2 * Copyright (c) 1997-2007 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
3 * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
17 * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
18 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
19 * without specific prior written permission.
21 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
22 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
23 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
24 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
25 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
26 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
27 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
28 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
29 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
30 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
36 #define MAX_TIME ((time_t)((1U << 31) - 1))
39 _kdc_fix_time(time_t **t)
45 if(**t == 0) **t = MAX_TIME; /* fix for old clients */
49 realloc_method_data(METHOD_DATA *md)
52 pa = realloc(md->val, (md->len + 1) * sizeof(*md->val));
61 set_salt_padata(METHOD_DATA *md, Salt *salt)
64 realloc_method_data(md);
65 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = salt->type;
66 der_copy_octet_string(&salt->salt,
67 &md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value);
72 _kdc_find_padata(const KDC_REQ *req, int *start, int type)
74 if (req->padata == NULL)
77 while((size_t)*start < req->padata->len){
79 if(req->padata->val[*start - 1].padata_type == (unsigned)type)
80 return &req->padata->val[*start - 1];
86 * This is a hack to allow predefined weak services, like afs to
87 * still use weak types
91 _kdc_is_weak_exception(krb5_principal principal, krb5_enctype etype)
93 if (principal->name.name_string.len > 0 &&
94 strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "afs") == 0 &&
95 (etype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
96 || etype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4
97 || etype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5))
104 * Detect if `key' is the using the the precomputed `default_salt'.
108 is_default_salt_p(const krb5_salt *default_salt, const Key *key)
110 if (key->salt == NULL)
112 if (default_salt->salttype != key->salt->type)
114 if (krb5_data_cmp(&default_salt->saltvalue, &key->salt->salt))
120 * return the first appropriate key of `princ' in `ret_key'. Look for
121 * all the etypes in (`etypes', `len'), stopping as soon as we find
122 * one, but preferring one that has default salt.
126 _kdc_find_etype(krb5_context context, krb5_boolean use_strongest_session_key,
127 krb5_boolean is_preauth, hdb_entry_ex *princ,
128 krb5_principal request_princ, krb5_enctype *etypes, unsigned len,
129 krb5_enctype *ret_enctype, Key **ret_key,
130 krb5_boolean *ret_default_salt)
134 krb5_enctype enctype = (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL;
135 const krb5_enctype *p;
139 /* We'll want to avoid keys with v4 salted keys in the pre-auth case... */
140 ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context, request_princ, &def_salt);
144 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
146 if (use_strongest_session_key) {
149 * Pick the strongest key that the KDC, target service, and
150 * client all support, using the local cryptosystem enctype
151 * list in strongest-to-weakest order to drive the search.
153 * This is not what RFC4120 says to do, but it encourages
154 * adoption of stronger enctypes. This doesn't play well with
155 * clients that have multiple Kerberos client implementations
156 * available with different supported enctype lists.
159 /* drive the search with local supported enctypes list */
160 p = krb5_kerberos_enctypes(context);
162 p[i] != (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL && enctype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL;
164 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, p[i]) != 0 &&
165 !_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->entry.principal, p[i]))
168 /* check that the client supports it too */
169 for (k = 0; k < len && enctype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL; k++) {
171 if (p[i] != etypes[k])
174 /* check target princ support */
176 while (hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, NULL,
178 if (key->key.keyvalue.length == 0) {
179 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
184 if (is_preauth && ret_key != NULL &&
185 !is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
192 * Pick the first key from the client's enctype list that is
193 * supported by the cryptosystem and by the given principal.
195 * RFC4120 says we SHOULD pick the first _strong_ key from the
196 * client's list... not the first key... If the admin disallows
197 * weak enctypes in krb5.conf and selects this key selection
198 * algorithm, then we get exactly what RFC4120 says.
200 for(i = 0; ret != 0 && i < len; i++) {
202 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[i]) != 0 &&
203 !_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->entry.principal, etypes[i]))
208 hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, NULL,
209 etypes[i], &key) == 0) {
210 if (key->key.keyvalue.length == 0) {
211 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
216 if (is_preauth && ret_key != NULL &&
217 !is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
223 if (enctype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL) {
225 * if the service principal is one for which there is a known 1DES
226 * exception and no other enctype matches both the client request and
227 * the service key list, provide a DES-CBC-CRC key.
229 if (ret_key == NULL &&
230 _kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->entry.principal, ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC)) {
232 enctype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC;
234 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
239 if (ret_enctype != NULL)
240 *ret_enctype = enctype;
243 if (ret_default_salt != NULL)
244 *ret_default_salt = is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key);
247 krb5_free_salt (context, def_salt);
252 _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname (PrincipalName *pn)
254 pn->name_type = KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL;
255 pn->name_string.len = 1;
256 pn->name_string.val = malloc(sizeof(*pn->name_string.val));
257 if (pn->name_string.val == NULL)
259 pn->name_string.val[0] = strdup("anonymous");
260 if (pn->name_string.val[0] == NULL) {
261 free(pn->name_string.val);
262 pn->name_string.val = NULL;
269 _kdc_r_log(kdc_request_t r, int level, const char *fmt, ...)
274 s = kdc_log_msg_va(r->context, r->config, level, fmt, ap);
280 _kdc_set_e_text(kdc_request_t r, const char *e_text)
283 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0, "%s", e_text);
287 _kdc_log_timestamp(krb5_context context,
288 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
290 KerberosTime authtime, KerberosTime *starttime,
291 KerberosTime endtime, KerberosTime *renew_till)
293 char authtime_str[100], starttime_str[100],
294 endtime_str[100], renewtime_str[100];
296 krb5_format_time(context, authtime,
297 authtime_str, sizeof(authtime_str), TRUE);
299 krb5_format_time(context, *starttime,
300 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
302 strlcpy(starttime_str, "unset", sizeof(starttime_str));
303 krb5_format_time(context, endtime,
304 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
306 krb5_format_time(context, *renew_till,
307 renewtime_str, sizeof(renewtime_str), TRUE);
309 strlcpy(renewtime_str, "unset", sizeof(renewtime_str));
311 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
312 "%s authtime: %s starttime: %s endtime: %s renew till: %s",
313 type, authtime_str, starttime_str, endtime_str, renewtime_str);
322 static krb5_error_code
323 pa_pkinit_validate(kdc_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
325 pk_client_params *pkp = NULL;
326 char *client_cert = NULL;
329 ret = _kdc_pk_rd_padata(r->context, r->config, &r->req, pa, r->client, &pkp);
330 if (ret || pkp == NULL) {
331 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
332 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PKINIT PA-DATA -- %s",
337 ret = _kdc_pk_check_client(r->context,
344 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "PKINIT certificate not allowed to "
345 "impersonate principal");
349 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "PKINIT pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
350 r->client_name, client_cert);
353 ret = _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(r->context, r->config, pkp, r->client,
354 r->sessionetype, &r->req, &r->request,
355 &r->reply_key, &r->session_key, &r->outpadata);
357 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Failed to build PK-INIT reply");
361 ret = _kdc_add_initial_verified_cas(r->context, r->config,
366 _kdc_pk_free_client_param(r->context, pkp);
377 static krb5_error_code
378 make_pa_enc_challange(krb5_context context, METHOD_DATA *md,
385 EncryptedData encdata;
390 krb5_us_timeofday (context, &p.patimestamp, &usec);
394 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ENC_TS_ENC, buf, buf_size, &p, &len, ret);
398 krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
400 ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
402 KRB5_KU_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC,
411 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncryptedData, buf, buf_size, &encdata, &len, ret);
412 free_EncryptedData(&encdata);
416 krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
418 ret = krb5_padata_add(context, md, KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE, buf, len);
424 static krb5_error_code
425 pa_enc_chal_validate(kdc_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
427 krb5_data pepper1, pepper2, ts_data;
428 KDC_REQ_BODY *b = &r->req.req_body;
429 int invalidPassword = 0;
430 EncryptedData enc_data;
431 krb5_enctype aenctype;
437 heim_assert(r->armor_crypto != NULL, "ENC-CHAL called for non FAST");
439 if (_kdc_is_anon_request(b)) {
440 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
441 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0, "ENC-CHALL doesn't support anon");
445 ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
446 pa->padata_value.length,
450 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
451 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
456 pepper1.data = "clientchallengearmor";
457 pepper1.length = strlen(pepper1.data);
458 pepper2.data = "challengelongterm";
459 pepper2.length = strlen(pepper2.data);
461 krb5_crypto_getenctype(r->context, r->armor_crypto, &aenctype);
463 for (i = 0; i < r->client->entry.keys.len; i++) {
464 krb5_crypto challangecrypto, longtermcrypto;
465 krb5_keyblock challangekey;
468 k = &r->client->entry.keys.val[i];
470 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &k->key, 0, &longtermcrypto);
474 ret = krb5_crypto_fx_cf2(r->context, r->armor_crypto, longtermcrypto,
475 &pepper1, &pepper2, aenctype,
477 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, longtermcrypto);
481 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &challangekey, 0,
486 ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData(r->context, challangecrypto,
487 KRB5_KU_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT,
491 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
492 krb5_error_code ret2;
497 ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, k->key.keytype, &str);
500 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decrypt ENC-CHAL -- %s "
501 "(enctype %s) error %s",
502 r->client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype", msg);
503 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
509 ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data,
513 krb5_data_free(&ts_data);
515 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challangecrypto);
516 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
517 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
522 if (labs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > r->context->max_skew) {
523 char client_time[100];
525 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challangecrypto);
527 krb5_format_time(r->context, p.patimestamp,
528 client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
530 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
531 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "Too large time skew, "
532 "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
534 (unsigned)labs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
535 r->context->max_skew,
538 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
542 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
544 ret = make_pa_enc_challange(r->context, &r->outpadata,
546 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challangecrypto);
550 set_salt_padata(&r->outpadata, k->salt);
551 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
552 ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &k->key, &r->reply_key);
559 if (r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
560 r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status(r->context, r->clientdb, r->client,
565 if (invalidPassword && r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status) {
566 r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status(r->context, r->clientdb, r->client,
567 HDB_AUTH_WRONG_PASSWORD);
568 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
571 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
576 static krb5_error_code
577 pa_enc_ts_validate(kdc_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
579 EncryptedData enc_data;
588 if (_kdc_is_anon_request(&r->req.req_body)) {
589 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
590 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "ENC-TS doesn't support anon");
594 ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
595 pa->padata_value.length,
599 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
600 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
605 ret = hdb_enctype2key(r->context, &r->client->entry, NULL,
606 enc_data.etype, &pa_key);
609 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "No key matching entype");
610 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
611 if(krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, enc_data.etype, &estr))
615 "No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s",
616 enc_data.etype, r->client_name);
619 "No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s",
620 estr, r->client_name);
622 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
627 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &pa_key->key, 0, &crypto);
629 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
630 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
631 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
632 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
636 ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (r->context,
638 KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP,
641 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, crypto);
643 * Since the user might have several keys with the same
644 * enctype but with diffrent salting, we need to try all
645 * the keys with the same enctype.
648 krb5_error_code ret2;
649 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
651 ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context,
652 pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
655 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA -- %s "
656 "(enctype %s) error %s",
657 r->client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype", msg);
658 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
661 if(hdb_next_enctype2key(r->context, &r->client->entry, NULL,
662 enc_data.etype, &pa_key) == 0)
665 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
667 if (r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
668 r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status(r->context, r->clientdb, r->client,
669 HDB_AUTH_WRONG_PASSWORD);
671 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
674 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
675 ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data,
679 krb5_data_free(&ts_data);
681 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
682 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
686 if (labs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > r->context->max_skew) {
687 char client_time[100];
689 krb5_format_time(r->context, p.patimestamp,
690 client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
692 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
693 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "Too large time skew, "
694 "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
696 (unsigned)labs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
697 r->context->max_skew,
701 * The following is needed to make windows clients to
702 * retry using the timestamp in the error message, if
703 * there is a e_text, they become unhappy.
706 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
709 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
711 set_salt_padata(&r->outpadata, pa_key->salt);
713 ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &pa_key->key, &r->reply_key);
717 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
720 _kdc_r_log(r, 2, "ENC-TS Pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
721 r->client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype");
735 #define PA_ANNOUNCE 1
736 #define PA_REQ_FAST 2 /* only use inside fast */
737 krb5_error_code (*validate)(kdc_request_t, const PA_DATA *pa);
740 static const struct kdc_patypes pat[] = {
743 KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ, "PK-INIT(ietf)", PA_ANNOUNCE,
747 KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN, "PK-INIT(win2k)", PA_ANNOUNCE,
751 KRB5_PADATA_PKINIT_KX, "Anonymous PK-INIT", PA_ANNOUNCE,
755 { KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ, "PK-INIT(ietf)", 0, NULL },
756 { KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN, "PK-INIT(win2k)", 0, NULL },
757 { KRB5_PADATA_PKINIT_KX, "Anonymous PK-INIT", 0, NULL },
759 { KRB5_PADATA_PA_PK_OCSP_RESPONSE , "OCSP", 0, NULL },
761 KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP , "ENC-TS",
766 KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE , "ENC-CHAL",
767 PA_ANNOUNCE | PA_REQ_FAST,
770 { KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP , "REQ-ENC-PA-REP", 0, NULL },
771 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST, "FX-FAST", PA_ANNOUNCE, NULL },
772 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_ERROR, "FX-ERROR", 0, NULL },
773 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_COOKIE, "FX-COOKIE", 0, NULL }
777 log_patypes(krb5_context context,
778 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
781 struct rk_strpool *p = NULL;
785 for (n = 0; n < padata->len; n++) {
786 for (m = 0; m < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); m++) {
787 if (padata->val[n].padata_type == pat[m].type) {
788 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%s", pat[m].name);
792 if (m == sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]))
793 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", padata->val[n].padata_type);
794 if (p && n + 1 < padata->len)
795 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
797 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "out of memory");
802 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "none");
804 str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
805 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Client sent patypes: %s", str);
814 _kdc_encode_reply(krb5_context context,
815 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
816 krb5_crypto armor_crypto, uint32_t nonce,
817 KDC_REP *rep, EncTicketPart *et, EncKDCRepPart *ek,
819 int skvno, const EncryptionKey *skey,
820 int ckvno, const EncryptionKey *reply_key,
831 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTicketPart, buf, buf_size, et, &len, ret);
833 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
834 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode ticket: %s", msg);
835 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
839 krb5_abortx(context, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
841 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, skey, etype, &crypto);
843 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
844 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
845 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
850 ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
856 &rep->ticket.enc_part);
858 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
860 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
861 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encrypt data: %s", msg);
862 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
868 krb5_keyblock *strengthen_key = NULL;
869 KrbFastFinished finished;
871 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "FAST armor protection");
873 memset(&finished, 0, sizeof(finished));
874 krb5_data_zero(&data);
876 finished.timestamp = kdc_time;
878 finished.crealm = et->crealm;
879 finished.cname = et->cname;
881 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Ticket, data.data, data.length,
882 &rep->ticket, &len, ret);
885 if (data.length != len)
886 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
888 ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, armor_crypto,
889 KRB5_KU_FAST_FINISHED, 0,
890 data.data, data.length,
891 &finished.ticket_checksum);
892 krb5_data_free(&data);
896 ret = _kdc_fast_mk_response(context, armor_crypto,
897 rep->padata, strengthen_key, &finished,
899 free_Checksum(&finished.ticket_checksum);
904 free_METHOD_DATA(rep->padata);
906 rep->padata = calloc(1, sizeof(*(rep->padata)));
907 if (rep->padata == NULL) {
908 krb5_data_free(&data);
913 ret = krb5_padata_add(context, rep->padata,
915 data.data, data.length);
920 * Hide client name of privacy reasons
922 if (1 /* r->fast_options.hide_client_names */) {
923 rep->crealm[0] = '\0';
924 free_PrincipalName(&rep->cname);
925 rep->cname.name_type = 0;
929 if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep && !config->encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep)
930 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncASRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
932 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTGSRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
934 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
935 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
936 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
939 if(buf_size != len) {
941 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
942 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
943 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
945 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, reply_key, 0, &crypto);
947 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
949 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
950 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
953 if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep) {
954 krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
956 KRB5_KU_AS_REP_ENC_PART,
962 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
964 krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
966 rk_is_subkey ? KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SUB_KEY : KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION,
972 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(TGS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
974 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
976 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
977 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
978 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
981 if(buf_size != len) {
983 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
984 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
985 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
988 reply->length = buf_size;
993 * Return 1 if the client have only older enctypes, this is for
994 * determining if the server should send ETYPE_INFO2 or not.
998 older_enctype(krb5_enctype enctype)
1001 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
1002 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
1003 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
1004 case ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
1005 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5:
1006 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56:
1008 * The following three is "old" windows enctypes and is needed for
1009 * windows 2000 hosts.
1011 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_MD4:
1012 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD:
1013 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD_EXP:
1024 static krb5_error_code
1025 make_etype_info_entry(krb5_context context,
1026 ETYPE_INFO_ENTRY *ent,
1028 krb5_boolean include_salt)
1030 ent->etype = key->key.keytype;
1031 if (key->salt && include_salt){
1033 ALLOC(ent->salttype);
1035 if(key->salt->type == hdb_pw_salt)
1036 *ent->salttype = 0; /* or 1? or NULL? */
1037 else if(key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt)
1040 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "unknown salt-type: %d",
1042 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1044 /* according to `the specs', we can't send a salt if
1045 we have AFS3 salted key, but that requires that you
1046 *know* what cell you are using (e.g by assuming
1047 that the cell is the same as the realm in lower
1050 ALLOC(ent->salttype);
1051 *ent->salttype = key->salt->type;
1054 * We shouldn't sent salttype since it is incompatible with the
1055 * specification and it breaks windows clients. The afs
1056 * salting problem is solved by using KRB5-PADATA-AFS3-SALT
1057 * implemented in Heimdal 0.7 and later.
1059 ent->salttype = NULL;
1061 krb5_copy_data(context, &key->salt->salt,
1064 /* we return no salt type at all, as that should indicate
1065 * the default salt type and make everybody happy. some
1066 * systems (like w2k) dislike being told the salt type
1069 ent->salttype = NULL;
1075 static krb5_error_code
1076 get_pa_etype_info(krb5_context context,
1077 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1078 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey,
1079 krb5_boolean include_salt)
1081 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
1088 pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
1092 ret = make_etype_info_entry(context, &pa.val[0], ckey, include_salt);
1094 free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
1098 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
1099 free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
1102 ret = realloc_method_data(md);
1107 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO;
1108 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len;
1109 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf;
1117 extern int _krb5_AES_SHA1_string_to_default_iterator;
1118 extern int _krb5_AES_SHA2_string_to_default_iterator;
1120 static krb5_error_code
1121 make_s2kparams(int value, size_t len, krb5_data **ps2kparams)
1123 krb5_data *s2kparams;
1124 krb5_error_code ret;
1127 if (s2kparams == NULL)
1129 ret = krb5_data_alloc(s2kparams, len);
1134 _krb5_put_int(s2kparams->data, value, len);
1135 *ps2kparams = s2kparams;
1139 static krb5_error_code
1140 make_etype_info2_entry(ETYPE_INFO2_ENTRY *ent,
1142 krb5_boolean include_salt)
1144 krb5_error_code ret;
1146 ent->etype = key->key.keytype;
1147 if (key->salt && include_salt) {
1149 if (ent->salt == NULL)
1151 *ent->salt = malloc(key->salt->salt.length + 1);
1152 if (*ent->salt == NULL) {
1157 memcpy(*ent->salt, key->salt->salt.data, key->salt->salt.length);
1158 (*ent->salt)[key->salt->salt.length] = '\0';
1162 ent->s2kparams = NULL;
1164 switch (key->key.keytype) {
1165 case ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
1166 case ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
1167 ret = make_s2kparams(_krb5_AES_SHA1_string_to_default_iterator,
1168 4, &ent->s2kparams);
1170 case KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128:
1171 case KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192:
1172 ret = make_s2kparams(_krb5_AES_SHA2_string_to_default_iterator,
1173 4, &ent->s2kparams);
1175 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
1176 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
1177 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
1178 /* Check if this was a AFS3 salted key */
1179 if(key->salt && key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt)
1180 ret = make_s2kparams(1, 1, &ent->s2kparams);
1192 * Return an ETYPE-INFO2. Enctypes are storted the same way as in the
1193 * database (client supported enctypes first, then the unsupported
1197 static krb5_error_code
1198 get_pa_etype_info2(krb5_context context,
1199 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1200 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey,
1201 krb5_boolean include_salt)
1203 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
1209 pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
1213 ret = make_etype_info2_entry(&pa.val[0], ckey, include_salt);
1215 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
1219 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO2, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
1220 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
1223 ret = realloc_method_data(md);
1228 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO2;
1229 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len;
1230 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf;
1235 newer_enctype_present(struct KDC_REQ_BODY_etype *etype_list)
1239 for (i = 0; i < etype_list->len; i++) {
1240 if (!older_enctype(etype_list->val[i]))
1246 static krb5_error_code
1247 get_pa_etype_info_both(krb5_context context,
1248 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1249 struct KDC_REQ_BODY_etype *etype_list,
1250 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey,
1251 krb5_boolean include_salt)
1253 krb5_error_code ret;
1257 * When the AS server is to include pre-authentication data in a
1258 * KRB-ERROR or in an AS-REP, it MUST use PA-ETYPE-INFO2, not
1259 * PA-ETYPE-INFO, if the etype field of the client's AS-REQ lists
1260 * at least one "newer" encryption type. Otherwise (when the etype
1261 * field of the client's AS-REQ does not list any "newer" encryption
1262 * types), it MUST send both PA-ETYPE-INFO2 and PA-ETYPE-INFO (both
1263 * with an entry for each enctype). A "newer" enctype is any enctype
1264 * first officially specified concurrently with or subsequent to the
1265 * issue of this RFC. The enctypes DES, 3DES, or RC4 and any defined
1266 * in [RFC1510] are not "newer" enctypes.
1268 * It goes on to state:
1269 * The preferred ordering of the "hint" pre-authentication data that
1270 * affect client key selection is: ETYPE-INFO2, followed by ETYPE-INFO,
1271 * followed by PW-SALT. As noted in Section 3.1.3, a KDC MUST NOT send
1272 * ETYPE-INFO or PW-SALT when the client's AS-REQ includes at least one
1276 ret = get_pa_etype_info2(context, config, md, ckey, include_salt);
1280 if (!newer_enctype_present(etype_list))
1281 ret = get_pa_etype_info(context, config, md, ckey, include_salt);
1291 log_as_req(krb5_context context,
1292 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1293 krb5_enctype cetype,
1294 krb5_enctype setype,
1295 const KDC_REQ_BODY *b)
1297 krb5_error_code ret;
1298 struct rk_strpool *p;
1302 p = rk_strpoolprintf(NULL, "%s", "Client supported enctypes: ");
1304 for (i = 0; i < b->etype.len; i++) {
1305 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, b->etype.val[i], &str);
1307 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%s", str);
1310 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", b->etype.val[i]);
1311 if (p && i + 1 < b->etype.len)
1312 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
1314 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "out of memory");
1319 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "no encryption types");
1325 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, cetype, &cet);
1327 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, setype, &set);
1329 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using %s/%s", cet, set);
1335 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using enctypes %d/%d",
1339 str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
1340 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s", str);
1345 unparse_flags(KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options), asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
1346 fixedstr, sizeof(fixedstr));
1348 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Requested flags: %s", fixedstr);
1353 * verify the flags on `client' and `server', returning 0
1354 * if they are OK and generating an error messages and returning
1355 * and error code otherwise.
1359 kdc_check_flags(krb5_context context,
1360 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1361 hdb_entry_ex *client_ex, const char *client_name,
1362 hdb_entry_ex *server_ex, const char *server_name,
1363 krb5_boolean is_as_req)
1365 if(client_ex != NULL) {
1366 hdb_entry *client = &client_ex->entry;
1369 if (client->flags.locked_out) {
1370 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1371 "Client (%s) is locked out", client_name);
1372 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1375 if (client->flags.invalid) {
1376 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1377 "Client (%s) has invalid bit set", client_name);
1378 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1381 if(!client->flags.client){
1382 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1383 "Principal may not act as client -- %s", client_name);
1384 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1387 if (client->valid_start && *client->valid_start > kdc_time) {
1388 char starttime_str[100];
1389 krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_start,
1390 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
1391 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1392 "Client not yet valid until %s -- %s",
1393 starttime_str, client_name);
1394 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
1397 if (client->valid_end && *client->valid_end < kdc_time) {
1398 char endtime_str[100];
1399 krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_end,
1400 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
1401 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1402 "Client expired at %s -- %s",
1403 endtime_str, client_name);
1404 return KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP;
1407 if (client->flags.require_pwchange &&
1408 (server_ex == NULL || !server_ex->entry.flags.change_pw)) {
1409 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1410 "Client's key must be changed -- %s", client_name);
1411 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
1414 if (client->pw_end && *client->pw_end < kdc_time
1415 && (server_ex == NULL || !server_ex->entry.flags.change_pw)) {
1416 char pwend_str[100];
1417 krb5_format_time(context, *client->pw_end,
1418 pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
1419 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1420 "Client's key has expired at %s -- %s",
1421 pwend_str, client_name);
1422 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
1428 if (server_ex != NULL) {
1429 hdb_entry *server = &server_ex->entry;
1431 if (server->flags.locked_out) {
1432 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1433 "Client server locked out -- %s", server_name);
1434 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1436 if (server->flags.invalid) {
1437 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1438 "Server has invalid flag set -- %s", server_name);
1439 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1442 if(!server->flags.server){
1443 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1444 "Principal may not act as server -- %s", server_name);
1445 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1448 if(!is_as_req && server->flags.initial) {
1449 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1450 "AS-REQ is required for server -- %s", server_name);
1451 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1454 if (server->valid_start && *server->valid_start > kdc_time) {
1455 char starttime_str[100];
1456 krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_start,
1457 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
1458 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1459 "Server not yet valid until %s -- %s",
1460 starttime_str, server_name);
1461 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET;
1464 if (server->valid_end && *server->valid_end < kdc_time) {
1465 char endtime_str[100];
1466 krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_end,
1467 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
1468 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1469 "Server expired at %s -- %s",
1470 endtime_str, server_name);
1471 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP;
1474 if (server->pw_end && *server->pw_end < kdc_time) {
1475 char pwend_str[100];
1476 krb5_format_time(context, *server->pw_end,
1477 pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
1478 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1479 "Server's key has expired at -- %s",
1480 pwend_str, server_name);
1481 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
1488 * Return TRUE if `from' is part of `addresses' taking into consideration
1489 * the configuration variables that tells us how strict we should be about
1494 _kdc_check_addresses(krb5_context context,
1495 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1496 HostAddresses *addresses, const struct sockaddr *from)
1498 krb5_error_code ret;
1500 krb5_boolean result;
1501 krb5_boolean only_netbios = TRUE;
1504 if(config->check_ticket_addresses == 0)
1507 if(addresses == NULL)
1508 return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
1510 for (i = 0; i < addresses->len; ++i) {
1511 if (addresses->val[i].addr_type != KRB5_ADDRESS_NETBIOS) {
1512 only_netbios = FALSE;
1516 /* Windows sends it's netbios name, which I can only assume is
1517 * used for the 'allowed workstations' check. This is painful,
1518 * but we still want to check IP addresses if they happen to be
1523 return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
1525 ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (context, from, &addr);
1529 result = krb5_address_search(context, &addr, addresses);
1530 krb5_free_address (context, &addr);
1539 send_pac_p(krb5_context context, KDC_REQ *req)
1541 krb5_error_code ret;
1542 PA_PAC_REQUEST pacreq;
1546 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PA_PAC_REQUEST);
1550 ret = decode_PA_PAC_REQUEST(pa->padata_value.data,
1551 pa->padata_value.length,
1556 i = pacreq.include_pac;
1557 free_PA_PAC_REQUEST(&pacreq);
1567 static krb5_error_code
1568 generate_pac(kdc_request_t r, Key *skey)
1570 krb5_error_code ret;
1574 ret = _kdc_pac_generate(r->context, r->client, &p);
1576 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
1583 ret = _krb5_pac_sign(r->context, p, r->et.authtime,
1584 r->client->entry.principal,
1585 &skey->key, /* Server key */
1586 &skey->key, /* FIXME: should be krbtgt key */
1588 krb5_pac_free(r->context, p);
1590 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
1595 ret = _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(r->context, &r->et,
1596 KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC,
1598 krb5_data_free(&data);
1608 _kdc_is_anonymous(krb5_context context, krb5_principal principal)
1610 if ((principal->name.name_type != KRB5_NT_WELLKNOWN &&
1611 principal->name.name_type != KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN) ||
1612 principal->name.name_string.len != 2 ||
1613 strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_WELLKNOWN_NAME) != 0 ||
1614 strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], KRB5_ANON_NAME) != 0)
1620 require_preauth_p(kdc_request_t r)
1622 return r->config->require_preauth
1623 || r->client->entry.flags.require_preauth
1624 || r->server->entry.flags.require_preauth;
1632 static krb5_error_code
1633 add_enc_pa_rep(kdc_request_t r)
1635 krb5_error_code ret;
1641 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &r->reply_key, 0, &crypto);
1645 ret = krb5_create_checksum(r->context, crypto,
1647 r->request.data, r->request.length,
1649 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, crypto);
1653 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Checksum, cdata.data, cdata.length,
1654 &checksum, &len, ret);
1655 free_Checksum(&checksum);
1658 heim_assert(cdata.length == len, "ASN.1 internal error");
1660 if (r->ek.encrypted_pa_data == NULL) {
1661 ALLOC(r->ek.encrypted_pa_data);
1662 if (r->ek.encrypted_pa_data == NULL)
1665 ret = krb5_padata_add(r->context, r->ek.encrypted_pa_data,
1666 KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP, cdata.data, cdata.length);
1670 return krb5_padata_add(r->context, r->ek.encrypted_pa_data,
1671 KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST, NULL, 0);
1679 _kdc_as_rep(kdc_request_t r,
1682 struct sockaddr *from_addr,
1685 krb5_context context = r->context;
1686 krb5_kdc_configuration *config = r->config;
1687 KDC_REQ *req = &r->req;
1688 KDC_REQ_BODY *b = NULL;
1691 krb5_enctype setype;
1692 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
1695 int i, flags = HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ;
1696 METHOD_DATA error_method;
1698 krb5_boolean is_tgs;
1700 memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
1701 error_method.len = 0;
1702 error_method.val = NULL;
1705 * Look for FAST armor and unwrap
1707 ret = _kdc_fast_unwrap_request(r);
1709 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "FAST unwrap request from %s failed: %d", from, ret);
1717 flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
1719 if(b->sname == NULL){
1720 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1721 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "No server in request");
1723 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
1728 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->server_princ, &r->server_name);
1731 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1732 "AS-REQ malformed server name from %s", from);
1735 if(b->cname == NULL){
1736 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1737 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "No client in request");
1739 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
1746 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->client_princ, &r->client_name);
1749 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1750 "AS-REQ malformed client name from %s", from);
1754 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s",
1755 r->client_name, from, r->server_name);
1757 is_tgs = krb5_principal_is_krbtgt(context, r->server_princ);
1763 if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context, r->client_princ)) {
1764 if (!_kdc_is_anon_request(b)) {
1765 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Anonymous ticket w/o anonymous flag");
1766 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1769 } else if (_kdc_is_anon_request(b)) {
1770 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1771 "Request for a anonymous ticket with non "
1772 "anonymous client name: %s", r->client_name);
1773 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1781 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, r->client_princ,
1782 HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags, NULL,
1783 &r->clientdb, &r->client);
1784 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1785 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "client %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy",
1788 } else if (ret == HDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM) {
1789 char *fixed_client_name = NULL;
1791 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->client->entry.principal,
1792 &fixed_client_name);
1797 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "WRONG_REALM - %s -> %s",
1798 r->client_name, fixed_client_name);
1799 free(fixed_client_name);
1801 ret = _kdc_fast_mk_error(context, r,
1805 KRB5_KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM,
1809 &r->client->entry.principal->realm,
1814 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1815 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r->client_name, msg);
1816 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1817 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1820 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, r->server_princ,
1821 HDB_F_GET_SERVER | flags | (is_tgs ? HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT : 0),
1822 NULL, NULL, &r->server);
1823 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1824 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy",
1828 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1829 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r->server_name, msg);
1830 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1831 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1836 * Select a session enctype from the list of the crypto system
1837 * supported enctypes that is supported by the client and is one of
1838 * the enctype of the enctype of the service (likely krbtgt).
1840 * The latter is used as a hint of what enctypes all KDC support,
1841 * to make sure a newer version of KDC won't generate a session
1842 * enctype that an older version of a KDC in the same realm can't
1846 ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
1847 is_tgs ? config->tgt_use_strongest_session_key
1848 : config->svc_use_strongest_session_key,
1849 FALSE, r->client, r->client_princ,
1850 b->etype.val, b->etype.len,
1851 &r->sessionetype, NULL, NULL);
1853 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1854 "Client (%s) from %s has no common enctypes with KDC "
1855 "to use for the session key",
1856 r->client_name, from);
1861 * Pre-auth processing
1867 log_patypes(context, config, req->padata);
1869 /* Check if preauth matching */
1871 for (n = 0; !found_pa && n < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); n++) {
1872 if (pat[n].validate == NULL)
1874 if (r->armor_crypto == NULL && (pat[n].flags & PA_REQ_FAST))
1877 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1878 "Looking for %s pa-data -- %s", pat[n].name, r->client_name);
1880 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, pat[n].type);
1882 ret = pat[n].validate(r, pa);
1884 krb5_error_code ret2;
1886 krb5_boolean default_salt;
1889 * If there is a client key, send ETYPE_INFO{,2}
1891 ret2 = _kdc_find_etype(context,
1892 config->preauth_use_strongest_session_key,
1893 TRUE, r->client, r->client_princ, b->etype.val,
1894 b->etype.len, NULL, &ckey, &default_salt);
1896 ret2 = get_pa_etype_info_both(context, config, &b->etype,
1897 &error_method, ckey, !default_salt);
1903 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1904 "%s pre-authentication succeeded -- %s",
1905 pat[n].name, r->client_name);
1907 r->et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
1912 if (found_pa == 0) {
1915 krb5_boolean default_salt;
1917 for (n = 0; n < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); n++) {
1918 if ((pat[n].flags & PA_ANNOUNCE) == 0)
1920 ret = krb5_padata_add(context, &error_method,
1921 pat[n].type, NULL, 0);
1927 * If there is a client key, send ETYPE_INFO{,2}
1929 ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
1930 config->preauth_use_strongest_session_key, TRUE,
1931 r->client, r->client_princ,
1932 b->etype.val, b->etype.len, NULL,
1933 &ckey, &default_salt);
1935 ret = get_pa_etype_info_both(context, config, &b->etype,
1936 &error_method, ckey, !default_salt);
1942 * send requre preauth is its required or anon is requested,
1943 * anon is today only allowed via preauth mechanisms.
1945 if (require_preauth_p(r) || _kdc_is_anon_request(b)) {
1946 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
1947 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/PA-PK-AS-REQ");
1952 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
1953 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Doesn't have a client key available");
1956 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
1957 ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &ckey->key, &r->reply_key);
1962 if (r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status) {
1963 r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status(context, r->clientdb, r->client,
1968 * Verify flags after the user been required to prove its identity
1969 * with in a preauth mech.
1972 ret = _kdc_check_access(context, config, r->client, r->client_name,
1973 r->server, r->server_name,
1974 req, &error_method);
1979 * Select the best encryption type for the KDC with out regard to
1980 * the client since the client never needs to read that data.
1983 ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config,
1984 r->server, r->server_name,
1989 if(f.renew || f.validate || f.proxy || f.forwarded || f.enc_tkt_in_skey
1990 || (_kdc_is_anon_request(b) && !config->allow_anonymous)) {
1991 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1992 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Bad KDC options");
2001 rep.msg_type = krb_as_rep;
2003 if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context, r->client_princ)) {
2004 Realm anon_realm=KRB5_ANON_REALM;
2005 ret = copy_Realm(&anon_realm, &rep.crealm);
2006 } else if (f.canonicalize || r->client->entry.flags.force_canonicalize)
2007 ret = copy_Realm(&r->client->entry.principal->realm, &rep.crealm);
2009 ret = copy_Realm(&r->client_princ->realm, &rep.crealm);
2012 if (f.canonicalize || r->client->entry.flags.force_canonicalize)
2013 ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname, r->client->entry.principal);
2015 ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname, r->client_princ);
2019 rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
2020 if (f.canonicalize || r->server->entry.flags.force_canonicalize)
2021 ret = copy_Realm(&r->server->entry.principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
2023 ret = copy_Realm(&r->server_princ->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
2026 if (f.canonicalize || r->server->entry.flags.force_canonicalize)
2027 _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname,
2028 r->server->entry.principal);
2030 _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname,
2032 /* java 1.6 expects the name to be the same type, lets allow that
2033 * uncomplicated name-types. */
2034 #define CNT(sp,t) (((sp)->sname->name_type) == KRB5_NT_##t)
2035 if (CNT(b, UNKNOWN) || CNT(b, PRINCIPAL) || CNT(b, SRV_INST) || CNT(b, SRV_HST) || CNT(b, SRV_XHST))
2036 rep.ticket.sname.name_type = b->sname->name_type;
2039 r->et.flags.initial = 1;
2040 if(r->client->entry.flags.forwardable && r->server->entry.flags.forwardable)
2041 r->et.flags.forwardable = f.forwardable;
2042 else if (f.forwardable) {
2043 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be forwardable");
2044 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
2047 if(r->client->entry.flags.proxiable && r->server->entry.flags.proxiable)
2048 r->et.flags.proxiable = f.proxiable;
2049 else if (f.proxiable) {
2050 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be proxiable");
2051 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
2054 if(r->client->entry.flags.postdate && r->server->entry.flags.postdate)
2055 r->et.flags.may_postdate = f.allow_postdate;
2056 else if (f.allow_postdate){
2057 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be postdate");
2058 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
2062 /* check for valid set of addresses */
2063 if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context, config, b->addresses, from_addr)) {
2064 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Bad address list in requested");
2065 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
2069 ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep.cname, &r->et.cname);
2072 ret = copy_Realm(&rep.crealm, &r->et.crealm);
2080 start = r->et.authtime = kdc_time;
2082 if(f.postdated && req->req_body.from){
2083 ALLOC(r->et.starttime);
2084 start = *r->et.starttime = *req->req_body.from;
2085 r->et.flags.invalid = 1;
2086 r->et.flags.postdated = 1; /* XXX ??? */
2088 _kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
2091 /* be careful not overflowing */
2093 if(r->client->entry.max_life)
2094 t = start + min(t - start, *r->client->entry.max_life);
2095 if(r->server->entry.max_life)
2096 t = start + min(t - start, *r->server->entry.max_life);
2098 t = min(t, start + realm->max_life);
2101 if(f.renewable_ok && r->et.endtime < *b->till){
2103 if(b->rtime == NULL){
2107 if(*b->rtime < *b->till)
2108 *b->rtime = *b->till;
2110 if(f.renewable && b->rtime){
2114 if(r->client->entry.max_renew)
2115 t = start + min(t - start, *r->client->entry.max_renew);
2116 if(r->server->entry.max_renew)
2117 t = start + min(t - start, *r->server->entry.max_renew);
2119 t = min(t, start + realm->max_renew);
2121 ALLOC(r->et.renew_till);
2122 *r->et.renew_till = t;
2123 r->et.flags.renewable = 1;
2127 if (_kdc_is_anon_request(b))
2128 r->et.flags.anonymous = 1;
2132 copy_HostAddresses(b->addresses, r->et.caddr);
2135 r->et.transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
2136 krb5_data_zero(&r->et.transited.contents);
2138 /* The MIT ASN.1 library (obviously) doesn't tell lengths encoded
2139 * as 0 and as 0x80 (meaning indefinite length) apart, and is thus
2140 * incapable of correctly decoding SEQUENCE OF's of zero length.
2142 * To fix this, always send at least one no-op last_req
2144 * If there's a pw_end or valid_end we will use that,
2145 * otherwise just a dummy lr.
2147 r->ek.last_req.val = malloc(2 * sizeof(*r->ek.last_req.val));
2148 if (r->ek.last_req.val == NULL) {
2152 r->ek.last_req.len = 0;
2153 if (r->client->entry.pw_end
2154 && (config->kdc_warn_pwexpire == 0
2155 || kdc_time + config->kdc_warn_pwexpire >= *r->client->entry.pw_end)) {
2156 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_PW_EXPTIME;
2157 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *r->client->entry.pw_end;
2158 ++r->ek.last_req.len;
2160 if (r->client->entry.valid_end) {
2161 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_ACCT_EXPTIME;
2162 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *r->client->entry.valid_end;
2163 ++r->ek.last_req.len;
2165 if (r->ek.last_req.len == 0) {
2166 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_NONE;
2167 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = 0;
2168 ++r->ek.last_req.len;
2170 r->ek.nonce = b->nonce;
2171 if (r->client->entry.valid_end || r->client->entry.pw_end) {
2172 ALLOC(r->ek.key_expiration);
2173 if (r->client->entry.valid_end) {
2174 if (r->client->entry.pw_end)
2175 *r->ek.key_expiration = min(*r->client->entry.valid_end,
2176 *r->client->entry.pw_end);
2178 *r->ek.key_expiration = *r->client->entry.valid_end;
2180 *r->ek.key_expiration = *r->client->entry.pw_end;
2182 r->ek.key_expiration = NULL;
2183 r->ek.flags = r->et.flags;
2184 r->ek.authtime = r->et.authtime;
2185 if (r->et.starttime) {
2186 ALLOC(r->ek.starttime);
2187 *r->ek.starttime = *r->et.starttime;
2189 r->ek.endtime = r->et.endtime;
2190 if (r->et.renew_till) {
2191 ALLOC(r->ek.renew_till);
2192 *r->ek.renew_till = *r->et.renew_till;
2194 ret = copy_Realm(&rep.ticket.realm, &r->ek.srealm);
2197 ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep.ticket.sname, &r->ek.sname);
2202 copy_HostAddresses(r->et.caddr, r->ek.caddr);
2206 * Check and session and reply keys
2209 if (r->session_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) {
2210 ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, r->sessionetype, &r->session_key);
2215 if (r->reply_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) {
2216 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Client have no reply key");
2217 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
2221 ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&r->session_key, &r->et.key);
2225 ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&r->session_key, &r->ek.key);
2229 if (r->outpadata.len) {
2232 if (rep.padata == NULL) {
2236 ret = copy_METHOD_DATA(&r->outpadata, rep.padata);
2242 if (send_pac_p(context, req)) {
2243 generate_pac(r, skey);
2246 _kdc_log_timestamp(context, config, "AS-REQ", r->et.authtime, r->et.starttime,
2247 r->et.endtime, r->et.renew_till);
2249 /* do this as the last thing since this signs the EncTicketPart */
2250 ret = _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(context,
2254 r->client->entry.principal,
2261 log_as_req(context, config, r->reply_key.keytype, setype, b);
2264 * We always say we support FAST/enc-pa-rep
2267 r->et.flags.enc_pa_rep = r->ek.flags.enc_pa_rep = 1;
2270 * Add REQ_ENC_PA_REP if client supports it
2274 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP);
2277 ret = add_enc_pa_rep(r);
2279 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
2280 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "add_enc_pa_rep failed: %s: %d", msg, ret);
2281 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
2290 ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config,
2291 r->armor_crypto, req->req_body.nonce,
2292 &rep, &r->et, &r->ek, setype, r->server->entry.kvno,
2293 &skey->key, r->client->entry.kvno,
2294 &r->reply_key, 0, &r->e_text, reply);
2299 * Check if message too large
2301 if (datagram_reply && reply->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) {
2302 krb5_data_free(reply);
2303 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG;
2304 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Reply packet too large");
2311 * In case of a non proxy error, build an error message.
2313 if (ret != 0 && ret != HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE && reply->length == 0) {
2314 ret = _kdc_fast_mk_error(context, r,
2321 &r->client_princ->name : NULL,
2323 &r->client_princ->realm : NULL,
2330 free_EncTicketPart(&r->et);
2331 free_EncKDCRepPart(&r->ek);
2332 free_KDCFastState(&r->fast);
2334 if (error_method.len)
2335 free_METHOD_DATA(&error_method);
2336 if (r->outpadata.len)
2337 free_METHOD_DATA(&r->outpadata);
2338 if (r->client_princ) {
2339 krb5_free_principal(context, r->client_princ);
2340 r->client_princ = NULL;
2342 if (r->client_name) {
2343 free(r->client_name);
2344 r->client_name = NULL;
2346 if (r->server_princ){
2347 krb5_free_principal(context, r->server_princ);
2348 r->server_princ = NULL;
2350 if (r->server_name) {
2351 free(r->server_name);
2352 r->server_name = NULL;
2355 _kdc_free_ent(context, r->client);
2357 _kdc_free_ent(context, r->server);
2358 if (r->armor_crypto) {
2359 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, r->armor_crypto);
2360 r->armor_crypto = NULL;
2362 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
2363 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->session_key);
2368 * Add the AuthorizationData `data´ of `type´ to the last element in
2369 * the sequence of authorization_data in `tkt´ wrapped in an IF_RELEVANT
2373 _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(krb5_context context,
2376 const krb5_data *data)
2378 krb5_error_code ret;
2381 if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
2382 tkt->authorization_data = calloc(1, sizeof(*tkt->authorization_data));
2383 if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
2384 krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOMEM, "out of memory");
2389 /* add the entry to the last element */
2391 AuthorizationData ad = { 0, NULL };
2392 AuthorizationDataElement ade;
2395 ade.ad_data = *data;
2397 ret = add_AuthorizationData(&ad, &ade);
2399 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "add AuthorizationData failed");
2403 ade.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT;
2405 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthorizationData,
2406 ade.ad_data.data, ade.ad_data.length,
2408 free_AuthorizationData(&ad);
2410 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "ASN.1 encode of "
2411 "AuthorizationData failed");
2414 if (ade.ad_data.length != size)
2415 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
2417 ret = add_AuthorizationData(tkt->authorization_data, &ade);
2418 der_free_octet_string(&ade.ad_data);
2420 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "add AuthorizationData failed");
2429 _kdc_is_anon_request(const KDC_REQ_BODY *b)
2431 /* some versions of heimdal use bit 14 instead of 16 for
2432 request_anonymous, as indicated in the anonymous draft prior to
2433 version 11. Bit 14 is assigned to S4U2Proxy, but all S4U2Proxy
2434 requests will have a second ticket; don't consider those anonymous */
2435 return (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous ||
2436 (b->kdc_options.constrained_delegation && !b->additional_tickets));