-/*
+/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
handle SMBsessionsetup
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1998-2001
Copyright (C) Jim McDonough <jmcd@us.ibm.com> 2002
Copyright (C) Luke Howard 2003
Copyright (C) Volker Lendecke 2007
+ Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 2007
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
-
+
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
-
+
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
extern struct auth_context *negprot_global_auth_context;
-extern BOOL global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
-extern BOOL global_spnego_negotiated;
+extern bool global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
+extern bool global_spnego_negotiated;
extern enum protocol_types Protocol;
extern int max_send;
on a logon error possibly map the error to success if "map to guest"
is set approriately
*/
-static NTSTATUS do_map_to_guest(NTSTATUS status, auth_serversupplied_info **server_info,
+static NTSTATUS do_map_to_guest(NTSTATUS status,
+ auth_serversupplied_info **server_info,
const char *user, const char *domain)
{
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
- if ((lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_USER) ||
+ if ((lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_USER) ||
(lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD)) {
DEBUG(3,("No such user %s [%s] - using guest account\n",
user, domain));
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD)) {
if (lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD) {
- DEBUG(3,("Registered username %s for guest access\n",user));
+ DEBUG(3,("Registered username %s for guest access\n",
+ user));
status = make_server_info_guest(server_info);
}
}
Start the signing engine if needed. Don't fail signing here.
****************************************************************************/
-static void sessionsetup_start_signing_engine(const auth_serversupplied_info *server_info,
- const uint8 *inbuf)
+static void sessionsetup_start_signing_engine(
+ const auth_serversupplied_info *server_info,
+ const uint8 *inbuf)
{
if (!server_info->guest && !srv_signing_started()) {
/* We need to start the signing engine
* correct one. Subsequent packets will
* be correct.
*/
- srv_check_sign_mac((char *)inbuf, False);
+ srv_check_sign_mac((char *)inbuf, False);
}
}
}
/****************************************************************************
- Do a 'guest' logon, getting back the
+ Do a 'guest' logon, getting back the
****************************************************************************/
-static NTSTATUS check_guest_password(auth_serversupplied_info **server_info)
+static NTSTATUS check_guest_password(auth_serversupplied_info **server_info)
{
struct auth_context *auth_context;
auth_usersupplied_info *user_info = NULL;
-
+
NTSTATUS nt_status;
unsigned char chal[8];
DEBUG(3,("Got anonymous request\n"));
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status = make_auth_context_fixed(&auth_context, chal))) {
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status = make_auth_context_fixed(&auth_context,
+ chal))) {
return nt_status;
}
(auth_context->free)(&auth_context);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
-
- nt_status = auth_context->check_ntlm_password(auth_context, user_info, server_info);
+
+ nt_status = auth_context->check_ntlm_password(auth_context,
+ user_info,
+ server_info);
(auth_context->free)(&auth_context);
free_user_info(&user_info);
return nt_status;
Cerate a clock skew error blob for a Windows client.
****************************************************************************/
-static BOOL make_krb5_skew_error(DATA_BLOB *pblob_out)
+static bool make_krb5_skew_error(DATA_BLOB *pblob_out)
{
krb5_context context = NULL;
krb5_error_code kerr = 0;
krb5_data reply;
krb5_principal host_princ = NULL;
char *host_princ_s = NULL;
- BOOL ret = False;
+ bool ret = False;
*pblob_out = data_blob_null;
kerr = smb_krb5_parse_name(context, host_princ_s, &host_princ);
if (kerr) {
- DEBUG(10,("make_krb5_skew_error: smb_krb5_parse_name failed for name %s: Error %s\n",
+ DEBUG(10,("make_krb5_skew_error: smb_krb5_parse_name failed "
+ "for name %s: Error %s\n",
host_princ_s, error_message(kerr) ));
goto out;
}
-
- kerr = smb_krb5_mk_error(context, KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW, host_princ, &reply);
+
+ kerr = smb_krb5_mk_error(context, KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW,
+ host_princ, &reply);
if (kerr) {
- DEBUG(10,("make_krb5_skew_error: smb_krb5_mk_error failed: Error %s\n",
+ DEBUG(10,("make_krb5_skew_error: smb_krb5_mk_error "
+ "failed: Error %s\n",
error_message(kerr) ));
goto out;
}
struct smb_request *req,
DATA_BLOB *secblob,
uint16 vuid,
- BOOL *p_invalidate_vuid)
+ bool *p_invalidate_vuid)
{
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
DATA_BLOB ticket;
fstring netbios_domain_name;
struct passwd *pw;
fstring user;
- int sess_vuid;
- NTSTATUS ret;
+ int sess_vuid = req->vuid;
+ NTSTATUS ret = NT_STATUS_OK;
PAC_DATA *pac_data;
DATA_BLOB ap_rep, ap_rep_wrapped, response;
auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL;
uint8 tok_id[2];
DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob_null;
fstring real_username;
- BOOL map_domainuser_to_guest = False;
- BOOL username_was_mapped;
+ bool map_domainuser_to_guest = False;
+ bool username_was_mapped;
PAC_LOGON_INFO *logon_info = NULL;
ZERO_STRUCT(ticket);
return;
}
- ret = ads_verify_ticket(mem_ctx, lp_realm(), 0, &ticket,
- &client, &pac_data, &ap_rep,
+ ret = ads_verify_ticket(mem_ctx, lp_realm(), 0, &ticket,
+ &client, &pac_data, &ap_rep,
&session_key, True);
data_blob_free(&ticket);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
#if 0
- /* Experiment that failed. See "only happens with a KDC" comment below. */
+ /* Experiment that failed.
+ * See "only happens with a KDC" comment below. */
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(ret, NT_STATUS_TIME_DIFFERENCE_AT_DC)) {
/*
- * Windows in this case returns NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED
- * with a negTokenTarg blob containing an krb5_error struct ASN1 encoded
- * containing KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW. The client then fixes its
- * clock and continues rather than giving an error. JRA.
+ * Windows in this case returns
+ * NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED
+ * with a negTokenTarg blob containing an krb5_error
+ * struct ASN1 encoded containing KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW.
+ * The client then fixes its clock and continues rather
+ * than giving an error. JRA.
* -- Looks like this only happens with a KDC. JRA.
*/
- BOOL ok = make_krb5_skew_error(&ap_rep);
+ bool ok = make_krb5_skew_error(&ap_rep);
if (!ok) {
talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
- return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(
+ NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
}
- ap_rep_wrapped = spnego_gen_krb5_wrap(ap_rep, TOK_ID_KRB_ERROR);
- response = spnego_gen_auth_response(&ap_rep_wrapped, ret, OID_KERBEROS5_OLD);
- reply_sesssetup_blob(conn, inbuf, outbuf, response, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED);
+ ap_rep_wrapped = spnego_gen_krb5_wrap(ap_rep,
+ TOK_ID_KRB_ERROR);
+ response = spnego_gen_auth_response(&ap_rep_wrapped,
+ ret, OID_KERBEROS5_OLD);
+ reply_sesssetup_blob(conn, inbuf, outbuf, response,
+ NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED);
/*
- * In this one case we don't invalidate the intermediate vuid.
- * as we're expecting the client to re-use it for the next
- * sessionsetupX packet. JRA.
+ * In this one case we don't invalidate the
+ * intermediate vuid as we're expecting the client
+ * to re-use it for the next sessionsetupX packet. JRA.
*/
*p_invalidate_vuid = False;
ret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
}
#endif
- DEBUG(1,("Failed to verify incoming ticket with error %s!\n", nt_errstr(ret)));
+ DEBUG(1,("Failed to verify incoming ticket with error %s!\n",
+ nt_errstr(ret)));
talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(ret));
return;
domain = p+1;
if (logon_info && logon_info->info3.hdr_logon_dom.uni_str_len) {
-
- unistr2_to_ascii(netbios_domain_name, &logon_info->info3.uni_logon_dom, -1);
+ unistr2_to_ascii(netbios_domain_name,
+ &logon_info->info3.uni_logon_dom,
+ sizeof(netbios_domain_name));
domain = netbios_domain_name;
DEBUG(10, ("Mapped to [%s] (using PAC)\n", domain));
}
fstr_sprintf(user, "%s%c%s", domain, *lp_winbind_separator(), client);
-
+
/* lookup the passwd struct, create a new user if necessary */
username_was_mapped = map_username( user );
/* do this before an eventual mappign to guest occurs */
ret = smb_pam_accountcheck(pw->pw_name);
if ( !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
- DEBUG(1, ("PAM account restriction prevents user login\n"));
+ DEBUG(1,("PAM account restriction "
+ "prevents user login\n"));
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
data_blob_free(&session_key);
TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
if (!pw) {
/* this was originally the behavior of Samba 2.2, if a user
- did not have a local uid but has been authenticated, then
+ did not have a local uid but has been authenticated, then
map them to a guest account */
- if (lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_UID){
+ if (lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_UID){
map_domainuser_to_guest = True;
fstrcpy(user,lp_guestaccount());
pw = smb_getpwnam( mem_ctx, user, real_username, True );
- }
+ }
/* extra sanity check that the guest account is valid */
if ( !pw ) {
- DEBUG(1,("Username %s is invalid on this system\n", user));
+ DEBUG(1,("Username %s is invalid on this system\n",
+ user));
SAFE_FREE(client);
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
data_blob_free(&session_key);
}
/* setup the string used by %U */
-
+
sub_set_smb_name( real_username );
reload_services(True);
if ( map_domainuser_to_guest ) {
make_server_info_guest(&server_info);
} else if (logon_info) {
- /* pass the unmapped username here since map_username()
+ /* pass the unmapped username here since map_username()
will be called again from inside make_server_info_info3() */
-
- ret = make_server_info_info3(mem_ctx, client, domain,
+
+ ret = make_server_info_info3(mem_ctx, client, domain,
&server_info, &logon_info->info3);
if ( !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret) ) {
DEBUG(1,("make_server_info_info3 failed: %s!\n",
* %D. */
if (server_info->sam_account != NULL) {
- pdb_set_domain(server_info->sam_account, domain, PDB_SET);
+ pdb_set_domain(server_info->sam_account,
+ domain, PDB_SET);
}
}
server_info->was_mapped |= username_was_mapped;
-
+
/* we need to build the token for the user. make_server_info_guest()
already does this */
-
+
if ( !server_info->ptok ) {
ret = create_local_token( server_info );
if ( !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret) ) {
}
}
- /* register_vuid keeps the server info */
- /* register_vuid takes ownership of session_key, no need to free after this.
- A better interface would copy it.... */
- sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nullblob, client);
+ /* register_existing_vuid keeps the server info */
+ /* register_existing_vuid takes ownership of session_key on success,
+ * no need to free after this on success. A better interface would copy
+ * it.... */
+
+ if (!is_partial_auth_vuid(sess_vuid)) {
+ sess_vuid = register_initial_vuid();
+ }
+ sess_vuid = register_existing_vuid(sess_vuid,
+ server_info,
+ session_key,
+ nullblob,
+ client);
SAFE_FREE(client);
reply_outbuf(req, 4, 0);
- SSVAL(req->outbuf,smb_uid,vuid);
+ SSVAL(req->outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
if (sess_vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID ) {
ret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
} else {
/* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */
reload_services( True );
SSVAL(req->outbuf, smb_vwv3, 0);
-
+
if (server_info->guest) {
SSVAL(req->outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
}
-
+
SSVAL(req->outbuf, smb_uid, sess_vuid);
sessionsetup_start_signing_engine(server_info, req->inbuf);
+ /* Successful logon. Keep this vuid. */
+ *p_invalidate_vuid = False;
}
/* wrap that up in a nice GSS-API wrapping */
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
- ap_rep_wrapped = spnego_gen_krb5_wrap(ap_rep, TOK_ID_KRB_AP_REP);
+ ap_rep_wrapped = spnego_gen_krb5_wrap(ap_rep,
+ TOK_ID_KRB_AP_REP);
} else {
ap_rep_wrapped = data_blob_null;
}
- response = spnego_gen_auth_response(&ap_rep_wrapped, ret, OID_KERBEROS5_OLD);
+ response = spnego_gen_auth_response(&ap_rep_wrapped, ret,
+ OID_KERBEROS5_OLD);
reply_sesssetup_blob(conn, req, response, ret);
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
uint16 vuid,
AUTH_NTLMSSP_STATE **auth_ntlmssp_state,
DATA_BLOB *ntlmssp_blob, NTSTATUS nt_status,
- BOOL wrap)
+ bool wrap)
{
DATA_BLOB response;
struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL;
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
server_info = (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->server_info;
} else {
- nt_status = do_map_to_guest(nt_status,
- &server_info,
- (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->user,
- (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->domain);
+ nt_status = do_map_to_guest(nt_status,
+ &server_info,
+ (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->user,
+ (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->domain);
}
reply_outbuf(req, 4, 0);
SSVAL(req->outbuf, smb_uid, vuid);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
- int sess_vuid;
DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob_null;
- DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob((*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->session_key.data, (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->session_key.length);
+ DATA_BLOB session_key =
+ data_blob(
+ (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->session_key.data,
+ (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->session_key.length);
+
+ if (!is_partial_auth_vuid(vuid)) {
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
+ nt_status = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* register_existing_vuid keeps the server info */
+ if (register_existing_vuid(vuid,
+ server_info,
+ session_key, nullblob,
+ (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->user) !=
+ vuid) {
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
+ nt_status = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+ goto out;
+ }
- /* register_vuid keeps the server info */
- sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nullblob, (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->user);
(*auth_ntlmssp_state)->server_info = NULL;
- if (sess_vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID ) {
- nt_status = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
- } else {
-
- /* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */
- reload_services( True );
-
- SSVAL(req->outbuf, smb_vwv3, 0);
-
- if (server_info->guest) {
- SSVAL(req->outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
- }
-
- SSVAL(req->outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
+ /* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */
+ reload_services( True );
- sessionsetup_start_signing_engine(server_info, req->inbuf);
+ SSVAL(req->outbuf, smb_vwv3, 0);
+
+ if (server_info->guest) {
+ SSVAL(req->outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
}
+
+ sessionsetup_start_signing_engine(server_info,
+ (uint8 *)req->inbuf);
}
+ out:
+
if (wrap) {
- response = spnego_gen_auth_response(ntlmssp_blob, nt_status, OID_NTLMSSP);
+ response = spnego_gen_auth_response(ntlmssp_blob,
+ nt_status, OID_NTLMSSP);
} else {
response = *ntlmssp_blob;
}
if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
/* NB. This is *NOT* an error case. JRA */
auth_ntlmssp_end(auth_ntlmssp_state);
- /* Kill the intermediate vuid */
- invalidate_vuid(vuid);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ /* Kill the intermediate vuid */
+ invalidate_vuid(vuid);
+ }
}
}
Is this a krb5 mechanism ?
****************************************************************************/
-NTSTATUS parse_spnego_mechanisms(DATA_BLOB blob_in, DATA_BLOB *pblob_out, BOOL *p_is_krb5)
+NTSTATUS parse_spnego_mechanisms(DATA_BLOB blob_in, DATA_BLOB *pblob_out,
+ bool *p_is_krb5)
{
char *OIDs[ASN1_MAX_OIDS];
int i;
}
/* only look at the first OID for determining the mechToken --
- accoirding to RFC2478, we should choose the one we want
- and renegotiate, but i smell a client bug here..
-
- Problem observed when connecting to a member (samba box)
- of an AD domain as a user in a Samba domain. Samba member
- server sent back krb5/mskrb5/ntlmssp as mechtypes, but the
- client (2ksp3) replied with ntlmssp/mskrb5/krb5 and an
+ according to RFC2478, we should choose the one we want
+ and renegotiate, but i smell a client bug here..
+
+ Problem observed when connecting to a member (samba box)
+ of an AD domain as a user in a Samba domain. Samba member
+ server sent back krb5/mskrb5/ntlmssp as mechtypes, but the
+ client (2ksp3) replied with ntlmssp/mskrb5/krb5 and an
NTLMSSP mechtoken. --jerry */
-#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
+#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
if (strcmp(OID_KERBEROS5, OIDs[0]) == 0 ||
strcmp(OID_KERBEROS5_OLD, OIDs[0]) == 0) {
*p_is_krb5 = True;
}
#endif
-
+
for (i=0;OIDs[i];i++) {
DEBUG(5,("parse_spnego_mechanisms: Got OID %s\n", OIDs[i]));
free(OIDs[i]);
{
DATA_BLOB secblob;
DATA_BLOB chal;
- BOOL got_kerberos_mechanism = False;
+ bool got_kerberos_mechanism = False;
NTSTATUS status;
- status = parse_spnego_mechanisms(blob1, &secblob, &got_kerberos_mechanism);
+ status = parse_spnego_mechanisms(blob1, &secblob,
+ &got_kerberos_mechanism);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(vuid);
return;
}
- DEBUG(3,("reply_spnego_negotiate: Got secblob of size %lu\n", (unsigned long)secblob.length));
+ DEBUG(3,("reply_spnego_negotiate: Got secblob of size %lu\n",
+ (unsigned long)secblob.length));
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
- if ( got_kerberos_mechanism && ((lp_security()==SEC_ADS) || lp_use_kerberos_keytab()) ) {
- BOOL destroy_vuid = True;
+ if ( got_kerberos_mechanism && ((lp_security()==SEC_ADS) ||
+ lp_use_kerberos_keytab()) ) {
+ bool destroy_vuid = True;
reply_spnego_kerberos(conn, req, &secblob, vuid,
&destroy_vuid);
data_blob_free(&secblob);
return;
}
- status = auth_ntlmssp_update(*auth_ntlmssp_state,
+ status = auth_ntlmssp_update(*auth_ntlmssp_state,
secblob, &chal);
data_blob_free(&secblob);
if (auth.data[0] == ASN1_APPLICATION(0)) {
/* Might be a second negTokenTarg packet */
- BOOL got_krb5_mechanism = False;
- status = parse_spnego_mechanisms(auth, &secblob, &got_krb5_mechanism);
+ bool got_krb5_mechanism = False;
+ status = parse_spnego_mechanisms(auth, &secblob,
+ &got_krb5_mechanism);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- DEBUG(3,("reply_spnego_auth: Got secblob of size %lu\n", (unsigned long)secblob.length));
+ DEBUG(3,("reply_spnego_auth: Got secblob of size %lu\n",
+ (unsigned long)secblob.length));
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
- if ( got_krb5_mechanism && ((lp_security()==SEC_ADS) || lp_use_kerberos_keytab()) ) {
- BOOL destroy_vuid = True;
+ if ( got_krb5_mechanism && ((lp_security()==SEC_ADS) ||
+ lp_use_kerberos_keytab()) ) {
+ bool destroy_vuid = True;
reply_spnego_kerberos(conn, req, &secblob,
vuid, &destroy_vuid);
data_blob_free(&secblob);
/* If we get here it wasn't a negTokenTarg auth packet. */
data_blob_free(&secblob);
-
+
if (!*auth_ntlmssp_state) {
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(vuid);
NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
return;
}
-
- status = auth_ntlmssp_update(*auth_ntlmssp_state,
+
+ status = auth_ntlmssp_update(*auth_ntlmssp_state,
auth, &auth_reply);
data_blob_free(&auth);
reply_spnego_ntlmssp(conn, req, vuid,
auth_ntlmssp_state,
&auth_reply, status, True);
-
+
data_blob_free(&auth_reply);
/* and tell smbd that we have already replied to this packet */
}
/****************************************************************************
- Check the size of an SPNEGO blob. If we need more return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED,
- else return NT_STATUS_OK. Don't allow the blob to be more than 64k.
+ Check the size of an SPNEGO blob. If we need more return
+ NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED, else return NT_STATUS_OK. Don't allow
+ the blob to be more than 64k.
****************************************************************************/
-static NTSTATUS check_spnego_blob_complete(uint16 smbpid, uint16 vuid, DATA_BLOB *pblob)
+static NTSTATUS check_spnego_blob_complete(uint16 smbpid, uint16 vuid,
+ DATA_BLOB *pblob)
{
struct pending_auth_data *pad = NULL;
ASN1_DATA data;
/* Integer wrap paranoia.... */
- if (pad->partial_data.length + copy_len < pad->partial_data.length ||
+ if (pad->partial_data.length + copy_len <
+ pad->partial_data.length ||
pad->partial_data.length + copy_len < copy_len) {
DEBUG(2,("check_spnego_blob_complete: integer wrap "
/* Refuse the blob if it's bigger than 64k. */
if (needed_len > 65536) {
- DEBUG(2,("check_spnego_blob_complete: needed_len too large (%u)\n",
+ DEBUG(2,("check_spnego_blob_complete: needed_len "
+ "too large (%u)\n",
(unsigned int)needed_len ));
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
}
}
-
+
p = (uint8 *)smb_buf(req->inbuf);
if (data_blob_len == 0) {
sizeof(native_lanman), STR_TERMINATE);
p2 += srvstr_pull_buf(req->inbuf, smb_flag2, primary_domain, p2,
sizeof(primary_domain), STR_TERMINATE);
- DEBUG(3,("NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s] PrimaryDomain=[%s]\n",
+ DEBUG(3,("NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s] PrimaryDomain=[%s]\n",
native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain));
if ( ra_type == RA_WIN2K ) {
if ( !strlen(native_os) && !strlen(native_lanman) )
set_remote_arch(RA_VISTA);
-
- /* Windows 2003 doesn't set the native lanman string,
+
+ /* Windows 2003 doesn't set the native lanman string,
but does set primary domain which is a bug I think */
-
+
if ( !strlen(native_lanman) ) {
ra_lanman_string( primary_domain );
} else {
ra_lanman_string( native_lanman );
}
}
-
- vuser = get_partial_auth_user_struct(vuid);
- if (!vuser) {
+
+ /* Did we get a valid vuid ? */
+ if (!is_partial_auth_vuid(vuid)) {
+ /* No, then try and see if this is an intermediate sessionsetup
+ * for a large SPNEGO packet. */
struct pending_auth_data *pad = get_pending_auth_data(smbpid);
if (pad) {
- DEBUG(10,("reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego: found pending vuid %u\n",
+ DEBUG(10,("reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego: found "
+ "pending vuid %u\n",
(unsigned int)pad->vuid ));
vuid = pad->vuid;
- vuser = get_partial_auth_user_struct(vuid);
}
}
- if (!vuser) {
- vuid = register_vuid(NULL, data_blob_null, data_blob_null, NULL);
- if (vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID ) {
+ /* Do we have a valid vuid now ? */
+ if (!is_partial_auth_vuid(vuid)) {
+ /* No, start a new authentication setup. */
+ vuid = register_initial_vuid();
+ if (vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID) {
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
return;
}
-
- vuser = get_partial_auth_user_struct(vuid);
}
+ vuser = get_partial_auth_user_struct(vuid);
+ /* This MUST be valid. */
if (!vuser) {
- data_blob_free(&blob1);
- reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
- NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
- return;
+ smb_panic("reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego: invalid vuid.");
}
-
+
/* Large (greater than 4k) SPNEGO blobs are split into multiple
* sessionsetup requests as the Windows limit on the security blob
* field is 4k. Bug #4400. JRA.
status = check_spnego_blob_complete(smbpid, vuid, &blob1);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
+ if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status,
+ NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
/* Real error - kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(vuid);
}
status = auth_ntlmssp_update(vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state,
blob1, &chal);
-
+
data_blob_free(&blob1);
-
+
reply_spnego_ntlmssp(conn, req, vuid,
&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state,
&chal, status, False);
static void setup_new_vc_session(void)
{
- DEBUG(2,("setup_new_vc_session: New VC == 0, if NT4.x compatible we would close all old resources.\n"));
+ char addr[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+
+ DEBUG(2,("setup_new_vc_session: New VC == 0, if NT4.x "
+ "compatible we would close all old resources.\n"));
#if 0
conn_close_all();
invalidate_all_vuids();
#endif
if (lp_reset_on_zero_vc()) {
- connections_forall(shutdown_other_smbds, client_addr());
+ connections_forall(shutdown_other_smbds,
+ CONST_DISCARD(void *,
+ client_addr(get_client_fd(),addr,sizeof(addr))));
}
}
void reply_sesssetup_and_X(connection_struct *conn, struct smb_request *req)
{
int sess_vuid;
- int smb_bufsize;
+ int smb_bufsize;
DATA_BLOB lm_resp;
DATA_BLOB nt_resp;
DATA_BLOB plaintext_password;
fstring native_os;
fstring native_lanman;
fstring primary_domain;
- static BOOL done_sesssetup = False;
+ static bool done_sesssetup = False;
auth_usersupplied_info *user_info = NULL;
auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL;
uint16 smb_flag2 = req->flags2;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
- BOOL doencrypt = global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
+ bool doencrypt = global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
DATA_BLOB session_key;
-
-
START_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
ZERO_STRUCT(lm_resp);
"negotiated.\n"));
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
+ END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
}
reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego(conn, req);
-
+ END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
if (Protocol < PROTOCOL_NT1) {
uint16 passlen1 = SVAL(req->inbuf,smb_vwv7);
- /* Never do NT status codes with protocols before NT1 as we don't get client caps. */
+ /* Never do NT status codes with protocols before NT1 as we
+ * don't get client caps. */
remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
if ((passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN)
smb_buf(req->inbuf)))) {
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
+ END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
char *p = smb_buf(req->inbuf);
char *save_p = smb_buf(req->inbuf);
uint16 byte_count;
-
+
if(global_client_caps == 0) {
global_client_caps = IVAL(req->inbuf,smb_vwv11);
-
+
if (!(global_client_caps & CAP_STATUS32)) {
- remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
+ remove_from_common_flags2(
+ FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
}
- /* client_caps is used as final determination if client is NT or Win95.
- This is needed to return the correct error codes in some
- circumstances.
+ /* client_caps is used as final determination if
+ * client is NT or Win95. This is needed to return
+ * the correct error codes in some circumstances.
*/
-
- if(ra_type == RA_WINNT || ra_type == RA_WIN2K || ra_type == RA_WIN95) {
- if(!(global_client_caps & (CAP_NT_SMBS | CAP_STATUS32))) {
+
+ if(ra_type == RA_WINNT || ra_type == RA_WIN2K ||
+ ra_type == RA_WIN95) {
+ if(!(global_client_caps & (CAP_NT_SMBS|
+ CAP_STATUS32))) {
set_remote_arch( RA_WIN95);
}
}
}
if (!doencrypt) {
- /* both Win95 and WinNT stuff up the password lengths for
- non-encrypting systems. Uggh.
-
- if passlen1==24 its a win95 system, and its setting the
- password length incorrectly. Luckily it still works with the
- default code because Win95 will null terminate the password
- anyway
-
- if passlen1>0 and passlen2>0 then maybe its a NT box and its
- setting passlen2 to some random value which really stuffs
- things up. we need to fix that one. */
-
- if (passlen1 > 0 && passlen2 > 0 && passlen2 != 24 && passlen2 != 1)
+ /* both Win95 and WinNT stuff up the password
+ * lengths for non-encrypting systems. Uggh.
+
+ if passlen1==24 its a win95 system, and its setting
+ the password length incorrectly. Luckily it still
+ works with the default code because Win95 will null
+ terminate the password anyway
+
+ if passlen1>0 and passlen2>0 then maybe its a NT box
+ and its setting passlen2 to some random value which
+ really stuffs things up. we need to fix that one. */
+
+ if (passlen1 > 0 && passlen2 > 0 && passlen2 != 24 &&
+ passlen2 != 1) {
passlen2 = 0;
+ }
}
-
+
/* check for nasty tricks */
if (passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN
|| passlen1 > smb_bufrem(req->inbuf, p)) {
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
+ END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
|| passlen2 > smb_bufrem(req->inbuf, p+passlen1)) {
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
+ END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
/* Save the lanman2 password and the NT md4 password. */
-
+
if ((doencrypt) && (passlen1 != 0) && (passlen1 != 24)) {
doencrypt = False;
}
lm_resp = data_blob(p, passlen1);
nt_resp = data_blob(p+passlen1, passlen2);
} else {
- pstring pass;
- BOOL unic= smb_flag2 & FLAGS2_UNICODE_STRINGS;
-
-#if 0
- /* This was the previous fix. Not sure if it's still valid. JRA. */
- if ((ra_type == RA_WINNT) && (passlen2 == 0) && unic && passlen1) {
- /* NT4.0 stuffs up plaintext unicode password lengths... */
- srvstr_pull(inbuf, pass, smb_buf(inbuf) + 1,
- sizeof(pass), passlen1, STR_TERMINATE);
-#endif
+ char *pass = NULL;
+ bool unic= smb_flag2 & FLAGS2_UNICODE_STRINGS;
if (unic && (passlen2 == 0) && passlen1) {
/* Only a ascii plaintext password was sent. */
- srvstr_pull(req->inbuf, req->flags2, pass,
- smb_buf(req->inbuf), sizeof(pass),
- passlen1, STR_TERMINATE|STR_ASCII);
+ (void)srvstr_pull_talloc(talloc_tos(),
+ req->inbuf,
+ req->flags2,
+ &pass,
+ smb_buf(req->inbuf),
+ passlen1,
+ STR_TERMINATE|STR_ASCII);
} else {
- srvstr_pull(req->inbuf, req->flags2, pass,
- smb_buf(req->inbuf), sizeof(pass),
- unic ? passlen2 : passlen1,
- STR_TERMINATE);
+ (void)srvstr_pull_talloc(talloc_tos(),
+ req->inbuf,
+ req->flags2,
+ &pass,
+ smb_buf(req->inbuf),
+ unic ? passlen2 : passlen1,
+ STR_TERMINATE);
+ }
+ if (!pass) {
+ reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
+ NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
+ END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
+ return;
}
plaintext_password = data_blob(pass, strlen(pass)+1);
}
-
+
p += passlen1 + passlen2;
p += srvstr_pull_buf(req->inbuf, req->flags2, user, p,
sizeof(user), STR_TERMINATE);
native_lanman, p, sizeof(native_lanman),
STR_TERMINATE);
- /* not documented or decoded by Ethereal but there is one more string
- in the extra bytes which is the same as the PrimaryDomain when using
- extended security. Windows NT 4 and 2003 use this string to store
- the native lanman string. Windows 9x does not include a string here
- at all so we have to check if we have any extra bytes left */
-
+ /* not documented or decoded by Ethereal but there is one more
+ * string in the extra bytes which is the same as the
+ * PrimaryDomain when using extended security. Windows NT 4
+ * and 2003 use this string to store the native lanman string.
+ * Windows 9x does not include a string here at all so we have
+ * to check if we have any extra bytes left */
+
byte_count = SVAL(req->inbuf, smb_vwv13);
- if ( PTR_DIFF(p, save_p) < byte_count)
+ if ( PTR_DIFF(p, save_p) < byte_count) {
p += srvstr_pull_buf(req->inbuf, req->flags2,
primary_domain, p,
sizeof(primary_domain),
STR_TERMINATE);
- else
+ } else {
fstrcpy( primary_domain, "null" );
+ }
- DEBUG(3,("Domain=[%s] NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s] PrimaryDomain=[%s]\n",
- domain, native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain));
+ DEBUG(3,("Domain=[%s] NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s] "
+ "PrimaryDomain=[%s]\n",
+ domain, native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain));
if ( ra_type == RA_WIN2K ) {
if ( strlen(native_lanman) == 0 )
setup_new_vc_session();
}
- DEBUG(3,("sesssetupX:name=[%s]\\[%s]@[%s]\n", domain, user, get_remote_machine_name()));
+ DEBUG(3,("sesssetupX:name=[%s]\\[%s]@[%s]\n",
+ domain, user, get_remote_machine_name()));
if (*user) {
if (global_spnego_negotiated) {
-
- /* This has to be here, because this is a perfectly valid behaviour for guest logons :-( */
-
- DEBUG(0,("reply_sesssetup_and_X: Rejecting attempt at 'normal' session setup after negotiating spnego.\n"));
+
+ /* This has to be here, because this is a perfectly
+ * valid behaviour for guest logons :-( */
+
+ DEBUG(0,("reply_sesssetup_and_X: Rejecting attempt "
+ "at 'normal' session setup after "
+ "negotiating spnego.\n"));
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
+ END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
fstrcpy(sub_user, user);
sub_set_smb_name(sub_user);
reload_services(True);
-
+
if (lp_security() == SEC_SHARE) {
/* in share level we should ignore any passwords */
/* Then force it to null for the benfit of the code below */
*user = 0;
}
-
+
if (!*user) {
nt_status = check_guest_password(&server_info);
} else if (doencrypt) {
if (!negprot_global_auth_context) {
- DEBUG(0, ("reply_sesssetup_and_X: Attempted encrypted session setup without negprot denied!\n"));
+ DEBUG(0, ("reply_sesssetup_and_X: Attempted encrypted "
+ "session setup without negprot denied!\n"));
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
+ END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
- nt_status = make_user_info_for_reply_enc(&user_info, user, domain,
- lm_resp, nt_resp);
+ nt_status = make_user_info_for_reply_enc(&user_info, user,
+ domain,
+ lm_resp, nt_resp);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
- nt_status = negprot_global_auth_context->check_ntlm_password(negprot_global_auth_context,
- user_info,
- &server_info);
+ nt_status = negprot_global_auth_context->check_ntlm_password(
+ negprot_global_auth_context,
+ user_info,
+ &server_info);
}
} else {
struct auth_context *plaintext_auth_context = NULL;
const uint8 *chal;
- nt_status = make_auth_context_subsystem(&plaintext_auth_context);
+ nt_status = make_auth_context_subsystem(
+ &plaintext_auth_context);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
- chal = plaintext_auth_context->get_ntlm_challenge(plaintext_auth_context);
-
- if (!make_user_info_for_reply(&user_info,
+ chal = plaintext_auth_context->get_ntlm_challenge(
+ plaintext_auth_context);
+
+ if (!make_user_info_for_reply(&user_info,
user, domain, chal,
plaintext_password)) {
nt_status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
-
+
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
- nt_status = plaintext_auth_context->check_ntlm_password(plaintext_auth_context,
- user_info,
- &server_info);
-
- (plaintext_auth_context->free)(&plaintext_auth_context);
+ nt_status = plaintext_auth_context->check_ntlm_password(
+ plaintext_auth_context,
+ user_info,
+ &server_info);
+
+ (plaintext_auth_context->free)(
+ &plaintext_auth_context);
}
}
}
free_user_info(&user_info);
-
+
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
- nt_status = do_map_to_guest(nt_status, &server_info, user, domain);
+ nt_status = do_map_to_guest(nt_status, &server_info,
+ user, domain);
}
-
+
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(nt_status));
+ END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
- /* Ensure we can't possible take a code path leading to a null defref. */
+ /* Ensure we can't possible take a code path leading to a
+ * null defref. */
if (!server_info) {
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
+ END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(nt_status));
+ END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
if (server_info->user_session_key.data) {
- session_key = data_blob(server_info->user_session_key.data, server_info->user_session_key.length);
+ session_key = data_blob(server_info->user_session_key.data,
+ server_info->user_session_key.length);
} else {
session_key = data_blob_null;
}
data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
-
+
/* it's ok - setup a reply */
reply_outbuf(req, 3, 0);
if (Protocol >= PROTOCOL_NT1) {
push_signature(&req->outbuf);
/* perhaps grab OS version here?? */
}
-
+
if (server_info->guest) {
SSVAL(req->outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
}
data_blob_free(&session_key);
TALLOC_FREE(server_info);
} else {
- /* register_vuid keeps the server info */
- sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key,
- nt_resp.data ? nt_resp : lm_resp,
- sub_user);
+ /* Ignore the initial vuid. */
+ sess_vuid = register_initial_vuid();
+ if (sess_vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID) {
+ data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
+ data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
+ reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
+ NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
+ END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
+ return;
+ }
+ /* register_existing_vuid keeps the server info */
+ sess_vuid = register_existing_vuid(sess_vuid,
+ server_info,
+ session_key,
+ nt_resp.data ? nt_resp : lm_resp,
+ sub_user);
if (sess_vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID) {
data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
+ END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
-
+
SSVAL(req->outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
SSVAL(req->inbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
-
+
if (!done_sesssetup)
max_send = MIN(max_send,smb_bufsize);
-
+
done_sesssetup = True;
-
+
END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
- chain_reply_new(req);
+ chain_reply(req);
return;
}
git.samba.org / samba.git / blobdiff