bpf: restrict map value pointer arithmetic for unprivileged
authorDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:28:24 +0000 (21:28 +0100)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thu, 31 Jan 2019 07:14:40 +0000 (08:14 +0100)
commit9e57b2969d4afa8fe08dda6d658963336c97b594
tree87f42f2e78b2b4149a4099b27a1bad4b254e08de
parent232ac70dd38bfae4899460c342aae7aa0a36aa64
bpf: restrict map value pointer arithmetic for unprivileged

[ commit 0d6303db7970e6f56ae700fa07e11eb510cda125 upstream ]

Restrict map value pointer arithmetic for unprivileged users in that
arithmetic itself must not go out of bounds as opposed to the actual
access later on. Therefore after each adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() with a
map value pointer as a destination it will simulate a check_map_access()
of 1 byte on the destination and once that fails the program is rejected
for unprivileged program loads. We use this later on for masking any
pointer arithmetic with the remainder of the map value space. The
likelihood of breaking any existing real-world unprivileged eBPF
program is very small for this corner case.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
kernel/bpf/verifier.c