kerberos utility library
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2001
Copyright (C) Remus Koos 2001
-
+ Copyright (C) Luke Howard 2003
+ Copyright (C) Guenther Deschner 2003, 2005
+ Copyright (C) Jim McDonough (jmcd@us.ibm.com) 2003
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2004-2005
+ Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 2007
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
- Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
+#include "smb_krb5.h"
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
-/*
- verify an incoming ticket and parse out the principal name and
- authorization_data if available
-*/
-NTSTATUS ads_verify_ticket(ADS_STRUCT *ads, const DATA_BLOB *ticket,
- char **principal, DATA_BLOB *auth_data)
+#if !defined(HAVE_KRB5_PRINC_COMPONENT)
+const krb5_data *krb5_princ_component(krb5_context, krb5_principal, int );
+#endif
+
+/**********************************************************************************
+ Try to verify a ticket using the system keytab... the system keytab has kvno -1 entries, so
+ it's more like what microsoft does... see comment in utils/net_ads.c in the
+ ads_keytab_add_entry function for details.
+***********************************************************************************/
+
+static bool ads_keytab_verify_ticket(krb5_context context,
+ krb5_auth_context auth_context,
+ const DATA_BLOB *ticket,
+ krb5_ticket **pp_tkt,
+ krb5_keyblock **keyblock,
+ krb5_error_code *perr)
{
- krb5_context context;
- krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
+ krb5_error_code ret = 0;
+ bool auth_ok = False;
krb5_keytab keytab = NULL;
+ krb5_kt_cursor kt_cursor;
+ krb5_keytab_entry kt_entry;
+ char *valid_princ_formats[7] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
+ char *entry_princ_s = NULL;
+ fstring my_name, my_fqdn;
+ int i;
+ int number_matched_principals = 0;
krb5_data packet;
- krb5_ticket *tkt = NULL;
- int ret;
- krb5_keyblock * key;
- krb5_principal host_princ;
- char *host_princ_s;
- fstring myname;
- char *password_s;
+
+ *pp_tkt = NULL;
+ *keyblock = NULL;
+ *perr = 0;
+
+ /* Generate the list of principal names which we expect
+ * clients might want to use for authenticating to the file
+ * service. We allow name$,{host,cifs}/{name,fqdn,name.REALM}. */
+
+ fstrcpy(my_name, global_myname());
+
+ my_fqdn[0] = '\0';
+ name_to_fqdn(my_fqdn, global_myname());
+
+ if (asprintf(&valid_princ_formats[0], "%s$@%s", my_name, lp_realm()) == -1) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (asprintf(&valid_princ_formats[1], "host/%s@%s", my_name, lp_realm()) == -1) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (asprintf(&valid_princ_formats[2], "host/%s@%s", my_fqdn, lp_realm()) == -1) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (asprintf(&valid_princ_formats[3], "host/%s.%s@%s", my_name, lp_realm(), lp_realm()) == -1) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (asprintf(&valid_princ_formats[4], "cifs/%s@%s", my_name, lp_realm()) == -1) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (asprintf(&valid_princ_formats[5], "cifs/%s@%s", my_fqdn, lp_realm()) == -1) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (asprintf(&valid_princ_formats[6], "cifs/%s.%s@%s", my_name, lp_realm(), lp_realm()) == -1) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(kt_entry);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(kt_cursor);
+
+ ret = smb_krb5_open_keytab(context, NULL, False, &keytab);
+ if (ret) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("ads_keytab_verify_ticket: smb_krb5_open_keytab failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Iterate through the keytab. For each key, if the principal
+ * name case-insensitively matches one of the allowed formats,
+ * try verifying the ticket using that principal. */
+
+ ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context, keytab, &kt_cursor);
+ if (ret) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("ads_keytab_verify_ticket: krb5_kt_start_seq_get failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ while (!auth_ok && (krb5_kt_next_entry(context, keytab, &kt_entry, &kt_cursor) == 0)) {
+ ret = smb_krb5_unparse_name(context, kt_entry.principal, &entry_princ_s);
+ if (ret) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("ads_keytab_verify_ticket: smb_krb5_unparse_name failed (%s)\n",
+ error_message(ret)));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(valid_princ_formats); i++) {
+
+ if (!strequal(entry_princ_s, valid_princ_formats[i])) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ number_matched_principals++;
+ packet.length = ticket->length;
+ packet.data = (char *)ticket->data;
+ *pp_tkt = NULL;
+
+ ret = krb5_rd_req_return_keyblock_from_keytab(context, &auth_context, &packet,
+ kt_entry.principal, keytab,
+ NULL, pp_tkt, keyblock);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ DEBUG(10,("ads_keytab_verify_ticket: "
+ "krb5_rd_req_return_keyblock_from_keytab(%s) failed: %s\n",
+ entry_princ_s, error_message(ret)));
+
+ /* workaround for MIT:
+ * as krb5_ktfile_get_entry will explicitly
+ * close the krb5_keytab as soon as krb5_rd_req
+ * has successfully decrypted the ticket but the
+ * ticket is not valid yet (due to clockskew)
+ * there is no point in querying more keytab
+ * entries - Guenther */
+
+ if (ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV ||
+ ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED ||
+ ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW) {
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(3,("ads_keytab_verify_ticket: "
+ "krb5_rd_req_return_keyblock_from_keytab succeeded for principal %s\n",
+ entry_princ_s));
+ auth_ok = True;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Free the name we parsed. */
+ SAFE_FREE(entry_princ_s);
+
+ /* Free the entry we just read. */
+ smb_krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &kt_entry);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(kt_entry);
+ }
+ krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, keytab, &kt_cursor);
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(kt_cursor);
+
+ out:
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(valid_princ_formats); i++) {
+ SAFE_FREE(valid_princ_formats[i]);
+ }
+
+ if (!auth_ok) {
+ if (!number_matched_principals) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("ads_keytab_verify_ticket: no keytab principals matched expected file service name.\n"));
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(3, ("ads_keytab_verify_ticket: krb5_rd_req failed for all %d matched keytab principals\n",
+ number_matched_principals));
+ }
+ }
+
+ SAFE_FREE(entry_princ_s);
+
+ {
+ krb5_keytab_entry zero_kt_entry;
+ ZERO_STRUCT(zero_kt_entry);
+ if (memcmp(&zero_kt_entry, &kt_entry, sizeof(krb5_keytab_entry))) {
+ smb_krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &kt_entry);
+ }
+ }
+
+ {
+ krb5_kt_cursor zero_csr;
+ ZERO_STRUCT(zero_csr);
+ if ((memcmp(&kt_cursor, &zero_csr, sizeof(krb5_kt_cursor)) != 0) && keytab) {
+ krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, keytab, &kt_cursor);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (keytab) {
+ krb5_kt_close(context, keytab);
+ }
+ *perr = ret;
+ return auth_ok;
+}
+
+/**********************************************************************************
+ Try to verify a ticket using the secrets.tdb.
+***********************************************************************************/
+
+static krb5_error_code ads_secrets_verify_ticket(krb5_context context,
+ krb5_auth_context auth_context,
+ krb5_principal host_princ,
+ const DATA_BLOB *ticket,
+ krb5_ticket **pp_tkt,
+ krb5_keyblock **keyblock,
+ krb5_error_code *perr)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret = 0;
+ bool auth_ok = False;
+ char *password_s = NULL;
krb5_data password;
+ krb5_enctype enctypes[] = {
+#if defined(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC)
+ ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
+#endif
+ ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
+ ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5,
+ ENCTYPE_NULL
+ };
+ krb5_data packet;
+ int i;
+
+ *pp_tkt = NULL;
+ *keyblock = NULL;
+ *perr = 0;
+
if (!secrets_init()) {
- DEBUG(1,("secrets_init failed\n"));
- return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+ DEBUG(1,("ads_secrets_verify_ticket: secrets_init failed\n"));
+ *perr = KRB5_CONFIG_CANTOPEN;
+ return False;
}
- password_s = secrets_fetch_machine_password();
+ password_s = secrets_fetch_machine_password(lp_workgroup(), NULL, NULL);
if (!password_s) {
- DEBUG(1,("failed to fetch machine password\n"));
- return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+ DEBUG(1,("ads_secrets_verify_ticket: failed to fetch machine password\n"));
+ *perr = KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD;
+ return False;
}
password.data = password_s;
password.length = strlen(password_s);
+ /* CIFS doesn't use addresses in tickets. This would break NAT. JRA */
+
+ packet.length = ticket->length;
+ packet.data = (char *)ticket->data;
+
+ /* We need to setup a auth context with each possible encoding type in turn. */
+ for (i=0;enctypes[i];i++) {
+ krb5_keyblock *key = NULL;
+
+ if (!(key = SMB_MALLOC_P(krb5_keyblock))) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (create_kerberos_key_from_string(context, host_princ, &password, key, enctypes[i], false)) {
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ krb5_auth_con_setuseruserkey(context, auth_context, key);
+
+ if (!(ret = krb5_rd_req(context, &auth_context, &packet,
+ NULL,
+ NULL, NULL, pp_tkt))) {
+ DEBUG(10,("ads_secrets_verify_ticket: enc type [%u] decrypted message !\n",
+ (unsigned int)enctypes[i] ));
+ auth_ok = True;
+ krb5_copy_keyblock(context, key, keyblock);
+ krb5_free_keyblock(context, key);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG((ret != KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE) ? 3 : 10,
+ ("ads_secrets_verify_ticket: enc type [%u] failed to decrypt with error %s\n",
+ (unsigned int)enctypes[i], error_message(ret)));
+
+ /* successfully decrypted but ticket is just not valid at the moment */
+ if (ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV ||
+ ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED ||
+ ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW) {
+ krb5_free_keyblock(context, key);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ krb5_free_keyblock(context, key);
+
+ }
+
+ out:
+ SAFE_FREE(password_s);
+ *perr = ret;
+ return auth_ok;
+}
+
+/**********************************************************************************
+ Verify an incoming ticket and parse out the principal name and
+ authorization_data if available.
+***********************************************************************************/
+
+NTSTATUS ads_verify_ticket(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const char *realm,
+ time_t time_offset,
+ const DATA_BLOB *ticket,
+ char **principal,
+ struct PAC_DATA **pac_data,
+ DATA_BLOB *ap_rep,
+ DATA_BLOB *session_key,
+ bool use_replay_cache)
+{
+ NTSTATUS sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+ NTSTATUS pac_ret;
+ DATA_BLOB auth_data;
+ krb5_context context = NULL;
+ krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
+ krb5_data packet;
+ krb5_ticket *tkt = NULL;
+ krb5_rcache rcache = NULL;
+ krb5_keyblock *keyblock = NULL;
+ time_t authtime;
+ krb5_error_code ret = 0;
+ int flags = 0;
+ krb5_principal host_princ = NULL;
+ krb5_const_principal client_principal = NULL;
+ char *host_princ_s = NULL;
+ bool auth_ok = False;
+ bool got_auth_data = False;
+ struct named_mutex *mutex = NULL;
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(packet);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(auth_data);
+
+ *principal = NULL;
+ *pac_data = NULL;
+ *ap_rep = data_blob_null;
+ *session_key = data_blob_null;
+
+ initialize_krb5_error_table();
ret = krb5_init_context(&context);
if (ret) {
- DEBUG(1,("krb5_init_context failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
+ DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_init_context failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
}
- ret = krb5_set_default_realm(context, ads->auth.realm);
+ if (time_offset != 0) {
+ krb5_set_real_time(context, time(NULL) + time_offset, 0);
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_set_default_realm(context, realm);
if (ret) {
- DEBUG(1,("krb5_set_default_realm failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
- ads_destroy(&ads);
- return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+ DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_set_default_realm failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
+ goto out;
}
- /* this whole process is far more complex than I would
+ /* This whole process is far more complex than I would
like. We have to go through all this to allow us to store
the secret internally, instead of using /etc/krb5.keytab */
+
ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &auth_context);
if (ret) {
- DEBUG(1,("krb5_auth_con_init failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
- return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+ DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_auth_con_init failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
+ goto out;
}
- fstrcpy(myname, global_myname());
- strlower(myname);
- asprintf(&host_princ_s, "HOST/%s@%s", myname, lp_realm());
- ret = krb5_parse_name(context, host_princ_s, &host_princ);
+ krb5_auth_con_getflags( context, auth_context, &flags );
+ if ( !use_replay_cache ) {
+ /* Disable default use of a replay cache */
+ flags &= ~KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME;
+ krb5_auth_con_setflags( context, auth_context, flags );
+ }
+
+ if (asprintf(&host_princ_s, "%s$", global_myname()) == -1) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ strlower_m(host_princ_s);
+ ret = smb_krb5_parse_name(context, host_princ_s, &host_princ);
if (ret) {
- DEBUG(1,("krb5_parse_name(%s) failed (%s)\n", host_princ_s, error_message(ret)));
- return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+ DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: smb_krb5_parse_name(%s) failed (%s)\n",
+ host_princ_s, error_message(ret)));
+ goto out;
}
- if (!(key = (krb5_keyblock *)malloc(sizeof(*key)))) {
- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+
+ if ( use_replay_cache ) {
+
+ /* Lock a mutex surrounding the replay as there is no
+ locking in the MIT krb5 code surrounding the replay
+ cache... */
+
+ mutex = grab_named_mutex(talloc_tos(), "replay cache mutex",
+ 10);
+ if (mutex == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: unable to protect "
+ "replay cache with mutex.\n"));
+ ret = KRB5_CC_IO;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* JRA. We must set the rcache here. This will prevent
+ replay attacks. */
+
+ ret = krb5_get_server_rcache(context,
+ krb5_princ_component(context, host_princ, 0),
+ &rcache);
+ if (ret) {
+ DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_get_server_rcache "
+ "failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_auth_con_setrcache(context, auth_context, rcache);
+ if (ret) {
+ DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_auth_con_setrcache "
+ "failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
+ goto out;
+ }
}
+
+ /* Try secrets.tdb first and fallback to the krb5.keytab if
+ necessary */
+
+ auth_ok = ads_secrets_verify_ticket(context, auth_context, host_princ,
+ ticket, &tkt, &keyblock, &ret);
+
+ if (!auth_ok &&
+ (ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV ||
+ ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED ||
+ ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW)) {
+ goto auth_failed;
+ }
+
+ if (!auth_ok && lp_use_kerberos_keytab()) {
+ auth_ok = ads_keytab_verify_ticket(context, auth_context,
+ ticket, &tkt, &keyblock, &ret);
+ }
+
+ if ( use_replay_cache ) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(mutex);
+#if 0
+ /* Heimdal leaks here, if we fix the leak, MIT crashes */
+ if (rcache) {
+ krb5_rc_close(context, rcache);
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+ auth_failed:
+ if (!auth_ok) {
+ DEBUG(3,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_rd_req with auth failed (%s)\n",
+ error_message(ret)));
+ /* Try map the error return in case it's something like
+ * a clock skew error.
+ */
+ sret = krb5_to_nt_status(ret);
+ if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(sret) || NT_STATUS_EQUAL(sret,NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL)) {
+ sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+ }
+ DEBUG(10,("ads_verify_ticket: returning error %s\n",
+ nt_errstr(sret) ));
+ goto out;
+ }
- if (create_kerberos_key_from_string(context, host_princ, &password, key)) {
- SAFE_FREE(key);
- return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+ authtime = get_authtime_from_tkt(tkt);
+ client_principal = get_principal_from_tkt(tkt);
+
+ ret = krb5_mk_rep(context, auth_context, &packet);
+ if (ret) {
+ DEBUG(3,("ads_verify_ticket: Failed to generate mutual authentication reply (%s)\n",
+ error_message(ret)));
+ goto out;
}
-
- krb5_auth_con_setuseruserkey(context, auth_context, key);
- packet.length = ticket->length;
- packet.data = (krb5_pointer)ticket->data;
+ *ap_rep = data_blob(packet.data, packet.length);
+ if (packet.data) {
+ kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &packet);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(packet);
+ }
+
+ get_krb5_smb_session_key(context, auth_context, session_key, True);
+ dump_data_pw("SMB session key (from ticket)\n", session_key->data, session_key->length);
#if 0
file_save("/tmp/ticket.dat", ticket->data, ticket->length);
#endif
- if ((ret = krb5_rd_req(context, &auth_context, &packet,
- NULL, keytab, NULL, &tkt))) {
- DEBUG(3,("krb5_rd_req with auth failed (%s)\n",
- error_message(ret)));
- return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+ /* continue when no PAC is retrieved or we couldn't decode the PAC
+ (like accounts that have the UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED flag set, or
+ Kerberos tickets encrypted using a DES key) - Guenther */
+
+ got_auth_data = get_auth_data_from_tkt(mem_ctx, &auth_data, tkt);
+ if (!got_auth_data) {
+ DEBUG(3,("ads_verify_ticket: did not retrieve auth data. continuing without PAC\n"));
}
- get_auth_data_from_tkt(auth_data, tkt);
+ if (got_auth_data) {
+ pac_ret = decode_pac_data(mem_ctx, &auth_data, context, keyblock, client_principal, authtime, pac_data);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(pac_ret)) {
+ DEBUG(3,("ads_verify_ticket: failed to decode PAC_DATA: %s\n", nt_errstr(pac_ret)));
+ *pac_data = NULL;
+ }
+ data_blob_free(&auth_data);
+ }
#if 0
+#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_TKT_ENC_PART2)
+ /* MIT */
if (tkt->enc_part2) {
- file_save("/tmp/authdata.dat",
+ file_save("/tmp/authdata.dat",
tkt->enc_part2->authorization_data[0]->contents,
tkt->enc_part2->authorization_data[0]->length);
}
+#else
+ /* Heimdal */
+ if (tkt->ticket.authorization_data) {
+ file_save("/tmp/authdata.dat",
+ tkt->ticket.authorization_data->val->ad_data.data,
+ tkt->ticket.authorization_data->val->ad_data.length);
+ }
+#endif
#endif
- if ((ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, get_principal_from_tkt(tkt), principal))) {
- DEBUG(3,("krb5_unparse_name failed (%s)\n",
+ if ((ret = smb_krb5_unparse_name(context, client_principal, principal))) {
+ DEBUG(3,("ads_verify_ticket: smb_krb5_unparse_name failed (%s)\n",
error_message(ret)));
- return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+ sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ sret = NT_STATUS_OK;
+
+ out:
+
+ TALLOC_FREE(mutex);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(sret)) {
+ data_blob_free(&auth_data);
+ }
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(sret)) {
+ data_blob_free(ap_rep);
+ }
+
+ if (host_princ) {
+ krb5_free_principal(context, host_princ);
+ }
+
+ if (keyblock) {
+ krb5_free_keyblock(context, keyblock);
}
- return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ if (tkt != NULL) {
+ krb5_free_ticket(context, tkt);
+ }
+
+ SAFE_FREE(host_princ_s);
+
+ if (auth_context) {
+ krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context);
+ }
+
+ if (context) {
+ krb5_free_context(context);
+ }
+
+ return sret;
}
-#endif
+#endif /* HAVE_KRB5 */
git.samba.org / samba.git / blobdiff