+ ==============================
+ Release Notes for Samba 4.2.11
+ April 12, 2016
+ ==============================
+
+This is a security release containing one additional
+regression fix for the security release 4.2.10.
+
+This fixes a regression that prevents things like 'net ads join'
+from working against a Windows 2003 domain.
+
+Changes since 4.2.10:
+=====================
+
+o Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+ * Bug 11804 - prerequisite backports for the security release on
+ April 12th, 2016
+
+Release notes for the original 4.2.10 release follows:
+------------------------------------------------------
+
+ ==============================
+ Release Notes for Samba 4.2.10
+ April 12, 2016
+ ==============================
+
+
+This is a security release in order to address the following CVEs:
+
+o CVE-2015-5370 (Multiple errors in DCE-RPC code)
+
+o CVE-2016-2110 (Man in the middle attacks possible with NTLMSSP)
+
+o CVE-2016-2111 (NETLOGON Spoofing Vulnerability)
+
+o CVE-2016-2112 (LDAP client and server don't enforce integrity)
+
+o CVE-2016-2113 (Missing TLS certificate validation)
+
+o CVE-2016-2114 ("server signing = mandatory" not enforced)
+
+o CVE-2016-2115 (SMB IPC traffic is not integrity protected)
+
+o CVE-2016-2118 (SAMR and LSA man in the middle attacks possible)
+
+The number of changes are rather huge for a security release,
+compared to typical security releases.
+
+Given the number of problems and the fact that they are all related
+to man in the middle attacks we decided to fix them all at once
+instead of splitting them.
+
+In order to prevent the man in the middle attacks it was required
+to change the (default) behavior for some protocols. Please see the
+"New smb.conf options" and "Behavior changes" sections below.
+
+=======
+Details
+=======
+
+o CVE-2015-5370
+
+ Versions of Samba from 3.6.0 to 4.4.0 inclusive are vulnerable to
+ denial of service attacks (crashes and high cpu consumption)
+ in the DCE-RPC client and server implementations. In addition,
+ errors in validation of the DCE-RPC packets can lead to a downgrade
+ of a secure connection to an insecure one.
+
+ While we think it is unlikely, there's a nonzero chance for
+ a remote code execution attack against the client components,
+ which are used by smbd, winbindd and tools like net, rpcclient and
+ others. This may gain root access to the attacker.
+
+ The above applies all possible server roles Samba can operate in.
+
+ Note that versions before 3.6.0 had completely different marshalling
+ functions for the generic DCE-RPC layer. It's quite possible that
+ that code has similar problems!
+
+ The downgrade of a secure connection to an insecure one may
+ allow an attacker to take control of Active Directory object
+ handles created on a connection created from an Administrator
+ account and re-use them on the now non-privileged connection,
+ compromising the security of the Samba AD-DC.
+
+o CVE-2016-2110:
+
+ There are several man in the middle attacks possible with
+ NTLMSSP authentication.
+
+ E.g. NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN and NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL
+ can be cleared by a man in the middle.
+
+ This was by protocol design in earlier Windows versions.
+
+ Windows Server 2003 RTM and Vista RTM introduced a way
+ to protect against the trivial downgrade.
+
+ See MsvAvFlags and flag 0x00000002 in
+ https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc236646.aspx
+
+ This new feature also implies support for a mechlistMIC
+ when used within SPNEGO, which may prevent downgrades
+ from other SPNEGO mechs, e.g. Kerberos, if sign or
+ seal is finally negotiated.
+
+ The Samba implementation doesn't enforce the existence of
+ required flags, which were requested by the application layer,
+ e.g. LDAP or SMB1 encryption (via the unix extensions).
+ As a result a man in the middle can take over the connection.
+ It is also possible to misguide client and/or
+ server to send unencrypted traffic even if encryption
+ was explicitly requested.
+
+ LDAP (with NTLMSSP authentication) is used as a client
+ by various admin tools of the Samba project,
+ e.g. "net", "samba-tool", "ldbsearch", "ldbedit", ...
+
+ As an active directory member server LDAP is also used
+ by the winbindd service when connecting to domain controllers.
+
+ Samba also offers an LDAP server when running as
+ active directory domain controller.
+
+ The NTLMSSP authentication used by the SMB1 encryption
+ is protected by smb signing, see CVE-2015-5296.
+
+o CVE-2016-2111:
+
+ It's basically the same as CVE-2015-0005 for Windows:
+
+ The NETLOGON service in Microsoft Windows Server 2003 SP2,
+ Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, and Windows Server 2012 Gold
+ and R2, when a Domain Controller is configured, allows remote
+ attackers to spoof the computer name of a secure channel's
+ endpoint, and obtain sensitive session information, by running a
+ crafted application and leveraging the ability to sniff network
+ traffic, aka "NETLOGON Spoofing Vulnerability".
+
+ The vulnerability in Samba is worse as it doesn't require
+ credentials of a computer account in the domain.
+
+ This only applies to Samba running as classic primary domain controller,
+ classic backup domain controller or active directory domain controller.
+
+ The security patches introduce a new option called "raw NTLMv2 auth"
+ ("yes" or "no") for the [global] section in smb.conf.
+ Samba (the smbd process) will reject client using raw NTLMv2
+ without using NTLMSSP.
+
+ Note that this option also applies to Samba running as
+ standalone server and member server.
+
+ You should also consider using "lanman auth = no" (which is already the default)
+ and "ntlm auth = no". Have a look at the smb.conf manpage for further details,
+ as they might impact compatibility with older clients. These also
+ apply for all server roles.
+
+o CVE-2016-2112:
+
+ Samba uses various LDAP client libraries, a builtin one and/or the system
+ ldap libraries (typically openldap).
+
+ As active directory domain controller Samba also provides an LDAP server.
+
+ Samba takes care of doing SASL (GSS-SPNEGO) authentication with Kerberos or NTLMSSP
+ for LDAP connections, including possible integrity (sign) and privacy (seal)
+ protection.
+
+ Samba has support for an option called "client ldap sasl wrapping" since version
+ 3.2.0. Its default value has changed from "plain" to "sign" with version 4.2.0.
+
+ Tools using the builtin LDAP client library do not obey the
+ "client ldap sasl wrapping" option. This applies to tools like:
+ "samba-tool", "ldbsearch", "ldbedit" and more. Some of them have command line
+ options like "--sign" and "--encrypt". With the security update they will
+ also obey the "client ldap sasl wrapping" option as default.
+
+ In all cases, even if explicitly request via "client ldap sasl wrapping",
+ "--sign" or "--encrypt", the protection can be downgraded by a man in the
+ middle.
+
+ The LDAP server doesn't have an option to enforce strong authentication
+ yet. The security patches will introduce a new option called
+ "ldap server require strong auth", possible values are "no",
+ "allow_sasl_over_tls" and "yes".
+
+ As the default behavior was as "no" before, you may
+ have to explicitly change this option until all clients have
+ been adjusted to handle LDAP_STRONG_AUTH_REQUIRED errors.
+ Windows clients and Samba member servers already use
+ integrity protection.
+
+o CVE-2016-2113:
+
+ Samba has support for TLS/SSL for some protocols:
+ ldap and http, but currently certificates are not
+ validated at all. While we have a "tls cafile" option,
+ the configured certificate is not used to validate
+ the server certificate.
+
+ This applies to ldaps:// connections triggered by tools like:
+ "ldbsearch", "ldbedit" and more. Note that it only applies
+ to the ldb tools when they are built as part of Samba or with Samba
+ extensions installed, which means the Samba builtin LDAP client library is
+ used.
+
+ It also applies to dcerpc client connections using ncacn_http (with https://),
+ which are only used by the openchange project. Support for ncacn_http
+ was introduced in version 4.2.0.
+
+ The security patches will introduce a new option called
+ "tls verify peer". Possible values are "no_check", "ca_only",
+ "ca_and_name_if_available", "ca_and_name" and "as_strict_as_possible".
+
+ If you use the self-signed certificates which are auto-generated
+ by Samba, you won't have a crl file and need to explicitly
+ set "tls verify peer = ca_and_name".
+
+o CVE-2016-2114
+
+ Due to a regression introduced in Samba 4.0.0,
+ an explicit "server signing = mandatory" in the [global] section
+ of the smb.conf was not enforced for clients using the SMB1 protocol.
+
+ As a result it does not enforce smb signing and allows man in the middle attacks.
+
+ This problem applies to all possible server roles:
+ standalone server, member server, classic primary domain controller,
+ classic backup domain controller and active directory domain controller.
+
+ In addition, when Samba is configured with "server role = active directory domain controller"
+ the effective default for the "server signing" option should be "mandatory".
+
+ During the early development of Samba 4 we had a new experimental
+ file server located under source4/smb_server. But before
+ the final 4.0.0 release we switched back to the file server
+ under source3/smbd.
+
+ But the logic for the correct default of "server signing" was not
+ ported correctly ported.
+
+ Note that the default for server roles other than active directory domain
+ controller, is "off" because of performance reasons.
+
+o CVE-2016-2115:
+
+ Samba has an option called "client signing", this is turned off by default
+ for performance reasons on file transfers.
+
+ This option is also used when using DCERPC with ncacn_np.
+
+ In order to get integrity protection for ipc related communication
+ by default the "client ipc signing" option is introduced.
+ The effective default for this new option is "mandatory".
+
+ In order to be compatible with more SMB server implementations,
+ the following additional options are introduced:
+ "client ipc min protocol" ("NT1" by default) and
+ "client ipc max protocol" (the highest support SMB2/3 dialect by default).
+ These options overwrite the "client min protocol" and "client max protocol"
+ options, because the default for "client max protocol" is still "NT1".
+ The reason for this is the fact that all SMB2/3 support SMB signing,
+ while there are still SMB1 implementations which don't offer SMB signing
+ by default (this includes Samba versions before 4.0.0).
+
+ Note that winbindd (in versions 4.2.0 and higher) enforces SMB signing
+ against active directory domain controllers despite of the
+ "client signing" and "client ipc signing" options.
+
+o CVE-2016-2118 (a.k.a. BADLOCK):
+
+ The Security Account Manager Remote Protocol [MS-SAMR] and the
+ Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol [MS-LSAD]
+ are both vulnerable to man in the middle attacks. Both are application level
+ protocols based on the generic DCE 1.1 Remote Procedure Call (DCERPC) protocol.
+
+ These protocols are typically available on all Windows installations
+ as well as every Samba server. They are used to maintain
+ the Security Account Manager Database. This applies to all
+ roles, e.g. standalone, domain member, domain controller.
+
+ Any authenticated DCERPC connection a client initiates against a server
+ can be used by a man in the middle to impersonate the authenticated user
+ against the SAMR or LSAD service on the server.
+
+ The client chosen application protocol, auth type (e.g. Kerberos or NTLMSSP)
+ and auth level (NONE, CONNECT, PKT_INTEGRITY, PKT_PRIVACY) do not matter
+ in this case. A man in the middle can change auth level to CONNECT
+ (which means authentication without message protection) and take over
+ the connection.
+
+ As a result, a man in the middle is able to get read/write access to the
+ Security Account Manager Database, which reveals all passwords
+ and any other potential sensitive information.
+
+ Samba running as an active directory domain controller is additionally
+ missing checks to enforce PKT_PRIVACY for the
+ Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol [MS-DRSR] (drsuapi)
+ and the BackupKey Remote Protocol [MS-BKRP] (backupkey).
+ The Domain Name Service Server Management Protocol [MS-DNSP] (dnsserver)
+ is not enforcing at least PKT_INTEGRITY.
+
+====================
+New smb.conf options
+====================
+
+ allow dcerpc auth level connect (G)
+
+ This option controls whether DCERPC services are allowed to be used with
+ DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT, which provides authentication, but no per
+ message integrity nor privacy protection.
+
+ Some interfaces like samr, lsarpc and netlogon have a hard-coded default
+ of no and epmapper, mgmt and rpcecho have a hard-coded default of yes.
+
+ The behavior can be overwritten per interface name (e.g. lsarpc,
+ netlogon, samr, srvsvc, winreg, wkssvc ...) by using
+ 'allow dcerpc auth level connect:interface = yes' as option.
+
+ This option yields precedence to the implementation specific restrictions.
+ E.g. the drsuapi and backupkey protocols require DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY.
+ The dnsserver protocol requires DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY.
+
+ Default: allow dcerpc auth level connect = no
+
+ Example: allow dcerpc auth level connect = yes
+
+ client ipc signing (G)
+
+ This controls whether the client is allowed or required to use
+ SMB signing for IPC$ connections as DCERPC transport. Possible
+ values are auto, mandatory and disabled.
+
+ When set to mandatory or default, SMB signing is required.
+
+ When set to auto, SMB signing is offered, but not enforced and
+ if set to disabled, SMB signing is not offered either.
+
+ Connections from winbindd to Active Directory Domain Controllers
+ always enforce signing.
+
+ Default: client ipc signing = default
+
+ client ipc max protocol (G)
+
+ The value of the parameter (a string) is the highest protocol level that will
+ be supported for IPC$ connections as DCERPC transport.
+
+ Normally this option should not be set as the automatic negotiation phase
+ in the SMB protocol takes care of choosing the appropriate protocol.
+
+ The value default refers to the latest supported protocol, currently SMB3_11.
+
+ See client max protocol for a full list of available protocols.
+ The values CORE, COREPLUS, LANMAN1, LANMAN2 are silently upgraded to NT1.
+
+ Default: client ipc max protocol = default
+
+ Example: client ipc max protocol = SMB2_10
+
+ client ipc min protocol (G)
+
+ This setting controls the minimum protocol version that the will be
+ attempted to use for IPC$ connections as DCERPC transport.
+
+ Normally this option should not be set as the automatic negotiation phase
+ in the SMB protocol takes care of choosing the appropriate protocol.
+
+ The value default refers to the higher value of NT1 and the
+ effective value of "client min protocol".
+
+ See client max protocol for a full list of available protocols.
+ The values CORE, COREPLUS, LANMAN1, LANMAN2 are silently upgraded to NT1.
+
+ Default: client ipc min protocol = default
+
+ Example: client ipc min protocol = SMB3_11
+
+ ldap server require strong auth (G)
+
+ The ldap server require strong auth defines whether the
+ ldap server requires ldap traffic to be signed or
+ signed and encrypted (sealed). Possible values are no,
+ allow_sasl_over_tls and yes.
+
+ A value of no allows simple and sasl binds over all transports.
+
+ A value of allow_sasl_over_tls allows simple and sasl binds (without sign or seal)
+ over TLS encrypted connections. Unencrypted connections only
+ allow sasl binds with sign or seal.
+
+ A value of yes allows only simple binds over TLS encrypted connections.
+ Unencrypted connections only allow sasl binds with sign or seal.
+
+ Default: ldap server require strong auth = yes
+
+ raw NTLMv2 auth (G)
+
+ This parameter determines whether or not smbd(8) will allow SMB1 clients
+ without extended security (without SPNEGO) to use NTLMv2 authentication.
+
+ If this option, lanman auth and ntlm auth are all disabled, then only
+ clients with SPNEGO support will be permitted. That means NTLMv2 is only
+ supported within NTLMSSP.
+
+ Default: raw NTLMv2 auth = no
+
+ tls verify peer (G)
+
+ This controls if and how strict the client will verify the peer's
+ certificate and name. Possible values are (in increasing order): no_check,
+ ca_only, ca_and_name_if_available, ca_and_name and as_strict_as_possible.
+
+ When set to no_check the certificate is not verified at all,
+ which allows trivial man in the middle attacks.
+
+ When set to ca_only the certificate is verified to be signed from a ca
+ specified in the "tls ca file" option. Setting "tls ca file" to a valid file
+ is required. The certificate lifetime is also verified. If the "tls crl file"
+ option is configured, the certificate is also verified against
+ the ca crl.
+
+ When set to ca_and_name_if_available all checks from ca_only are performed.
+ In addition, the peer hostname is verified against the certificate's
+ name, if it is provided by the application layer and not given as
+ an ip address string.
+
+ When set to ca_and_name all checks from ca_and_name_if_available are performed.
+ In addition the peer hostname needs to be provided and even an ip
+ address is checked against the certificate's name.
+
+ When set to as_strict_as_possible all checks from ca_and_name are performed.
+ In addition the "tls crl file" needs to be configured. Future versions
+ of Samba may implement additional checks.
+
+ Default: tls verify peer = as_strict_as_possible
+
+ tls priority (G) (backported from Samba 4.3 to Samba 4.2)
+
+ This option can be set to a string describing the TLS protocols to be
+ supported in the parts of Samba that use GnuTLS, specifically the AD DC.
+
+ The default turns off SSLv3, as this protocol is no longer considered
+ secure after CVE-2014-3566 (otherwise known as POODLE) impacted SSLv3 use
+ in HTTPS applications.
+
+ The valid options are described in the GNUTLS Priority-Strings
+ documentation at http://gnutls.org/manual/html_node/Priority-Strings.html
+
+ Default: tls priority = NORMAL:-VERS-SSL3.0
+
+================
+Behavior changes
+================
+
+o The default auth level for authenticated binds has changed from
+ DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT to DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY.
+ That means ncacn_ip_tcp:server is now implicitly the same
+ as ncacn_ip_tcp:server[sign] and offers a similar protection
+ as ncacn_np:server, which relies on smb signing.
+
+o The following constraints are applied to SMB1 connections:
+
+ - "client lanman auth = yes" is now consistently
+ required for authenticated connections using the
+ SMB1 LANMAN2 dialect.
+ - "client ntlmv2 auth = yes" and "client use spnego = yes"
+ (both the default values), require extended security (SPNEGO)
+ support from the server. That means NTLMv2 is only used within
+ NTLMSSP.
+
+o Tools like "samba-tool", "ldbsearch", "ldbedit" and more obey the
+ default of "client ldap sasl wrapping = sign". Even with
+ "client ldap sasl wrapping = plain" they will automatically upgrade
+ to "sign" when getting LDAP_STRONG_AUTH_REQUIRED from the LDAP
+ server.
+
+Changes since 4.2.9:
+====================
+
+o Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+ * Bug 11344 - CVE-2015-5370: Multiple errors in DCE-RPC code.
+
+ * Bug 11804 - prerequisite backports for the security release on
+ April 12th, 2016.
+
+o Christian Ambach <ambi@samba.org>
+ * Bug 11804 - prerequisite backports for the security release on
+ April 12th, 2016.
+
+o Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
+ * Bug 11804 - prerequisite backports for the security release on
+ April 12th, 2016.
+
+o Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
+ * Bug 11644 - CVE-2016-2112: The LDAP client and server don't enforce
+ integrity protection.
+
+o Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
+ * Bug 11749 - CVE-2016-2111: NETLOGON Spoofing Vulnerability.
+
+ * Bug 11804 - prerequisite backports for the security release on
+ April 12th, 2016.
+
+o Björn Jacke <bj@sernet.de>
+ * Bug 11804 - prerequisite backports for the security release on
+ April 12th, 2016.
+
+o Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
+ * Bug 11804 - prerequisite backports for the security release on
+ April 12th, 2016.
+
+o Kamen Mazdrashki <kamenim@samba.org>
+ * Bug 11804 - prerequisite backports for the security release on
+ April 12th, 2016.
+
+o Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+ * Bug 11344 - CVE-2015-5370: Multiple errors in DCE-RPC code.
+
+ * Bug 11616 - CVE-2016-2118: SAMR and LSA man in the middle attacks possible.
+
+ * Bug 11644 - CVE-2016-2112: The LDAP client and server doesn't enforce
+ integrity protection.
+
+ * Bug 11687 - CVE-2016-2114: "server signing = mandatory" not enforced.
+
+ * Bug 11688 - CVE-2016-2110: Man in the middle attacks possible with NTLMSSP.
+
+ * Bug 11749 - CVE-2016-2111: NETLOGON Spoofing Vulnerability.
+
+ * Bug 11752 - CVE-2016-2113: Missing TLS certificate validation allows man in
+ the middle attacks.
+
+ * Bug 11756 - CVE-2016-2115: SMB client connections for IPC traffic are not
+ integrity protected.
+
+ * Bug 11804 - prerequisite backports for the security release on
+ April 12th, 2016.
+
+o Richard Sharpe <rsharpe@samba.org>
+ * Bug 11804 - prerequisite backports for the security release on
+ April 12th, 2016.
+
+o Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
+ * Bug 11804 - prerequisite backports for the security release on
+ April 12th, 2016.
+
+o Jelmer Vernooij <jelmer@samba.org>
+ * Bug 11804 - prerequisite backports for the security release on
+ April 12th, 2016.
+
+
+#######################################
+Reporting bugs & Development Discussion
+#######################################
+
+Please discuss this release on the samba-technical mailing list or by
+joining the #samba-technical IRC channel on irc.freenode.net.
+
+If you do report problems then please try to send high quality
+feedback. If you don't provide vital information to help us track down
+the problem then you will probably be ignored. All bug reports should
+be filed under the "Samba 4.1 and newer" product in the project's Bugzilla
+database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
+
+
+======================================================================
+== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
+== The Samba Team
+======================================================================
+
+
+Release notes for older releases follow:
+----------------------------------------
+
+
+ =============================
+ Release Notes for Samba 4.2.9
+ March 8, 2016
+ =============================
+
+
+This is a security release in order to address the following CVEs:
+
+o CVE-2015-7560 (Incorrect ACL get/set allowed on symlink path)
+o CVE-2016-0771 (Out-of-bounds read in internal DNS server)
+
+=======
+Details
+=======
+
+o CVE-2015-7560:
+ All versions of Samba from 3.2.0 to 4.4.0rc3 inclusive are vulnerable to
+ a malicious client overwriting the ownership of ACLs using symlinks.
+
+ An authenticated malicious client can use SMB1 UNIX extensions to
+ create a symlink to a file or directory, and then use non-UNIX SMB1
+ calls to overwrite the contents of the ACL on the file or directory
+ linked to.
+
+o CVE-2016-0771:
+ All versions of Samba from 4.0.0 to 4.4.0rc3 inclusive, when deployed as
+ an AD DC and choose to run the internal DNS server, are vulnerable to an
+ out-of-bounds read issue during DNS TXT record handling caused by users
+ with permission to modify DNS records.
+
+ A malicious client can upload a specially constructed DNS TXT record,
+ resulting in a remote denial-of-service attack. As long as the affected
+ TXT record remains undisturbed in the Samba database, a targeted DNS
+ query may continue to trigger this exploit.
+
+ While unlikely, the out-of-bounds read may bypass safety checks and
+ allow leakage of memory from the server in the form of a DNS TXT reply.
+
+ By default only authenticated accounts can upload DNS records,
+ as "allow dns updates = secure only" is the default.
+ Any other value would allow anonymous clients to trigger this
+ bug, which is a much higher risk.
+
+
+Changes since 4.2.8:
+--------------------
+
+o Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11648: CVE-2015-7560: Getting and setting Windows ACLs on symlinks can
+ change permissions on link target.
+
+o Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
+ * BUGs 11128, 11686: CVE-2016-0771: Read of uninitialized memory DNS TXT
+ handling.
+
+o Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+ * BUGs 11128, 11686: CVE-2016-0771: Read of uninitialized memory DNS TXT
+ handling.
+
+
+#######################################
+Reporting bugs & Development Discussion
+#######################################
+
+Please discuss this release on the samba-technical mailing list or by
+joining the #samba-technical IRC channel on irc.freenode.net.
+
+If you do report problems then please try to send high quality
+feedback. If you don't provide vital information to help us track down
+the problem then you will probably be ignored. All bug reports should
+be filed under the "Samba 4.1 and newer" product in the project's Bugzilla
+database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
+
+
+======================================================================
+== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
+== The Samba Team
+======================================================================
+
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+ =============================
+ Release Notes for Samba 4.2.8
+ February 2, 2016
+ =============================
+
+
+This is the latest stable release of Samba 4.2.
+
+
+Changes since 4.2.7:
+--------------------
+
+o Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11647: s3:smbd: Fix a corner case of the symlink verification.
+
+
+o Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11624: s3: libsmb: Correctly initialize the list head when keeping a
+ list of primary followed by DFS connections.
+ * BUG 11625: Reduce the memory footprint of empty string options.
+
+
+o Christian Ambach <ambi@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11400: s3:smbd/oplock: Obey kernel oplock setting when releasing
+ oplocks.
+
+
+o Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11065: vfs_fruit: Fix renaming directories with open files.
+ * BUG 11347: Fix MacOS finder error 36 when copying folder to Samba.
+ * BUG 11466: Fix copying files with vfs_fruit when using vfs_streams_xattr
+ without stream prefix and type suffix.
+ * BUG 11645: smbd: make "hide dot files" option work with "store dos
+ attributes = yes".
+ * BUG 11684: s3:smbd: Ignore initial allocation size for directory creation.
+
+
+o Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11639: lib/async_req: Do not install async_connect_send_test.
+
+
+o Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11641: docs: Fix typos in man vfs_gpfs.
+
+
+o Uri Simchoni <uri@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11682: smbcacls: Fix uninitialized variable.
+
+
+#######################################
+Reporting bugs & Development Discussion
+#######################################
+
+Please discuss this release on the samba-technical mailing list or by
+joining the #samba-technical IRC channel on irc.freenode.net.
+
+If you do report problems then please try to send high quality
+feedback. If you don't provide vital information to help us track down
+the problem then you will probably be ignored. All bug reports should
+be filed under the "Samba 4.1 and newer" product in the project's Bugzilla
+database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
+
+
+======================================================================
+== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
+== The Samba Team
+======================================================================
+
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+ =============================
+ Release Notes for Samba 4.2.7
+ December 16, 2015
+ =============================
+
+
+This is a security release in order to address the following CVEs:
+
+o CVE-2015-3223 (Denial of service in Samba Active Directory
+ server)
+o CVE-2015-5252 (Insufficient symlink verification in smbd)
+o CVE-2015-5299 (Missing access control check in shadow copy
+ code)
+o CVE-2015-5296 (Samba client requesting encryption vulnerable
+ to downgrade attack)
+o CVE-2015-8467 (Denial of service attack against Windows
+ Active Directory server)
+o CVE-2015-5330 (Remote memory read in Samba LDAP server)
+
+Please note that if building against a system libldb, the required
+version has been bumped to ldb-1.1.24. This is needed to ensure
+we build against a system ldb library that contains the fixes
+for CVE-2015-5330 and CVE-2015-3223.
+
+=======
+Details
+=======
+
+o CVE-2015-3223:
+ All versions of Samba from 4.0.0 to 4.3.2 inclusive (resp. all
+ ldb versions up to 1.1.23 inclusive) are vulnerable to
+ a denial of service attack in the samba daemon LDAP server.
+
+ A malicious client can send packets that cause the LDAP server in the
+ samba daemon process to become unresponsive, preventing the server
+ from servicing any other requests.
+
+ This flaw is not exploitable beyond causing the code to loop expending
+ CPU resources.
+
+o CVE-2015-5252:
+ All versions of Samba from 3.0.0 to 4.3.2 inclusive are vulnerable to
+ a bug in symlink verification, which under certain circumstances could
+ allow client access to files outside the exported share path.
+
+ If a Samba share is configured with a path that shares a common path
+ prefix with another directory on the file system, the smbd daemon may
+ allow the client to follow a symlink pointing to a file or directory
+ in that other directory, even if the share parameter "wide links" is
+ set to "no" (the default).
+
+o CVE-2015-5299:
+ All versions of Samba from 3.2.0 to 4.3.2 inclusive are vulnerable to
+ a missing access control check in the vfs_shadow_copy2 module. When
+ looking for the shadow copy directory under the share path the current
+ accessing user should have DIRECTORY_LIST access rights in order to
+ view the current snapshots.
+
+ This was not being checked in the affected versions of Samba.
+
+o CVE-2015-5296:
+ Versions of Samba from 3.2.0 to 4.3.2 inclusive do not ensure that
+ signing is negotiated when creating an encrypted client connection to
+ a server.
+
+ Without this a man-in-the-middle attack could downgrade the connection
+ and connect using the supplied credentials as an unsigned, unencrypted
+ connection.
+
+o CVE-2015-8467:
+ Samba, operating as an AD DC, is sometimes operated in a domain with a
+ mix of Samba and Windows Active Directory Domain Controllers.
+
+ All versions of Samba from 4.0.0 to 4.3.2 inclusive, when deployed as
+ an AD DC in the same domain with Windows DCs, could be used to
+ override the protection against the MS15-096 / CVE-2015-2535 security
+ issue in Windows.
+
+ Prior to MS16-096 it was possible to bypass the quota of machine
+ accounts a non-administrative user could create. Pure Samba domains
+ are not impacted, as Samba does not implement the
+ SeMachineAccountPrivilege functionality to allow non-administrator
+ users to create new computer objects.
+
+o CVE-2015-5330:
+ All versions of Samba from 4.0.0 to 4.3.2 inclusive (resp. all
+ ldb versions up to 1.1.23 inclusive) are vulnerable to
+ a remote memory read attack in the samba daemon LDAP server.
+
+ A malicious client can send packets that cause the LDAP server in the
+ samba daemon process to return heap memory beyond the length of the
+ requested value.
+
+ This memory may contain data that the client should not be allowed to
+ see, allowing compromise of the server.
+
+ The memory may either be returned to the client in an error string, or
+ stored in the database by a suitabily privileged user. If untrusted
+ users can create objects in your database, please confirm that all DN
+ and name attributes are reasonable.
+
+
+Changes since 4.2.6:
+--------------------
+
+o Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11552: CVE-2015-8467: samdb: Match MS15-096 behaviour for
+ userAccountControl.
+
+o Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11325: CVE-2015-3223: Fix LDAP \00 search expression attack DoS.
+ * BUG 11395: CVE-2015-5252: Fix insufficient symlink verification (file
+ access outside the share).
+ * BUG 11529: CVE-2015-5299: s3-shadow-copy2: Fix missing access check on
+ snapdir.
+
+o Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
+ * BUG 11599: CVE-2015-5330: Fix remote read memory exploit in LDB.
+
+o Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11536: CVE-2015-5296: Add man in the middle protection when forcing
+ smb encryption on the client side.
+
+
+#######################################
+Reporting bugs & Development Discussion
+#######################################
+
+Please discuss this release on the samba-technical mailing list or by
+joining the #samba-technical IRC channel on irc.freenode.net.
+
+If you do report problems then please try to send high quality
+feedback. If you don't provide vital information to help us track down
+the problem then you will probably be ignored. All bug reports should
+be filed under the "Samba 4.1 and newer" product in the project's Bugzilla
+database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
+
+
+======================================================================
+== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
+== The Samba Team
+======================================================================
+
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+ =============================
+ Release Notes for Samba 4.2.6
+ December 08, 2015
+ =============================
+
+
+This is the latest stable release of Samba 4.2.
+
+
+Changes since 4.2.5:
+--------------------
+
+o Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11365: ctdb: Strip trailing spaces from nodes file.
+ * BUG 11577: ctdb: Open the RO tracking db with perms 0600 instead of 0000.
+ * BUG 11619: doc: Fix a typo in the smb.conf manpage.
+
+
+o Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11452: s3-smbd: Fix old DOS client doing wildcard delete - gives a
+ attribute type of zero.
+ * BUG 11565: auth: gensec: Fix a memory leak.
+ * BUG 11566: lib: util: Make non-critical message a warning.
+ * BUG 11589: s3: smbd: If EA's are turned off on a share don't allow an SMB2
+ create containing them.
+ * BUG 11615: s3: smbd: have_file_open_below() fails to enumerate open files
+ below an open directory handle.
+
+
+o Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11564: async_req: Fix non-blocking connect().
+
+
+o Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11243: vfs_gpfs: Re-enable share modes.
+ * BUG 11570: smbd: Send SMB2 oplock breaks unencrypted.
+
+
+o YvanM <yvan.masson@openmailbox.org>
+ * BUG 11584: manpage: Correct small typo error.
+
+
+o Marc Muehlfeld <mmuehlfeld@samba.org>
+ * BUG 9912: Changing log level of two entries to from 1 to 3.
+
+
+o Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11346: wafsamba: Also build libraries with RELRO protection.
+ * BUG 11563: nss_wins: Do not run into use after free issues when we access
+ memory allocated on the globals and the global being reinitialized.
+
+
+o Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11619: docs: Fix some typos in the idmap config section of man 5
+ smb.conf.
+
+
+o Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
+ * BUG 11569: Fix winbindd crashes with samlogon for trusted domain user.
+ * BUG 11597: Backport some valgrind fixes from upstream master.
+
+
+#######################################
+Reporting bugs & Development Discussion
+#######################################
+
+Please discuss this release on the samba-technical mailing list or by
+joining the #samba-technical IRC channel on irc.freenode.net.
+
+If you do report problems then please try to send high quality
+feedback. If you don't provide vital information to help us track down
+the problem then you will probably be ignored. All bug reports should
+be filed under the Samba 4.2 product in the project's Bugzilla
+database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
+
+
+======================================================================
+== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
+== The Samba Team
+======================================================================
+
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+ =============================
+ Release Notes for Samba 4.2.5
+ October 27, 2015
+ =============================
+
+
+This is the latest stable release of Samba 4.2.
+
+
+Changes since 4.2.4:
+--------------------
+
+o Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+ * BUG 10252: s3: smbd: Fix our access-based enumeration on "hide unreadable"
+ to match Windows.
+ * BUG 10634: smbd: Fix file name buflen and padding in notify repsonse.
+ * BUG 11486: s3: smbd: Fix mkdir race condition.
+ * BUG 11522: s3: smbd: Fix opening/creating :stream files on the root share
+ directory.
+ * BUG 11535: s3: smbd: Fix NULL pointer bug introduced by previous 'raw'
+ stream fix (bug #11522).
+ * BUG 11555: s3: lsa: lookup_name() logic for unqualified (no DOMAIN\
+ component) names is incorrect.
+
+
+o Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11535: s3: smbd: Fix a crash in unix_convert().
+ * BUG 11543: vfs_fruit: Return value of ad_pack in vfs_fruit.c.
+ * BUG 11549: Fix bug in smbstatus where the lease info is not printed.
+ * BUG 11550: s3:smbstatus: Add stream name to share_entry_forall().
+ * BUG 11555: s3:lib: validate domain name in lookup_wellknown_name().
+
+
+o Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11038: kerberos: Make sure we only use prompter type when available.
+
+
+o Björn Jacke <bj@sernet.de>
+ * BUG 10365: nss_winbind: Fix hang on Solaris on big groups.
+ * BUG 11355: build: Use as-needed linker flag also on OpenBSD.
+
+
+o Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11038: winbind: Fix 100% loop.
+ * BUG 11381: Fix a deadlock in tdb.
+
+
+o Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11316: s3:ctdbd_conn: Make sure we destroy tevent_fd before closing
+ the socket.
+ * BUG 11327: dcerpc.idl: accept invalid dcerpc_bind_nak pdus.
+
+
+o Har Gagan Sahai <SHarGagan@novell.com>
+ * BUG 11509: s3: dfs: Fix a crash when the dfs targets are disabled.
+
+
+o Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11502: pam_winbind: Fix a segfault if initialization fails.
+
+
+o Uri Simchoni <uri@samba.org>
+ * BUG 11528: net: Fix a crash with 'net ads keytab create'.
+ * BUG 11547: vfs_commit: Set the fd on open before calling SMB_VFS_FSTAT.
+
+
+#######################################
+Reporting bugs & Development Discussion
+#######################################
+
+Please discuss this release on the samba-technical mailing list or by
+joining the #samba-technical IRC channel on irc.freenode.net.
+
+If you do report problems then please try to send high quality
+feedback. If you don't provide vital information to help us track down
+the problem then you will probably be ignored. All bug reports should
+be filed under the Samba 4.2 product in the project's Bugzilla
+database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
+
+
+======================================================================
+== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
+== The Samba Team
+======================================================================
+
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
=============================
Release Notes for Samba 4.2.4
September 8, 2015
======================================================================
-Release notes for older releases follow:
-----------------------------------------
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
-======================================================================
=============================
Release Notes for Samba 4.2.3