*/
#include "includes.h"
-#include "system/time.h"
-#include "../libds/common/flags.h"
-#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h"
-#include "librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
#include "libcli/security/security.h"
#include "auth/auth.h"
-#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
#include "auth/auth_sam.h"
#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
#include "dsdb/common/util.h"
-#include "librpc/ndr/libndr.h"
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
-#include "librpc/gen_ndr/lsa.h"
-#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
#include "param/param.h"
#include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
#include "system/kerberos.h"
#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
#include <hdb.h>
#include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
+#include "kdc/kdc-glue.h"
#include "kdc/db-glue.h"
+#define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno) \
+ ((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) >> 16))
+
+#define SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, krbtgt) \
+ ((krb5_kvno)((((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF) | \
+ ((((uint32_t)krbtgt) << 16) & 0xFFFF0000)))
+
enum samba_kdc_ent_type
{ SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
NULL
};
+
static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
{
const char *tmp;
flags.client = 0;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
- flags.invalid = 1;
+ flags.locked_out = 1;
}
/*
if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
}
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION) {
+ /*
+ * this is confusing...
+ *
+ * UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
+ * => ok_as_delegate
+ *
+ * and
+ *
+ * UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION
+ * => trusted_for_delegation
+ */
+ flags.trusted_for_delegation = 1;
+ }
if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
flags.forwardable = 1;
flags.proxiable = 1;
uint16_t i;
uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
int rodc_krbtgt_number = 0;
- uint32_t supported_enctypes;
+ int kvno = 0;
+ uint32_t supported_enctypes
+ = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
+ "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
+ 0);
if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT || is_rodc) {
- /* KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs) use AES, but not DES */
- supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
- supported_enctypes &= ~(ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5);
+ /* KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs) use AES */
+ supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
} else if (userAccountControl & (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)) {
/* DCs and RODCs comptuer accounts use AES */
- supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
+ supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
} else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT ||
(ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY)) {
/* for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it
* supports, and this will vary between computers a
- * user logs in from. However, some accounts may be
- * banned from using DES, so allow the default to be
- * overridden
+ * user logs in from.
*
* likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported,
* to export into a keytab */
- supported_enctypes = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
- ENC_ALL_TYPES);
+ supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
+ }
+
+ /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
+ supported_enctypes = ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5;
} else {
- /* However, if this is a TGS-REQ, then lock it down to
- * a reasonable guess as to what the server can decode
- * - we must use whatever is in
- * "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes", or the 'old' set
- * of keys (ie, what Windows 2000 supported) */
- supported_enctypes = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
- ENC_CRC32 | ENC_RSA_MD5 | ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5);
+ /* Otherwise, add in the default enc types */
+ supported_enctypes |= ENC_CRC32 | ENC_RSA_MD5 | ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
}
/* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */
}
}
-
- /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
- if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
- /* However, this still won't allow use of DES, if we
- * were told not to by msDS-SupportedEncTypes */
- supported_enctypes &= ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5;
- } else {
- switch (ent_type) {
- case SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT:
- case SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST:
- /* Unless a very special effort it made,
- * disallow trust tickets to be DES encrypted,
- * it's just too dangerous */
- supported_enctypes &= ~(ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5);
- break;
- default:
- break;
- /* No further restrictions */
- }
- }
-
entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
- entry_ex->entry.kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
+ kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
if (is_rodc) {
- entry_ex->entry.kvno |= (rodc_krbtgt_number << 16);
+ kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, rodc_krbtgt_number);
}
+ entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
/* Get keys from the db */
* Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
*/
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
- struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
- enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
- struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
- struct ldb_message *msg,
- hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
+ enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
+ unsigned flags,
+ struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
+ struct ldb_message *msg,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
uint32_t userAccountControl;
+ uint32_t msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
unsigned int i;
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
- char *realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
NTTIME acct_expiry;
memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex));
- if (!realm) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_strdup: out of memory");
- goto out;
- }
-
p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
if (!p) {
ret = ENOMEM;
userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
+ msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed
+ = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
+ "msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed",
+ UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE);
+
+ /*
+ * This brings in the lockout flag, block the account if not
+ * found. We need the weird UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE check because
+ * we do not want to fail open if the value is not returned,
+ * but 0 is a valid value (all OK)
+ */
+ if (msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed == UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: "
+ "no msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed present");
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ userAccountControl |= msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
+ }
entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
- krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, realm, samAccountName, NULL);
+ krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
} else {
ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
if (ret) {
* we determine from our records */
/* this has to be with malloc() */
- krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
+ krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
}
/* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
}
}
- {
+ if (flags & HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) {
/* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
* of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
* DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
/* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
krb5_make_principal(context,
&entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
- realm, "kadmin", NULL);
+ lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
/* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
krb5_make_principal(context,
&entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal,
- realm, "kadmin", NULL);
+ lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
}
entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
- entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
+ entry_ex->entry.max_life = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.max_life == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
- entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
+ if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
+ *entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime;
+ } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT) {
+ *entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime;
+ } else {
+ *entry_ex->entry.max_life = MIN(kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
+ kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime);
+ }
+
+ entry_ex->entry.max_renew = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.max_renew == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ *entry_ex->entry.max_renew = kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime;
entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
/*
* Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
+ * The kvno is what the remote client asked for
*/
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
enum trust_direction direction,
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
+ unsigned flags,
+ uint32_t kvno,
struct ldb_message *msg,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
const char *dnsdomain;
- char *realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
- DATA_BLOB password_utf16;
- struct samr_Password password_hash;
+ const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx);
+ DATA_BLOB password_utf16 = data_blob_null;
+ DATA_BLOB password_utf8 = data_blob_null;
+ struct samr_Password _password_hash;
+ const struct samr_Password *password_hash = NULL;
const struct ldb_val *password_val;
struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
-
+ bool use_previous;
+ uint32_t current_kvno;
+ uint32_t num_keys = 0;
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
int ret, trust_direction_flags;
unsigned int i;
+ struct AuthenticationInformationArray *auth_array;
+ uint32_t supported_enctypes = ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC;
+
+ if (dsdb_functional_level(kdc_db_ctx->samdb) >= DS_DOMAIN_FUNCTION_2008) {
+ supported_enctypes = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
+ "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
+ supported_enctypes);
+ }
p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
if (!p) {
&entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
realm, "kadmin", NULL);
+ entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.principal == NULL) {
+ krb5_clear_error_message(context);
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
+ if (ret) {
+ krb5_clear_error_message(context);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * While we have copied the client principal, tests
+ * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
+ * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
+ * replace the client principal's realm with the one
+ * we determine from our records
+ */
+
+ krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
+
entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
} else { /* OUTBOUND */
dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
/* replace realm */
- talloc_free(realm);
realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
}
if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
- ret = ENOENT;
+ krb5_clear_error_message(context);
+ ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
goto out;
}
ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
- entry_ex->entry.kvno = -1;
+
+ /* we need to work out if we are going to use the current or
+ * the previous password hash.
+ * We base this on the kvno the client passes in. If the kvno
+ * passed in is equal to the current kvno in our database then
+ * we use the current structure. If it is the current kvno-1,
+ * then we use the previous substrucure.
+ */
+
+ /* first work out the current kvno */
+ current_kvno = 0;
for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
- entry_ex->entry.kvno = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
+ current_kvno = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
}
}
- for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
- if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
- password_utf16 = data_blob_const(password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
- password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
- /* In the future, generate all sorts of
- * hashes, but for now we can't safely convert
- * the random strings windows uses into
- * utf8 */
-
- /* but as it is utf16 already, we can get the NT password/arcfour-hmac-md5 key */
- mdfour(password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
- break;
- } else if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
- password_hash = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
+ /* work out whether we will use the previous or current
+ password */
+ if (password_blob.previous.count == 0) {
+ /* there is no previous password */
+ use_previous = false;
+ } else if (!(flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) ||
+ kvno == current_kvno) {
+ use_previous = false;
+ } else if ((kvno+1 == current_kvno) ||
+ (kvno == 255 && current_kvno == 0)) {
+ use_previous = true;
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Request for unknown kvno %u - current kvno is %u\n",
+ kvno, current_kvno));
+ krb5_clear_error_message(context);
+ ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (use_previous) {
+ auth_array = &password_blob.previous;
+ } else {
+ auth_array = &password_blob.current;
+ }
+
+ /* use the kvno the client specified, if available */
+ if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
+ entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
+ } else {
+ entry_ex->entry.kvno = current_kvno;
+ }
+
+ for (i=0; i < auth_array->count; i++) {
+ if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
+ bool ok;
+
+ password_utf16 = data_blob_const(auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
+ auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
+ if (password_utf16.length == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (supported_enctypes & ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
+ mdfour(_password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
+ if (password_hash == NULL) {
+ num_keys += 1;
+ }
+ password_hash = &_password_hash;
+ }
+
+ if (!(supported_enctypes & (ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128|ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256))) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ok = convert_string_talloc(mem_ctx,
+ CH_UTF16MUNGED, CH_UTF8,
+ password_utf16.data,
+ password_utf16.length,
+ (void *)&password_utf8.data,
+ &password_utf8.length);
+ if (!ok) {
+ krb5_clear_error_message(context);
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
+ num_keys += 1;
+ }
+ if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
+ num_keys += 1;
+ }
break;
+ } else if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
+ if (supported_enctypes & ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
+ password_hash = &auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
+ num_keys += 1;
+ }
}
}
- if (i < password_blob.count) {
- Key key;
- /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
- entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(1, sizeof(Key));
+ /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
+ if (num_keys == 0) {
+ DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": no usable key found\n"));
+ krb5_clear_error_message(context);
+ ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ goto out;
+ }
- key.mkvno = 0;
- key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(num_keys, sizeof(Key));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
+ krb5_clear_error_message(context);
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
- if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
+ if (password_utf8.length != 0) {
+ Key key = {};
+ krb5_const_principal salt_principal = principal;
+ krb5_salt salt;
+ krb5_data cleartext_data;
+
+ cleartext_data.data = password_utf8.data;
+ cleartext_data.length = password_utf8.length;
+
+ ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context,
+ salt_principal,
+ &salt);
+ if (ret != 0) {
goto out;
}
+ if (supported_enctypes & ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96) {
+ ret = krb5_string_to_key_data_salt(context,
+ ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
+ cleartext_data,
+ salt,
+ &key.key);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ krb5_free_salt(context, salt);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
+ }
+
+ if (supported_enctypes & ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96) {
+ ret = krb5_string_to_key_data_salt(context,
+ ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
+ cleartext_data,
+ salt,
+ &key.key);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ krb5_free_salt(context, salt);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
+ }
+
+ krb5_free_salt(context, salt);
+ }
+
+ if (password_hash != NULL) {
+ Key key = {};
+
ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
- password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash),
+ password_hash->hash,
+ sizeof(password_hash->hash),
&key.key);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
}
- entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
-
- ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
- if (ret) {
- krb5_clear_error_message(context);
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
- * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
- * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
- * replace the client principal's realm with the one
- * we determine from our records */
-
- krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
struct ldb_message **pmsg)
{
- int lret;
- krb5_error_code ret;
- char *filter = NULL;
+ NTSTATUS status;
const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
- struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
- filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=trustedDomain)(|(flatname=%s)(trustPartner=%s)))", realm, realm);
-
- if (!filter) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
- return ret;
- }
-
- lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &res,
- ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx),
- LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs, "%s", filter);
- if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
- DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
- return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
- } else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) {
- DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count));
- talloc_free(res);
+ status = sam_get_results_trust(ldb_ctx,
+ mem_ctx, realm, realm, attrs,
+ pmsg);
+ if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ return 0;
+ } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND)) {
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
+ int ret = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: out of memory");
+ return ret;
+ } else {
+ int ret = EINVAL;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: %s", nt_errstr(status));
+ return ret;
}
- talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs);
- *pmsg = res->msgs[0];
- talloc_free(res);
- return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
+ unsigned flags,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
krb5_error_code ret;
}
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
- principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
- realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
+ principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
+ flags,
+ realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
return ret;
}
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
- uint32_t krbtgt_number,
+ unsigned flags,
+ uint32_t kvno,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
* krbtgt */
int lret;
- char *realm_fixed;
+ unsigned int krbtgt_number;
+ /* w2k8r2 sometimes gives us a kvno of 255 for inter-domain
+ trust tickets. We don't yet know what this means, but we do
+ seem to need to treat it as unspecified */
+ if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
+ krbtgt_number = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno);
+ if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
+ if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
+ return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
+ }
if (krbtgt_number == kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
&msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
- krbtgt_attrs, 0,
+ krbtgt_attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
"(objectClass=user)");
} else {
/* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
&msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
krbtgt_attrs,
- DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
+ DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
"(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
}
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
- realm_fixed = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
- if (!realm_fixed) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "strupper_talloc: out of memory");
- return ret;
- }
-
- ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal);
- if (ret) {
- return ret;
- }
-
- free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
- alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(realm_fixed);
- talloc_free(realm_fixed);
- if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: strdup() failed!");
- return ret;
- }
- principal = alloc_principal;
+ /*
+ * Windows seems to canonicalize the principal
+ * in a TGS REP even if the client did not specify
+ * the canonicalize flag.
+ */
+ if (flags & (HDB_F_CANON|HDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ)) {
+ ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal);
+ if (ret) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* When requested to do so, ensure that the
+ * both realm values in the principal are set
+ * to the upper case, canonical realm */
+ free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
+ alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
+ if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: strdup() failed!");
+ return ret;
+ }
+ principal = alloc_principal;
+ }
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
- principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
- realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
+ principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
+ flags, realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
+ if (alloc_principal) {
+ /* This is again copied in the message2entry call */
+ krb5_free_principal(context, alloc_principal);
+ }
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
}
}
ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
- principal, direction,
- realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
+ principal, direction,
+ realm_dn, flags, kvno, msg, entry_ex);
if (ret != 0) {
- krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed");
+ krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed for %s",
+ ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: "
+ "trust_message2entry failed for %s",
+ ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
}
return ret;
}
struct ldb_message **msg)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
- const char *realm;
if (principal->name.name_string.len >= 2) {
/* 'normal server' case */
int ldb_ret;
ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
mem_ctx,
msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
- attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN, "(objectClass=*)");
+ attrs,
+ DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
+ "(objectClass=*)");
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
} else {
int lret;
- char *filter = NULL;
char *short_princ;
+ /* const char *realm; */
/* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
*realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
- realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
+ /* realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal); */
- /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referall */
+ /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referral */
ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ);
lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
*realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
attrs,
- DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
+ DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
"(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ));
- free(short_princ);
if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
- DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a entry for %s\n", filter));
+ DEBUG(3, ("Failed to find an entry for %s\n", short_princ));
+ free(short_princ);
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
- DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for for %s - %s\n",
- filter, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
+ DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for %s - %s\n",
+ short_princ, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
+ free(short_princ);
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
+ free(short_princ);
}
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
- struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- krb5_const_principal principal,
- hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ krb5_const_principal principal,
+ unsigned flags,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
}
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
- principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
- realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
+ principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
+ flags,
+ realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
}
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
unsigned flags,
- unsigned kvno,
+ krb5_kvno kvno,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
- unsigned int krbtgt_number;
- if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
- krbtgt_number = kvno >> 16;
- if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
- if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
- return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
- }
- }
- } else {
- krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
- }
mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
if (!mem_ctx) {
}
if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
- ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex);
+ ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
}
if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
/* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
- ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, krbtgt_number, entry_ex);
+ ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
/* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
- ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex);
+ ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
}
if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
- ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, krbtgt_number, entry_ex);
+ ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
}
if (priv->index < priv->count) {
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
- NULL, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
- priv->realm_dn, priv->msgs[priv->index++], entry);
+ NULL, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
+ HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA|HDB_F_GET_ANY,
+ priv->realm_dn, priv->msgs[priv->index++], entry);
} else {
ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
return ret;
}
+ krb5_free_default_realm(context, realm);
- lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
- priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
- "(objectClass=user)");
+ lret = dsdb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
+ priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
+ DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
+ "(objectClass=user)");
if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
/* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
*
* This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
- *
- * This is shared between the constrained delegation and S4U2Self code.
*/
krb5_error_code
-samba_kdc_check_identical_client_and_server(krb5_context context,
- struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
- hdb_entry_ex *entry,
- krb5_const_principal target_principal)
+samba_kdc_check_s4u2self(krb5_context context,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry,
+ krb5_const_principal target_principal)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
"objectSid", NULL
};
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation");
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self");
if (!mem_ctx) {
ret = ENOMEM;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self: talloc_named() failed!");
return ret;
}
/* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
if (target_principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation: request for delegation to enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self: request for delegation to enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
target_principal->name.name_string.len);
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
return ret;
}
+/*
+ * Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal
+ * with S4U2Proxy.
+ */
+krb5_error_code
+samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy(krb5_context context,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry,
+ krb5_const_principal target_principal)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ char *tmp = NULL;
+ const char *client_dn = NULL;
+ const char *target_principal_name = NULL;
+ struct ldb_message_element *el;
+ struct ldb_val val;
+ unsigned int i;
+ bool found = false;
+ struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
+
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy");
+
+ if (!mem_ctx) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
+ "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
+ " talloc_named() failed!");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ client_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(p->msg->dn);
+ if (!client_dn) {
+ if (errno == 0) {
+ errno = ENOMEM;
+ }
+ ret = errno;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
+ "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
+ " ldb_dn_get_linearized() failed!");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The main heimdal code already checked that the target_principal
+ * belongs to the same realm as the client.
+ *
+ * So we just need the principal without the realm,
+ * as that is what is configured in the "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo"
+ * attribute.
+ */
+ ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, target_principal,
+ KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &tmp);
+ if (ret) {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
+ "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
+ " krb5_unparse_name() failed!");
+ return ret;
+ }
+ DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] for target[%s]\n",
+ client_dn, tmp));
+
+ target_principal_name = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, tmp);
+ SAFE_FREE(tmp);
+ if (target_principal_name == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
+ "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
+ " talloc_strdup() failed!");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ el = ldb_msg_find_element(p->msg, "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo");
+ if (el == NULL) {
+ goto bad_option;
+ }
+
+ val = data_blob_string_const(target_principal_name);
+
+ for (i=0; i<el->num_values; i++) {
+ struct ldb_val *val1 = &val;
+ struct ldb_val *val2 = &el->values[i];
+ int cmp;
+
+ if (val1->length != val2->length) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ cmp = strncasecmp((const char *)val1->data,
+ (const char *)val2->data,
+ val1->length);
+ if (cmp != 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!found) {
+ goto bad_option;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] allowed target[%s]\n",
+ client_dn, tmp));
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return 0;
+
+bad_option:
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
+ "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] "
+ "not allowed for delegation to target[%s]",
+ client_dn,
+ target_principal_name);
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
+}
+
NTSTATUS samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx,
struct samba_kdc_db_context **kdc_db_ctx_out)
{
kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx = base_ctx->ev_ctx;
kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx = base_ctx->lp_ctx;
+ /* get default kdc policy */
+ lpcfg_default_kdc_policy(base_ctx->lp_ctx,
+ &kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
+ &kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime,
+ &kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime);
+
session_info = system_session(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
if (session_info == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
&msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
secondary_keytab,
- 0,
+ DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
"(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
} else {
kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
- &msg, NULL, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
+ &msg,
+ ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
+ LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
krbtgt_attrs,
- DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
+ DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
"(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
git.samba.org / obnox / samba / samba-obnox.git / blobdiff