}
}
-static int
-only_older_enctype_p(const KDC_REQ *req)
-{
- int i;
-
- for(i = 0; i < req->req_body.etype.len; i++) {
- if (!older_enctype(req->req_body.etype.val[i]))
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
/*
*
*/
static krb5_error_code
get_pa_etype_info(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
- METHOD_DATA *md, hdb_entry *client,
- ENCTYPE *etypes, unsigned int etypes_len)
+ METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
- int i, j;
- unsigned int n = 0;
ETYPE_INFO pa;
unsigned char *buf;
size_t len;
- pa.len = client->keys.len;
- if(pa.len > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*pa.val))
- return ERANGE;
- pa.val = malloc(pa.len * sizeof(*pa.val));
+ pa.len = 1;
+ pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
if(pa.val == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
- memset(pa.val, 0, pa.len * sizeof(*pa.val));
-
- for(i = 0; i < client->keys.len; i++) {
- for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
- if (pa.val[j].etype == client->keys.val[i].key.keytype)
- goto skip1;
- for(j = 0; j < etypes_len; j++) {
- if(client->keys.val[i].key.keytype == etypes[j]) {
- if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[j]) != 0)
- continue;
- if (!older_enctype(etypes[j]))
- continue;
- if (n >= pa.len)
- krb5_abortx(context, "internal error: n >= p.len");
- if((ret = make_etype_info_entry(context,
- &pa.val[n++],
- &client->keys.val[i])) != 0) {
- free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
- return ret;
- }
- break;
- }
- }
- skip1:;
- }
- for(i = 0; i < client->keys.len; i++) {
- /* already added? */
- for(j = 0; j < etypes_len; j++) {
- if(client->keys.val[i].key.keytype == etypes[j])
- goto skip2;
- }
- if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, client->keys.val[i].key.keytype) != 0)
- continue;
- if (!older_enctype(etypes[j]))
- continue;
- if (n >= pa.len)
- krb5_abortx(context, "internal error: n >= p.len");
- if((ret = make_etype_info_entry(context,
- &pa.val[n++],
- &client->keys.val[i])) != 0) {
- free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
- return ret;
- }
- skip2:;
- }
- if(n < pa.len) {
- /* stripped out dups, newer enctypes, and not valid enctypes */
- pa.len = n;
+ ret = make_etype_info_entry(context, &pa.val[0], ckey);
+ if (ret) {
+ free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
+ return ret;
}
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
static krb5_error_code
get_pa_etype_info2(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
- METHOD_DATA *md, hdb_entry *client,
- ENCTYPE *etypes, unsigned int etypes_len)
+ METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
- int i, j;
- unsigned int n = 0;
ETYPE_INFO2 pa;
unsigned char *buf;
size_t len;
- pa.len = client->keys.len;
- if(pa.len > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*pa.val))
- return ERANGE;
- pa.val = malloc(pa.len * sizeof(*pa.val));
+ pa.len = 1;
+ pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
if(pa.val == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
- memset(pa.val, 0, pa.len * sizeof(*pa.val));
-
- for(i = 0; i < client->keys.len; i++) {
- for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
- if (pa.val[j].etype == client->keys.val[i].key.keytype)
- goto skip1;
- for(j = 0; j < etypes_len; j++) {
- if(client->keys.val[i].key.keytype == etypes[j]) {
- if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[j]) != 0)
- continue;
- if (n >= pa.len)
- krb5_abortx(context, "internal error: n >= p.len");
- if((ret = make_etype_info2_entry(&pa.val[n++],
- &client->keys.val[i])) != 0) {
- free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
- return ret;
- }
- break;
- }
- }
- skip1:;
- }
- /* send enctypes that the client doesn't know about too */
- for(i = 0; i < client->keys.len; i++) {
- /* already added? */
- for(j = 0; j < etypes_len; j++) {
- if(client->keys.val[i].key.keytype == etypes[j])
- goto skip2;
- }
- if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, client->keys.val[i].key.keytype) != 0)
- continue;
- if (n >= pa.len)
- krb5_abortx(context, "internal error: n >= p.len");
- if((ret = make_etype_info2_entry(&pa.val[n++],
- &client->keys.val[i])) != 0) {
- free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
- return ret;
- }
- skip2:;
- }
- if(n < pa.len) {
- /* stripped out dups, and not valid enctypes */
- pa.len = n;
+ ret = make_etype_info2_entry(&pa.val[0], ckey);
+ if (ret) {
+ free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
+ return ret;
}
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO2, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
return TRUE;
}
+static krb5_boolean
+is_anonymous(krb5_context context, krb5_principal principal)
+{
+ if (principal->name.name_type != KRB5_NT_WELLKNOWN ||
+ principal->name.name_string.len != 2 ||
+ strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_WELLKNOWN_NAME) != 0 ||
+ strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], KRB5_ANON_NAME) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
*
*/
if (ret)
goto out;
}
+
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client_princ, &client_name);
}
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s",
client_name, from, server_name);
+ /*
+ *
+ */
+
+ if (is_anonymous(context, client_princ)) {
+ if (!b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Anonymous ticket w/o anonymous flag");
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0,
+ "Request for a anonymous ticket with non "
+ "anonymous client name: %s", client_name);
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ *
+ */
+
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, client_princ,
HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags, NULL, &client);
if(ret){
memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et));
memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek));
+ /*
+ * Find the client key for reply encryption and pa-type salt, Pick
+ * the client key upfront before the other keys because that is
+ * going to affect what enctypes we are going to use in
+ * ETYPE-INFO{,2}.
+ */
+
+ ret = _kdc_find_etype(context, client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len,
+ &ckey, &cetype);
+ if (ret) {
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0,
+ "Client (%s) has no support for etypes", client_name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Pre-auth processing
+ */
+
if(req->padata){
int i;
const PA_DATA *pa;
if (ret == 0 && pkp == NULL)
goto ts_enc;
- ret = _kdc_pk_check_client(context,
- config,
- client,
- pkp,
- &client_cert);
- if (ret) {
- e_text = "PKINIT certificate not allowed to "
- "impersonate principal";
- _kdc_pk_free_client_param(context, pkp);
-
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s", e_text);
- pkp = NULL;
- goto out;
+ if (!b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
+ ret = _kdc_pk_check_client(context,
+ config,
+ client,
+ pkp,
+ &client_cert);
+ if (ret) {
+ e_text = "PKINIT certificate not allowed to "
+ "impersonate principal";
+ _kdc_pk_free_client_param(context, pkp);
+
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s", e_text);
+ pkp = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ client_cert = strdup("anonymous client client");
+ if (client_cert == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
}
+
found_pa = 1;
et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
found_pa = 1;
+ if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
+ ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "ENC-TS doesn't support anon");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
pa->padata_value.length,
&enc_data,
goto out;
}
}else if (config->require_preauth
+ || b->kdc_options.request_anonymous /* hack to force anon */
|| client->entry.flags.require_preauth
|| server->entry.flags.require_preauth) {
METHOD_DATA method_data;
* both info replies (we send 'info' first in the list).
* - If the client is 'modern', because it knows about 'new'
* enctype types, then only send the 'info2' reply.
+ *
+ * Before we send the full list of etype-info data, we pick
+ * the client key we would have used anyway below, just pick
+ * that instead.
*/
- /* XXX check ret */
- if (only_older_enctype_p(req))
+ if (older_enctype(ckey->key.keytype)) {
ret = get_pa_etype_info(context, config,
- &method_data, &client->entry,
- b->etype.val, b->etype.len);
- /* XXX check ret */
- ret = get_pa_etype_info2(context, config, &method_data,
- &client->entry, b->etype.val, b->etype.len);
-
+ &method_data, ckey);
+ if (ret) {
+ free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = get_pa_etype_info2(context, config,
+ &method_data, ckey);
+ if (ret) {
+ free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
+ goto out;
+ }
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(METHOD_DATA, buf, len, &method_data, &len, ret);
free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
goto out;
/*
- * Find the client key (for preauth ENC-TS verification and reply
- * encryption). Then the best encryption type for the KDC and
- * last the best session key that shared between the client and
- * KDC runtime enctypes.
+ * Selelct the best encryption type for the KDC with out regard to
+ * the client since the client never needs to read that data.
*/
- ret = _kdc_find_etype(context, client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len,
- &ckey, &cetype);
- if (ret) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0,
- "Client (%s) has no support for etypes", client_name);
- goto out;
- }
-
ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config,
server, server_name,
&setype, &skey);
git.samba.org / metze / heimdal / wip.git / commitdiff