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6 <title>Samba - Security Announcement Archive</title>
11 <H2>CVE-2007-2444: Local SID/Name translation bug can result in
12 user privilege elevation</H2>
16 ==========================================================
18 == Subject: Local SID/Name translation bug can result
19 == in user privilege elevation
20 == CVE ID#: CVE-2007-2444
22 == Versions: Samba 3.0.23d - 3.0.25pre2 (inclusive)
24 == Summary: A bug in the local SID/Name translation
25 == routines may potentially result in a user
26 == being able to issue SMB/CIFS protocol
27 == operations as root.
29 ==========================================================
35 When translating SIDs to/from names using Samba local
36 list of user and group accounts, a logic error in the
37 smbd daemon's internal security stack may result in a
38 transition to the root user id rather than the non-root
39 user. The user is then able to temporarily issue SMB/CIFS
40 protocol operations as the root user. This window of
41 opportunity may allow the attacker to establish additional
42 means of gaining root access to the server.
49 A patch against Samba 3.0.23d/3.0.24 has posted at
51 http://www.samba.org/samba/security/
58 There is no immediate workaround for this defect that does
59 not involve changing the server code in the smbd daemon.
60 The Samba Team always encourages users to run the latest
61 stable release as a defense against attacks. If this
62 is not immediately possible, administrators should read
63 the "Server Security" documentation found at
65 http://www.samba.org/samba/docs/server_security.html
72 This vulnerability was reported to Samba developers by Paul
73 Griffith <paulg@cse.yorku.ca> and Andrew Hogue. Much thanks
74 to Paul and Andrew for their cooperation and patience in the
75 announcement of this defect. Thanks also to Samba developers
76 James Peach and Jeremy Allison for the analysis and resolution
79 The time line is as follows:
81 * March 20, 2007: Defect first reported to the security@samba.org
83 * March 30, 2007: Initial developer response by Gerald Carter.
84 * April 4, 2007: Patch released to bug reporter for testing.
85 * April 9, 2007: Fixed confirmed by original reporter.
86 * May 3, 2007: Announcement to vendor-sec mailing list
87 * May 14, 2007: Public announcement of the security issue.
91 ==========================================================
92 == Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
94 ==========================================================