1 /* -*- c-file-style: "linux" -*-
3 * Copyright (C) 1996-2000 by Andrew Tridgell
4 * Copyright (C) Paul Mackerras 1996
5 * Copyright (C) 2001, 2002 by Martin Pool <mbp@samba.org>
7 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
8 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
9 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
10 * (at your option) any later version.
12 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
13 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
14 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
15 * GNU General Public License for more details.
17 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
18 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
19 * Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
25 * Utilities used in rsync
31 extern struct exclude_list_struct server_exclude_list;
33 int sanitize_paths = 0;
38 * Set a fd into nonblocking mode
40 void set_nonblocking(int fd)
44 if ((val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0)) == -1)
46 if (!(val & NONBLOCK_FLAG)) {
48 fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val);
53 * Set a fd into blocking mode
55 void set_blocking(int fd)
59 if ((val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0)) == -1)
61 if (val & NONBLOCK_FLAG) {
62 val &= ~NONBLOCK_FLAG;
63 fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val);
69 * Create a file descriptor pair - like pipe() but use socketpair if
70 * possible (because of blocking issues on pipes).
72 * Always set non-blocking.
74 int fd_pair(int fd[2])
79 ret = socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, fd);
85 set_nonblocking(fd[0]);
86 set_nonblocking(fd[1]);
93 void print_child_argv(char **cmd)
95 rprintf(FINFO, "opening connection using ");
97 /* Look for characters that ought to be quoted. This
98 * is not a great quoting algorithm, but it's
99 * sufficient for a log message. */
100 if (strspn(*cmd, "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
101 "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
103 ",.-_=+@/") != strlen(*cmd)) {
104 rprintf(FINFO, "\"%s\" ", *cmd);
106 rprintf(FINFO, "%s ", *cmd);
109 rprintf(FINFO, "\n");
113 void out_of_memory(char *str)
115 rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: out of memory in %s\n", str);
116 exit_cleanup(RERR_MALLOC);
119 void overflow(char *str)
121 rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: buffer overflow in %s\n", str);
122 exit_cleanup(RERR_MALLOC);
127 int set_modtime(char *fname, time_t modtime)
134 rprintf(FINFO, "set modtime of %s to (%ld) %s",
135 fname, (long) modtime,
136 asctime(localtime(&modtime)));
142 tbuf.actime = time(NULL);
143 tbuf.modtime = modtime;
144 return utime(fname,&tbuf);
145 #elif defined(HAVE_UTIME)
149 return utime(fname,t);
152 t[0].tv_sec = time(NULL);
154 t[1].tv_sec = modtime;
156 return utimes(fname,t);
163 Create any necessary directories in fname. Unfortunately we don't know
164 what perms to give the directory when this is called so we need to rely
167 int create_directory_path(char *fname, int base_umask)
171 while (*fname == '/')
173 while (strncmp(fname, "./", 2) == 0)
177 while ((p = strchr(p,'/')) != NULL) {
179 do_mkdir(fname, 0777 & ~base_umask);
188 * Write @p len bytes at @p ptr to descriptor @p desc, retrying if
191 * @retval len upon success
193 * @retval <0 write's (negative) error code
195 * Derived from GNU C's cccp.c.
197 static int full_write(int desc, char *ptr, size_t len)
203 int written = write(desc, ptr, len);
209 total_written += written;
213 return total_written;
218 * Read @p len bytes at @p ptr from descriptor @p desc, retrying if
221 * @retval >0 the actual number of bytes read
225 * @retval <0 for an error.
227 * Derived from GNU C's cccp.c. */
228 static int safe_read(int desc, char *ptr, size_t len)
236 n_chars = read(desc, ptr, len);
237 } while (n_chars < 0 && errno == EINTR);
245 * This is used in conjunction with the --temp-dir option */
246 int copy_file(char *source, char *dest, mode_t mode)
251 int len; /* Number of bytes read into `buf'. */
253 ifd = do_open(source, O_RDONLY, 0);
255 rprintf(FERROR,"open %s: %s\n",
256 source,strerror(errno));
260 if (robust_unlink(dest) && errno != ENOENT) {
261 rprintf(FERROR,"unlink %s: %s\n",
262 dest,strerror(errno));
266 ofd = do_open(dest, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL, mode);
268 rprintf(FERROR,"open %s: %s\n",
269 dest,strerror(errno));
274 while ((len = safe_read(ifd, buf, sizeof buf)) > 0) {
275 if (full_write(ofd, buf, len) < 0) {
276 rprintf(FERROR,"write %s: %s\n",
277 dest,strerror(errno));
288 rprintf(FERROR,"read %s: %s\n",
289 source,strerror(errno));
296 /* MAX_RENAMES should be 10**MAX_RENAMES_DIGITS */
297 #define MAX_RENAMES_DIGITS 3
298 #define MAX_RENAMES 1000
301 * Robust unlink: some OS'es (HPUX) refuse to unlink busy files, so
302 * rename to <path>/.rsyncNNN instead.
304 * Note that successive rsync runs will shuffle the filenames around a
305 * bit as long as the file is still busy; this is because this function
306 * does not know if the unlink call is due to a new file coming in, or
307 * --delete trying to remove old .rsyncNNN files, hence it renames it
310 int robust_unlink(char *fname)
313 return do_unlink(fname);
315 static int counter = 1;
317 char path[MAXPATHLEN];
319 rc = do_unlink(fname);
320 if (rc == 0 || errno != ETXTBSY)
323 if ((pos = strlcpy(path, fname, MAXPATHLEN)) >= MAXPATHLEN)
324 pos = MAXPATHLEN - 1;
326 while (pos > 0 && path[pos-1] != '/')
328 pos += strlcpy(path+pos, ".rsync", MAXPATHLEN-pos);
330 if (pos > (MAXPATHLEN-MAX_RENAMES_DIGITS-1)) {
335 /* start where the last one left off to reduce chance of clashes */
338 sprintf(&path[pos], "%03d", counter);
339 if (++counter >= MAX_RENAMES)
341 } while ((rc = access(path, 0)) == 0 && counter != start);
344 rprintf(FINFO,"renaming %s to %s because of text busy\n",
348 /* maybe we should return rename()'s exit status? Nah. */
349 if (do_rename(fname, path) != 0) {
357 /* Returns 0 on success, -1 on most errors, and -2 if we got an error
358 * trying to copy the file across file systems. */
359 int robust_rename(char *from, char *to, int mode)
364 if (do_rename(from, to) == 0)
370 if (robust_unlink(to) != 0)
375 if (copy_file(from, to, mode) != 0)
387 static pid_t all_pids[10];
390 /** Fork and record the pid of the child. **/
393 pid_t newpid = fork();
395 if (newpid != 0 && newpid != -1) {
396 all_pids[num_pids++] = newpid;
404 * @todo It would be kind of nice to make sure that they are actually
405 * all our children before we kill them, because their pids may have
406 * been recycled by some other process. Perhaps when we wait for a
407 * child, we should remove it from this array. Alternatively we could
408 * perhaps use process groups, but I think that would not work on
409 * ancient Unix versions that don't support them.
411 void kill_all(int sig)
415 for (i = 0; i < num_pids; i++) {
416 /* Let's just be a little careful where we
417 * point that gun, hey? See kill(2) for the
418 * magic caused by negative values. */
419 pid_t p = all_pids[i];
431 /** Turn a user name into a uid */
432 int name_to_uid(char *name, uid_t *uid)
435 if (!name || !*name) return 0;
436 pass = getpwnam(name);
444 /** Turn a group name into a gid */
445 int name_to_gid(char *name, gid_t *gid)
448 if (!name || !*name) return 0;
449 grp = getgrnam(name);
458 /** Lock a byte range in a open file */
459 int lock_range(int fd, int offset, int len)
463 lock.l_type = F_WRLCK;
464 lock.l_whence = SEEK_SET;
465 lock.l_start = offset;
469 return fcntl(fd,F_SETLK,&lock) == 0;
472 static int exclude_server_path(char *arg)
476 if (server_exclude_list.head) {
477 for (s = arg; (s = strchr(s, '/')) != NULL; ) {
479 if (check_exclude(&server_exclude_list, arg, 1) < 0) {
480 /* We must leave arg truncated! */
489 static void glob_expand_one(char *s, char **argv, int *argc, int maxargs)
491 #if !(defined(HAVE_GLOB) && defined(HAVE_GLOB_H))
493 s = argv[*argc] = strdup(s);
494 exclude_server_path(s);
497 extern int sanitize_paths;
503 s = argv[*argc] = strdup(s);
504 if (sanitize_paths) {
505 sanitize_path(s, NULL);
508 memset(&globbuf, 0, sizeof globbuf);
509 if (!exclude_server_path(s))
510 glob(s, 0, NULL, &globbuf);
511 if (globbuf.gl_pathc == 0) {
516 for (i = 0; i < maxargs - *argc && i < (int)globbuf.gl_pathc; i++) {
519 argv[*argc + i] = strdup(globbuf.gl_pathv[i]);
520 if (!argv[*argc + i])
521 out_of_memory("glob_expand");
528 /* This routine is only used in daemon mode. */
529 void glob_expand(char *base1, char **argv, int *argc, int maxargs)
531 char *s = argv[*argc];
534 int base_len = strlen(base);
536 if (!s || !*s) return;
538 if (strncmp(s, base, base_len) == 0)
542 if (!s) out_of_memory("glob_expand");
544 if (asprintf(&base," %s/", base1) <= 0) out_of_memory("glob_expand");
548 while ((p = strstr(q,base)) != NULL && *argc < maxargs) {
549 /* split it at this point */
551 glob_expand_one(q, argv, argc, maxargs);
555 if (*q && *argc < maxargs)
556 glob_expand_one(q, argv, argc, maxargs);
563 * Convert a string to lower case
565 void strlower(char *s)
568 if (isupper(* (unsigned char *) s))
569 *s = tolower(* (unsigned char *) s);
574 /* Join strings p1 & p2 into "dest" with a guaranteed '/' between them. (If
575 * p1 ends with a '/', no extra '/' is inserted.) Returns the length of both
576 * strings + 1 (if '/' was inserted), regardless of whether the null-terminated
577 * string fits into destsize. */
578 size_t pathjoin(char *dest, size_t destsize, const char *p1, const char *p2)
580 size_t len = strlcpy(dest, p1, destsize);
581 if (len < destsize - 1) {
582 if (!len || dest[len-1] != '/')
584 if (len < destsize - 1)
585 len += strlcpy(dest + len, p2, destsize - len);
592 len += strlen(p2) + 1; /* Assume we'd insert a '/'. */
596 /* Join any number of strings together, putting them in "dest". The return
597 * value is the length of all the strings, regardless of whether the null-
598 * terminated whole fits in destsize. Your list of string pointers must end
599 * with a NULL to indicate the end of the list. */
600 size_t stringjoin(char *dest, size_t destsize, ...)
606 va_start(ap, destsize);
608 if (!(src = va_arg(ap, const char *)))
615 memcpy(dest, src, len);
626 void clean_fname(char *name)
637 if ((p = strstr(name,"/./")) != NULL) {
645 if ((p = strstr(name,"//")) != NULL) {
653 if (strncmp(p = name, "./", 2) == 0) {
660 l = strlen(p = name);
661 if (l > 1 && p[l-1] == '/') {
669 * Make path appear as if a chroot had occurred:
671 * @li 1. remove leading "/" (or replace with "." if at end)
673 * @li 2. remove leading ".." components (except those allowed by @p reldir)
675 * @li 3. delete any other "<dir>/.." (recursively)
677 * Can only shrink paths, so sanitizes in place.
679 * While we're at it, remove double slashes and "." components like
680 * clean_fname() does, but DON'T remove a trailing slash because that
681 * is sometimes significant on command line arguments.
683 * If @p reldir is non-null, it is a sanitized directory that the path will be
684 * relative to, so allow as many ".." at the beginning of the path as
685 * there are components in reldir. This is used for symbolic link targets.
686 * If reldir is non-null and the path began with "/", to be completely like
687 * a chroot we should add in depth levels of ".." at the beginning of the
688 * path, but that would blow the assumption that the path doesn't grow and
689 * it is not likely to end up being a valid symlink anyway, so just do
690 * the normal removal of the leading "/" instead.
692 * Contributed by Dave Dykstra <dwd@bell-labs.com>
694 void sanitize_path(char *p, char *reldir)
703 if (*reldir++ == '/') {
711 /* remove leading slashes */
715 /* this loop iterates once per filename component in p.
716 * both p (and sanp if the original had a slash) should
717 * always be left pointing after a slash
719 if (*p == '.' && (p[1] == '/' || p[1] == '\0')) {
720 /* skip "." component */
721 while (*++p == '/') {
722 /* skip following slashes */
728 if (*p == '.' && p[1] == '.' && (p[2] == '/' || p[2] == '\0')) {
729 /* ".." component followed by slash or end */
730 if (depth > 0 && sanp == start) {
731 /* allow depth levels of .. at the beginning */
739 /* back up sanp one level */
740 --sanp; /* now pointing at slash */
741 while (sanp > start && sanp[-1] != '/') {
742 /* skip back up to slash */
750 /* copy one component through next slash */
752 if (*p == '\0' || p[-1] == '/') {
754 /* skip multiple slashes */
761 /* move the virtual beginning to leave the .. alone */
765 if (sanp == start && !allowdotdot) {
766 /* ended up with nothing, so put in "." component */
768 * note that the !allowdotdot doesn't prevent this from
769 * happening in all allowed ".." situations, but I didn't
770 * think it was worth putting in an extra variable to ensure
771 * it since an extra "." won't hurt in those situations.
778 /* Works much like sanitize_path(), with these differences: (1) a new buffer
779 * is allocated for the sanitized path rather than modifying it in-place; (2)
780 * a leading slash gets transformed into the rootdir value (which can be empty
781 * or NULL if you just want the slash to get dropped); (3) no "reldir" can be
783 char *alloc_sanitize_path(const char *path, const char *rootdir)
786 int rlen, plen = strlen(path);
788 if (*path == '/' && rootdir) {
789 rlen = strlen(rootdir);
794 if (!(buf = new_array(char, rlen + plen + 1)))
795 out_of_memory("alloc_sanitize_path");
797 memcpy(buf, rootdir, rlen);
798 memcpy(buf + rlen, path, plen + 1);
802 sanitize_path(buf + rlen, NULL);
803 if (rlen && buf[rlen] == '.' && buf[rlen+1] == '\0') {
812 char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
813 unsigned int curr_dir_len;
816 * Like chdir(), but it keeps track of the current directory (in the
817 * global "curr_dir"), and ensures that the path size doesn't overflow.
818 * Also cleans the path using the clean_fname() function.
820 int push_dir(char *dir)
822 static int initialised;
827 getcwd(curr_dir, sizeof curr_dir - 1);
828 curr_dir_len = strlen(curr_dir);
831 if (!dir) /* this call was probably just to initialize */
835 if (len == 1 && *dir == '.')
838 if ((*dir == '/' ? len : curr_dir_len + 1 + len) >= sizeof curr_dir)
845 memcpy(curr_dir, dir, len + 1);
848 curr_dir[curr_dir_len++] = '/';
849 memcpy(curr_dir + curr_dir_len, dir, len + 1);
853 clean_fname(curr_dir);
859 * Reverse a push_dir() call. You must pass in an absolute path
860 * that was copied from a prior value of "curr_dir".
862 int pop_dir(char *dir)
867 curr_dir_len = strlcpy(curr_dir, dir, sizeof curr_dir);
868 if (curr_dir_len >= sizeof curr_dir)
869 curr_dir_len = sizeof curr_dir - 1;
875 * Return a quoted string with the full pathname of the indicated filename.
876 * The string " (in MODNAME)" may also be appended. The returned pointer
877 * remains valid until the next time full_fname() is called.
879 char *full_fname(char *fn)
881 extern int module_id;
882 static char *result = NULL;
895 if (module_id >= 0) {
897 m2 = lp_name(module_id);
900 if (!lp_use_chroot(module_id)) {
901 char *p = lp_path(module_id);
902 if (*p != '/' || p[1])
915 asprintf(&result, "\"%s%s%s\"%s%s%s", p1, p2, fn, m1, m2, m3);
920 /** We need to supply our own strcmp function for file list comparisons
921 to ensure that signed/unsigned usage is consistent between machines. */
922 int u_strcmp(const char *cs1, const char *cs2)
924 const uchar *s1 = (const uchar *)cs1;
925 const uchar *s2 = (const uchar *)cs2;
927 while (*s1 && *s2 && (*s1 == *s2)) {
931 return (int)*s1 - (int)*s2;
937 * Determine if a symlink points outside the current directory tree.
938 * This is considered "unsafe" because e.g. when mirroring somebody
939 * else's machine it might allow them to establish a symlink to
940 * /etc/passwd, and then read it through a web server.
942 * Null symlinks and absolute symlinks are always unsafe.
944 * Basically here we are concerned with symlinks whose target contains
945 * "..", because this might cause us to walk back up out of the
946 * transferred directory. We are not allowed to go back up and
949 * @param dest Target of the symlink in question.
951 * @param src Top source directory currently applicable. Basically this
952 * is the first parameter to rsync in a simple invocation, but it's
953 * modified by flist.c in slightly complex ways.
955 * @retval True if unsafe
956 * @retval False is unsafe
960 int unsafe_symlink(const char *dest, const char *src)
962 const char *name, *slash;
965 /* all absolute and null symlinks are unsafe */
966 if (!dest || !*dest || *dest == '/') return 1;
968 /* find out what our safety margin is */
969 for (name = src; (slash = strchr(name, '/')) != 0; name = slash+1) {
970 if (strncmp(name, "../", 3) == 0) {
972 } else if (strncmp(name, "./", 2) == 0) {
978 if (strcmp(name, "..") == 0)
981 for (name = dest; (slash = strchr(name, '/')) != 0; name = slash+1) {
982 if (strncmp(name, "../", 3) == 0) {
983 /* if at any point we go outside the current directory
984 then stop - it is unsafe */
987 } else if (strncmp(name, "./", 2) == 0) {
993 if (strcmp(name, "..") == 0)
1001 * Return the date and time as a string
1003 char *timestring(time_t t)
1005 static char TimeBuf[200];
1006 struct tm *tm = localtime(&t);
1008 #ifdef HAVE_STRFTIME
1009 strftime(TimeBuf, sizeof TimeBuf - 1, "%Y/%m/%d %H:%M:%S", tm);
1011 strlcpy(TimeBuf, asctime(tm), sizeof TimeBuf);
1014 if (TimeBuf[strlen(TimeBuf)-1] == '\n') {
1015 TimeBuf[strlen(TimeBuf)-1] = 0;
1023 * Sleep for a specified number of milliseconds.
1025 * Always returns TRUE. (In the future it might return FALSE if
1031 struct timeval tval, t1, t2;
1033 gettimeofday(&t1, NULL);
1034 gettimeofday(&t2, NULL);
1037 tval.tv_sec = (t-tdiff)/1000;
1038 tval.tv_usec = 1000*((t-tdiff)%1000);
1041 select(0,NULL,NULL, NULL, &tval);
1043 gettimeofday(&t2, NULL);
1044 tdiff = (t2.tv_sec - t1.tv_sec)*1000 +
1045 (t2.tv_usec - t1.tv_usec)/1000;
1053 * Determine if two file modification times are equivalent (either
1054 * exact or in the modification timestamp window established by
1057 * @retval 0 if the times should be treated as the same
1059 * @retval +1 if the first is later
1061 * @retval -1 if the 2nd is later
1063 int cmp_modtime(time_t file1, time_t file2)
1065 extern int modify_window;
1067 if (file2 > file1) {
1068 if (file2 - file1 <= modify_window) return 0;
1071 if (file1 - file2 <= modify_window) return 0;
1080 This routine is a trick to immediately catch errors when debugging
1081 with insure. A xterm with a gdb is popped up when insure catches
1082 a error. It is Linux specific.
1084 int _Insure_trap_error(int a1, int a2, int a3, int a4, int a5, int a6)
1090 asprintf(&cmd, "/usr/X11R6/bin/xterm -display :0 -T Panic -n Panic -e /bin/sh -c 'cat /tmp/ierrs.*.%d ; gdb /proc/%d/exe %d'",
1091 getpid(), getpid(), getpid());
1095 h = dlopen("/usr/local/parasoft/insure++lite/lib.linux2/libinsure.so", RTLD_LAZY);
1096 fn = dlsym(h, "_Insure_trap_error");
1099 ret = fn(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6);
1110 #define MALLOC_MAX 0x40000000
1112 void *_new_array(unsigned int size, unsigned long num)
1114 if (num >= MALLOC_MAX/size)
1116 return malloc(size * num);
1119 void *_realloc_array(void *ptr, unsigned int size, unsigned long num)
1121 if (num >= MALLOC_MAX/size)
1123 /* No realloc should need this, but just in case... */
1125 return malloc(size * num);
1126 return realloc(ptr, size * num);