2 * Copyright (c) 1997-2007 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
3 * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
17 * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
18 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
19 * without specific prior written permission.
21 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
22 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
23 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
24 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
25 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
26 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
27 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
28 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
29 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
30 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
36 #define MAX_TIME ((time_t)((1U << 31) - 1))
39 _kdc_fix_time(time_t **t)
45 if(**t == 0) **t = MAX_TIME; /* fix for old clients */
49 realloc_method_data(METHOD_DATA *md)
52 pa = realloc(md->val, (md->len + 1) * sizeof(*md->val));
61 set_salt_padata(METHOD_DATA *md, Salt *salt)
64 realloc_method_data(md);
65 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = salt->type;
66 der_copy_octet_string(&salt->salt,
67 &md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value);
72 _kdc_find_padata(const KDC_REQ *req, int *start, int type)
74 if (req->padata == NULL)
77 while((size_t)*start < req->padata->len){
79 if(req->padata->val[*start - 1].padata_type == (unsigned)type)
80 return &req->padata->val[*start - 1];
86 * This is a hack to allow predefined weak services, like afs to
87 * still use weak types
91 _kdc_is_weak_exception(krb5_principal principal, krb5_enctype etype)
93 if (principal->name.name_string.len > 0 &&
94 strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "afs") == 0 &&
95 (etype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
96 || etype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4
97 || etype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5))
104 * Detect if `key' is the using the the precomputed `default_salt'.
108 is_default_salt_p(const krb5_salt *default_salt, const Key *key)
110 if (key->salt == NULL)
112 if (default_salt->salttype != key->salt->type)
114 if (krb5_data_cmp(&default_salt->saltvalue, &key->salt->salt))
120 * return the first appropriate key of `princ' in `ret_key'. Look for
121 * all the etypes in (`etypes', `len'), stopping as soon as we find
122 * one, but preferring one that has default salt
126 _kdc_find_etype(krb5_context context, krb5_boolean use_strongest_session_key,
127 krb5_boolean is_preauth, hdb_entry_ex *princ,
128 krb5_enctype *etypes, unsigned len,
129 krb5_enctype *ret_enctype, Key **ret_key)
133 krb5_enctype enctype = ETYPE_NULL;
134 krb5_enctype clientbest = (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL;
135 const krb5_enctype *p;
138 int client_offered_1des = 0;
140 /* We'll want to avoid keys with v4 salted keys in the pre-auth case... */
141 ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context, princ->entry.principal, &def_salt);
145 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
147 if (use_strongest_session_key) {
150 * Pick the strongest key that the KDC, target service, and
151 * client all support, using the local cryptosystem enctype
152 * list in strongest-to-weakest order to drive the search.
154 * This is not what RFC4120 says to do, but it encourages
155 * adoption of stronger enctypes. This doesn't play well with
156 * clients that have multiple Kerberos client implementations
157 * available with different supported enctype lists.
160 /* drive the search with local supported enctypes list */
161 p = krb5_kerberos_enctypes(context);
163 p[i] != (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL && enctype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL;
165 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, p[i]) != 0)
168 /* check that the client supports it too */
169 for (k = 0; k < len && enctype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL; k++) {
170 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[k]) != 0 &&
171 !_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->entry.principal, etypes[k]))
173 if (etypes[k] == ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC)
174 client_offered_1des = 1;
175 if (p[i] != etypes[k])
177 if (clientbest == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL)
179 /* check target princ support */
180 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, NULL, p[i], &key);
183 if (is_preauth && !is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
188 if (clientbest != (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL &&
189 enctype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL) {
191 enctype = clientbest;
192 } else if (enctype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL) {
193 if (client_offered_1des &&
194 _kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->entry.principal, ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC)) {
196 enctype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC;
198 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
201 if (ret == 0 && ret_enctype != NULL)
202 *ret_enctype = enctype;
203 if (ret == 0 && ret_key != NULL)
207 * Pick the first key from the client's enctype list that is
208 * supported by the cryptosystem and by the given principal.
210 * RFC4120 says we SHOULD pick the first _strong_ key from the
211 * client's list... not the first key... If the admin disallows
212 * weak enctypes in krb5.conf and selects this key selection
213 * algorithm, then we get exactly what RFC4120 says.
215 for(key = NULL, i = 0; ret != 0 && i < len; i++, key = NULL) {
217 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[i]) != 0 &&
218 !_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->entry.principal, etypes[i]))
221 while (hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, NULL,
222 etypes[i], &key) == 0) {
223 if (key->key.keyvalue.length == 0) {
224 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
229 if (ret_enctype != NULL)
230 *ret_enctype = etypes[i];
232 if (is_preauth && is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
239 krb5_free_salt (context, def_salt);
244 _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname (PrincipalName *pn)
246 pn->name_type = KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL;
247 pn->name_string.len = 1;
248 pn->name_string.val = malloc(sizeof(*pn->name_string.val));
249 if (pn->name_string.val == NULL)
251 pn->name_string.val[0] = strdup("anonymous");
252 if (pn->name_string.val[0] == NULL) {
253 free(pn->name_string.val);
254 pn->name_string.val = NULL;
261 _kdc_r_log(kdc_request_t r, int level, const char *fmt, ...)
266 s = kdc_log_msg_va(r->context, r->config, level, fmt, ap);
272 _kdc_set_e_text(kdc_request_t r, const char *e_text)
275 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0, "%s", e_text);
279 _kdc_log_timestamp(krb5_context context,
280 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
282 KerberosTime authtime, KerberosTime *starttime,
283 KerberosTime endtime, KerberosTime *renew_till)
285 char authtime_str[100], starttime_str[100],
286 endtime_str[100], renewtime_str[100];
288 krb5_format_time(context, authtime,
289 authtime_str, sizeof(authtime_str), TRUE);
291 krb5_format_time(context, *starttime,
292 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
294 strlcpy(starttime_str, "unset", sizeof(starttime_str));
295 krb5_format_time(context, endtime,
296 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
298 krb5_format_time(context, *renew_till,
299 renewtime_str, sizeof(renewtime_str), TRUE);
301 strlcpy(renewtime_str, "unset", sizeof(renewtime_str));
303 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
304 "%s authtime: %s starttime: %s endtime: %s renew till: %s",
305 type, authtime_str, starttime_str, endtime_str, renewtime_str);
314 static krb5_error_code
315 pa_pkinit_validate(kdc_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
317 pk_client_params *pkp = NULL;
318 char *client_cert = NULL;
321 ret = _kdc_pk_rd_padata(r->context, r->config, &r->req, pa, r->client, &pkp);
322 if (ret || pkp == NULL) {
323 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
324 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PKINIT PA-DATA -- %s",
329 ret = _kdc_pk_check_client(r->context,
336 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "PKINIT certificate not allowed to "
337 "impersonate principal");
341 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "PKINIT pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
342 r->client_name, client_cert);
345 ret = _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(r->context, r->config, pkp, r->client,
346 r->sessionetype, &r->req, &r->request,
347 &r->reply_key, &r->session_key, &r->outpadata);
349 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Failed to build PK-INIT reply");
353 ret = _kdc_add_inital_verified_cas(r->context, r->config,
358 _kdc_pk_free_client_param(r->context, pkp);
369 static krb5_error_code
370 make_pa_enc_challange(krb5_context context, METHOD_DATA *md,
377 EncryptedData encdata;
382 krb5_us_timeofday (context, &p.patimestamp, &usec);
386 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ENC_TS_ENC, buf, buf_size, &p, &len, ret);
390 krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
392 ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
394 KRB5_KU_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC,
403 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncryptedData, buf, buf_size, &encdata, &len, ret);
404 free_EncryptedData(&encdata);
408 krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
410 ret = krb5_padata_add(context, md, KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE, buf, len);
416 static krb5_error_code
417 pa_enc_chal_validate(kdc_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
419 krb5_data pepper1, pepper2, ts_data;
420 KDC_REQ_BODY *b = &r->req.req_body;
421 EncryptedData enc_data;
422 krb5_enctype aenctype;
428 heim_assert(r->armor_crypto != NULL, "ENC-CHAL called for non FAST");
430 if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
431 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
432 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0, "ENC-CHALL doesn't support anon");
436 ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
437 pa->padata_value.length,
441 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
442 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
447 pepper1.data = "clientchallengearmor";
448 pepper1.length = strlen(pepper1.data);
449 pepper2.data = "challengelongterm";
450 pepper2.length = strlen(pepper2.data);
452 krb5_crypto_getenctype(r->context, r->armor_crypto, &aenctype);
454 for (i = 0; i < r->client->entry.keys.len; i++) {
455 krb5_crypto challangecrypto, longtermcrypto;
456 krb5_keyblock challangekey;
459 k = &r->client->entry.keys.val[i];
461 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &k->key, 0, &longtermcrypto);
465 ret = krb5_crypto_fx_cf2(r->context, r->armor_crypto, longtermcrypto,
466 &pepper1, &pepper2, aenctype,
468 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, longtermcrypto);
472 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &challangekey, 0,
477 ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData(r->context, challangecrypto,
478 KRB5_KU_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT,
484 ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data,
488 krb5_data_free(&ts_data);
490 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challangecrypto);
491 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
492 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
497 if (abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > r->context->max_skew) {
498 char client_time[100];
500 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challangecrypto);
502 krb5_format_time(r->context, p.patimestamp,
503 client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
505 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
506 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "Too large time skew, "
507 "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
509 (unsigned)abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
510 r->context->max_skew,
513 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
517 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
519 ret = make_pa_enc_challange(r->context, &r->outpadata,
521 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challangecrypto);
525 set_salt_padata(&r->outpadata, k->salt);
526 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
527 ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &k->key, &r->reply_key);
533 if (i < r->client->entry.keys.len)
534 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
536 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
541 static krb5_error_code
542 pa_enc_ts_validate(kdc_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
544 EncryptedData enc_data;
553 if (r->req.req_body.kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
554 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
555 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "ENC-TS doesn't support anon");
559 ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
560 pa->padata_value.length,
564 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
565 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
570 ret = hdb_enctype2key(r->context, &r->client->entry, NULL,
571 enc_data.etype, &pa_key);
574 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "No key matching entype");
575 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
576 if(krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, enc_data.etype, &estr))
580 "No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s",
581 enc_data.etype, r->client_name);
584 "No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s",
585 estr, r->client_name);
587 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
592 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &pa_key->key, 0, &crypto);
594 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
595 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
596 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
597 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
601 ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (r->context,
603 KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP,
606 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, crypto);
608 * Since the user might have several keys with the same
609 * enctype but with diffrent salting, we need to try all
610 * the keys with the same enctype.
613 krb5_error_code ret2;
614 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
616 ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context,
617 pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
620 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA -- %s "
621 "(enctype %s) error %s",
622 r->client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype", msg);
623 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
626 if(hdb_next_enctype2key(r->context, &r->client->entry, NULL,
627 enc_data.etype, &pa_key) == 0)
630 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
632 if (r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
633 r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status(r->context, r->clientdb, r->client,
634 HDB_AUTH_WRONG_PASSWORD);
636 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
639 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
640 ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data,
644 krb5_data_free(&ts_data);
646 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
647 _kdc_r_log(r, 5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
651 if (abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > r->context->max_skew) {
652 char client_time[100];
654 krb5_format_time(r->context, p.patimestamp,
655 client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
657 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
658 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "Too large time skew, "
659 "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
661 (unsigned)abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
662 r->context->max_skew,
666 * The following is needed to make windows clients to
667 * retry using the timestamp in the error message, if
668 * there is a e_text, they become unhappy.
671 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
674 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
676 set_salt_padata(&r->outpadata, pa_key->salt);
678 ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &pa_key->key, &r->reply_key);
682 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
685 _kdc_r_log(r, 2, "ENC-TS Pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
686 r->client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype");
700 #define PA_ANNOUNCE 1
701 #define PA_REQ_FAST 2 /* only use inside fast */
702 krb5_error_code (*validate)(kdc_request_t, const PA_DATA *pa);
705 static const struct kdc_patypes pat[] = {
708 KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ, "PK-INIT(ietf)", PA_ANNOUNCE,
712 KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN, "PK-INIT(win2k)", PA_ANNOUNCE,
716 { KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ, "PK-INIT(ietf)", 0, NULL },
717 { KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN, "PK-INIT(win2k)", 0, NULL },
719 { KRB5_PADATA_PA_PK_OCSP_RESPONSE , "OCSP", 0, NULL },
721 KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP , "ENC-TS",
726 KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE , "ENC-CHAL",
727 PA_ANNOUNCE | PA_REQ_FAST,
730 { KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP , "REQ-ENC-PA-REP", 0, NULL },
731 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST, "FX-FAST", PA_ANNOUNCE, NULL },
732 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_ERROR, "FX-ERROR", 0, NULL },
733 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_COOKIE, "FX-COOKIE", 0, NULL }
737 log_patypes(krb5_context context,
738 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
741 struct rk_strpool *p = NULL;
745 for (n = 0; n < padata->len; n++) {
746 for (m = 0; m < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); m++) {
747 if (padata->val[n].padata_type == pat[m].type) {
748 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%s", pat[m].name);
752 if (m == sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]))
753 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", padata->val[n].padata_type);
754 if (p && n + 1 < padata->len)
755 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
757 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "out of memory");
762 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "none");
764 str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
765 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Client sent patypes: %s", str);
774 _kdc_encode_reply(krb5_context context,
775 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
776 krb5_crypto armor_crypto, uint32_t nonce,
777 KDC_REP *rep, EncTicketPart *et, EncKDCRepPart *ek,
779 int skvno, const EncryptionKey *skey,
780 int ckvno, const EncryptionKey *reply_key,
791 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTicketPart, buf, buf_size, et, &len, ret);
793 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
794 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode ticket: %s", msg);
795 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
799 krb5_abortx(context, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
801 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, skey, etype, &crypto);
803 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
804 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
805 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
809 ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
815 &rep->ticket.enc_part);
817 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
819 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
820 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encrypt data: %s", msg);
821 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
827 krb5_keyblock *strengthen_key = NULL;
828 KrbFastFinished finished;
830 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "FAST armor protection");
832 memset(&finished, 0, sizeof(finished));
833 krb5_data_zero(&data);
835 finished.timestamp = kdc_time;
837 finished.crealm = et->crealm;
838 finished.cname = et->cname;
840 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Ticket, data.data, data.length,
841 &rep->ticket, &len, ret);
844 if (data.length != len)
845 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
847 ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, armor_crypto,
848 KRB5_KU_FAST_FINISHED, 0,
849 data.data, data.length,
850 &finished.ticket_checksum);
851 krb5_data_free(&data);
855 ret = _kdc_fast_mk_response(context, armor_crypto,
856 rep->padata, strengthen_key, &finished,
858 free_Checksum(&finished.ticket_checksum);
863 free_METHOD_DATA(rep->padata);
865 rep->padata = calloc(1, sizeof(*(rep->padata)));
866 if (rep->padata == NULL) {
867 krb5_data_free(&data);
872 ret = krb5_padata_add(context, rep->padata,
874 data.data, data.length);
879 * Hide client name of privacy reasons
881 if (1 /* r->fast_options.hide_client_names */) {
882 rep->crealm[0] = '\0';
883 free_PrincipalName(&rep->cname);
884 rep->cname.name_type = 0;
888 if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep && !config->encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep)
889 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncASRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
891 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTGSRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
893 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
894 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
895 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
898 if(buf_size != len) {
900 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
901 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
902 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
904 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, reply_key, 0, &crypto);
906 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
908 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
909 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
912 if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep) {
913 krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
915 KRB5_KU_AS_REP_ENC_PART,
921 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
923 krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
925 rk_is_subkey ? KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SUB_KEY : KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION,
931 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(TGS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
933 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
935 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
936 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
937 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
940 if(buf_size != len) {
942 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
943 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
944 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
947 reply->length = buf_size;
952 * Return 1 if the client have only older enctypes, this is for
953 * determining if the server should send ETYPE_INFO2 or not.
957 older_enctype(krb5_enctype enctype)
960 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
961 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
962 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
963 case ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
964 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5:
965 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56:
967 * The following three is "old" windows enctypes and is needed for
968 * windows 2000 hosts.
970 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_MD4:
971 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD:
972 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD_EXP:
983 static krb5_error_code
984 make_etype_info_entry(krb5_context context, ETYPE_INFO_ENTRY *ent, Key *key)
986 ent->etype = key->key.keytype;
989 ALLOC(ent->salttype);
991 if(key->salt->type == hdb_pw_salt)
992 *ent->salttype = 0; /* or 1? or NULL? */
993 else if(key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt)
996 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "unknown salt-type: %d",
998 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1000 /* according to `the specs', we can't send a salt if
1001 we have AFS3 salted key, but that requires that you
1002 *know* what cell you are using (e.g by assuming
1003 that the cell is the same as the realm in lower
1006 ALLOC(ent->salttype);
1007 *ent->salttype = key->salt->type;
1010 * We shouldn't sent salttype since it is incompatible with the
1011 * specification and it breaks windows clients. The afs
1012 * salting problem is solved by using KRB5-PADATA-AFS3-SALT
1013 * implemented in Heimdal 0.7 and later.
1015 ent->salttype = NULL;
1017 krb5_copy_data(context, &key->salt->salt,
1020 /* we return no salt type at all, as that should indicate
1021 * the default salt type and make everybody happy. some
1022 * systems (like w2k) dislike being told the salt type
1025 ent->salttype = NULL;
1031 static krb5_error_code
1032 get_pa_etype_info(krb5_context context,
1033 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1034 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey)
1036 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
1043 pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
1047 ret = make_etype_info_entry(context, &pa.val[0], ckey);
1049 free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
1053 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
1054 free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
1057 ret = realloc_method_data(md);
1062 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO;
1063 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len;
1064 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf;
1072 extern int _krb5_AES_string_to_default_iterator;
1074 static krb5_error_code
1075 make_etype_info2_entry(ETYPE_INFO2_ENTRY *ent, Key *key)
1077 ent->etype = key->key.keytype;
1080 if (ent->salt == NULL)
1082 *ent->salt = malloc(key->salt->salt.length + 1);
1083 if (*ent->salt == NULL) {
1088 memcpy(*ent->salt, key->salt->salt.data, key->salt->salt.length);
1089 (*ent->salt)[key->salt->salt.length] = '\0';
1093 ent->s2kparams = NULL;
1095 switch (key->key.keytype) {
1096 case ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
1097 case ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
1098 ALLOC(ent->s2kparams);
1099 if (ent->s2kparams == NULL)
1101 ent->s2kparams->length = 4;
1102 ent->s2kparams->data = malloc(ent->s2kparams->length);
1103 if (ent->s2kparams->data == NULL) {
1104 free(ent->s2kparams);
1105 ent->s2kparams = NULL;
1108 _krb5_put_int(ent->s2kparams->data,
1109 _krb5_AES_string_to_default_iterator,
1110 ent->s2kparams->length);
1112 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
1113 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
1114 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
1115 /* Check if this was a AFS3 salted key */
1116 if(key->salt && key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt){
1117 ALLOC(ent->s2kparams);
1118 if (ent->s2kparams == NULL)
1120 ent->s2kparams->length = 1;
1121 ent->s2kparams->data = malloc(ent->s2kparams->length);
1122 if (ent->s2kparams->data == NULL) {
1123 free(ent->s2kparams);
1124 ent->s2kparams = NULL;
1127 _krb5_put_int(ent->s2kparams->data,
1129 ent->s2kparams->length);
1139 * Return an ETYPE-INFO2. Enctypes are storted the same way as in the
1140 * database (client supported enctypes first, then the unsupported
1144 static krb5_error_code
1145 get_pa_etype_info2(krb5_context context,
1146 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1147 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey)
1149 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
1155 pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
1159 ret = make_etype_info2_entry(&pa.val[0], ckey);
1161 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
1165 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO2, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
1166 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
1169 ret = realloc_method_data(md);
1174 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO2;
1175 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len;
1176 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf;
1185 log_as_req(krb5_context context,
1186 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1187 krb5_enctype cetype,
1188 krb5_enctype setype,
1189 const KDC_REQ_BODY *b)
1191 krb5_error_code ret;
1192 struct rk_strpool *p;
1196 p = rk_strpoolprintf(NULL, "%s", "Client supported enctypes: ");
1198 for (i = 0; i < b->etype.len; i++) {
1199 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, b->etype.val[i], &str);
1201 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%s", str);
1204 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", b->etype.val[i]);
1205 if (p && i + 1 < b->etype.len)
1206 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
1208 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "out of memory");
1213 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "no encryption types");
1219 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, cetype, &cet);
1221 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, setype, &set);
1223 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using %s/%s", cet, set);
1229 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using enctypes %d/%d",
1233 str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
1234 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s", str);
1239 unparse_flags(KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options), asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
1240 fixedstr, sizeof(fixedstr));
1242 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Requested flags: %s", fixedstr);
1247 * verify the flags on `client' and `server', returning 0
1248 * if they are OK and generating an error messages and returning
1249 * and error code otherwise.
1253 kdc_check_flags(krb5_context context,
1254 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1255 hdb_entry_ex *client_ex, const char *client_name,
1256 hdb_entry_ex *server_ex, const char *server_name,
1257 krb5_boolean is_as_req)
1259 if(client_ex != NULL) {
1260 hdb_entry *client = &client_ex->entry;
1263 if (client->flags.locked_out) {
1264 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1265 "Client (%s) is locked out", client_name);
1266 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1269 if (client->flags.invalid) {
1270 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1271 "Client (%s) has invalid bit set", client_name);
1272 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1275 if(!client->flags.client){
1276 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1277 "Principal may not act as client -- %s", client_name);
1278 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1281 if (client->valid_start && *client->valid_start > kdc_time) {
1282 char starttime_str[100];
1283 krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_start,
1284 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
1285 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1286 "Client not yet valid until %s -- %s",
1287 starttime_str, client_name);
1288 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
1291 if (client->valid_end && *client->valid_end < kdc_time) {
1292 char endtime_str[100];
1293 krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_end,
1294 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
1295 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1296 "Client expired at %s -- %s",
1297 endtime_str, client_name);
1298 return KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP;
1301 if (client->flags.require_pwchange &&
1302 (server_ex == NULL || !server_ex->entry.flags.change_pw)) {
1303 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1304 "Client's key must be changed -- %s", client_name);
1305 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
1308 if (client->pw_end && *client->pw_end < kdc_time
1309 && (server_ex == NULL || !server_ex->entry.flags.change_pw)) {
1310 char pwend_str[100];
1311 krb5_format_time(context, *client->pw_end,
1312 pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
1313 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1314 "Client's key has expired at %s -- %s",
1315 pwend_str, client_name);
1316 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
1322 if (server_ex != NULL) {
1323 hdb_entry *server = &server_ex->entry;
1325 if (server->flags.locked_out) {
1326 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1327 "Client server locked out -- %s", server_name);
1328 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1330 if (server->flags.invalid) {
1331 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1332 "Server has invalid flag set -- %s", server_name);
1333 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1336 if(!server->flags.server){
1337 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1338 "Principal may not act as server -- %s", server_name);
1339 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1342 if(!is_as_req && server->flags.initial) {
1343 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1344 "AS-REQ is required for server -- %s", server_name);
1345 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1348 if (server->valid_start && *server->valid_start > kdc_time) {
1349 char starttime_str[100];
1350 krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_start,
1351 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
1352 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1353 "Server not yet valid until %s -- %s",
1354 starttime_str, server_name);
1355 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET;
1358 if (server->valid_end && *server->valid_end < kdc_time) {
1359 char endtime_str[100];
1360 krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_end,
1361 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
1362 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1363 "Server expired at %s -- %s",
1364 endtime_str, server_name);
1365 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP;
1368 if (server->pw_end && *server->pw_end < kdc_time) {
1369 char pwend_str[100];
1370 krb5_format_time(context, *server->pw_end,
1371 pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
1372 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1373 "Server's key has expired at -- %s",
1374 pwend_str, server_name);
1375 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
1382 * Return TRUE if `from' is part of `addresses' taking into consideration
1383 * the configuration variables that tells us how strict we should be about
1388 _kdc_check_addresses(krb5_context context,
1389 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1390 HostAddresses *addresses, const struct sockaddr *from)
1392 krb5_error_code ret;
1394 krb5_boolean result;
1395 krb5_boolean only_netbios = TRUE;
1398 if(config->check_ticket_addresses == 0)
1401 if(addresses == NULL)
1402 return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
1404 for (i = 0; i < addresses->len; ++i) {
1405 if (addresses->val[i].addr_type != KRB5_ADDRESS_NETBIOS) {
1406 only_netbios = FALSE;
1410 /* Windows sends it's netbios name, which I can only assume is
1411 * used for the 'allowed workstations' check. This is painful,
1412 * but we still want to check IP addresses if they happen to be
1417 return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
1419 ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (context, from, &addr);
1423 result = krb5_address_search(context, &addr, addresses);
1424 krb5_free_address (context, &addr);
1433 send_pac_p(krb5_context context, KDC_REQ *req)
1435 krb5_error_code ret;
1436 PA_PAC_REQUEST pacreq;
1440 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PA_PAC_REQUEST);
1444 ret = decode_PA_PAC_REQUEST(pa->padata_value.data,
1445 pa->padata_value.length,
1450 i = pacreq.include_pac;
1451 free_PA_PAC_REQUEST(&pacreq);
1461 static krb5_error_code
1462 generate_pac(kdc_request_t r, Key *skey)
1464 krb5_error_code ret;
1468 ret = _kdc_pac_generate(r->context, r->client, &p);
1470 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
1477 ret = _krb5_pac_sign(r->context, p, r->et.authtime,
1478 r->client->entry.principal,
1479 &skey->key, /* Server key */
1480 &skey->key, /* FIXME: should be krbtgt key */
1482 krb5_pac_free(r->context, p);
1484 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
1489 ret = _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(r->context, &r->et,
1490 KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC,
1492 krb5_data_free(&data);
1502 _kdc_is_anonymous(krb5_context context, krb5_principal principal)
1504 if (principal->name.name_type != KRB5_NT_WELLKNOWN ||
1505 principal->name.name_string.len != 2 ||
1506 strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_WELLKNOWN_NAME) != 0 ||
1507 strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], KRB5_ANON_NAME) != 0)
1513 require_preauth_p(kdc_request_t r)
1515 return r->config->require_preauth
1516 || r->client->entry.flags.require_preauth
1517 || r->server->entry.flags.require_preauth;
1525 static krb5_error_code
1526 add_enc_pa_rep(kdc_request_t r)
1528 krb5_error_code ret;
1534 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &r->reply_key, 0, &crypto);
1538 ret = krb5_create_checksum(r->context, crypto,
1540 r->request.data, r->request.length,
1542 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, crypto);
1546 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Checksum, cdata.data, cdata.length,
1547 &checksum, &len, ret);
1548 free_Checksum(&checksum);
1551 heim_assert(cdata.length == len, "ASN.1 internal error");
1553 if (r->ek.encrypted_pa_data == NULL) {
1554 ALLOC(r->ek.encrypted_pa_data);
1555 if (r->ek.encrypted_pa_data == NULL)
1558 ret = krb5_padata_add(r->context, r->ek.encrypted_pa_data,
1559 KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP, cdata.data, cdata.length);
1563 return krb5_padata_add(r->context, r->ek.encrypted_pa_data,
1564 KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST, NULL, 0);
1572 _kdc_as_rep(kdc_request_t r,
1575 struct sockaddr *from_addr,
1578 krb5_context context = r->context;
1579 krb5_kdc_configuration *config = r->config;
1580 KDC_REQ *req = &r->req;
1581 KDC_REQ_BODY *b = NULL;
1584 krb5_enctype setype;
1585 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
1588 int i, flags = HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ;
1589 METHOD_DATA error_method;
1592 memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
1593 error_method.len = 0;
1594 error_method.val = NULL;
1597 * Look for FAST armor and unwrap
1599 ret = _kdc_fast_unwrap_request(r);
1601 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "FAST unwrap request from %s failed: %d", from, ret);
1609 flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
1611 if(b->sname == NULL){
1612 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1613 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "No server in request");
1615 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
1620 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->server_princ, &r->server_name);
1623 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1624 "AS-REQ malformed server name from %s", from);
1627 if(b->cname == NULL){
1628 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1629 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "No client in request");
1631 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
1638 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->client_princ, &r->client_name);
1641 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1642 "AS-REQ malformed client name from %s", from);
1646 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s",
1647 r->client_name, from, r->server_name);
1653 if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context, r->client_princ)) {
1654 if (!b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
1655 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Anonymous ticket w/o anonymous flag");
1656 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1659 } else if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
1660 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1661 "Request for a anonymous ticket with non "
1662 "anonymous client name: %s", r->client_name);
1663 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1671 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, r->client_princ,
1672 HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags, NULL,
1673 &r->clientdb, &r->client);
1674 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1675 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "client %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy",
1679 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1680 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r->client_name, msg);
1681 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1682 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1685 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, r->server_princ,
1686 HDB_F_GET_SERVER|HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT | flags,
1687 NULL, NULL, &r->server);
1688 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1689 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy",
1693 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1694 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r->server_name, msg);
1695 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1696 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1701 * Select a session enctype from the list of the crypto system
1702 * supported enctypes that is supported by the client and is one of
1703 * the enctype of the enctype of the service (likely krbtgt).
1705 * The latter is used as a hint of what enctypes all KDC support,
1706 * to make sure a newer version of KDC won't generate a session
1707 * enctype that an older version of a KDC in the same realm can't
1711 ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
1712 krb5_principal_is_krbtgt(context, r->server_princ) ?
1713 config->tgt_use_strongest_session_key :
1714 config->svc_use_strongest_session_key, FALSE,
1715 r->client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, &r->sessionetype,
1718 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1719 "Client (%s) from %s has no common enctypes with KDC "
1720 "to use for the session key",
1721 r->client_name, from);
1726 * Pre-auth processing
1732 log_patypes(context, config, req->padata);
1734 /* Check if preauth matching */
1736 for (n = 0; !found_pa && n < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); n++) {
1737 if (pat[n].validate == NULL)
1739 if (r->armor_crypto == NULL && (pat[n].flags & PA_REQ_FAST))
1742 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1743 "Looking for %s pa-data -- %s", pat[n].name, r->client_name);
1745 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, pat[n].type);
1747 ret = pat[n].validate(r, pa);
1749 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1750 "%s pre-authentication succeeded -- %s",
1751 pat[n].name, r->client_name);
1753 r->et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
1759 if (found_pa == 0) {
1763 for (n = 0; n < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); n++) {
1764 if ((pat[n].flags & PA_ANNOUNCE) == 0)
1766 ret = krb5_padata_add(context, &error_method,
1767 pat[n].type, NULL, 0);
1773 * If there is a client key, send ETYPE_INFO{,2}
1775 ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
1776 config->preauth_use_strongest_session_key, TRUE,
1777 r->client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, NULL, &ckey);
1782 * - If the client only knows about old enctypes, then send
1783 * both info replies (we send 'info' first in the list).
1784 * - If the client is 'modern', because it knows about 'new'
1785 * enctype types, then only send the 'info2' reply.
1787 * Before we send the full list of etype-info data, we pick
1788 * the client key we would have used anyway below, just pick
1792 if (older_enctype(ckey->key.keytype)) {
1793 ret = get_pa_etype_info(context, config,
1794 &error_method, ckey);
1798 ret = get_pa_etype_info2(context, config,
1799 &error_method, ckey);
1805 * send requre preauth is its required or anon is requested,
1806 * anon is today only allowed via preauth mechanisms.
1808 if (require_preauth_p(r) || b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
1809 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
1810 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/PA-PK-AS-REQ");
1815 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
1816 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Doesn't have a client key available");
1819 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
1820 ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &ckey->key, &r->reply_key);
1825 if (r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
1826 r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status(context, r->clientdb, r->client,
1830 * Verify flags after the user been required to prove its identity
1831 * with in a preauth mech.
1834 ret = _kdc_check_access(context, config, r->client, r->client_name,
1835 r->server, r->server_name,
1836 req, &error_method);
1841 * Select the best encryption type for the KDC with out regard to
1842 * the client since the client never needs to read that data.
1845 ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config,
1846 r->server, r->server_name,
1851 if(f.renew || f.validate || f.proxy || f.forwarded || f.enc_tkt_in_skey
1852 || (f.request_anonymous && !config->allow_anonymous)) {
1853 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1854 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Bad KDC options");
1863 rep.msg_type = krb_as_rep;
1865 ret = copy_Realm(&r->client->entry.principal->realm, &rep.crealm);
1868 ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname, r->client->entry.principal);
1872 rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
1873 copy_Realm(&r->server->entry.principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
1874 _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname,
1875 r->server->entry.principal);
1876 /* java 1.6 expects the name to be the same type, lets allow that
1877 * uncomplicated name-types. */
1878 #define CNT(sp,t) (((sp)->sname->name_type) == KRB5_NT_##t)
1879 if (CNT(b, UNKNOWN) || CNT(b, PRINCIPAL) || CNT(b, SRV_INST) || CNT(b, SRV_HST) || CNT(b, SRV_XHST))
1880 rep.ticket.sname.name_type = b->sname->name_type;
1883 r->et.flags.initial = 1;
1884 if(r->client->entry.flags.forwardable && r->server->entry.flags.forwardable)
1885 r->et.flags.forwardable = f.forwardable;
1886 else if (f.forwardable) {
1887 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be forwardable");
1888 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1891 if(r->client->entry.flags.proxiable && r->server->entry.flags.proxiable)
1892 r->et.flags.proxiable = f.proxiable;
1893 else if (f.proxiable) {
1894 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be proxiable");
1895 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1898 if(r->client->entry.flags.postdate && r->server->entry.flags.postdate)
1899 r->et.flags.may_postdate = f.allow_postdate;
1900 else if (f.allow_postdate){
1901 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be postdate");
1902 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1906 /* check for valid set of addresses */
1907 if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context, config, b->addresses, from_addr)) {
1908 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Bad address list in requested");
1909 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
1913 ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep.cname, &r->et.cname);
1916 ret = copy_Realm(&rep.crealm, &r->et.crealm);
1924 start = r->et.authtime = kdc_time;
1926 if(f.postdated && req->req_body.from){
1927 ALLOC(r->et.starttime);
1928 start = *r->et.starttime = *req->req_body.from;
1929 r->et.flags.invalid = 1;
1930 r->et.flags.postdated = 1; /* XXX ??? */
1932 _kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
1935 /* be careful not overflowing */
1937 if(r->client->entry.max_life)
1938 t = start + min(t - start, *r->client->entry.max_life);
1939 if(r->server->entry.max_life)
1940 t = start + min(t - start, *r->server->entry.max_life);
1942 t = min(t, start + realm->max_life);
1945 if(f.renewable_ok && r->et.endtime < *b->till){
1947 if(b->rtime == NULL){
1951 if(*b->rtime < *b->till)
1952 *b->rtime = *b->till;
1954 if(f.renewable && b->rtime){
1958 if(r->client->entry.max_renew)
1959 t = start + min(t - start, *r->client->entry.max_renew);
1960 if(r->server->entry.max_renew)
1961 t = start + min(t - start, *r->server->entry.max_renew);
1963 t = min(t, start + realm->max_renew);
1965 ALLOC(r->et.renew_till);
1966 *r->et.renew_till = t;
1967 r->et.flags.renewable = 1;
1971 if (f.request_anonymous)
1972 r->et.flags.anonymous = 1;
1976 copy_HostAddresses(b->addresses, r->et.caddr);
1979 r->et.transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
1980 krb5_data_zero(&r->et.transited.contents);
1982 /* The MIT ASN.1 library (obviously) doesn't tell lengths encoded
1983 * as 0 and as 0x80 (meaning indefinite length) apart, and is thus
1984 * incapable of correctly decoding SEQUENCE OF's of zero length.
1986 * To fix this, always send at least one no-op last_req
1988 * If there's a pw_end or valid_end we will use that,
1989 * otherwise just a dummy lr.
1991 r->ek.last_req.val = malloc(2 * sizeof(*r->ek.last_req.val));
1992 if (r->ek.last_req.val == NULL) {
1996 r->ek.last_req.len = 0;
1997 if (r->client->entry.pw_end
1998 && (config->kdc_warn_pwexpire == 0
1999 || kdc_time + config->kdc_warn_pwexpire >= *r->client->entry.pw_end)) {
2000 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_PW_EXPTIME;
2001 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *r->client->entry.pw_end;
2002 ++r->ek.last_req.len;
2004 if (r->client->entry.valid_end) {
2005 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_ACCT_EXPTIME;
2006 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *r->client->entry.valid_end;
2007 ++r->ek.last_req.len;
2009 if (r->ek.last_req.len == 0) {
2010 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_NONE;
2011 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = 0;
2012 ++r->ek.last_req.len;
2014 r->ek.nonce = b->nonce;
2015 if (r->client->entry.valid_end || r->client->entry.pw_end) {
2016 ALLOC(r->ek.key_expiration);
2017 if (r->client->entry.valid_end) {
2018 if (r->client->entry.pw_end)
2019 *r->ek.key_expiration = min(*r->client->entry.valid_end,
2020 *r->client->entry.pw_end);
2022 *r->ek.key_expiration = *r->client->entry.valid_end;
2024 *r->ek.key_expiration = *r->client->entry.pw_end;
2026 r->ek.key_expiration = NULL;
2027 r->ek.flags = r->et.flags;
2028 r->ek.authtime = r->et.authtime;
2029 if (r->et.starttime) {
2030 ALLOC(r->ek.starttime);
2031 *r->ek.starttime = *r->et.starttime;
2033 r->ek.endtime = r->et.endtime;
2034 if (r->et.renew_till) {
2035 ALLOC(r->ek.renew_till);
2036 *r->ek.renew_till = *r->et.renew_till;
2038 copy_Realm(&rep.ticket.realm, &r->ek.srealm);
2039 copy_PrincipalName(&rep.ticket.sname, &r->ek.sname);
2042 copy_HostAddresses(r->et.caddr, r->ek.caddr);
2046 * Check and session and reply keys
2049 if (r->session_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) {
2050 ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, r->sessionetype, &r->session_key);
2055 if (r->reply_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) {
2056 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Client have no reply key");
2057 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
2061 ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&r->session_key, &r->et.key);
2065 ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&r->session_key, &r->ek.key);
2070 * Add signing of alias referral
2073 if (f.canonicalize) {
2074 PA_ClientCanonicalized canon;
2077 krb5_crypto cryptox;
2080 memset(&canon, 0, sizeof(canon));
2082 canon.names.requested_name = *b->cname;
2083 canon.names.mapped_name = r->client->entry.principal->name;
2085 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ClientCanonicalizedNames, data.data, data.length,
2086 &canon.names, &len, ret);
2089 if (data.length != len)
2090 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
2092 /* sign using "returned session key" */
2093 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &r->et.key, 0, &cryptox);
2099 ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, cryptox,
2100 KRB5_KU_CANONICALIZED_NAMES, 0,
2101 data.data, data.length,
2102 &canon.canon_checksum);
2104 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, cryptox);
2108 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ClientCanonicalized, data.data, data.length,
2110 free_Checksum(&canon.canon_checksum);
2113 if (data.length != len)
2114 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
2116 tmppa.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_CLIENT_CANONICALIZED;
2117 tmppa.padata_value = data;
2118 ret = add_METHOD_DATA(&r->outpadata, &tmppa);
2124 if (r->outpadata.len) {
2127 if (rep.padata == NULL) {
2131 ret = copy_METHOD_DATA(&r->outpadata, rep.padata);
2137 if (send_pac_p(context, req)) {
2138 generate_pac(r, skey);
2141 _kdc_log_timestamp(context, config, "AS-REQ", r->et.authtime, r->et.starttime,
2142 r->et.endtime, r->et.renew_till);
2144 /* do this as the last thing since this signs the EncTicketPart */
2145 ret = _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(context,
2149 r->client->entry.principal,
2156 log_as_req(context, config, r->reply_key.keytype, setype, b);
2159 * We always say we support FAST/enc-pa-rep
2162 r->et.flags.enc_pa_rep = r->ek.flags.enc_pa_rep = 1;
2165 * Add REQ_ENC_PA_REP if client supports it
2169 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP);
2172 ret = add_enc_pa_rep(r);
2174 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
2175 _kdc_r_log(r, 0, "add_enc_pa_rep failed: %s: %d", msg, ret);
2176 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
2185 ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config,
2186 r->armor_crypto, req->req_body.nonce,
2187 &rep, &r->et, &r->ek, setype, r->server->entry.kvno,
2188 &skey->key, r->client->entry.kvno,
2189 &r->reply_key, 0, &r->e_text, reply);
2194 * Check if message too large
2196 if (datagram_reply && reply->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) {
2197 krb5_data_free(reply);
2198 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG;
2199 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Reply packet too large");
2206 * In case of a non proxy error, build an error message.
2208 if(ret != 0 && ret != HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
2209 ret = _kdc_fast_mk_error(context, r,
2214 r->client_princ, r->server_princ,
2221 free_EncTicketPart(&r->et);
2222 free_EncKDCRepPart(&r->ek);
2223 free_KDCFastState(&r->fast);
2225 if (error_method.len)
2226 free_METHOD_DATA(&error_method);
2227 if (r->outpadata.len)
2228 free_METHOD_DATA(&r->outpadata);
2229 if (r->client_princ) {
2230 krb5_free_principal(context, r->client_princ);
2231 r->client_princ = NULL;
2233 if (r->client_name) {
2234 free(r->client_name);
2235 r->client_name = NULL;
2237 if (r->server_princ){
2238 krb5_free_principal(context, r->server_princ);
2239 r->server_princ = NULL;
2241 if (r->server_name) {
2242 free(r->server_name);
2243 r->server_name = NULL;
2246 _kdc_free_ent(context, r->client);
2248 _kdc_free_ent(context, r->server);
2249 if (r->armor_crypto) {
2250 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, r->armor_crypto);
2251 r->armor_crypto = NULL;
2253 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
2254 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->session_key);
2259 * Add the AuthorizationData `data´ of `type´ to the last element in
2260 * the sequence of authorization_data in `tkt´ wrapped in an IF_RELEVANT
2264 _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(krb5_context context,
2267 const krb5_data *data)
2269 krb5_error_code ret;
2272 if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
2273 tkt->authorization_data = calloc(1, sizeof(*tkt->authorization_data));
2274 if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
2275 krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOMEM, "out of memory");
2280 /* add the entry to the last element */
2282 AuthorizationData ad = { 0, NULL };
2283 AuthorizationDataElement ade;
2286 ade.ad_data = *data;
2288 ret = add_AuthorizationData(&ad, &ade);
2290 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "add AuthorizationData failed");
2294 ade.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT;
2296 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthorizationData,
2297 ade.ad_data.data, ade.ad_data.length,
2299 free_AuthorizationData(&ad);
2301 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "ASN.1 encode of "
2302 "AuthorizationData failed");
2305 if (ade.ad_data.length != size)
2306 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
2308 ret = add_AuthorizationData(tkt->authorization_data, &ade);
2309 der_free_octet_string(&ade.ad_data);
2311 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "add AuthorizationData failed");