/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
Password and authentication handling
- Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2001-2004
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2001-2009
Copyright (C) Gerald Carter 2003
Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher 2005
*/
#include "includes.h"
-#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_netlogon.h"
#include "system/time.h"
-#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h"
-#include "../lib/util/util_ldb.h"
+#include <ldb.h>
+#include "libcli/ldap/ldap_ndr.h"
+#include "libcli/security/security.h"
#include "auth/auth.h"
-#include "auth/ntlm/ntlm_check.h"
+#include "../libcli/auth/ntlm_check.h"
#include "auth/ntlm/auth_proto.h"
#include "auth/auth_sam.h"
#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
-#include "libcli/security/security.h"
-#include "libcli/ldap/ldap_ndr.h"
+#include "dsdb/common/util.h"
#include "param/param.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_irpc_c.h"
+#include "lib/messaging/irpc.h"
+#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+#include "libds/common/roles.h"
+
+NTSTATUS auth_sam_init(void);
extern const char *user_attrs[];
extern const char *domain_ref_attrs[];
static NTSTATUS authsam_search_account(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct ldb_context *sam_ctx,
const char *account_name,
- const char *domain_name,
- struct ldb_message ***ret_msgs,
- struct ldb_message ***ret_msgs_domain_ref)
+ struct ldb_dn *domain_dn,
+ struct ldb_message **ret_msg)
{
- struct ldb_message **msgs_tmp;
- struct ldb_message **msgs;
- struct ldb_message **msgs_domain_ref;
- struct ldb_dn *partitions_basedn = samdb_partitions_dn(sam_ctx, mem_ctx);
-
int ret;
- int ret_domain;
-
- struct ldb_dn *domain_dn = NULL;
-
- if (domain_name) {
- domain_dn = samdb_domain_to_dn(sam_ctx, mem_ctx, domain_name);
- if (!domain_dn) {
- return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_DB_CORRUPTION;
- }
- }
/* pull the user attributes */
- ret = gendb_search(sam_ctx, mem_ctx, domain_dn, &msgs, user_attrs,
- "(&(sAMAccountName=%s)(objectclass=user))",
- ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, account_name));
- if (ret == -1) {
- return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_DB_CORRUPTION;
- }
-
- if (ret == 0) {
- DEBUG(3,("sam_search_user: Couldn't find user [%s\\%s] in samdb, under %s\n",
- domain_name, account_name, ldb_dn_get_linearized(domain_dn)));
- return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
+ ret = dsdb_search_one(sam_ctx, mem_ctx, ret_msg, domain_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
+ user_attrs,
+ DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
+ "(&(sAMAccountName=%s)(objectclass=user))",
+ ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, account_name));
+ if (ret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
+ DEBUG(3,("sam_search_user: Couldn't find user [%s] in samdb, under %s\n",
+ account_name, ldb_dn_get_linearized(domain_dn)));
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
}
-
- if (ret > 1) {
- DEBUG(0,("Found %d records matching user [%s]\n", ret, account_name));
+ if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_DB_CORRUPTION;
}
-
- if (!domain_dn) {
- struct dom_sid *domain_sid;
-
- domain_sid = samdb_result_sid_prefix(mem_ctx, msgs[0], "objectSid");
- if (!domain_sid) {
- return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_DB_CORRUPTION;
- }
-
- /* find the domain's DN */
- ret = gendb_search(sam_ctx, mem_ctx, NULL, &msgs_tmp, NULL,
- "(&(objectSid=%s)(objectClass=domain))",
- ldap_encode_ndr_dom_sid(mem_ctx, domain_sid));
- if (ret == -1) {
- return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_DB_CORRUPTION;
- }
-
- if (ret == 0) {
- DEBUG(3,("check_sam_security: Couldn't find domain_sid [%s] in passdb file.\n",
- dom_sid_string(mem_ctx, domain_sid)));
- return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
- }
-
- if (ret > 1) {
- DEBUG(0,("Found %d records matching domain_sid [%s]\n",
- ret, dom_sid_string(mem_ctx, domain_sid)));
- return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_DB_CORRUPTION;
- }
-
- domain_dn = msgs_tmp[0]->dn;
- }
-
- ret_domain = gendb_search(sam_ctx, mem_ctx, partitions_basedn, &msgs_domain_ref, domain_ref_attrs,
- "(nCName=%s)", ldb_dn_get_linearized(domain_dn));
- if (ret_domain == -1) {
- return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_DB_CORRUPTION;
- }
-
- if (ret_domain == 0) {
- DEBUG(3,("check_sam_security: Couldn't find domain [%s] in passdb file.\n",
- ldb_dn_get_linearized(msgs_tmp[0]->dn)));
- return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
- }
-
- if (ret_domain > 1) {
- DEBUG(0,("Found %d records matching domain [%s]\n",
- ret_domain, ldb_dn_get_linearized(msgs_tmp[0]->dn)));
- return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_DB_CORRUPTION;
- }
-
- *ret_msgs = msgs;
- *ret_msgs_domain_ref = msgs_domain_ref;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
Do a specific test for an smb password being correct, given a smb_password and
the lanman and NT responses.
****************************************************************************/
-static NTSTATUS authsam_password_ok(struct auth_context *auth_context,
+static NTSTATUS authsam_password_ok(struct auth4_context *auth_context,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
uint16_t acct_flags,
const struct samr_Password *lm_pwd,
{
NTSTATUS status;
- if (acct_flags & ACB_PWNOTREQ) {
- if (lp_null_passwords(auth_context->lp_ctx)) {
- DEBUG(3,("Account for user '%s' has no password and null passwords are allowed.\n",
- user_info->mapped.account_name));
- *lm_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
- *user_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
- return NT_STATUS_OK;
- } else {
- DEBUG(3,("Account for user '%s' has no password and null passwords are NOT allowed.\n",
- user_info->mapped.account_name));
- return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
- }
- }
-
switch (user_info->password_state) {
case AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN:
{
*lm_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
*user_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
status = hash_password_check(mem_ctx,
- auth_context->lp_ctx,
+ lpcfg_lanman_auth(auth_context->lp_ctx),
user_info->password.hash.lanman,
user_info->password.hash.nt,
user_info->mapped.account_name,
case AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE:
status = ntlm_password_check(mem_ctx,
- auth_context->lp_ctx,
+ lpcfg_lanman_auth(auth_context->lp_ctx),
+ lpcfg_ntlm_auth(auth_context->lp_ctx),
user_info->logon_parameters,
&auth_context->challenge.data,
&user_info->password.response.lanman,
break;
}
- if (user_sess_key && user_sess_key->data) {
- talloc_steal(auth_context, user_sess_key->data);
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ send a message to the drepl server telling it to initiate a
+ REPL_SECRET getncchanges extended op to fetch the users secrets
+ */
+static void auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(struct auth4_context *auth_context,
+ struct ldb_dn *user_dn)
+{
+ struct dcerpc_binding_handle *irpc_handle;
+ struct drepl_trigger_repl_secret r;
+ struct tevent_req *req;
+ TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
+
+ tmp_ctx = talloc_new(auth_context);
+ if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
}
- if (lm_sess_key && lm_sess_key->data) {
- talloc_steal(auth_context, lm_sess_key->data);
+
+ irpc_handle = irpc_binding_handle_by_name(tmp_ctx, auth_context->msg_ctx,
+ "dreplsrv",
+ &ndr_table_irpc);
+ if (irpc_handle == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Unable to get binding handle for dreplsrv\n"));
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+ return;
}
- return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ r.in.user_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(user_dn);
+
+ /*
+ * This seem to rely on the current IRPC implementation,
+ * which delivers the message in the _send function.
+ *
+ * TODO: we need a ONE_WAY IRPC handle and register
+ * a callback and wait for it to be triggered!
+ */
+ req = dcerpc_drepl_trigger_repl_secret_r_send(tmp_ctx,
+ auth_context->event_ctx,
+ irpc_handle,
+ &r);
+
+ /* we aren't interested in a reply */
+ talloc_free(req);
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
}
+/*
+ * Check that a password is OK, and update badPwdCount if required.
+ */
-static NTSTATUS authsam_authenticate(struct auth_context *auth_context,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct ldb_context *sam_ctx,
- struct ldb_message **msgs,
- struct ldb_message **msgs_domain_ref,
- const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info,
- DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key, DATA_BLOB *lm_sess_key)
+static NTSTATUS authsam_password_check_and_record(struct auth4_context *auth_context,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct ldb_dn *domain_dn,
+ struct ldb_message *msg,
+ uint16_t acct_flags,
+ const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info,
+ DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key,
+ DATA_BLOB *lm_sess_key)
{
- struct samr_Password *lm_pwd, *nt_pwd;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
- struct ldb_dn *domain_dn = samdb_result_dn(sam_ctx, mem_ctx, msgs_domain_ref[0], "nCName", NULL);
+ NTSTATUS auth_status;
+ TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
+ int i, ret;
+ int history_len = 0;
+ struct ldb_context *sam_ctx = auth_context->sam_ctx;
+ const char * const attrs[] = { "pwdHistoryLength", NULL };
+ struct ldb_message *dom_msg;
+ struct samr_Password *lm_pwd;
+ struct samr_Password *nt_pwd;
- uint16_t acct_flags = samdb_result_acct_flags(sam_ctx, mem_ctx, msgs[0], domain_dn);
-
- /* Quit if the account was locked out. */
- if (acct_flags & ACB_AUTOLOCK) {
- DEBUG(3,("check_sam_security: Account for user %s was locked out.\n",
- user_info->mapped.account_name));
- return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT;
+ tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
+ if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This call does more than what it appears to do, it also
+ * checks for the account lockout.
+ *
+ * It is done here so that all parts of Samba that read the
+ * password refuse to even operate on it if the account is
+ * locked out, to avoid mistakes like CVE-2013-4496.
+ */
+ nt_status = samdb_result_passwords(tmp_ctx, auth_context->lp_ctx,
+ msg, &lm_pwd, &nt_pwd);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+ return nt_status;
+ }
+
+ if (lm_pwd == NULL && nt_pwd == NULL) {
+ bool am_rodc;
+ if (samdb_rodc(auth_context->sam_ctx, &am_rodc) == LDB_SUCCESS && am_rodc) {
+ /*
+ * we don't have passwords for this
+ * account. We are an RODC, and this account
+ * may be one for which we either are denied
+ * REPL_SECRET replication or we haven't yet
+ * done the replication. We return
+ * NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED which tells the
+ * auth code to try the next authentication
+ * mechanism. We also send a message to our
+ * drepl server to tell it to try and
+ * replicate the secrets for this account.
+ */
+ auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(auth_context, msg->dn);
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ auth_status = authsam_password_ok(auth_context, tmp_ctx,
+ acct_flags,
+ lm_pwd, nt_pwd,
+ user_info,
+ user_sess_key, lm_sess_key);
+ if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(auth_status)) {
+ if (user_sess_key->data) {
+ talloc_steal(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data);
+ }
+ if (lm_sess_key->data) {
+ talloc_steal(mem_ctx, lm_sess_key->data);
+ }
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+ *user_sess_key = data_blob_null;
+ *lm_sess_key = data_blob_null;
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(auth_status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD)) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+ return auth_status;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We only continue if this was a wrong password
+ * and we'll always return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD
+ * no matter what error happens.
+ */
+
+ /* pull the domain password property attributes */
+ ret = dsdb_search_one(sam_ctx, tmp_ctx, &dom_msg, domain_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
+ attrs, 0, "objectClass=domain");
+ if (ret == LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ history_len = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(dom_msg, "pwdHistoryLength", 0);
+ } else if (ret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
+ DEBUG(3,("Couldn't find domain %s: %s!\n",
+ ldb_dn_get_linearized(domain_dn),
+ ldb_errstring(sam_ctx)));
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(3,("error finding domain %s: %s!\n",
+ ldb_dn_get_linearized(domain_dn),
+ ldb_errstring(sam_ctx)));
+ }
+
+ for (i = 1; i < MIN(history_len, 3); i++) {
+ static const struct samr_Password zero_hash;
+ struct samr_Password zero_string_hash;
+ struct samr_Password zero_string_des_hash;
+ struct samr_Password *nt_history_pwd = NULL;
+ struct samr_Password *lm_history_pwd = NULL;
+ NTTIME pwdLastSet;
+ struct timeval tv_now;
+ NTTIME now;
+ int allowed_period_mins;
+ NTTIME allowed_period;
+
+ nt_status = samdb_result_passwords_from_history(tmp_ctx,
+ auth_context->lp_ctx,
+ msg, i,
+ &lm_history_pwd,
+ &nt_history_pwd);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ /*
+ * If we don't find element 'i' we won't find
+ * 'i+1' ...
+ */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We choose to avoid any issues
+ * around different LM and NT history
+ * lengths by only checking the NT
+ * history
+ */
+ if (nt_history_pwd == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * If we don't find element 'i' we won't find
+ * 'i+1' ...
+ */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Skip over all-zero hashes in the history */
+ if (memcmp(nt_history_pwd->hash, zero_hash.hash,
+ sizeof(zero_hash.hash)) == 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This looks odd, but the password_hash module writes this in if
+ * (somehow) we didn't have an old NT hash
+ */
+
+ E_md4hash("", zero_string_hash.hash);
+ if (memcmp(nt_history_pwd->hash, zero_string_hash.hash, 16) == 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ E_deshash("", zero_string_des_hash.hash);
+ if (!lm_history_pwd || memcmp(lm_history_pwd->hash, zero_string_des_hash.hash, 16) == 0) {
+ lm_history_pwd = NULL;
+ }
+
+ auth_status = authsam_password_ok(auth_context, tmp_ctx,
+ acct_flags,
+ lm_history_pwd,
+ nt_history_pwd,
+ user_info,
+ user_sess_key,
+ lm_sess_key);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(auth_status)) {
+ /*
+ * If this was not a correct password, try the next
+ * one from the history
+ */
+ *user_sess_key = data_blob_null;
+ *lm_sess_key = data_blob_null;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (i != 1) {
+ /*
+ * The authentication was OK, but not against
+ * the previous password, which is stored at index 1.
+ *
+ * We just return the original wrong password.
+ * This skips the update of the bad pwd count,
+ * because this is almost certainly user error
+ * (or automatic login on a computer using a cached
+ * password from before the password change),
+ * not an attack.
+ */
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+
+ if (user_info->password_state != AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE) {
+ /*
+ * The authentication was OK against the previous password,
+ * but it's not a NTLM network authentication.
+ *
+ * We just return the original wrong password.
+ * This skips the update of the bad pwd count,
+ * because this is almost certainly user error
+ * (or automatic login on a computer using a cached
+ * password from before the password change),
+ * not an attack.
+ */
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the password was OK, it's a NTLM network authentication
+ * and it was the previous password.
+ *
+ * Now we see if it is within the grace period,
+ * so that we don't break cached sessions on other computers
+ * before the user can lock and unlock their other screens
+ * (resetting their cached password).
+ *
+ * See http://support.microsoft.com/kb/906305
+ * OldPasswordAllowedPeriod ("old password allowed period")
+ * is specified in minutes. The default is 60.
+ */
+ allowed_period_mins = lpcfg_old_password_allowed_period(auth_context->lp_ctx);
+ /*
+ * NTTIME uses 100ns units
+ */
+ allowed_period = allowed_period_mins * 60 * 1000*1000*10;
+ pwdLastSet = samdb_result_nttime(msg, "pwdLastSet", 0);
+ tv_now = timeval_current();
+ now = timeval_to_nttime(&tv_now);
+
+ if (now < pwdLastSet) {
+ /*
+ * time jump?
+ *
+ * We just return the original wrong password.
+ * This skips the update of the bad pwd count,
+ * because this is almost certainly user error
+ * (or automatic login on a computer using a cached
+ * password from before the password change),
+ * not an attack.
+ */
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+
+ if ((now - pwdLastSet) >= allowed_period) {
+ /*
+ * The allowed period is over.
+ *
+ * We just return the original wrong password.
+ * This skips the update of the bad pwd count,
+ * because this is almost certainly user error
+ * (or automatic login on a computer using a cached
+ * password from before the password change),
+ * not an attack.
+ */
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We finally allow the authentication with the
+ * previous password within the allowed period.
+ */
+ if (user_sess_key->data) {
+ talloc_steal(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data);
+ }
+ if (lm_sess_key->data) {
+ talloc_steal(mem_ctx, lm_sess_key->data);
+ }
+
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+ return auth_status;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we are not in the allowed period or match an old password,
+ * we didn't return early. Now update the badPwdCount et al.
+ */
+ nt_status = authsam_update_bad_pwd_count(auth_context->sam_ctx,
+ msg, domain_dn);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ /*
+ * We need to return the original
+ * NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD error, so there isn't
+ * anything more we can do than write something into
+ * the log
+ */
+ DEBUG(0, ("Failed to note bad password for user [%s]: %s\n",
+ user_info->mapped.account_name,
+ nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+ }
+
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS authsam_authenticate(struct auth4_context *auth_context,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct ldb_context *sam_ctx,
+ struct ldb_dn *domain_dn,
+ struct ldb_message *msg,
+ const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info,
+ DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key, DATA_BLOB *lm_sess_key)
+{
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+ bool interactive = (user_info->password_state == AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH);
+ uint16_t acct_flags = samdb_result_acct_flags(msg, NULL);
+ TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
+ if (!tmp_ctx) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/* You can only do an interactive login to normal accounts */
if (user_info->flags & USER_INFO_INTERACTIVE_LOGON) {
if (!(acct_flags & ACB_NORMAL)) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
}
}
- nt_status = samdb_result_passwords(mem_ctx, auth_context->lp_ctx, msgs[0], &lm_pwd, &nt_pwd);
- NT_STATUS_NOT_OK_RETURN(nt_status);
-
- nt_status = authsam_password_ok(auth_context, mem_ctx,
- acct_flags, lm_pwd, nt_pwd,
- user_info, user_sess_key, lm_sess_key);
- NT_STATUS_NOT_OK_RETURN(nt_status);
+ nt_status = authsam_password_check_and_record(auth_context, tmp_ctx,
+ domain_dn, msg, acct_flags,
+ user_info,
+ user_sess_key, lm_sess_key);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+ return nt_status;
+ }
- nt_status = authsam_account_ok(mem_ctx, sam_ctx,
+ nt_status = authsam_account_ok(tmp_ctx, auth_context->sam_ctx,
user_info->logon_parameters,
- msgs[0],
- msgs_domain_ref[0],
+ domain_dn,
+ msg,
user_info->workstation_name,
- user_info->mapped.account_name);
+ user_info->mapped.account_name,
+ false, false);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+ return nt_status;
+ }
+
+ nt_status = authsam_logon_success_accounting(auth_context->sam_ctx,
+ msg, domain_dn,
+ interactive);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+ return nt_status;
+ }
+ if (user_sess_key && user_sess_key->data) {
+ talloc_steal(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data);
+ }
+ if (lm_sess_key && lm_sess_key->data) {
+ talloc_steal(mem_ctx, lm_sess_key->data);
+ }
+
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return nt_status;
}
static NTSTATUS authsam_check_password_internals(struct auth_method_context *ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- const char *domain,
const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info,
- struct auth_serversupplied_info **server_info)
+ struct auth_user_info_dc **user_info_dc)
{
NTSTATUS nt_status;
const char *account_name = user_info->mapped.account_name;
- struct ldb_message **msgs;
- struct ldb_message **domain_ref_msgs;
- struct ldb_context *sam_ctx;
+ struct ldb_message *msg;
+ struct ldb_dn *domain_dn;
DATA_BLOB user_sess_key, lm_sess_key;
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
+ if (ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("No SAM available, cannot log in users\n"));
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE;
+ }
+
if (!account_name || !*account_name) {
/* 'not for me' */
return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(tmp_ctx, ctx->auth_ctx->event_ctx, ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx, system_session(mem_ctx, ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx));
- if (sam_ctx == NULL) {
+ domain_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx);
+ if (domain_dn == NULL) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE;
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_DOMAIN;
}
- nt_status = authsam_search_account(tmp_ctx, sam_ctx, account_name, domain, &msgs, &domain_ref_msgs);
+ nt_status = authsam_search_account(tmp_ctx, ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, account_name, domain_dn, &msg);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return nt_status;
}
- nt_status = authsam_authenticate(ctx->auth_ctx, tmp_ctx, sam_ctx, msgs, domain_ref_msgs, user_info,
+ nt_status = authsam_authenticate(ctx->auth_ctx, tmp_ctx, ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, domain_dn, msg, user_info,
&user_sess_key, &lm_sess_key);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return nt_status;
}
- nt_status = authsam_make_server_info(tmp_ctx, sam_ctx, lp_netbios_name(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx),
- msgs[0], domain_ref_msgs[0],
+ nt_status = authsam_make_user_info_dc(tmp_ctx, ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, lpcfg_netbios_name(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx),
+ lpcfg_sam_name(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx),
+ domain_dn,
+ msg,
user_sess_key, lm_sess_key,
- server_info);
+ user_info_dc);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return nt_status;
}
- talloc_steal(mem_ctx, *server_info);
+ talloc_steal(mem_ctx, *user_info_dc);
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
-static NTSTATUS authsam_ignoredomain_check_password(struct auth_method_context *ctx,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info,
- struct auth_serversupplied_info **server_info)
-{
- return authsam_check_password_internals(ctx, mem_ctx, NULL, user_info, server_info);
-}
-
/****************************************************************************
Check SAM security (above) but with a few extra checks.
****************************************************************************/
return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
- is_local_name = lp_is_myname(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx,
+ is_local_name = lpcfg_is_myname(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx,
user_info->mapped.domain_name);
- is_my_domain = lp_is_mydomain(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx,
+ is_my_domain = lpcfg_is_mydomain(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx,
user_info->mapped.domain_name);
/* check whether or not we service this domain/workgroup name */
- switch (lp_server_role(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx)) {
+ switch (lpcfg_server_role(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx)) {
case ROLE_STANDALONE:
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
- case ROLE_DOMAIN_CONTROLLER:
+ case ROLE_ACTIVE_DIRECTORY_DC:
if (!is_local_name && !is_my_domain) {
DEBUG(6,("authsam_check_password: %s is not one of my local names or domain name (DC)\n",
user_info->mapped.domain_name));
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
- DEBUG(6,("authsam_check_password: lp_server_role() has an undefined value\n"));
+ DEBUG(6,("authsam_check_password: lpcfg_server_role() has an undefined value\n"));
return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
-/****************************************************************************
-Check SAM security (above) but with a few extra checks.
-****************************************************************************/
-static NTSTATUS authsam_check_password(struct auth_method_context *ctx,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info,
- struct auth_serversupplied_info **server_info)
+
+/* Wrapper for the auth subsystem pointer */
+static NTSTATUS authsam_get_user_info_dc_principal_wrapper(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct auth4_context *auth_context,
+ const char *principal,
+ struct ldb_dn *user_dn,
+ struct auth_user_info_dc **user_info_dc)
{
- const char *domain;
-
- /* check whether or not we service this domain/workgroup name */
- switch (lp_server_role(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx)) {
- case ROLE_STANDALONE:
- case ROLE_DOMAIN_MEMBER:
- domain = lp_netbios_name(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx);
- break;
-
- case ROLE_DOMAIN_CONTROLLER:
- domain = lp_workgroup(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx);
- break;
-
- default:
- return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
- }
-
- return authsam_check_password_internals(ctx, mem_ctx, domain, user_info, server_info);
+ return authsam_get_user_info_dc_principal(mem_ctx, auth_context->lp_ctx, auth_context->sam_ctx,
+ principal, user_dn, user_info_dc);
}
-
static const struct auth_operations sam_ignoredomain_ops = {
- .name = "sam_ignoredomain",
- .get_challenge = auth_get_challenge_not_implemented,
- .want_check = authsam_ignoredomain_want_check,
- .check_password = authsam_ignoredomain_check_password
+ .name = "sam_ignoredomain",
+ .want_check = authsam_ignoredomain_want_check,
+ .check_password = authsam_check_password_internals,
+ .get_user_info_dc_principal = authsam_get_user_info_dc_principal_wrapper,
+ .flags = AUTH_METHOD_LOCAL_SAM
};
static const struct auth_operations sam_ops = {
- .name = "sam",
- .get_challenge = auth_get_challenge_not_implemented,
- .want_check = authsam_want_check,
- .check_password = authsam_check_password
+ .name = "sam",
+ .want_check = authsam_want_check,
+ .check_password = authsam_check_password_internals,
+ .get_user_info_dc_principal = authsam_get_user_info_dc_principal_wrapper,
+ .flags = AUTH_METHOD_LOCAL_SAM
};
-_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth_sam_init(void)
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth4_sam_init(void);
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth4_sam_init(void)
{
NTSTATUS ret;
git.samba.org / obnox / samba / samba-obnox.git / blobdiff