctype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL;
164 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, p[i]) != 0 &&
165 !_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->entry.principal, p[i]))
168 /* check that the client supports it too */
169 for (k = 0; k < len && enctype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL; k++) {
171 if (p[i] != etypes[k])
174 /* check target princ support */
176 while (hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, NULL,
178 if (key->key.keyvalue.length == 0) {
179 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
184 if (is_preauth && ret_key != NULL &&
185 !is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
192 * Pick the first key from the client's enctype list that is
193 * supported by the cryptosystem and by the given principal.
195 * RFC4120 says we SHOULD pick the first _strong_ key from the
196 * client's list... not the first key... If the admin disallows
197 * weak enctypes in krb5.conf and selects this key selection
198 * algorithm, then we get exactly what RFC4120 says.
200 for(i = 0; ret != 0 && i < len; i++) {
202 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[i]) != 0 &&
203 !_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->entry.principal, etypes[i]))
208 hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, NULL,
209 etypes[i], &key) == 0) {
210 if (key->key.keyvalue.length == 0) {
211 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
216 if (is_preauth && ret_key != NULL &&
217 !is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
223 if (enctype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL) {
225 * if the service principal is one for which there is a known 1DES
226 * exception and no other enctype matches both the client request and
227 * the service key list, provide a DES-CBC-CRC key.
229 if (ret_key == NULL &&
230 _kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->entry.principal, ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC)) {
232 enctype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC;
234 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
239 if (ret_enctype != NULL)
240 *ret_enctype = enctype;
243 if (ret_default_salt != NULL)
244 *ret_default_salt = is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key);
247 krb5_free_salt (context, def_salt);
252 _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname (PrincipalName *pn)
254 pn->name_type = KRB5_NT_WELLKNOWN;
255 pn->name_string.len = 2;
256 pn->name_string.val = calloc(2, sizeof(*pn->name_string.val));
257 if (pn->name_string.val == NULL)
260 pn->name_string.val[0] = strdup(KRB5_WELLKNOWN_NAME);
261 if (pn->name_string.val[0] == NULL)
264 pn->name_string.val[1] = strdup(KRB5_ANON_NAME);
265 if (pn->name_string.val[1] == NULL)
271 free_PrincipalName(pn);
273 pn->name_type = KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN;
274 pn->name_string.len = 0;
275 pn->name_string.val = NULL;
281 _kdc_r_log(kdc_request_t r, int level, const char *fmt, ...)
286 s = kdc_log_msg_va(r->context, r->config, level, fmt, ap);
292 _kdc_set_e_text(kdc_request_t r, const char *e_text)
295 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0, "%s", e_text);
299 _kdc_log_timestamp(krb5_context context,
300 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
302 KerberosTime authtime, KerberosTime *starttime,
303 KerberosTime endtime, KerberosTime *renew_till)
305 char authtime_str[100], starttime_str[100],
306 endtime_str[100], renewtime_str[100];
308 krb5_format_time(context, authtime,
309 authtime_str, sizeof(authtime_str), TRUE);
311 krb5_format_time(context, *starttime,
312 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
314 strlcpy(starttime_str, "unset", sizeof(starttime_str));
315 krb5_format_time(context, endtime,
316 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
318 krb5_format_time(context, *renew_till,
319 renewtime_str, sizeof(renewtime_str), TRUE);
321 strlcpy(renewtime_str, "unset", sizeof(renewtime_str));
323 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
324 "%s authtime: %s starttime: %s endtime: %s renew till: %s",
325 type, authtime_str, starttime_str, endtime_str, renewtime_str);
334 static krb5_error_code
335 pa_pkinit_validate(kdc_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
337 pk_client_params *pkp = NULL;
338 char *client_cert = NULL;
341 ret = _kdc_pk_rd_padata(r->context, r->config, &r->req, pa, r->client, &pkp);
342 if (ret || pkp == NULL) {
343 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
344 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PKINIT PA-DATA -- %s",
349 ret = _kdc_pk_check_client(r->context,
356 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "PKINIT certificate not allowed to "
357 "impersonate principal");
361 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "PKINIT pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
362 r->client_name, client_cert);
365 ret = _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(r->context, r->config, pkp, r->client,
366 r->sessionetype, &r->req, &r->request,
367 &r->reply_key, &r->session_key, &r->outpadata);
369 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Failed to build PK-INIT reply");
373 ret = _kdc_add_initial_verified_cas(r->context, r->config,
378 _kdc_pk_free_client_param(r->context, pkp);
389 static krb5_error_code
390 make_pa_enc_challange(krb5_context context, METHOD_DATA *md,
397 EncryptedData encdata;
402 krb5_us_timeofday (context, &p.patimestamp, &usec);
406 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ENC_TS_ENC, buf, buf_size, &p, &len, ret);
410 krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
412 ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
414 KRB5_KU_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC,
423 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncryptedData, buf, buf_size, &encdata, &len, ret);
424 free_EncryptedData(&encdata);
428 krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
430 ret = krb5_padata_add(context, md, KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE, buf, len);
436 static krb5_error_code
437 pa_enc_chal_validate(kdc_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
439 krb5_data pepper1, pepper2, ts_data;
440 KDC_REQ_BODY *b = &r->req.req_body;
441 int invalidPassword = 0;
442 EncryptedData enc_data;
443 krb5_enctype aenctype;
449 heim_assert(r->armor_crypto != NULL, "ENC-CHAL called for non FAST");
451 if (_kdc_is_anon_request(b)) {
452 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
453 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0, "ENC-CHALL doesn't support anon");
457 ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
458 pa->padata_value.length,
462 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
463 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
468 pepper1.data = "clientchallengearmor";
469 pepper1.length = strlen(pepper1.data);
470 pepper2.data = "challengelongterm";
471 pepper2.length = strlen(pepper2.data);
473 krb5_crypto_getenctype(r->context, r->armor_crypto, &aenctype);
475 for (i = 0; i < r->client->entry.keys.len; i++) {
476 krb5_crypto challangecrypto, longtermcrypto;
477 krb5_keyblock challangekey;
480 k = &r->client->entry.keys.val[i];
482 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &k->key, 0, &longtermcrypto);
486 ret = krb5_crypto_fx_cf2(r->context, r->armor_crypto, longtermcrypto,
487 &pepper1, &pepper2, aenctype,
489 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, longtermcrypto);
493 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &challangekey, 0,
498 ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData(r->context, challangecrypto,
499 KRB5_KU_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT,
503 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
504 krb5_error_code ret2;
509 ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, k->key.keytype, &str);
512 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decrypt ENC-CHAL -- %s "
513 "(enctype %s) error %s",
514 r->client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype", msg);
515 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
521 ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data,
525 krb5_data_free(&ts_data);
527 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challangecrypto);
528 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
529 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
534 if (labs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > r->context->max_skew) {
535 char client_time[100];
537 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challangecrypto);
539 krb5_format_time(r->context, p.patimestamp,
540 client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
542 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
543 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "Too large time skew, "
544 "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
546 (unsigned)labs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
547 r->context->max_skew,
550 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
554 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
556 ret = make_pa_enc_challange(r->context, &r->outpadata,
558 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challangecrypto);
562 set_salt_padata(&r->outpadata, k->salt);
563 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
564 ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &k->key, &r->reply_key);
571 if (r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
572 r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status(r->context, r->clientdb, r->client,
577 if (invalidPassword && r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status) {
578 r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status(r->context, r->clientdb, r->client,
579 HDB_AUTH_WRONG_PASSWORD);
580 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
583 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
588 static krb5_error_code
589 pa_enc_ts_validate(kdc_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
591 EncryptedData enc_data;
600 ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
601 pa->padata_value.length,
605 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
606 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
611 ret = hdb_enctype2key(r->context, &r->client->entry, NULL,
612 enc_data.etype, &pa_key);
615 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "No key matching entype");
616 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
617 if(krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, enc_data.etype, &estr))
621 "No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s",
622 enc_data.etype, r->client_name);
625 "No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s",
626 estr, r->client_name);
628 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
633 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &pa_key->key, 0, &crypto);
635 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
636 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
637 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
638 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
642 ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (r->context,
644 KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP,
647 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, crypto);
649 * Since the user might have several keys with the same
650 * enctype but with diffrent salting, we need to try all
651 * the keys with the same enctype.
654 krb5_error_code ret2;
655 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
657 ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context,
658 pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
661 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA -- %s "
662 "(enctype %s) error %s",
663 r->client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype", msg);
664 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
667 if(hdb_next_enctype2key(r->context, &r->client->entry, NULL,
668 enc_data.etype, &pa_key) == 0)
671 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
673 if (r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
674 r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status(r->context, r->clientdb, r->client,
675 HDB_AUTH_WRONG_PASSWORD);
677 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
680 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
681 ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data,
685 krb5_data_free(&ts_data);
687 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
688 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
692 if (labs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > r->context->max_skew) {
693 char client_time[100];
695 krb5_format_time(r->context, p.patimestamp,
696 client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
698 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
699 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "Too large time skew, "
700 "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
702 (unsigned)labs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
703 r->context->max_skew,
707 * The following is needed to make windows clients to
708 * retry using the timestamp in the error message, if
709 * there is a e_text, they become unhappy.
712 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
715 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
717 set_salt_padata(&r->outpadata, pa_key->salt);
719 ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &pa_key->key, &r->reply_key);
723 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
726 _kdc_r_log(r, 2, "ENC-TS Pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
727 r->client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype");
741 #define PA_ANNOUNCE 1
742 #define PA_REQ_FAST 2 /* only use inside fast */
743 krb5_error_code (*validate)(kdc_request_t, const PA_DATA *pa);
746 static const struct kdc_patypes pat[] = {
749 KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ, "PK-INIT(ietf)", PA_ANNOUNCE,
753 KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN, "PK-INIT(win2k)", PA_ANNOUNCE,
757 KRB5_PADATA_PKINIT_KX, "Anonymous PK-INIT", PA_ANNOUNCE,
761 { KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ, "PK-INIT(ietf)", 0, NULL },
762 { KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN, "PK-INIT(win2k)", 0, NULL },
763 { KRB5_PADATA_PKINIT_KX, "Anonymous PK-INIT", 0, NULL },
765 { KRB5_PADATA_PA_PK_OCSP_RESPONSE , "OCSP", 0, NULL },
767 KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP , "ENC-TS",
772 KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE , "ENC-CHAL",
773 PA_ANNOUNCE | PA_REQ_FAST,
776 { KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP , "REQ-ENC-PA-REP", 0, NULL },
777 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST, "FX-FAST", PA_ANNOUNCE, NULL },
778 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_ERROR, "FX-ERROR", 0, NULL },
779 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_COOKIE, "FX-COOKIE", 0, NULL }
783 log_patypes(krb5_context context,
784 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
787 struct rk_strpool *p = NULL;
791 for (n = 0; n < padata->len; n++) {
792 for (m = 0; m < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); m++) {
793 if (padata->val[n].padata_type == pat[m].type) {
794 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%s", pat[m].name);
798 if (m == sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]))
799 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", padata->val[n].padata_type);
800 if (p && n + 1 < padata->len)
801 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
803 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "out of memory");
808 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "none");
810 str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
811 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Client sent patypes: %s", str);
820 _kdc_encode_reply(krb5_context context,
821 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
822 krb5_crypto armor_crypto, uint32_t nonce,
823 KDC_REP *rep, EncTicketPart *et, EncKDCRepPart *ek,
825 int skvno, const EncryptionKey *skey,
826 int ckvno, const EncryptionKey *reply_key,
837 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTicketPart, buf, buf_size, et, &len, ret);
839 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
840 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode ticket: %s", msg);
841 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
845 krb5_abortx(context, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
847 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, skey, etype, &crypto);
849 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
850 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
851 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
856 ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
862 &rep->ticket.enc_part);
864 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
866 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
867 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encrypt data: %s", msg);
868 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
874 krb5_keyblock *strengthen_key = NULL;
875 KrbFastFinished finished;
877 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "FAST armor protection");
879 memset(&finished, 0, sizeof(finished));
880 krb5_data_zero(&data);
882 finished.timestamp = kdc_time;
884 finished.crealm = et->crealm;
885 finished.cname = et->cname;
887 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Ticket, data.data, data.length,
888 &rep->ticket, &len, ret);
891 if (data.length != len)
892 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
894 ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, armor_crypto,
895 KRB5_KU_FAST_FINISHED, 0,
896 data.data, data.length,
897 &finished.ticket_checksum);
898 krb5_data_free(&data);
902 ret = _kdc_fast_mk_response(context, armor_crypto,
903 rep->padata, strengthen_key, &finished,
905 free_Checksum(&finished.ticket_checksum);
910 free_METHOD_DATA(rep->padata);
912 rep->padata = calloc(1, sizeof(*(rep->padata)));
913 if (rep->padata == NULL) {
914 krb5_data_free(&data);
919 ret = krb5_padata_add(context, rep->padata,
921 data.data, data.length);
926 * Hide client name of privacy reasons
928 if (1 /* r->fast_options.hide_client_names */) {
929 rep->crealm[0] = '\0';
930 free_PrincipalName(&rep->cname);
931 rep->cname.name_type = 0;
935 if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep && !config->encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep)
936 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncASRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
938 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTGSRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
940 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
941 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
942 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
945 if(buf_size != len) {
947 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
948 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
949 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
951 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, reply_key, 0, &crypto);
953 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
955 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
956 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
959 if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep) {
960 krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
962 KRB5_KU_AS_REP_ENC_PART,
968 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
970 krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
972 rk_is_subkey ? KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SUB_KEY : KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION,
978 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(TGS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
980 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
982 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
983 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
984 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
987 if(buf_size != len) {
989 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
990 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
991 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
994 reply->length = buf_size;
999 * Return 1 if the client have only older enctypes, this is for
1000 * determining if the server should send ETYPE_INFO2 or not.
1004 older_enctype(krb5_enctype enctype)
1007 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
1008 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
1009 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
1010 case ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
1011 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5:
1012 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56:
1014 * The following three is "old" windows enctypes and is needed for
1015 * windows 2000 hosts.
1017 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_MD4:
1018 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD:
1019 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD_EXP:
1030 static krb5_error_code
1031 make_etype_info_entry(krb5_context context,
1032 ETYPE_INFO_ENTRY *ent,
1034 krb5_boolean include_salt)
1036 ent->etype = key->key.keytype;
1037 if (key->salt && include_salt){
1039 ALLOC(ent->salttype);
1041 if(key->salt->type == hdb_pw_salt)
1042 *ent->salttype = 0; /* or 1? or NULL? */
1043 else if(key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt)
1046 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "unknown salt-type: %d",
1048 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1050 /* according to `the specs', we can't send a salt if
1051 we have AFS3 salted key, but that requires that you
1052 *know* what cell you are using (e.g by assuming
1053 that the cell is the same as the realm in lower
1056 ALLOC(ent->salttype);
1057 *ent->salttype = key->salt->type;
1060 * We shouldn't sent salttype since it is incompatible with the
1061 * specification and it breaks windows clients. The afs
1062 * salting problem is solved by using KRB5-PADATA-AFS3-SALT
1063 * implemented in Heimdal 0.7 and later.
1065 ent->salttype = NULL;
1067 krb5_copy_data(context, &key->salt->salt,
1070 /* we return no salt type at all, as that should indicate
1071 * the default salt type and make everybody happy. some
1072 * systems (like w2k) dislike being told the salt type
1075 ent->salttype = NULL;
1081 static krb5_error_code
1082 get_pa_etype_info(krb5_context context,
1083 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1084 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey,
1085 krb5_boolean include_salt)
1087 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
1094 pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
1098 ret = make_etype_info_entry(context, &pa.val[0], ckey, include_salt);
1100 free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
1104 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
1105 free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
1108 ret = realloc_method_data(md);
1113 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO;
1114 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len;
1115 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf;
1123 extern int _krb5_AES_SHA1_string_to_default_iterator;
1124 extern int _krb5_AES_SHA2_string_to_default_iterator;
1126 static krb5_error_code
1127 make_s2kparams(int value, size_t len, krb5_data **ps2kparams)
1129 krb5_data *s2kparams;
1130 krb5_error_code ret;
1133 if (s2kparams == NULL)
1135 ret = krb5_data_alloc(s2kparams, len);
1140 _krb5_put_int(s2kparams->data, value, len);
1141 *ps2kparams = s2kparams;
1145 static krb5_error_code
1146 make_etype_info2_entry(ETYPE_INFO2_ENTRY *ent,
1148 krb5_boolean include_salt)
1150 krb5_error_code ret;
1152 ent->etype = key->key.keytype;
1153 if (key->salt && include_salt) {
1155 if (ent->salt == NULL)
1157 *ent->salt = malloc(key->salt->salt.length + 1);
1158 if (*ent->salt == NULL) {
1163 memcpy(*ent->salt, key->salt->salt.data, key->salt->salt.length);
1164 (*ent->salt)[key->salt->salt.length] = '\0';
1168 ent->s2kparams = NULL;
1170 switch (key->key.keytype) {
1171 case ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
1172 case ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
1173 ret = make_s2kparams(_krb5_AES_SHA1_string_to_default_iterator,
1174 4, &ent->s2kparams);
1176 case KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128:
1177 case KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192:
1178 ret = make_s2kparams(_krb5_AES_SHA2_string_to_default_iterator,
1179 4, &ent->s2kparams);
1181 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
1182 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
1183 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
1184 /* Check if this was a AFS3 salted key */
1185 if(key->salt && key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt)
1186 ret = make_s2kparams(1, 1, &ent->s2kparams);
1198 * Return an ETYPE-INFO2. Enctypes are storted the same way as in the
1199 * database (client supported enctypes first, then the unsupported
1203 static krb5_error_code
1204 get_pa_etype_info2(krb5_context context,
1205 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1206 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey,
1207 krb5_boolean include_salt)
1209 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
1215 pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
1219 ret = make_etype_info2_entry(&pa.val[0], ckey, include_salt);
1221 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
1225 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO2, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
1226 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
1229 ret = realloc_method_data(md);
1234 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO2;
1235 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len;
1236 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf;
1241 newer_enctype_present(struct KDC_REQ_BODY_etype *etype_list)
1245 for (i = 0; i < etype_list->len; i++) {
1246 if (!older_enctype(etype_list->val[i]))
1252 static krb5_error_code
1253 get_pa_etype_info_both(krb5_context context,
1254 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1255 struct KDC_REQ_BODY_etype *etype_list,
1256 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey,
1257 krb5_boolean include_salt)
1259 krb5_error_code ret;
1263 * When the AS server is to include pre-authentication data in a
1264 * KRB-ERROR or in an AS-REP, it MUST use PA-ETYPE-INFO2, not
1265 * PA-ETYPE-INFO, if the etype field of the client's AS-REQ lists
1266 * at least one "newer" encryption type. Otherwise (when the etype
1267 * field of the client's AS-REQ does not list any "newer" encryption
1268 * types), it MUST send both PA-ETYPE-INFO2 and PA-ETYPE-INFO (both
1269 * with an entry for each enctype). A "newer" enctype is any enctype
1270 * first officially specified concurrently with or subsequent to the
1271 * issue of this RFC. The enctypes DES, 3DES, or RC4 and any defined
1272 * in [RFC1510] are not "newer" enctypes.
1274 * It goes on to state:
1275 * The preferred ordering of the "hint" pre-authentication data that
1276 * affect client key selection is: ETYPE-INFO2, followed by ETYPE-INFO,
1277 * followed by PW-SALT. As noted in Section 3.1.3, a KDC MUST NOT send
1278 * ETYPE-INFO or PW-SALT when the client's AS-REQ includes at least one
1282 ret = get_pa_etype_info2(context, config, md, ckey, include_salt);
1286 if (!newer_enctype_present(etype_list))
1287 ret = get_pa_etype_info(context, config, md, ckey, include_salt);
1297 log_as_req(krb5_context context,
1298 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1299 krb5_enctype cetype,
1300 krb5_enctype setype,
1301 const KDC_REQ_BODY *b)
1303 krb5_error_code ret;
1304 struct rk_strpool *p;
1308 p = rk_strpoolprintf(NULL, "%s", "Client supported enctypes: ");
1310 for (i = 0; i < b->etype.len; i++) {
1311 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, b->etype.val[i], &str);
1313 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%s", str);
1316 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", b->etype.val[i]);
1317 if (p && i + 1 < b->etype.len)
1318 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
1320 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "out of memory");
1325 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "no encryption types");
1331 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, cetype, &cet);
1333 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, setype, &set);
1335 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using %s/%s", cet, set);
1341 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using enctypes %d/%d",
1345 str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
1346 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s", str);
1351 unparse_flags(KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options), asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
1352 fixedstr, sizeof(fixedstr));
1354 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Requested flags: %s", fixedstr);
1359 * verify the flags on `client' and `server', returning 0
1360 * if they are OK and generating an error messages and returning
1361 * and error code otherwise.
1365 kdc_check_flags(krb5_context context,
1366 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1367 hdb_entry_ex *client_ex, const char *client_name,
1368 hdb_entry_ex *server_ex, const char *server_name,
1369 krb5_boolean is_as_req)
1371 if(client_ex != NULL) {
1372 hdb_entry *client = &client_ex->entry;
1375 if (client->flags.locked_out) {
1376 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1377 "Client (%s) is locked out", client_name);
1378 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1381 if (client->flags.invalid) {
1382 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1383 "Client (%s) has invalid bit set", client_name);
1384 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1387 if(!client->flags.client){
1388 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1389 "Principal may not act as client -- %s", client_name);
1390 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1393 if (client->valid_start && *client->valid_start > kdc_time) {
1394 char starttime_str[100];
1395 krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_start,
1396 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
1397 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1398 "Client not yet valid until %s -- %s",
1399 starttime_str, client_name);
1400 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
1403 if (client->valid_end && *client->valid_end < kdc_time) {
1404 char endtime_str[100];
1405 krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_end,
1406 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
1407 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1408 "Client expired at %s -- %s",
1409 endtime_str, client_name);
1410 return KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP;
1413 if (client->flags.require_pwchange &&
1414 (server_ex == NULL || !server_ex->entry.flags.change_pw)) {
1415 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1416 "Client's key must be changed -- %s", client_name);
1417 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
1420 if (client->pw_end && *client->pw_end < kdc_time
1421 && (server_ex == NULL || !server_ex->entry.flags.change_pw)) {
1422 char pwend_str[100];
1423 krb5_format_time(context, *client->pw_end,
1424 pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
1425 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1426 "Client's key has expired at %s -- %s",
1427 pwend_str, client_name);
1428 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
1434 if (server_ex != NULL) {
1435 hdb_entry *server = &server_ex->entry;
1437 if (server->flags.locked_out) {
1438 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1439 "Client server locked out -- %s", server_name);
1440 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1442 if (server->flags.invalid) {
1443 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1444 "Server has invalid flag set -- %s", server_name);
1445 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1448 if(!server->flags.server){
1449 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1450 "Principal may not act as server -- %s", server_name);
1451 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1454 if(!is_as_req && server->flags.initial) {
1455 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1456 "AS-REQ is required for server -- %s", server_name);
1457 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1460 if (server->valid_start && *server->valid_start > kdc_time) {
1461 char starttime_str[100];
1462 krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_start,
1463 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
1464 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1465 "Server not yet valid until %s -- %s",
1466 starttime_str, server_name);
1467 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET;
1470 if (server->valid_end && *server->valid_end < kdc_time) {
1471 char endtime_str[100];
1472 krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_end,
1473 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
1474 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1475 "Server expired at %s -- %s",
1476 endtime_str, server_name);
1477 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP;
1480 if (server->pw_end && *server->pw_end < kdc_time) {
1481 char pwend_str[100];
1482 krb5_format_time(context, *server->pw_end,
1483 pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
1484 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1485 "Server's key has expired at -- %s",
1486 pwend_str, server_name);
1487 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
1494 * Return TRUE if `from' is part of `addresses' taking into consideration
1495 * the configuration variables that tells us how strict we should be about
1500 _kdc_check_addresses(krb5_context context,
1501 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1502 HostAddresses *addresses, const struct sockaddr *from)
1504 krb5_error_code ret;
1506 krb5_boolean result;
1507 krb5_boolean only_netbios = TRUE;
1510 if(config->check_ticket_addresses == 0)
1513 if(addresses == NULL)
1514 return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
1516 for (i = 0; i < addresses->len; ++i) {
1517 if (addresses->val[i].addr_type != KRB5_ADDRESS_NETBIOS) {
1518 only_netbios = FALSE;
1522 /* Windows sends it's netbios name, which I can only assume is
1523 * used for the 'allowed workstations' check. This is painful,
1524 * but we still want to check IP addresses if they happen to be
1529 return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
1531 ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (context, from, &addr);
1535 result = krb5_address_search(context, &addr, addresses);
1536 krb5_free_address (context, &addr);
1545 send_pac_p(krb5_context context, KDC_REQ *req)
1547 krb5_error_code ret;
1548 PA_PAC_REQUEST pacreq;
1552 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PA_PAC_REQUEST);
1556 ret = decode_PA_PAC_REQUEST(pa->padata_value.data,
1557 pa->padata_value.length,
1562 i = pacreq.include_pac;
1563 free_PA_PAC_REQUEST(&pacreq);
1573 static krb5_error_code
1574 generate_pac(kdc_request_t r, Key *skey)
1576 krb5_error_code ret;
1580 ret = _kdc_pac_generate(r->context, r->client, &p);
1582 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
1589 ret = _krb5_pac_sign(r->context, p, r->et.authtime,
1590 r->client->entry.principal,
1591 &skey->key, /* Server key */
1592 &skey->key, /* FIXME: should be krbtgt key */
1594 krb5_pac_free(r->context, p);
1596 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
1601 ret = _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(r->context, &r->et,
1602 KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC,
1604 krb5_data_free(&data);
1614 _kdc_is_anonymous(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal principal)
1616 return krb5_principal_is_anonymous(context, principal, KRB5_ANON_MATCH_ANY);
1620 require_preauth_p(kdc_request_t r)
1622 return r->config->require_preauth
1623 || r->client->entry.flags.require_preauth
1624 || r->server->entry.flags.require_preauth;
1632 static krb5_error_code
1633 add_enc_pa_rep(kdc_request_t r)
1635 krb5_error_code ret;
1641 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &r->reply_key, 0, &crypto);
1645 ret = krb5_create_checksum(r->context, crypto,
1647 r->request.data, r->request.length,
1649 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, crypto);
1653 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Checksum, cdata.data, cdata.length,
1654 &checksum, &len, ret);
1655 free_Checksum(&checksum);
1658 heim_assert(cdata.length == len, "ASN.1 internal error");
1660 if (r->ek.encrypted_pa_data == NULL) {
1661 ALLOC(r->ek.encrypted_pa_data);
1662 if (r->ek.encrypted_pa_data == NULL)
1665 ret = krb5_padata_add(r->context, r->ek.encrypted_pa_data,
1666 KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP, cdata.data, cdata.length);
1670 return krb5_padata_add(r->context, r->ek.encrypted_pa_data,
1671 KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST, NULL, 0);
1679 _kdc_as_rep(kdc_request_t r,
1682 struct sockaddr *from_addr,
1685 krb5_context context = r->context;
1686 krb5_kdc_configuration *config = r->config;
1687 KDC_REQ *req = &r->req;
1688 KDC_REQ_BODY *b = NULL;
1691 krb5_enctype setype;
1692 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
1695 int i, flags = HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ;
1696 METHOD_DATA error_method;
1698 krb5_boolean is_tgs;
1700 memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
1701 error_method.len = 0;
1702 error_method.val = NULL;
1705 * Look for FAST armor and unwrap
1707 ret = _kdc_fast_unwrap_request(r);
1709 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "FAST unwrap request from %s failed: %d", from, ret);
1717 flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
1719 if(b->sname == NULL){
1720 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1721 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "No server in request");
1723 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
1728 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->server_princ, &r->server_name);
1731 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1732 "AS-REQ malformed server name from %s", from);
1735 if(b->cname == NULL){
1736 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1737 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "No client in request");
1739 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
1746 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->client_princ, &r->client_name);
1749 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1750 "AS-REQ malformed client name from %s", from);
1754 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s",
1755 r->client_name, from, r->server_name);
1757 is_tgs = krb5_principal_is_krbtgt(context, r->server_princ);
1763 if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context, r->client_princ)) {
1764 if (!_kdc_is_anon_request(b)) {
1765 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Anonymous client w/o anonymous flag");
1766 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1775 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, r->client_princ,
1776 HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags, NULL,
1777 &r->clientdb, &r->client);
1778 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1779 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "client %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy",
1782 } else if (ret == HDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM) {
1783 char *fixed_client_name = NULL;
1785 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->client->entry.principal,
1786 &fixed_client_name);
1791 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "WRONG_REALM - %s -> %s",
1792 r->client_name, fixed_client_name);
1793 free(fixed_client_name);
1795 ret = _kdc_fast_mk_error(context, r,
1799 KRB5_KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM,
1803 &r->client->entry.principal->realm,
1808 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1809 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r->client_name, msg);
1810 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1811 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1814 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, r->server_princ,
1815 HDB_F_GET_SERVER | flags | (is_tgs ? HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT : 0),
1816 NULL, NULL, &r->server);
1817 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1818 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy",
1822 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1823 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r->server_name, msg);
1824 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1825 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1830 * Select a session enctype from the list of the crypto system
1831 * supported enctypes that is supported by the client and is one of
1832 * the enctype of the enctype of the service (likely krbtgt).
1834 * The latter is used as a hint of what enctypes all KDC support,
1835 * to make sure a newer version of KDC won't generate a session
1836 * enctype that an older version of a KDC in the same realm can't
1840 ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
1841 is_tgs ? config->tgt_use_strongest_session_key
1842 : config->svc_use_strongest_session_key,
1843 FALSE, r->client, r->client_princ,
1844 b->etype.val, b->etype.len,
1845 &r->sessionetype, NULL, NULL);
1847 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1848 "Client (%s) from %s has no common enctypes with KDC "
1849 "to use for the session key",
1850 r->client_name, from);
1855 * Pre-auth processing
1861 log_patypes(context, config, req->padata);
1863 /* Check if preauth matching */
1865 for (n = 0; !found_pa && n < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); n++) {
1866 if (pat[n].validate == NULL)
1868 if (r->armor_crypto == NULL && (pat[n].flags & PA_REQ_FAST))
1871 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1872 "Looking for %s pa-data -- %s", pat[n].name, r->client_name);
1874 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, pat[n].type);
1876 ret = pat[n].validate(r, pa);
1878 krb5_error_code ret2;
1880 krb5_boolean default_salt;
1883 * If there is a client key, send ETYPE_INFO{,2}
1885 ret2 = _kdc_find_etype(context,
1886 config->preauth_use_strongest_session_key,
1887 TRUE, r->client, r->client_princ, b->etype.val,
1888 b->etype.len, NULL, &ckey, &default_salt);
1890 ret2 = get_pa_etype_info_both(context, config, &b->etype,
1891 &error_method, ckey, !default_salt);
1897 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1898 "%s pre-authentication succeeded -- %s",
1899 pat[n].name, r->client_name);
1901 r->et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
1906 if (found_pa == 0) {
1909 krb5_boolean default_salt;
1911 for (n = 0; n < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); n++) {
1912 if ((pat[n].flags & PA_ANNOUNCE) == 0)
1914 ret = krb5_padata_add(context, &error_method,
1915 pat[n].type, NULL, 0);
1921 * If there is a client key, send ETYPE_INFO{,2}
1923 ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
1924 config->preauth_use_strongest_session_key, TRUE,
1925 r->client, r->client_princ,
1926 b->etype.val, b->etype.len, NULL,
1927 &ckey, &default_salt);
1929 ret = get_pa_etype_info_both(context, config, &b->etype,
1930 &error_method, ckey, !default_salt);
1936 * send requre preauth is its required or anon is requested,
1937 * anon is today only allowed via preauth mechanisms.
1939 if (require_preauth_p(r) || _kdc_is_anon_request(b)) {
1940 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
1941 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/PA-PK-AS-REQ");
1946 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
1947 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Doesn't have a client key available");
1950 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
1951 ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &ckey->key, &r->reply_key);
1956 if (r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status) {
1957 r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status(context, r->clientdb, r->client,
1962 * Verify flags after the user been required to prove its identity
1963 * with in a preauth mech.
1966 ret = _kdc_check_access(context, config, r->client, r->client_name,
1967 r->server, r->server_name,
1968 req, &error_method);
1973 * Select the best encryption type for the KDC with out regard to
1974 * the client since the client never needs to read that data.
1977 ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config,
1978 r->server, r->server_name,
1983 if(f.renew || f.validate || f.proxy || f.forwarded || f.enc_tkt_in_skey
1984 || (_kdc_is_anon_request(b) && !config->allow_anonymous)) {
1985 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1986 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Bad KDC options");
1995 rep.msg_type = krb_as_rep;
1997 if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context, r->client_princ)) {
1998 Realm anon_realm = KRB5_ANON_REALM;
1999 ret = copy_Realm(&anon_realm, &rep.crealm);
2000 } else if (f.canonicalize || r->client->entry.flags.force_canonicalize)
2001 ret = copy_Realm(&r->client->entry.principal->realm, &rep.crealm);
2003 ret = copy_Realm(&r->client_princ->realm, &rep.crealm);
2006 if (_kdc_is_anon_request(b))
2007 ret = _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname(&rep.cname);
2008 else if (f.canonicalize || r->client->entry.flags.force_canonicalize)
2009 ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname, r->client->entry.principal);
2011 ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname, r->client_princ);
2015 rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
2016 if (f.canonicalize || r->server->entry.flags.force_canonicalize)
2017 ret = copy_Realm(&r->server->entry.principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
2019 ret = copy_Realm(&r->server_princ->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
2022 if (f.canonicalize || r->server->entry.flags.force_canonicalize)
2023 _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname,
2024 r->server->entry.principal);
2026 _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname,
2028 /* java 1.6 expects the name to be the same type, lets allow that
2029 * uncomplicated name-types. */
2030 #define CNT(sp,t) (((sp)->sname->name_type) == KRB5_NT_##t)
2031 if (CNT(b, UNKNOWN) || CNT(b, PRINCIPAL) || CNT(b, SRV_INST) || CNT(b, SRV_HST) || CNT(b, SRV_XHST))
2032 rep.ticket.sname.name_type = b->sname->name_type;
2035 r->et.flags.initial = 1;
2036 if(r->client->entry.flags.forwardable && r->server->entry.flags.forwardable)
2037 r->et.flags.forwardable = f.forwardable;
2038 else if (f.forwardable) {
2039 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be forwardable");
2040 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
2043 if(r->client->entry.flags.proxiable && r->server->entry.flags.proxiable)
2044 r->et.flags.proxiable = f.proxiable;
2045 else if (f.proxiable) {
2046 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be proxiable");
2047 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
2050 if(r->client->entry.flags.postdate && r->server->entry.flags.postdate)
2051 r->et.flags.may_postdate = f.allow_postdate;
2052 else if (f.allow_postdate){
2053 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be postdate");
2054 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
2058 /* check for valid set of addresses */
2059 if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context, config, b->addresses, from_addr)) {
2060 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Bad address list in requested");
2061 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
2065 ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep.cname, &r->et.cname);
2068 ret = copy_Realm(&rep.crealm, &r->et.crealm);
2076 start = r->et.authtime = kdc_time;
2078 if(f.postdated && req->req_body.from){
2079 ALLOC(r->et.starttime);
2080 start = *r->et.starttime = *req->req_body.from;
2081 r->et.flags.invalid = 1;
2082 r->et.flags.postdated = 1; /* XXX ??? */
2084 _kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
2087 /* be careful not overflowing */
2089 if(r->client->entry.max_life)
2090 t = start + min(t - start, *r->client->entry.max_life);
2091 if(r->server->entry.max_life)
2092 t = start + min(t - start, *r->server->entry.max_life);
2094 t = min(t, start + realm->max_life);
2097 if(f.renewable_ok && r->et.endtime < *b->till){
2099 if(b->rtime == NULL){
2103 if(*b->rtime < *b->till)
2104 *b->rtime = *b->till;
2106 if(f.renewable && b->rtime){
2110 if(r->client->entry.max_renew)
2111 t = start + min(t - start, *r->client->entry.max_renew);
2112 if(r->server->entry.max_renew)
2113 t = start + min(t - start, *r->server->entry.max_renew);
2115 t = min(t, start + realm->max_renew);
2117 ALLOC(r->et.renew_till);
2118 *r->et.renew_till = t;
2119 r->et.flags.renewable = 1;
2123 if (_kdc_is_anon_request(b))
2124 r->et.flags.anonymous = 1;
2128 copy_HostAddresses(b->addresses, r->et.caddr);
2131 r->et.transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
2132 krb5_data_zero(&r->et.transited.contents);
2134 /* The MIT ASN.1 library (obviously) doesn't tell lengths encoded
2135 * as 0 and as 0x80 (meaning indefinite length) apart, and is thus
2136 * incapable of correctly decoding SEQUENCE OF's of zero length.
2138 * To fix this, always send at least one no-op last_req
2140 * If there's a pw_end or valid_end we will use that,
2141 * otherwise just a dummy lr.
2143 r->ek.last_req.val = malloc(2 * sizeof(*r->ek.last_req.val));
2144 if (r->ek.last_req.val == NULL) {
2148 r->ek.last_req.len = 0;
2149 if (r->client->entry.pw_end
2150 && (config->kdc_warn_pwexpire == 0
2151 || kdc_time + config->kdc_warn_pwexpire >= *r->client->entry.pw_end)) {
2152 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_PW_EXPTIME;
2153 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *r->client->entry.pw_end;
2154 ++r->ek.last_req.len;
2156 if (r->client->entry.valid_end) {
2157 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_ACCT_EXPTIME;
2158 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *r->client->entry.valid_end;
2159 ++r->ek.last_req.len;
2161 if (r->ek.last_req.len == 0) {
2162 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_NONE;
2163 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = 0;
2164 ++r->ek.last_req.len;
2166 r->ek.nonce = b->nonce;
2167 if (r->client->entry.valid_end || r->client->entry.pw_end) {
2168 ALLOC(r->ek.key_expiration);
2169 if (r->client->entry.valid_end) {
2170 if (r->client->entry.pw_end)
2171 *r->ek.key_expiration = min(*r->client->entry.valid_end,
2172 *r->client->entry.pw_end);
2174 *r->ek.key_expiration = *r->client->entry.valid_end;
2176 *r->ek.key_expiration = *r->client->entry.pw_end;
2178 r->ek.key_expiration = NULL;
2179 r->ek.flags = r->et.flags;
2180 r->ek.authtime = r->et.authtime;
2181 if (r->et.starttime) {
2182 ALLOC(r->ek.starttime);
2183 *r->ek.starttime = *r->et.starttime;
2185 r->ek.endtime = r->et.endtime;
2186 if (r->et.renew_till) {
2187 ALLOC(r->ek.renew_till);
2188 *r->ek.renew_till = *r->et.renew_till;
2190 ret = copy_Realm(&rep.ticket.realm, &r->ek.srealm);
2193 ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep.ticket.sname, &r->ek.sname);
2198 copy_HostAddresses(r->et.caddr, r->ek.caddr);
2202 * Check and session and reply keys
2205 if (r->session_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) {
2206 ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, r->sessionetype, &r->session_key);
2211 if (r->reply_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) {
2212 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Client have no reply key");
2213 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
2217 ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&r->session_key, &r->et.key);
2221 ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&r->session_key, &r->ek.key);
2225 if (r->outpadata.len) {
2228 if (rep.padata == NULL) {
2232 ret = copy_METHOD_DATA(&r->outpadata, rep.padata);
2238 if (send_pac_p(context, req) && !_kdc_is_anon_request(b)) {
2239 generate_pac(r, skey);
2242 _kdc_log_timestamp(context, config, "AS-REQ", r->et.authtime, r->et.starttime,
2243 r->et.endtime, r->et.renew_till);
2246 krb5_principal client_principal;
2248 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context, &client_principal,
2249 rep.cname, rep.crealm);
2253 /* do this as the last thing since this signs the EncTicketPart */
2254 ret = _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(context,
2262 krb5_free_principal(context, client_principal);
2267 log_as_req(context, config, r->reply_key.keytype, setype, b);
2270 * We always say we support FAST/enc-pa-rep
2273 r->et.flags.enc_pa_rep = r->ek.flags.enc_pa_rep = 1;
2276 * Add REQ_ENC_PA_REP if client supports it
2280 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP);
2283 ret = add_enc_pa_rep(r);
2285 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
2286 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "add_enc_pa_rep failed: %s: %d", msg, ret);
2287 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
2296 ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config,
2297 r->armor_crypto, req->req_body.nonce,
2298 &rep, &r->et, &r->ek, setype, r->server->entry.kvno,
2299 &skey->key, r->client->entry.kvno,
2300 &r->reply_key, 0, &r->e_text, reply);
2305 * Check if message too large
2307 if (datagram_reply && reply->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) {
2308 krb5_data_free(reply);
2309 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG;
2310 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Reply packet too large");
2317 * In case of a non proxy error, build an error message.
2319 if (ret != 0 && ret != HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE && reply->length == 0) {
2320 ret = _kdc_fast_mk_error(context, r,
2327 &r->client_princ->name : NULL,
2329 &r->client_princ->realm : NULL,
2336 free_EncTicketPart(&r->et);
2337 free_EncKDCRepPart(&r->ek);
2338 free_KDCFastState(&r->fast);
2340 if (error_method.len)
2341 free_METHOD_DATA(&error_method);
2342 if (r->outpadata.len)
2343 free_METHOD_DATA(&r->outpadata);
2344 if (r->client_princ) {
2345 krb5_free_principal(context, r->client_princ);
2346 r->client_princ = NULL;
2348 if (r->client_name) {
2349 free(r->client_name);
2350 r->client_name = NULL;
2352 if (r->server_princ){
2353 krb5_free_principal(context, r->server_princ);
2354 r->server_princ = NULL;
2356 if (r->server_name) {
2357 free(r->server_name);
2358 r->server_name = NULL;
2361 _kdc_free_ent(context, r->client);
2363 _kdc_free_ent(context, r->server);
2364 if (r->armor_crypto) {
2365 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, r->armor_crypto);
2366 r->armor_crypto = NULL;
2368 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
2369 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->session_key);
2374 * Add the AuthorizationData `data´ of `type´ to the last element in
2375 * the sequence of authorization_data in `tkt´ wrapped in an IF_RELEVANT
2379 _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(krb5_context context,
2382 const krb5_data *data)
2384 krb5_error_code ret;
2387 if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
2388 tkt->authorization_data = calloc(1, sizeof(*tkt->authorization_data));
2389 if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
2390 krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOMEM, "out of memory");
2395 /* add the entry to the last element */
2397 AuthorizationData ad = { 0, NULL };
2398 AuthorizationDataElement ade;
2401 ade.ad_data = *data;
2403 ret = add_AuthorizationData(&ad, &ade);
2405 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "add AuthorizationData failed");
2409 ade.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT;
2411 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthorizationData,
2412 ade.ad_data.data, ade.ad_data.length,
2414 free_AuthorizationData(&ad);
2416 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "ASN.1 encode of "
2417 "AuthorizationData failed");
2420 if (ade.ad_data.length != size)
2421 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
2423 ret = add_AuthorizationData(tkt->authorization_data, &ade);
2424 der_free_octet_string(&ade.ad_data);
2426 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "add AuthorizationData failed");
2435 _kdc_is_anon_request(const KDC_REQ_BODY *b)
2437 /* some versions of heimdal use bit 14 instead of 16 for
2438 request_anonymous, as indicated in the anonymous draft prior to
2439 version 11. Bit 14 is assigned to S4U2Proxy, but all S4U2Proxy
2440 requests will have a second ticket; don't consider those anonymous */
2441 return (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous ||
2442 (b->kdc_options.cname_in_addl_tkt && !b->additional_tickets));