2 * Copyright (c) 1997-2007 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
3 * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
17 * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
18 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
19 * without specific prior written permission.
21 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
22 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
23 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
24 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
25 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
26 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
27 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
28 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
29 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
30 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
37 #if SIZEOF_TIME_T == 4
38 #define MAX_TIME ((time_t)INT32_MAX)
39 #elif SIZEOF_TIME_T == 8
40 #define MAX_TIME ((time_t)INT64_MAX)
42 #error "Unexpected sizeof(time_t)"
46 #if SIZEOF_TIME_T == 4
47 #define MAX_TIME ((time_t)UINT32_MAX)
49 #define MAX_TIME ((time_t)UINT64_MAX)
54 #define __attribute__(X)
57 _kdc_fix_time(time_t **t)
63 if(**t == 0) **t = MAX_TIME; /* fix for old clients */
67 realloc_method_data(METHOD_DATA *md)
70 pa = realloc(md->val, (md->len + 1) * sizeof(*md->val));
78 static krb5_error_code
79 get_pa_etype_info2(krb5_context context,
80 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
81 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey,
82 krb5_boolean include_salt);
84 static krb5_error_code
85 set_salt_padata(krb5_context context,
86 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
87 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *key)
92 return get_pa_etype_info2(context, config, md, key, TRUE);
96 _kdc_find_padata(const KDC_REQ *req, int *start, int type)
98 if (req->padata == NULL)
101 while((size_t)*start < req->padata->len){
103 if(req->padata->val[*start - 1].padata_type == (unsigned)type)
104 return &req->padata->val[*start - 1];
110 * This is a hack to allow predefined weak services, like afs to
111 * still use weak types
115 _kdc_is_weak_exception(krb5_principal principal, krb5_enctype etype)
117 if (principal->name.name_string.len > 0 &&
118 strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "afs") == 0 &&
119 (etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
120 || etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4
121 || etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5))
128 * Detect if `key' is the using the the precomputed `default_salt'.
132 is_default_salt_p(const krb5_salt *default_salt, const Key *key)
134 if (key->salt == NULL)
136 if (default_salt->salttype != key->salt->type)
138 if (krb5_data_cmp(&default_salt->saltvalue, &key->salt->salt) != 0)
144 * Detect if `key' is the using the the precomputed `default_salt'
145 * (for des-cbc-crc) or any salt otherwise.
147 * This is for avoiding Kerberos v4 (yes really) keys in AS-REQ as
148 * that salt is strange, and a buggy client will try to use the
149 * principal as the salt and not the returned value.
153 is_good_salt_p(const krb5_salt *default_salt, const Key *key)
155 if (key->key.keytype == KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC)
156 return is_default_salt_p(default_salt, key);
162 _kdc_is_anon_request(const KDC_REQ *req)
164 const KDC_REQ_BODY *b = &req->req_body;
167 * Versions of Heimdal from 0.9rc1 through 1.50 use bit 14 instead
168 * of 16 for request_anonymous, as indicated in the anonymous draft
169 * prior to version 11. Bit 14 is assigned to S4U2Proxy, but S4U2Proxy
170 * requests are only sent to the TGS and, in any case, would have an
171 * additional ticket present.
173 return b->kdc_options.request_anonymous ||
174 (b->kdc_options.cname_in_addl_tkt && !b->additional_tickets);
178 * return the first appropriate key of `princ' in `ret_key'. Look for
179 * all the etypes in (`etypes', `len'), stopping as soon as we find
180 * one, but preferring one that has default salt.
182 * XXX This function does way way too much. Split it up!
184 * XXX `etypes' and `len' are always `b->etype.val' and `b->etype.len' -- the
185 * etype list from the KDC-REQ-BODY, which is available here as
186 * `r->req->req_body', so we could just stop having it passed in.
188 * XXX Picking an enctype(s) for PA-ETYPE-INFO* is rather different than
189 * picking an enctype for a ticket's session key. The former is what we do
190 * here when `(flags & KFE_IS_PREAUTH)', the latter otherwise.
194 _kdc_find_etype(astgs_request_t r, uint32_t flags,
195 krb5_enctype *etypes, unsigned len,
196 krb5_enctype *ret_enctype, Key **ret_key,
197 krb5_boolean *ret_default_salt)
199 krb5_boolean use_strongest_session_key;
200 krb5_boolean is_preauth = flags & KFE_IS_PREAUTH;
201 krb5_boolean is_tgs = flags & KFE_IS_TGS;
203 krb5_principal request_princ;
206 krb5_enctype enctype = ETYPE_NULL;
207 const krb5_enctype *p;
211 if (is_preauth && (flags & KFE_USE_CLIENT) &&
212 r->client->flags.synthetic)
213 return KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
215 if ((flags & KFE_USE_CLIENT) && !r->client->flags.synthetic) {
217 request_princ = r->client_princ;
220 request_princ = r->server->principal;
223 use_strongest_session_key =
224 is_preauth ? r->config->preauth_use_strongest_session_key
225 : (is_tgs ? r->config->tgt_use_strongest_session_key :
226 r->config->svc_use_strongest_session_key);
228 /* We'll want to avoid keys with v4 salted keys in the pre-auth case... */
229 ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(r->context, request_princ, &def_salt);
233 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
236 * Pick an enctype that is in the intersection of:
238 * - permitted_enctypes (local policy)
239 * - requested enctypes (KDC-REQ-BODY's etype list)
240 * - the client's long-term keys' enctypes
242 * the server's configured etype list
244 * There are two sub-cases:
246 * - use local enctype preference (local policy)
247 * - use the client's preference list
250 if (use_strongest_session_key) {
252 * Pick the strongest key that the KDC, target service, and
253 * client all support, using the local cryptosystem enctype
254 * list in strongest-to-weakest order to drive the search.
256 * This is not what RFC4120 says to do, but it encourages
257 * adoption of stronger enctypes. This doesn't play well with
258 * clients that have multiple Kerberos client implementations
259 * with different supported enctype lists sharing the same ccache.
262 /* drive the search with local supported enctypes list */
263 p = krb5_kerberos_enctypes(r->context);
265 p[i] != ETYPE_NULL && enctype == ETYPE_NULL;
267 if (krb5_enctype_valid(r->context, p[i]) != 0 &&
268 !_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->principal, p[i]))
271 /* check that the client supports it too */
272 for (k = 0; k < len && enctype == ETYPE_NULL; k++) {
274 if (p[i] != etypes[k])
277 if (!is_preauth && (flags & KFE_USE_CLIENT)) {
279 * It suffices that the client says it supports this
280 * enctype in its KDC-REQ-BODY's etype list, which is what
288 /* check target princ support */
290 if (!is_preauth && !(flags & KFE_USE_CLIENT) && princ->etypes) {
292 * Use the etypes list from the server's HDB entry instead
293 * of deriving it from its long-term keys. This allows an
294 * entry to have just one long-term key but record support
295 * for multiple enctypes.
297 for (m = 0; m < princ->etypes->len; m++) {
298 if (p[i] == princ->etypes->val[m]) {
306 * Use the entry's long-term keys as the source of its
307 * supported enctypes, either because we're making
308 * PA-ETYPE-INFO* or because we're selecting a session key
311 while (hdb_next_enctype2key(r->context, princ, NULL,
313 if (key->key.keyvalue.length == 0) {
314 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
319 if (is_preauth && ret_key != NULL &&
320 !is_good_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
328 * Pick the first key from the client's enctype list that is
329 * supported by the cryptosystem and by the given principal.
331 * RFC4120 says we SHOULD pick the first _strong_ key from the
332 * client's list... not the first key... If the admin disallows
333 * weak enctypes in krb5.conf and selects this key selection
334 * algorithm, then we get exactly what RFC4120 says.
336 for(i = 0; ret != 0 && i < len; i++) {
338 if (krb5_enctype_valid(r->context, etypes[i]) != 0 &&
339 !_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->principal, etypes[i]))
344 hdb_next_enctype2key(r->context, princ, NULL,
345 etypes[i], &key) == 0) {
346 if (key->key.keyvalue.length == 0) {
347 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
352 if (is_preauth && ret_key != NULL &&
353 !is_good_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
359 if (ret == 0 && enctype == ETYPE_NULL) {
361 * if the service principal is one for which there is a known 1DES
362 * exception and no other enctype matches both the client request and
363 * the service key list, provide a DES-CBC-CRC key.
365 if (ret_key == NULL &&
366 _kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->principal, ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC)) {
368 enctype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC;
370 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
375 if (ret_enctype != NULL)
376 *ret_enctype = enctype;
379 if (ret_default_salt != NULL)
380 *ret_default_salt = is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key);
383 krb5_free_salt (r->context, def_salt);
388 * The principal's session_etypes must be sorted in order of strength, with
389 * preferred etype first.
392 _kdc_find_session_etype(astgs_request_t r,
393 krb5_enctype *etypes, size_t len,
394 const hdb_entry *princ,
395 krb5_enctype *ret_enctype)
399 if (princ->session_etypes == NULL) {
400 /* The principal must have session etypes available. */
401 return KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
404 /* Loop over the client's specified etypes. */
405 for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
408 /* Check that the server also supports the etype. */
409 for (j = 0; j < princ->session_etypes->len; ++j) {
410 if (princ->session_etypes->val[j] == etypes[i]) {
411 *ret_enctype = etypes[i];
417 return KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
421 _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname (PrincipalName *pn)
423 pn->name_type = KRB5_NT_WELLKNOWN;
424 pn->name_string.len = 2;
425 pn->name_string.val = calloc(2, sizeof(*pn->name_string.val));
426 if (pn->name_string.val == NULL)
429 pn->name_string.val[0] = strdup(KRB5_WELLKNOWN_NAME);
430 if (pn->name_string.val[0] == NULL)
433 pn->name_string.val[1] = strdup(KRB5_ANON_NAME);
434 if (pn->name_string.val[1] == NULL)
440 free_PrincipalName(pn);
442 pn->name_type = KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN;
443 pn->name_string.len = 0;
444 pn->name_string.val = NULL;
450 _kdc_r_log(astgs_request_t r, int level, const char *fmt, ...)
451 __attribute__ ((__format__ (__printf__, 3, 4)))
456 s = kdc_log_msg_va(r->context, r->config, level, fmt, ap);
462 _kdc_set_const_e_text(astgs_request_t r, const char *e_text)
464 /* We should never see this */
466 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 1,
467 "trying to replace e-text \"%s\" with \"%s\"\n",
473 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 4, "%s", e_text);
477 _kdc_set_e_text(astgs_request_t r, const char *fmt, ...)
478 __attribute__ ((__format__ (__printf__, 2, 3)))
485 vasprintf_ret = vasprintf(&e_text, fmt, ap);
488 if (vasprintf_ret < 0 || !e_text) {
489 /* not much else to do... */
490 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 1,
491 "Could not set e_text: %s (out of memory)", fmt);
495 /* We should never see this */
497 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 1, "trying to replace e-text: %s\n",
504 r->e_text_buf = e_text;
505 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 4, "%s", e_text);
509 _kdc_log_timestamp(astgs_request_t r, const char *type,
510 KerberosTime authtime, KerberosTime *starttime,
511 KerberosTime endtime, KerberosTime *renew_till)
513 krb5_kdc_configuration *config = r->config;
514 char authtime_str[100], starttime_str[100],
515 endtime_str[100], renewtime_str[100];
518 kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, "auth", authtime);
519 if (starttime && *starttime)
520 kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, "start", *starttime);
522 kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, "end", endtime);
523 if (renew_till && *renew_till)
524 kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, "renew", *renew_till);
526 krb5_format_time(r->context, authtime,
527 authtime_str, sizeof(authtime_str), TRUE);
529 krb5_format_time(r->context, *starttime,
530 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
532 strlcpy(starttime_str, "unset", sizeof(starttime_str));
533 krb5_format_time(r->context, endtime,
534 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
536 krb5_format_time(r->context, *renew_till,
537 renewtime_str, sizeof(renewtime_str), TRUE);
539 strlcpy(renewtime_str, "unset", sizeof(renewtime_str));
541 kdc_log(r->context, config, 4,
542 "%s authtime: %s starttime: %s endtime: %s renew till: %s",
543 type, authtime_str, starttime_str, endtime_str, renewtime_str);
552 static krb5_error_code
553 pa_pkinit_validate(astgs_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
555 pk_client_params *pkp = NULL;
556 char *client_cert = NULL;
559 ret = _kdc_pk_rd_padata(r, pa, &pkp);
560 if (ret || pkp == NULL) {
561 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
562 _kdc_r_log(r, 4, "Failed to decode PKINIT PA-DATA -- %s",
567 ret = _kdc_pk_check_client(r, pkp, &client_cert);
569 kdc_audit_addkv((kdc_request_t)r, 0, KDC_REQUEST_KV_PKINIT_CLIENT_CERT,
572 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "PKINIT certificate not allowed to "
573 "impersonate principal");
574 kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
575 KDC_AUTH_EVENT_CLIENT_NAME_UNAUTHORIZED);
579 r->pa_endtime = _kdc_pk_endtime(pkp);
580 if (!r->client->flags.synthetic)
581 r->pa_max_life = _kdc_pk_max_life(pkp);
583 _kdc_r_log(r, 4, "PKINIT pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
584 r->cname, client_cert);
586 ret = _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(r, pkp);
588 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Failed to build PK-INIT reply");
591 ret = _kdc_add_initial_verified_cas(r->context, r->config,
594 kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
595 KDC_AUTH_EVENT_PREAUTH_SUCCEEDED);
599 _kdc_pk_free_client_param(r->context, pkp);
607 static krb5_error_code
608 pa_gss_validate(astgs_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
610 gss_client_params *gcp = NULL;
611 char *client_name = NULL;
615 ret = _kdc_gss_rd_padata(r, pa, &gcp, &open);
616 if (ret && gcp == NULL)
620 ret = _kdc_gss_check_client(r, gcp, &client_name);
622 kdc_audit_addkv((kdc_request_t)r, 0, KDC_REQUEST_KV_GSS_INITIATOR,
625 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "GSS-API client not allowed to "
626 "impersonate principal");
627 kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
628 KDC_AUTH_EVENT_CLIENT_NAME_UNAUTHORIZED);
632 r->pa_endtime = _kdc_gss_endtime(r, gcp);
634 _kdc_r_log(r, 4, "GSS pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
635 r->cname, client_name);
636 kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
637 KDC_AUTH_EVENT_PREAUTH_SUCCEEDED);
639 ret = _kdc_gss_mk_composite_name_ad(r, gcp);
641 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Failed to build GSS authorization data");
646 ret = _kdc_gss_mk_pa_reply(r, gcp);
648 if (ret != KRB5_KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED)
649 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Failed to build GSS pre-authentication reply");
653 ret = kdc_request_set_attribute((kdc_request_t)r,
654 HSTR("org.h5l.pa-gss-client-params"), gcp);
659 kdc_object_release(gcp);
665 static krb5_error_code
666 pa_gss_finalize_pac(astgs_request_t r)
668 gss_client_params *gcp;
670 gcp = kdc_request_get_attribute((kdc_request_t)r, HSTR("org.h5l.pa-gss-client-params"));
672 heim_assert(gcp != NULL, "invalid GSS-API client params");
674 return _kdc_gss_finalize_pac(r, gcp);
677 static krb5_error_code
678 pa_enc_chal_validate(astgs_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
680 krb5_data pepper1, pepper2;
681 int invalidPassword = 0;
682 EncryptedData enc_data;
683 krb5_enctype aenctype;
689 heim_assert(r->armor_crypto != NULL, "ENC-CHAL called for non FAST");
691 if (_kdc_is_anon_request(&r->req)) {
692 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
693 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 4, "ENC-CHALL doesn't support anon");
697 if (r->client->flags.locked_out) {
698 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
699 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0,
700 "Client (%s) is locked out", r->cname);
701 kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
702 KDC_AUTH_EVENT_CLIENT_LOCKED_OUT);
706 ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
707 pa->padata_value.length,
711 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
712 _kdc_r_log(r, 4, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
717 pepper1.data = "clientchallengearmor";
718 pepper1.length = strlen(pepper1.data);
719 pepper2.data = "challengelongterm";
720 pepper2.length = strlen(pepper2.data);
722 krb5_crypto_getenctype(r->context, r->armor_crypto, &aenctype);
724 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 5, "FAST armor enctype is: %d", (int)aenctype);
726 for (i = 0; i < r->client->keys.len; i++) {
727 krb5_crypto challengecrypto, longtermcrypto;
728 krb5_keyblock challengekey;
730 k = &r->client->keys.val[i];
732 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &k->key, 0, &longtermcrypto);
736 ret = krb5_crypto_fx_cf2(r->context, r->armor_crypto, longtermcrypto,
737 &pepper1, &pepper2, aenctype,
740 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, longtermcrypto);
744 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &challengekey, 0,
746 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &challengekey);
748 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, longtermcrypto);
752 ret = _krb5_validate_pa_enc_challenge(r->context,
754 KRB5_KU_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT,
757 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challengecrypto);
760 krb5_error_code ret2;
763 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, longtermcrypto);
765 invalidPassword = (ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY);
766 if (!invalidPassword) {
770 ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, k->key.keytype, &str);
773 msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
774 _kdc_r_log(r, 2, "Failed to decrypt ENC-CHAL -- %s "
775 "(enctype %s) error %s",
776 r->cname, str ? str : "unknown enctype", msg);
777 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
784 * Found a key that the client used, lets pick that as the reply key
787 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
788 ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &k->key, &r->reply_key);
790 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, longtermcrypto);
794 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &challengekey);
797 * Provide KDC authentication to the client, uses a different
798 * challenge key (different pepper).
801 pepper1.data = "kdcchallengearmor";
802 pepper1.length = strlen(pepper1.data);
804 ret = krb5_crypto_fx_cf2(r->context, r->armor_crypto, longtermcrypto,
805 &pepper1, &pepper2, aenctype,
807 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, longtermcrypto);
811 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &challengekey, 0, &challengecrypto);
812 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &challengekey);
816 ret = _krb5_make_pa_enc_challenge(r->context, challengecrypto,
817 KRB5_KU_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC,
819 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challengecrypto);
824 ret = set_salt_padata(r->context, r->config,
830 kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
831 KDC_AUTH_EVENT_VALIDATED_LONG_TERM_KEY);
835 if (invalidPassword) {
836 kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
837 KDC_AUTH_EVENT_WRONG_LONG_TERM_KEY);
838 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
840 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
843 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
848 static krb5_error_code
849 pa_enc_ts_validate(astgs_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
851 EncryptedData enc_data;
860 if (r->armor_crypto && !r->config->enable_armored_pa_enc_timestamp) {
861 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
862 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0,
863 "Armored encrypted timestamp pre-authentication is disabled");
865 } else if (!r->armor_crypto && !r->config->enable_unarmored_pa_enc_timestamp) {
866 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
867 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0,
868 "Unarmored encrypted timestamp pre-authentication is disabled");
872 if (r->client->flags.locked_out) {
873 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
874 kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0,
875 "Client (%s) is locked out", r->cname);
876 kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
877 KDC_AUTH_EVENT_CLIENT_LOCKED_OUT);
881 ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
882 pa->padata_value.length,
886 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
887 _kdc_r_log(r, 4, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
892 ret = hdb_enctype2key(r->context, r->client, NULL,
893 enc_data.etype, &pa_key);
896 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "No key matching entype");
897 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
898 if(krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, enc_data.etype, &estr))
902 "No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s",
903 enc_data.etype, r->cname);
906 "No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s",
909 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
914 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &pa_key->key, 0, &crypto);
916 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
917 _kdc_r_log(r, 4, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
918 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
919 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
923 ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (r->context,
925 KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP,
928 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, crypto);
930 * Since the user might have several keys with the same
931 * enctype but with diffrent salting, we need to try all
932 * the keys with the same enctype.
935 krb5_error_code ret2;
936 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
938 ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context,
939 pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
942 _kdc_r_log(r, 2, "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA -- %s "
943 "(enctype %s) error %s",
944 r->cname, str ? str : "unknown enctype", msg);
946 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
947 kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_PA_ETYPE,
948 pa_key->key.keytype);
949 kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
950 KDC_AUTH_EVENT_WRONG_LONG_TERM_KEY);
951 if(hdb_next_enctype2key(r->context, r->client, NULL,
952 enc_data.etype, &pa_key) == 0)
955 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
957 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
960 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
961 ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data,
965 krb5_data_free(&ts_data);
967 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
968 _kdc_r_log(r, 4, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
972 if (labs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > r->context->max_skew) {
973 char client_time[100];
975 krb5_format_time(r->context, p.patimestamp,
976 client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
978 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
979 _kdc_r_log(r, 4, "Too large time skew, "
980 "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
982 (unsigned)labs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
983 r->context->max_skew,
985 kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
986 KDC_AUTH_EVENT_CLIENT_TIME_SKEW);
989 * The following is needed to make windows clients to
990 * retry using the timestamp in the error message, if
991 * there is a e_text, they become unhappy.
994 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
997 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
999 ret = set_salt_padata(r->context, r->config,
1000 r->rep.padata, pa_key);
1002 ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &pa_key->key, &r->reply_key);
1006 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
1009 _kdc_r_log(r, 4, "ENC-TS Pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
1010 r->cname, str ? str : "unknown enctype");
1012 kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_PA_ETYPE,
1013 pa_key->key.keytype);
1014 kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
1015 KDC_AUTH_EVENT_VALIDATED_LONG_TERM_KEY);
1024 struct kdc_patypes {
1028 #define PA_ANNOUNCE 1
1029 #define PA_REQ_FAST 2 /* only use inside fast */
1030 #define PA_SYNTHETIC_OK 4
1031 #define PA_REPLACE_REPLY_KEY 8 /* PA mech replaces reply key */
1032 #define PA_USES_LONG_TERM_KEY 16 /* PA mech uses client's long-term key */
1033 krb5_error_code (*validate)(astgs_request_t, const PA_DATA *pa);
1034 krb5_error_code (*finalize_pac)(astgs_request_t r);
1035 void (*cleanup)(astgs_request_t r);
1038 static const struct kdc_patypes pat[] = {
1041 KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ, "PK-INIT(ietf)",
1042 PA_ANNOUNCE | PA_SYNTHETIC_OK | PA_REPLACE_REPLY_KEY,
1043 pa_pkinit_validate, NULL, NULL
1046 KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN, "PK-INIT(win2k)", PA_ANNOUNCE | PA_REPLACE_REPLY_KEY,
1047 pa_pkinit_validate, NULL, NULL
1050 KRB5_PADATA_PKINIT_KX, "Anonymous PK-INIT", PA_ANNOUNCE,
1054 { KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ, "PK-INIT(ietf)", 0, NULL , NULL, NULL },
1055 { KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN, "PK-INIT(win2k)", 0, NULL, NULL, NULL },
1056 { KRB5_PADATA_PKINIT_KX, "Anonymous PK-INIT", 0, NULL, NULL, NULL },
1058 { KRB5_PADATA_PA_PK_OCSP_RESPONSE , "OCSP", 0, NULL, NULL, NULL },
1060 KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP , "ENC-TS",
1061 PA_ANNOUNCE | PA_USES_LONG_TERM_KEY,
1062 pa_enc_ts_validate, NULL, NULL
1065 KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE , "ENC-CHAL",
1066 PA_ANNOUNCE | PA_USES_LONG_TERM_KEY | PA_REQ_FAST,
1067 pa_enc_chal_validate, NULL, NULL
1069 { KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP , "REQ-ENC-PA-REP", 0, NULL, NULL, NULL },
1070 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST, "FX-FAST", PA_ANNOUNCE, NULL, NULL, NULL },
1071 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_ERROR, "FX-ERROR", 0, NULL, NULL, NULL },
1072 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_COOKIE, "FX-COOKIE", 0, NULL, NULL, NULL },
1074 KRB5_PADATA_GSS , "GSS",
1075 PA_ANNOUNCE | PA_SYNTHETIC_OK | PA_REPLACE_REPLY_KEY,
1076 pa_gss_validate, pa_gss_finalize_pac, NULL
1081 log_patypes(astgs_request_t r, METHOD_DATA *padata)
1083 krb5_kdc_configuration *config = r->config;
1084 struct rk_strpool *p = NULL;
1088 for (n = 0; n < padata->len; n++) {
1089 for (m = 0; m < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); m++) {
1090 if (padata->val[n].padata_type == pat[m].type) {
1091 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%s", pat[m].name);
1095 if (m == sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]))
1096 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", padata->val[n].padata_type);
1097 if (p && n + 1 < padata->len)
1098 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
1100 kdc_log(r->context, config, 1, "out of memory");
1105 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "none");
1107 str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
1108 kdc_log(r->context, config, 4, "Client sent patypes: %s", str);
1109 kdc_audit_addkv((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_AUDIT_EATWHITE,
1110 "client-pa", "%s", str);
1115 pa_used_flag_isset(astgs_request_t r, unsigned int flag)
1117 if (r->pa_used == NULL)
1120 return (r->pa_used->flags & flag) == flag;
1128 _kdc_encode_reply(krb5_context context,
1129 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1130 astgs_request_t r, uint32_t nonce,
1132 int skvno, const EncryptionKey *skey,
1140 krb5_error_code ret;
1142 KDC_REP *rep = &r->rep;
1143 EncTicketPart *et = &r->et;
1144 EncKDCRepPart *ek = &r->ek;
1146 heim_assert(rep->padata != NULL, "reply padata uninitialized");
1148 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTicketPart, buf, buf_size, et, &len, ret);
1150 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1151 kdc_log(context, config, 4, "Failed to encode ticket: %s", msg);
1152 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1156 krb5_abortx(context, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
1158 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, skey, etype, &crypto);
1160 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1161 kdc_log(context, config, 4, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
1162 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1167 ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
1173 &rep->ticket.enc_part);
1175 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
1177 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1178 kdc_log(context, config, 4, "Failed to encrypt data: %s", msg);
1179 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1183 if (r && r->armor_crypto) {
1184 KrbFastFinished finished;
1187 kdc_log(context, config, 4, "FAST armor protection");
1189 memset(&finished, 0, sizeof(finished));
1190 krb5_data_zero(&data);
1192 finished.timestamp = kdc_time;
1194 finished.crealm = et->crealm;
1195 finished.cname = et->cname;
1197 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Ticket, data.data, data.length,
1198 &rep->ticket, &len, ret);
1201 if (data.length != len)
1202 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
1204 ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, r->armor_crypto,
1205 KRB5_KU_FAST_FINISHED, 0,
1206 data.data, data.length,
1207 &finished.ticket_checksum);
1208 krb5_data_free(&data);
1212 ret = _kdc_fast_mk_response(context, r->armor_crypto,
1213 rep->padata, &r->strengthen_key, &finished,
1215 free_Checksum(&finished.ticket_checksum);
1219 free_METHOD_DATA(r->rep.padata);
1221 ret = krb5_padata_add(context, rep->padata,
1222 KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST,
1223 data.data, data.length);
1228 * Hide client name for privacy reasons
1230 if (r->fast.flags.requested_hidden_names) {
1231 Realm anon_realm = KRB5_ANON_REALM;
1233 free_Realm(&rep->crealm);
1234 ret = copy_Realm(&anon_realm, &rep->crealm);
1236 free_PrincipalName(&rep->cname);
1237 ret = _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname(&rep->cname);
1244 if (rep->padata->len == 0) {
1245 free_METHOD_DATA(rep->padata);
1250 if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep && !config->encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep)
1251 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncASRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
1253 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTGSRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
1255 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1256 kdc_log(context, config, 4, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
1257 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1260 if(buf_size != len) {
1262 kdc_log(context, config, 4, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
1263 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "KDC internal error");
1264 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1266 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &r->reply_key, 0, &crypto);
1268 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1270 kdc_log(context, config, 4, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
1271 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1274 if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep) {
1275 ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
1277 KRB5_KU_AS_REP_ENC_PART,
1284 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
1286 ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
1289 KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SUB_KEY :
1290 KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION,
1297 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(TGS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
1299 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
1301 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1302 kdc_log(context, config, 4, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
1303 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1306 if(buf_size != len) {
1308 kdc_log(context, config, 4, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
1309 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "KDC internal error");
1310 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1313 reply->length = buf_size;
1321 static krb5_error_code
1322 get_pa_etype_info(krb5_context context,
1323 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1324 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey,
1325 krb5_boolean include_salt)
1327 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
1328 ETYPE_INFO_ENTRY eie; /* do not free this one */
1334 * Code moved here from what used to be make_etype_info_entry() because
1335 * using the ASN.1 compiler-generated SEQUENCE OF add functions makes that
1336 * old function's body and this one's small and clean.
1338 * The following comment blocks were there:
1340 * According to `the specs', we can't send a salt if we have AFS3 salted
1341 * key, but that requires that you *know* what cell you are using (e.g by
1342 * assuming that the cell is the same as the realm in lower case)
1344 * We shouldn't sent salttype since it is incompatible with the
1345 * specification and it breaks windows clients. The afs salting problem
1346 * is solved by using KRB5-PADATA-AFS3-SALT implemented in Heimdal 0.7 and
1349 * We return no salt type at all, as that should indicate the default salt
1350 * type and make everybody happy. some systems (like w2k) dislike being
1351 * told the salt type here.
1354 pa.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO;
1355 pa.padata_value.data = NULL;
1356 pa.padata_value.length = 0;
1359 eie.etype = ckey->key.keytype;
1360 eie.salttype = NULL;
1362 if (include_salt && ckey->salt)
1363 eie.salt = &ckey->salt->salt;
1364 ret = add_ETYPE_INFO(&ei, &eie);
1366 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO, pa.padata_value.data, pa.padata_value.length,
1369 add_METHOD_DATA(md, &pa);
1370 free_ETYPE_INFO(&ei);
1379 extern int _krb5_AES_SHA1_string_to_default_iterator;
1380 extern int _krb5_AES_SHA2_string_to_default_iterator;
1382 static krb5_error_code
1383 make_s2kparams(int value, size_t len, krb5_data **ps2kparams)
1385 krb5_data *s2kparams;
1386 krb5_error_code ret;
1389 if (s2kparams == NULL)
1391 ret = krb5_data_alloc(s2kparams, len);
1396 _krb5_put_int(s2kparams->data, value, len);
1397 *ps2kparams = s2kparams;
1401 static krb5_error_code
1402 make_etype_info2_entry(ETYPE_INFO2_ENTRY *ent,
1404 krb5_boolean include_salt)
1406 krb5_error_code ret;
1408 ent->etype = key->key.keytype;
1409 if (key->salt && include_salt) {
1411 if (ent->salt == NULL)
1413 *ent->salt = malloc(key->salt->salt.length + 1);
1414 if (*ent->salt == NULL) {
1419 memcpy(*ent->salt, key->salt->salt.data, key->salt->salt.length);
1420 (*ent->salt)[key->salt->salt.length] = '\0';
1424 ent->s2kparams = NULL;
1426 switch (key->key.keytype) {
1427 case ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
1428 case ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
1429 ret = make_s2kparams(_krb5_AES_SHA1_string_to_default_iterator,
1430 4, &ent->s2kparams);
1432 case KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128:
1433 case KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192:
1434 ret = make_s2kparams(_krb5_AES_SHA2_string_to_default_iterator,
1435 4, &ent->s2kparams);
1437 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
1438 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
1439 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
1440 /* Check if this was a AFS3 salted key */
1441 if(key->salt && key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt)
1442 ret = make_s2kparams(1, 1, &ent->s2kparams);
1454 * Return an ETYPE-INFO2. Enctypes are storted the same way as in the
1455 * database (client supported enctypes first, then the unsupported
1459 static krb5_error_code
1460 get_pa_etype_info2(krb5_context context,
1461 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1462 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey,
1463 krb5_boolean include_salt)
1465 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
1471 pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
1475 ret = make_etype_info2_entry(&pa.val[0], ckey, include_salt);
1477 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
1481 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO2, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
1482 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
1485 ret = realloc_method_data(md);
1490 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO2;
1491 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len;
1492 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf;
1497 * Return 0 if the client have only older enctypes, this is for
1498 * determining if the server should send ETYPE_INFO2 or not.
1502 newer_enctype_present(krb5_context context,
1503 struct KDC_REQ_BODY_etype *etype_list)
1507 for (i = 0; i < etype_list->len; i++) {
1508 if (!krb5_is_enctype_old(context, etype_list->val[i]))
1514 static krb5_error_code
1515 get_pa_etype_info_both(krb5_context context,
1516 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1517 struct KDC_REQ_BODY_etype *etype_list,
1518 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey,
1519 krb5_boolean include_salt)
1521 krb5_error_code ret;
1524 * Windows 2019 (and earlier versions) always sends the salt
1525 * and Samba has testsuites that check this behaviour, so a
1526 * Samba AD DC will set this flag to match the AS-REP packet
1529 if (config->force_include_pa_etype_salt)
1530 include_salt = TRUE;
1534 * When the AS server is to include pre-authentication data in a
1535 * KRB-ERROR or in an AS-REP, it MUST use PA-ETYPE-INFO2, not
1536 * PA-ETYPE-INFO, if the etype field of the client's AS-REQ lists
1537 * at least one "newer" encryption type. Otherwise (when the etype
1538 * field of the client's AS-REQ does not list any "newer" encryption
1539 * types), it MUST send both PA-ETYPE-INFO2 and PA-ETYPE-INFO (both
1540 * with an entry for each enctype). A "newer" enctype is any enctype
1541 * first officially specified concurrently with or subsequent to the
1542 * issue of this RFC. The enctypes DES, 3DES, or RC4 and any defined
1543 * in [RFC1510] are not "newer" enctypes.
1545 * It goes on to state:
1546 * The preferred ordering of the "hint" pre-authentication data that
1547 * affect client key selection is: ETYPE-INFO2, followed by ETYPE-INFO,
1548 * followed by PW-SALT. As noted in Section 3.1.3, a KDC MUST NOT send
1549 * ETYPE-INFO or PW-SALT when the client's AS-REQ includes at least one
1553 ret = get_pa_etype_info2(context, config, md, ckey, include_salt);
1557 if (!newer_enctype_present(context, etype_list))
1558 ret = get_pa_etype_info(context, config, md, ckey, include_salt);
1568 _log_astgs_req(astgs_request_t r, krb5_enctype setype)
1570 const KDC_REQ_BODY *b = &r->req.req_body;
1571 krb5_enctype cetype = r->reply_key.keytype;
1572 krb5_error_code ret;
1573 struct rk_strpool *p;
1574 struct rk_strpool *s = NULL;
1581 * we are collecting ``p'' and ``s''. The former is a textual
1582 * representation of the enctypes as strings which will be used
1583 * for debugging. The latter is a terse comma separated list of
1584 * the %d's of the enctypes to emit into our audit trail to
1585 * conserve space in the logs.
1588 p = rk_strpoolprintf(NULL, "%s", "Client supported enctypes: ");
1590 for (i = 0; i < b->etype.len; i++) {
1591 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, b->etype.val[i], &str);
1593 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%s", str);
1596 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", b->etype.val[i]);
1599 _kdc_r_log(r, 4, "out of memory");
1602 s = rk_strpoolprintf(s, "%d", b->etype.val[i]);
1603 if (i + 1 < b->etype.len) {
1604 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
1605 s = rk_strpoolprintf(s, ",");
1609 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "no encryption types");
1611 str = rk_strpoolcollect(s);
1613 kdc_audit_addkv((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_AUDIT_EATWHITE, "etypes", "%s",
1617 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, cetype, &cet);
1619 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, setype, &set);
1621 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using %s/%s", cet, set);
1627 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using enctypes %d/%d",
1630 str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
1632 _kdc_r_log(r, 4, "%s", str);
1635 kdc_audit_addkv((kdc_request_t)r, 0, "etype", "%d/%d", cetype, setype);
1641 result = unparse_flags(KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options), asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
1642 fixedstr, sizeof(fixedstr));
1644 _kdc_r_log(r, 4, "Requested flags: %s", fixedstr);
1645 kdc_audit_addkv((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_AUDIT_EATWHITE,
1646 "flags", "%s", fixedstr);
1652 * verify the flags on `client' and `server', returning 0
1653 * if they are OK and generating an error messages and returning
1654 * and error code otherwise.
1657 KDC_LIB_FUNCTION krb5_error_code KDC_LIB_CALL
1658 kdc_check_flags(astgs_request_t r,
1659 krb5_boolean is_as_req,
1663 if (client != NULL) {
1665 if (client->flags.locked_out) {
1666 kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r, "Client is locked out");
1667 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
1670 if (client->flags.invalid) {
1671 kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
1672 "Client has invalid bit set");
1673 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1676 if (!client->flags.client) {
1677 kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
1678 "Principal may not act as client");
1679 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1682 if (client->valid_start && *client->valid_start > kdc_time) {
1683 char starttime_str[100];
1684 krb5_format_time(r->context, *client->valid_start,
1685 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
1686 kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r, "Client not yet valid "
1687 "until %s", starttime_str);
1688 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
1691 if (client->valid_end && *client->valid_end < kdc_time) {
1692 char endtime_str[100];
1693 krb5_format_time(r->context, *client->valid_end,
1694 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
1695 kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r, "Client expired at %s",
1697 return KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP;
1700 if (client->flags.require_pwchange &&
1701 (server == NULL || !server->flags.change_pw))
1702 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
1704 if (client->pw_end && *client->pw_end < kdc_time
1705 && (server == NULL || !server->flags.change_pw)) {
1706 char pwend_str[100];
1707 krb5_format_time(r->context, *client->pw_end,
1708 pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
1709 kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r, "Client's key has expired "
1710 "at %s", pwend_str);
1711 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
1717 if (server != NULL) {
1718 if (server->flags.locked_out) {
1719 kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r, "Server locked out");
1720 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_REVOKED;
1722 if (server->flags.invalid) {
1723 kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
1724 "Server has invalid flag set");
1725 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1727 if (!server->flags.server) {
1728 kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
1729 "Principal may not act as server");
1730 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1733 if (!is_as_req && server->flags.initial) {
1734 kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
1735 "AS-REQ is required for server");
1736 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1739 if (server->valid_start && *server->valid_start > kdc_time) {
1740 char starttime_str[100];
1741 krb5_format_time(r->context, *server->valid_start,
1742 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
1743 kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r, "Server not yet valid "
1744 "until %s", starttime_str);
1745 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET;
1748 if (server->valid_end && *server->valid_end < kdc_time) {
1749 char endtime_str[100];
1750 krb5_format_time(r->context, *server->valid_end,
1751 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
1752 kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r, "Server expired at %s",
1754 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP;
1757 if (server->pw_end && *server->pw_end < kdc_time) {
1758 char pwend_str[100];
1759 krb5_format_time(r->context, *server->pw_end,
1760 pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
1761 kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r, "Server's key has expired "
1762 "at %s", pwend_str);
1763 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
1770 * Return TRUE if `from' is part of `addresses' taking into consideration
1771 * the configuration variables that tells us how strict we should be about
1776 _kdc_check_addresses(astgs_request_t r, HostAddresses *addresses,
1777 const struct sockaddr *from)
1779 krb5_kdc_configuration *config = r->config;
1780 krb5_error_code ret;
1782 krb5_boolean result;
1783 krb5_boolean only_netbios = TRUE;
1786 if (!config->check_ticket_addresses && !config->warn_ticket_addresses)
1790 * Fields of HostAddresses type are always OPTIONAL and should be non-
1791 * empty, but we check for empty just in case as our compiler doesn't
1792 * support size constraints on SEQUENCE OF.
1794 if (addresses == NULL || addresses->len == 0)
1795 return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
1797 for (i = 0; i < addresses->len; ++i) {
1798 if (addresses->val[i].addr_type != KRB5_ADDRESS_NETBIOS) {
1799 only_netbios = FALSE;
1803 /* Windows sends it's netbios name, which I can only assume is
1804 * used for the 'allowed workstations' check. This is painful,
1805 * but we still want to check IP addresses if they happen to be
1810 return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
1812 ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (r->context, from, &addr);
1816 result = krb5_address_search(r->context, &addr, addresses);
1817 krb5_free_address (r->context, &addr);
1825 _kdc_check_anon_policy(astgs_request_t r)
1827 if (!r->config->allow_anonymous) {
1828 kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
1829 "Anonymous tickets denied by local policy");
1830 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1837 * Determine whether the client requested a PAC be included
1838 * or excluded explictly, or whether it doesn't care.
1842 get_pac_attributes(krb5_context context, KDC_REQ *req)
1844 krb5_error_code ret;
1845 PA_PAC_REQUEST pacreq;
1848 uint32_t pac_attributes;
1850 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PA_PAC_REQUEST);
1852 return KRB5_PAC_WAS_GIVEN_IMPLICITLY;
1854 ret = decode_PA_PAC_REQUEST(pa->padata_value.data,
1855 pa->padata_value.length,
1859 return KRB5_PAC_WAS_GIVEN_IMPLICITLY;
1861 pac_attributes = pacreq.include_pac ? KRB5_PAC_WAS_REQUESTED : 0;
1862 free_PA_PAC_REQUEST(&pacreq);
1863 return pac_attributes;
1870 static krb5_error_code
1871 generate_pac(astgs_request_t r, const Key *skey, const Key *tkey,
1872 krb5_boolean is_tgs)
1874 krb5_error_code ret;
1877 krb5_principal client;
1878 krb5_const_principal canon_princ = NULL;
1880 r->pac_attributes = get_pac_attributes(r->context, &r->req);
1881 kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, "pac_attributes",
1884 if (!is_tgs && !(r->pac_attributes & (KRB5_PAC_WAS_REQUESTED | KRB5_PAC_WAS_GIVEN_IMPLICITLY)))
1888 * When a PA mech does not use the client's long-term key, the PAC
1889 * may include the client's long-term key (encrypted in the reply key)
1890 * for use by other shared secret authentication protocols, e.g. NTLM.
1891 * Validate a PA mech was actually used before doing this.
1894 ret = _kdc_pac_generate(r,
1897 r->pa_used && !pa_used_flag_isset(r, PA_USES_LONG_TERM_KEY)
1898 ? &r->reply_key : NULL,
1902 _kdc_r_log(r, 4, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
1909 rodc_id = r->server->kvno >> 16;
1911 /* libkrb5 expects ticket and PAC client names to match */
1912 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(r->context, &client,
1913 r->et.cname, r->et.crealm);
1918 * Include the canonical name of the principal in the authorization
1919 * data, if the realms match (if they don't, then the KDC could
1920 * impersonate any realm. Windows always canonicalizes the realm,
1921 * but Heimdal permits aliases between realms.)
1923 if (krb5_realm_compare(r->context, client, r->canon_client_princ)) {
1926 canon_princ = r->canon_client_princ;
1928 (void) krb5_unparse_name(r->context, canon_princ, &cpn);
1929 kdc_audit_addkv((kdc_request_t)r, 0, "canon_client_name", "%s",
1930 cpn ? cpn : "<unknown>");
1934 if (r->pa_used && r->pa_used->finalize_pac) {
1935 ret = r->pa_used->finalize_pac(r);
1940 ret = _krb5_pac_sign(r->context,
1944 &skey->key, /* Server key */
1945 &tkey->key, /* TGS key */
1949 false, /* add_full_sig */
1950 is_tgs ? &r->pac_attributes : NULL,
1952 krb5_free_principal(r->context, client);
1953 krb5_pac_free(r->context, r->pac);
1956 _kdc_r_log(r, 4, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
1961 ret = _kdc_tkt_insert_pac(r->context, &r->et, &data);
1962 krb5_data_free(&data);
1972 _kdc_is_anonymous(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal principal)
1974 return krb5_principal_is_anonymous(context, principal, KRB5_ANON_MATCH_ANY);
1978 * Returns TRUE if principal is the unauthenticated anonymous identity,
1979 * i.e. WELLKNOWN/ANONYMOUS@WELLKNOWN:ANONYMOUS. Unfortunately due to
1980 * backwards compatibility logic in krb5_principal_is_anonymous() we
1981 * have to use our own implementation.
1985 _kdc_is_anonymous_pkinit(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal principal)
1987 return _kdc_is_anonymous(context, principal) &&
1988 strcmp(principal->realm, KRB5_ANON_REALM) == 0;
1992 require_preauth_p(astgs_request_t r)
1994 return r->config->require_preauth
1995 || r->client->flags.require_preauth
1996 || r->server->flags.require_preauth;
2004 static krb5_error_code
2005 add_enc_pa_rep(astgs_request_t r)
2007 krb5_error_code ret;
2013 ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &r->reply_key, 0, &crypto);
2017 ret = krb5_create_checksum(r->context, crypto,
2019 r->request.data, r->request.length,
2021 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, crypto);
2025 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Checksum, cdata.data, cdata.length,
2026 &checksum, &len, ret);
2027 free_Checksum(&checksum);
2030 heim_assert(cdata.length == len, "ASN.1 internal error");
2032 if (r->ek.encrypted_pa_data == NULL) {
2033 ALLOC(r->ek.encrypted_pa_data);
2034 if (r->ek.encrypted_pa_data == NULL)
2037 ret = krb5_padata_add(r->context, r->ek.encrypted_pa_data,
2038 KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP, cdata.data, cdata.length);
2042 return krb5_padata_add(r->context, r->ek.encrypted_pa_data,
2043 KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST, NULL, 0);
2047 * Add an authorization data element indicating that a synthetic
2048 * principal was used, so that the TGS does not accidentally
2049 * synthesize a non-synthetic principal that has since been deleted.
2051 static krb5_error_code
2052 add_synthetic_princ_ad(astgs_request_t r)
2056 krb5_data_zero(&data);
2058 return _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(r->context, &r->et,
2059 KRB5_AUTHDATA_SYNTHETIC_PRINC_USED,
2063 static krb5_error_code
2064 get_local_tgs(krb5_context context,
2065 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
2066 krb5_const_realm realm,
2070 krb5_error_code ret;
2071 krb5_principal tgs_name;
2076 ret = krb5_make_principal(context,
2083 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, tgs_name,
2084 HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT, NULL, krbtgtdb, krbtgt);
2086 krb5_free_principal(context, tgs_name);
2095 _kdc_as_rep(astgs_request_t r)
2097 krb5_kdc_configuration *config = r->config;
2098 KDC_REQ *req = &r->req;
2099 const char *from = r->from;
2100 KDC_REQ_BODY *b = NULL;
2101 KDC_REP *rep = &r->rep;
2103 krb5_enctype setype;
2104 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
2107 int i, flags = HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ;
2109 krb5_boolean is_tgs;
2113 memset(rep, 0, sizeof(*rep));
2116 if (rep->padata == NULL) {
2118 krb5_set_error_message(r->context, ret, N_("malloc: out of memory", ""));
2123 * Look for FAST armor and unwrap
2125 ret = _kdc_fast_unwrap_request(r, NULL, NULL);
2127 _kdc_r_log(r, 1, "FAST unwrap request from %s failed: %d", from, ret);
2135 flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
2137 if (b->sname == NULL) {
2138 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
2139 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "No server in request");
2143 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(r->context, &r->server_princ,
2144 *(b->sname), b->realm);
2146 ret = krb5_unparse_name(r->context, r->server_princ, &r->sname);
2148 kdc_log(r->context, config, 2,
2149 "AS_REQ malformed server name from %s", from);
2153 if (b->cname == NULL) {
2154 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
2155 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "No client in request");
2159 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(r->context, &r->client_princ,
2160 *(b->cname), b->realm);
2162 ret = krb5_unparse_name(r->context, r->client_princ, &r->cname);
2164 kdc_log(r->context, config, 2,
2165 "AS-REQ malformed client name from %s", from);
2169 kdc_log(r->context, config, 4, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s",
2170 r->cname, r->from, r->sname);
2172 is_tgs = krb5_principal_is_krbtgt(r->context, r->server_princ);
2174 if (_kdc_is_anonymous(r->context, r->client_princ) &&
2175 !_kdc_is_anon_request(req)) {
2176 kdc_log(r->context, config, 2, "Anonymous client w/o anonymous flag");
2177 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
2181 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(r->context, config, r->client_princ,
2182 HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | HDB_F_SYNTHETIC_OK | flags, NULL,
2183 &r->clientdb, &r->client);
2185 case 0: /* Success */
2187 case HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE:
2188 kdc_log(r->context, config, 5, "client %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy",
2191 case HDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM: {
2192 char *fixed_client_name = NULL;
2194 ret = krb5_unparse_name(r->context, r->client->principal,
2195 &fixed_client_name);
2200 kdc_log(r->context, config, 4, "WRONG_REALM - %s -> %s",
2201 r->cname, fixed_client_name);
2202 free(fixed_client_name);
2205 ret = _kdc_fast_mk_error(r, r->rep.padata, r->armor_crypto,
2207 r->error_code = KRB5_KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM,
2208 r->client->principal, r->server_princ,
2209 NULL, NULL, r->reply);
2214 msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
2215 kdc_log(r->context, config, 4, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r->cname, msg);
2216 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
2217 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
2218 kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
2219 KDC_AUTH_EVENT_CLIENT_UNKNOWN);
2223 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(r->context, config, r->server_princ,
2224 HDB_F_GET_SERVER | HDB_F_DELAY_NEW_KEYS |
2225 flags | (is_tgs ? HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT : 0),
2226 NULL, &r->serverdb, &r->server);
2228 case 0: /* Success */
2230 case HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE:
2231 kdc_log(r->context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy",
2235 msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
2236 kdc_log(r->context, config, 4, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r->sname, msg);
2237 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
2238 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
2243 * This has to be here (not later), because we need to have r->sessionetype
2244 * set prior to calling pa_pkinit_validate(), which in turn calls
2245 * _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(), during padata validation.
2249 * Select an enctype for the to-be-issued ticket's session key using the
2250 * intersection of the client's requested enctypes and the server's (like a
2251 * root krbtgt, but not necessarily) etypes from its HDB entry.
2253 ret = _kdc_find_session_etype(r, b->etype.val, b->etype.len,
2254 r->server, &r->sessionetype);
2256 kdc_log(r->context, config, 4,
2257 "Client (%s) from %s has no common enctypes with KDC "
2258 "to use for the session key",
2264 * Pre-auth processing
2270 log_patypes(r, req->padata);
2272 /* Check if preauth matching */
2274 for (n = 0; !found_pa && n < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); n++) {
2275 if (pat[n].validate == NULL)
2277 if (r->armor_crypto == NULL && (pat[n].flags & PA_REQ_FAST))
2280 kdc_log(r->context, config, 5,
2281 "Looking for %s pa-data -- %s", pat[n].name, r->cname);
2283 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, pat[n].type);
2285 if (r->client->flags.synthetic &&
2286 !(pat[n].flags & PA_SYNTHETIC_OK)) {
2287 kdc_log(r->context, config, 4, "UNKNOWN -- %s", r->cname);
2288 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
2291 kdc_audit_addkv((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_AUDIT_VIS, "pa", "%s",
2293 ret = pat[n].validate(r, pa);
2295 krb5_error_code ret2;
2297 krb5_boolean default_salt;
2299 if (ret != KRB5_KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED &&
2300 !kdc_audit_getkv((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT))
2301 kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
2302 KDC_AUTH_EVENT_PREAUTH_FAILED);
2305 * If there is a client key, send ETYPE_INFO{,2}
2307 ret2 = _kdc_find_etype(r, KFE_IS_PREAUTH|KFE_USE_CLIENT,
2308 b->etype.val, b->etype.len,
2309 NULL, &ckey, &default_salt);
2311 ret2 = get_pa_etype_info_both(r->context, config, &b->etype,
2312 r->rep.padata, ckey, !default_salt);
2318 if (!kdc_audit_getkv((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT))
2319 kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
2320 KDC_AUTH_EVENT_PREAUTH_SUCCEEDED);
2321 kdc_log(r->context, config, 4,
2322 "%s pre-authentication succeeded -- %s",
2323 pat[n].name, r->cname);
2325 r->pa_used = &pat[n];
2326 r->et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
2331 if (found_pa == 0) {
2334 krb5_boolean default_salt;
2336 if (r->client->flags.synthetic) {
2337 kdc_log(r->context, config, 4, "UNKNOWN -- %s", r->cname);
2338 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
2342 for (n = 0; n < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); n++) {
2343 if ((pat[n].flags & PA_ANNOUNCE) == 0)
2346 if (!r->armor_crypto && (pat[n].flags & PA_REQ_FAST))
2348 if (pat[n].type == KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP) {
2349 if (r->armor_crypto && !r->config->enable_armored_pa_enc_timestamp)
2351 if (!r->armor_crypto && !r->config->enable_unarmored_pa_enc_timestamp)
2355 ret = krb5_padata_add(r->context, r->rep.padata,
2356 pat[n].type, NULL, 0);
2362 * If there is a client key, send ETYPE_INFO{,2}
2364 ret = _kdc_find_etype(r, KFE_IS_PREAUTH|KFE_USE_CLIENT,
2365 b->etype.val, b->etype.len,
2366 NULL, &ckey, &default_salt);
2368 ret = get_pa_etype_info_both(r->context, config, &b->etype,
2369 r->rep.padata, ckey, !default_salt);
2375 * send requre preauth is its required or anon is requested,
2376 * anon is today only allowed via preauth mechanisms.
2378 if (require_preauth_p(r) || _kdc_is_anon_request(&r->req)) {
2379 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
2380 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/PA-PK-AS-REQ");
2385 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
2386 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Doesn't have a client key available");
2389 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
2390 ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &ckey->key, &r->reply_key);
2395 r->canon_client_princ = r->client->principal;
2398 * Verify flags after the user been required to prove its identity
2399 * with in a preauth mech.
2402 ret = _kdc_check_access(r);
2406 if (_kdc_is_anon_request(&r->req)) {
2407 ret = _kdc_check_anon_policy(r);
2409 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Anonymous ticket requests are disabled");
2413 r->et.flags.anonymous = 1;
2416 kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
2417 KDC_AUTH_EVENT_CLIENT_AUTHORIZED);
2420 * Select the best encryption type for the KDC with out regard to
2421 * the client since the client never needs to read that data.
2424 ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(r->context, config,
2425 r->server, r->sname,
2430 /* If server is not krbtgt, fetch local krbtgt key for signing authdata */
2434 ret = get_local_tgs(r->context, config, r->server_princ->realm,
2435 &r->krbtgtdb, &r->krbtgt);
2439 ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(r->context, config, r->krbtgt,
2440 r->server_princ->realm,
2446 if(f.renew || f.validate || f.proxy || f.forwarded || f.enc_tkt_in_skey) {
2447 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
2448 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Bad KDC options");
2456 rep->msg_type = krb_as_rep;
2458 if (!config->historical_anon_realm &&
2459 _kdc_is_anonymous(r->context, r->client_princ)) {
2460 Realm anon_realm = KRB5_ANON_REALM;
2461 ret = copy_Realm(&anon_realm, &rep->crealm);
2462 } else if (f.canonicalize || r->client->flags.force_canonicalize)
2463 ret = copy_Realm(&r->canon_client_princ->realm, &rep->crealm);
2465 ret = copy_Realm(&r->client_princ->realm, &rep->crealm);
2468 if (r->et.flags.anonymous)
2469 ret = _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname(&rep->cname);
2470 else if (f.canonicalize || r->client->flags.force_canonicalize)
2471 ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep->cname, r->canon_client_princ);
2473 ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep->cname, r->client_princ);
2477 rep->ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
2478 if (f.canonicalize || r->server->flags.force_canonicalize)
2479 ret = copy_Realm(&r->server->principal->realm, &rep->ticket.realm);
2481 ret = copy_Realm(&r->server_princ->realm, &rep->ticket.realm);
2484 if (f.canonicalize || r->server->flags.force_canonicalize)
2485 _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep->ticket.sname,
2486 r->server->principal);
2488 _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep->ticket.sname,
2490 /* java 1.6 expects the name to be the same type, lets allow that
2491 * uncomplicated name-types, when f.canonicalize is not set (to
2492 * match Windows Server 1709). */
2493 #define CNT(sp,t) (((sp)->sname->name_type) == KRB5_NT_##t)
2495 && (CNT(b, UNKNOWN) || CNT(b, PRINCIPAL) || CNT(b, SRV_INST) || CNT(b, SRV_HST) || CNT(b, SRV_XHST))) {
2496 rep->ticket.sname.name_type = b->sname->name_type;
2500 r->et.flags.initial = 1;
2501 if(r->client->flags.forwardable && r->server->flags.forwardable)
2502 r->et.flags.forwardable = f.forwardable;
2503 if(r->client->flags.proxiable && r->server->flags.proxiable)
2504 r->et.flags.proxiable = f.proxiable;
2505 else if (f.proxiable) {
2506 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be proxiable");
2507 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
2510 if(r->client->flags.postdate && r->server->flags.postdate)
2511 r->et.flags.may_postdate = f.allow_postdate;
2512 else if (f.allow_postdate){
2513 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be postdate");
2514 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
2519 kdc_audit_addaddrs((kdc_request_t)r, b->addresses, "reqaddrs");
2521 /* check for valid set of addresses */
2522 if (!_kdc_check_addresses(r, b->addresses, r->addr)) {
2523 if (r->config->warn_ticket_addresses) {
2524 kdc_audit_setkv_bool((kdc_request_t)r, "wrongaddr", TRUE);
2526 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Request from wrong address");
2527 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
2532 ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep->cname, &r->et.cname);
2535 ret = copy_Realm(&rep->crealm, &r->et.crealm);
2543 start = r->et.authtime = kdc_time;
2545 if(f.postdated && req->req_body.from){
2546 ALLOC(r->et.starttime);
2547 start = *r->et.starttime = *req->req_body.from;
2548 r->et.flags.invalid = 1;
2549 r->et.flags.postdated = 1; /* XXX ??? */
2551 _kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
2554 /* be careful not overflowing */
2557 * Pre-auth can override r->client->max_life if configured.
2559 * See pre-auth methods, specifically PKINIT, which can get or derive
2560 * this from the client's certificate.
2562 if (r->pa_max_life > 0)
2563 t = rk_time_add(start, min(rk_time_sub(t, start), r->pa_max_life));
2564 else if (r->client->max_life)
2565 t = rk_time_add(start, min(rk_time_sub(t, start),
2566 *r->client->max_life));
2568 if (r->server->max_life)
2569 t = rk_time_add(start, min(rk_time_sub(t, start),
2570 *r->server->max_life));
2572 /* Pre-auth can bound endtime as well */
2573 if (r->pa_endtime > 0)
2574 t = rk_time_add(start, min(rk_time_sub(t, start), r->pa_endtime));
2576 t = min(t, rk_time_add(start, realm->max_life));
2580 if (start > r->et.endtime) {
2581 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Requested effective lifetime is negative or too short");
2582 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID;
2586 if(f.renewable_ok && r->et.endtime < *b->till){
2588 if(b->rtime == NULL){
2592 if(*b->rtime < *b->till)
2593 *b->rtime = *b->till;
2595 if(f.renewable && b->rtime){
2599 if(r->client->max_renew)
2600 t = rk_time_add(start, min(rk_time_sub(t, start),
2601 *r->client->max_renew));
2602 if(r->server->max_renew)
2603 t = rk_time_add(start, min(rk_time_sub(t, start),
2604 *r->server->max_renew));
2606 t = min(t, rk_time_add(start, realm->max_renew));
2608 ALLOC(r->et.renew_till);
2609 *r->et.renew_till = t;
2610 r->et.flags.renewable = 1;
2616 copy_HostAddresses(b->addresses, r->et.caddr);
2619 r->et.transited.tr_type = domain_X500_Compress;
2620 krb5_data_zero(&r->et.transited.contents);
2622 /* The MIT ASN.1 library (obviously) doesn't tell lengths encoded
2623 * as 0 and as 0x80 (meaning indefinite length) apart, and is thus
2624 * incapable of correctly decoding SEQUENCE OF's of zero length.
2626 * To fix this, always send at least one no-op last_req
2628 * If there's a pw_end or valid_end we will use that,
2629 * otherwise just a dummy lr.
2631 r->ek.last_req.val = malloc(2 * sizeof(*r->ek.last_req.val));
2632 if (r->ek.last_req.val == NULL) {
2636 r->ek.last_req.len = 0;
2637 if (r->client->pw_end
2638 && (config->kdc_warn_pwexpire == 0
2639 || kdc_time + config->kdc_warn_pwexpire >= *r->client->pw_end)) {
2640 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_PW_EXPTIME;
2641 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *r->client->pw_end;
2642 ++r->ek.last_req.len;
2644 if (r->client->valid_end) {
2645 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_ACCT_EXPTIME;
2646 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *r->client->valid_end;
2647 ++r->ek.last_req.len;
2649 if (r->ek.last_req.len == 0) {
2650 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_NONE;
2651 r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = 0;
2652 ++r->ek.last_req.len;
2654 r->ek.nonce = b->nonce;
2655 if (r->client->valid_end || r->client->pw_end) {
2656 ALLOC(r->ek.key_expiration);
2657 if (r->client->valid_end) {
2658 if (r->client->pw_end)
2659 *r->ek.key_expiration = min(*r->client->valid_end,
2660 *r->client->pw_end);
2662 *r->ek.key_expiration = *r->client->valid_end;
2664 *r->ek.key_expiration = *r->client->pw_end;
2666 r->ek.key_expiration = NULL;
2667 r->ek.flags = r->et.flags;
2668 r->ek.authtime = r->et.authtime;
2669 if (r->et.starttime) {
2670 ALLOC(r->ek.starttime);
2671 *r->ek.starttime = *r->et.starttime;
2673 r->ek.endtime = r->et.endtime;
2674 if (r->et.renew_till) {
2675 ALLOC(r->ek.renew_till);
2676 *r->ek.renew_till = *r->et.renew_till;
2678 ret = copy_Realm(&rep->ticket.realm, &r->ek.srealm);
2681 ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep->ticket.sname, &r->ek.sname);
2686 copy_HostAddresses(r->et.caddr, r->ek.caddr);
2690 * Check and session and reply keys
2693 if (r->session_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) {
2694 ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(r->context, r->sessionetype, &r->session_key);
2699 if (r->reply_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) {
2700 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Client have no reply key");
2701 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
2705 ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&r->session_key, &r->et.key);
2709 ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&r->session_key, &r->ek.key);
2714 if (!r->et.flags.anonymous) {
2715 ret = generate_pac(r, skey, krbtgt_key, is_tgs);
2720 if (r->client->flags.synthetic) {
2721 ret = add_synthetic_princ_ad(r);
2726 _kdc_log_timestamp(r, "AS-REQ", r->et.authtime,
2727 r->et.starttime, r->et.endtime,
2730 _log_astgs_req(r, setype);
2733 * We always say we support FAST/enc-pa-rep
2736 r->et.flags.enc_pa_rep = r->ek.flags.enc_pa_rep = 1;
2739 * update reply-key with strengthen-key
2742 ret = _kdc_fast_strengthen_reply_key(r);
2747 * Add REQ_ENC_PA_REP if client supports it
2751 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP);
2754 ret = add_enc_pa_rep(r);
2756 msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
2757 _kdc_r_log(r, 4, "add_enc_pa_rep failed: %s: %d", msg, ret);
2758 krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
2764 * Last chance for plugins to update reply
2766 ret = _kdc_finalize_reply(r);
2771 * Don't send kvno from client entry if the pre-authentication
2772 * mechanism replaced the reply key.
2775 ret = _kdc_encode_reply(r->context, config,
2776 r, req->req_body.nonce, setype,
2777 r->server->kvno, &skey->key,
2778 pa_used_flag_isset(r, PA_REPLACE_REPLY_KEY) ? 0 : r->client->kvno,
2784 * Check if message too large
2786 if (r->datagram_reply && r->reply->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) {
2787 krb5_data_free(r->reply);
2788 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG;
2789 _kdc_set_e_text(r, "Reply packet too large");
2793 r->error_code = ret;
2795 krb5_error_code ret2 = _kdc_audit_request(r);
2797 krb5_data_free(r->reply);
2803 * In case of a non proxy error, build an error message.
2805 if (ret != 0 && ret != HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE && r->reply->length == 0) {
2806 kdc_log(r->context, config, 5, "as-req: sending error: %d to client", ret);
2807 ret = _kdc_fast_mk_error(r,
2818 if (r->pa_used && r->pa_used->cleanup)
2819 r->pa_used->cleanup(r);
2821 free_AS_REP(&r->rep);
2822 free_EncTicketPart(&r->et);
2823 free_EncKDCRepPart(&r->ek);
2824 _kdc_free_fast_state(&r->fast);
2826 if (r->client_princ) {
2827 krb5_free_principal(r->context, r->client_princ);
2828 r->client_princ = NULL;
2830 if (r->server_princ){
2831 krb5_free_principal(r->context, r->server_princ);
2832 r->server_princ = NULL;
2835 _kdc_free_ent(r->context, r->clientdb, r->client);
2837 _kdc_free_ent(r->context, r->serverdb, r->server);
2839 _kdc_free_ent(r->context, r->krbtgtdb, r->krbtgt);
2840 if (r->armor_crypto) {
2841 krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, r->armor_crypto);
2842 r->armor_crypto = NULL;
2844 if (r->armor_ticket)
2845 krb5_free_ticket(r->context, r->armor_ticket);
2846 if (r->armor_server)
2847 _kdc_free_ent(r->context, r->armor_serverdb, r->armor_server);
2848 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
2849 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->session_key);
2850 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->strengthen_key);
2851 krb5_pac_free(r->context, r->pac);