struct {
uint16_t session_id;
DATA_BLOB application_key;
+ bool protected_key;
} smb1;
struct smb2cli_session *smb2;
struct {
DATA_BLOB signing_key;
} smb2_channel;
+
+ /*
+ * this should be a short term hack
+ * until the upper layers have implemented
+ * re-authentication.
+ */
+ bool disconnect_expired;
};
struct smbXcli_tcon {
bool should_sign;
bool should_encrypt;
+ uint64_t encryption_session_id;
bool signing_skipped;
bool notify_async;
return conn->protocol;
}
+bool smbXcli_conn_nt_smbs_supported(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
+{
+ if (conn->protocol >= PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ if (smb1cli_conn_capabilities(conn) & CAP_NT_SMBS) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+bool smbXcli_conn_use_status32(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
+{
+ if (conn->protocol >= PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ if (smb1cli_conn_capabilities(conn) & CAP_STATUS32) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+bool smbXcli_conn_use_large_files(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
+{
+ if (conn->protocol >= PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ if (smb1cli_conn_capabilities(conn) & CAP_LARGE_FILES) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
bool smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
{
if (conn->protocol >= PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
goto fail;
}
- ev = tevent_context_init(frame);
+ ev = samba_tevent_context_init(frame);
if (ev == NULL) {
goto fail;
}
uint8_t *hdr;
uint8_t cmd;
uint32_t wct_ofs;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ size_t min_size = MIN_SMB_SIZE;
- buflen = smb_len_nbt(buf);
+ buflen = smb_len_tcp(buf);
taken = 0;
hdr = buf + NBT_HDR_SIZE;
- if (buflen < MIN_SMB_SIZE) {
+ status = smb1cli_pull_raw_error(hdr);
+ if (NT_STATUS_IS_ERR(status)) {
+ /*
+ * This is an ugly hack to support OS/2
+ * which skips the byte_count in the DATA block
+ * on some error responses.
+ *
+ * See bug #9096
+ */
+ min_size -= sizeof(uint16_t);
+ }
+
+ if (buflen < min_size) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
}
size_t needed;
/*
- * we need at least WCT and BCC
+ * we need at least WCT
*/
- needed = sizeof(uint8_t) + sizeof(uint16_t);
+ needed = sizeof(uint8_t);
if (len < needed) {
DEBUG(10, ("%s: %d bytes left, expected at least %d\n",
__location__, (int)len, (int)needed));
goto inval;
}
+ if ((num_iov == 1) &&
+ (len == needed) &&
+ NT_STATUS_IS_ERR(status))
+ {
+ /*
+ * This is an ugly hack to support OS/2
+ * which skips the byte_count in the DATA block
+ * on some error responses.
+ *
+ * See bug #9096
+ */
+ iov_tmp = talloc_realloc(mem_ctx, iov, struct iovec,
+ num_iov + 2);
+ if (iov_tmp == NULL) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(iov);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+ iov = iov_tmp;
+ cur = &iov[num_iov];
+ num_iov += 2;
+
+ cur[0].iov_len = 0;
+ cur[0].iov_base = hdr + (wct_ofs + sizeof(uint8_t));
+ cur[1].iov_len = 0;
+ cur[1].iov_base = cur[0].iov_base;
+
+ taken += needed;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * we need at least BCC
+ */
+ needed += sizeof(uint16_t);
+ if (len < needed) {
+ DEBUG(10, ("%s: %d bytes left, expected at least %d\n",
+ __location__, (int)len, (int)needed));
+ goto inval;
+ }
+
/*
* Now we check if the specified bytes are there
*/
uint16_t mid;
bool oplock_break;
uint8_t *inhdr = inbuf + NBT_HDR_SIZE;
- size_t len = smb_len_nbt(inbuf);
+ size_t len = smb_len_tcp(inbuf);
struct iovec *iov = NULL;
int num_iov = 0;
struct tevent_req **chain = NULL;
cmd = CVAL(inhdr, HDR_COM);
status = smb1cli_pull_raw_error(inhdr);
+ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NETWORK_SESSION_EXPIRED) &&
+ (state->session != NULL) && state->session->disconnect_expired)
+ {
+ /*
+ * this should be a short term hack
+ * until the upper layers have implemented
+ * re-authentication.
+ */
+ return status;
+ }
+
if (state->smb1.chained_requests == NULL) {
if (num_iov != 3) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
|| (talloc_array_length(conn->pending) != 0));
}
+bool smbXcli_conn_dfs_supported(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
+{
+ if(conn->protocol >= PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
+ return (smb2cli_conn_server_capabilities(conn) & SMB2_CAP_DFS);
+ }
+
+ return (smb1cli_conn_capabilities(conn) & CAP_DFS);
+}
+
uint32_t smb2cli_conn_server_capabilities(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
{
return conn->smb2.server.capabilities;
}
substate = tevent_req_data(subreq, struct smbXcli_req_state);
+ /*
+ * clear everything but the SMB2_HDR_FLAG_ASYNC flag
+ * e.g. if SMB2_HDR_FLAG_CHAINED is set we get INVALID_PARAMETER back
+ */
+ flags &= SMB2_HDR_FLAG_ASYNC;
+
if (flags & SMB2_HDR_FLAG_ASYNC) {
mid = 0;
}
struct tevent_req *subreq;
struct iovec *iov;
int i, num_iov, nbt_len;
+ int tf_iov = -1;
+ const DATA_BLOB *encryption_key = NULL;
+ uint64_t encryption_session_id = 0;
/*
- * 1 for the nbt length
- * per request: TRANSFORM, HDR, fixed, dyn, padding
+ * 1 for the nbt length, optional TRANSFORM
+ * per request: HDR, fixed, dyn, padding
* -1 because the last one does not need padding
*/
- iov = talloc_array(reqs[0], struct iovec, 1 + 5*num_reqs - 1);
+ iov = talloc_array(reqs[0], struct iovec, 1 + 1 + 4*num_reqs - 1);
if (iov == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
num_iov = 1;
nbt_len = 0;
+ /*
+ * the session of the first request that requires encryption
+ * specifies the encryption key.
+ */
+ for (i=0; i<num_reqs; i++) {
+ if (!tevent_req_is_in_progress(reqs[i])) {
+ return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ state = tevent_req_data(reqs[i], struct smbXcli_req_state);
+
+ if (!smbXcli_conn_is_connected(state->conn)) {
+ return NT_STATUS_CONNECTION_DISCONNECTED;
+ }
+
+ if ((state->conn->protocol != PROTOCOL_NONE) &&
+ (state->conn->protocol < PROTOCOL_SMB2_02)) {
+ return NT_STATUS_REVISION_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ if (state->session == NULL) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (!state->smb2.should_encrypt) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ encryption_key = &state->session->smb2->encryption_key;
+ if (encryption_key->length == 0) {
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
+ }
+
+ encryption_session_id = state->session->smb2->session_id;
+
+ tf_iov = num_iov;
+ iov[num_iov].iov_base = state->smb2.transform;
+ iov[num_iov].iov_len = sizeof(state->smb2.transform);
+ num_iov += 1;
+
+ SBVAL(state->smb2.transform, SMB2_TF_PROTOCOL_ID, SMB2_TF_MAGIC);
+ SBVAL(state->smb2.transform, SMB2_TF_NONCE,
+ state->session->smb2->nonce_low);
+ SBVAL(state->smb2.transform, SMB2_TF_NONCE+8,
+ state->session->smb2->nonce_high);
+ SBVAL(state->smb2.transform, SMB2_TF_SESSION_ID,
+ encryption_session_id);
+
+ state->session->smb2->nonce_low += 1;
+ if (state->session->smb2->nonce_low == 0) {
+ state->session->smb2->nonce_high += 1;
+ state->session->smb2->nonce_low += 1;
+ }
+
+ nbt_len += SMB2_TF_HDR_SIZE;
+ break;
+ }
+
for (i=0; i<num_reqs; i++) {
- int tf_iov;
int hdr_iov;
size_t reqlen;
bool ret;
uint16_t credits;
uint64_t mid;
const DATA_BLOB *signing_key = NULL;
- const DATA_BLOB *encryption_key = NULL;
if (!tevent_req_is_in_progress(reqs[i])) {
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SBVAL(state->smb2.hdr, SMB2_HDR_MESSAGE_ID, mid);
skip_credits:
- if (state->session) {
+ if (state->session && encryption_key == NULL) {
/*
* We prefer the channel signing key if it is
* already there.
if (signing_key && signing_key->length == 0) {
signing_key = NULL;
}
-
- if (state->smb2.should_encrypt) {
- encryption_key = &state->session->smb2->encryption_key;
- }
- }
-
- if (encryption_key) {
- tf_iov = num_iov;
- iov[num_iov].iov_base = state->smb2.transform;
- iov[num_iov].iov_len = sizeof(state->smb2.transform);
- num_iov += 1;
}
hdr_iov = num_iov;
SIVAL(state->smb2.hdr, SMB2_HDR_NEXT_COMMAND, reqlen);
}
- if (encryption_key) {
- NTSTATUS status;
- uint8_t *buf;
- int vi;
-
- SBVAL(state->smb2.transform, SMB2_TF_NONCE,
- state->session->smb2->nonce_low);
- SBVAL(state->smb2.transform, SMB2_TF_NONCE+8,
- state->session->smb2->nonce_high);
-
- state->session->smb2->nonce_low += 1;
- if (state->session->smb2->nonce_low == 0) {
- state->session->smb2->nonce_high += 1;
- state->session->smb2->nonce_low += 1;
- }
-
- SBVAL(state->smb2.transform, SMB2_TF_MSG_SIZE,
- reqlen);
-
- buf = talloc_array(iov, uint8_t, reqlen);
- if (buf == NULL) {
- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
- }
-
- reqlen += SMB2_TF_HDR_SIZE;
+ state->smb2.encryption_session_id = encryption_session_id;
- /*
- * We copy the buffers before encrypting them,
- * this is at least currently needed for the
- * to keep state->smb2.hdr.
- *
- * Also the callers may expect there buffers
- * to be const.
- */
- for (vi = hdr_iov; vi < num_iov; vi++) {
- struct iovec *v = &iov[vi];
- const uint8_t *o = (const uint8_t *)v->iov_base;
-
- memcpy(buf, o, v->iov_len);
- v->iov_base = (void *)buf;
- buf += v->iov_len;
- }
-
- status = smb2_signing_encrypt_pdu(*encryption_key,
- state->session->conn->protocol,
- &iov[tf_iov], num_iov - tf_iov);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- return status;
- }
- } else if (signing_key) {
+ if (signing_key != NULL) {
NTSTATUS status;
status = smb2_signing_sign_pdu(*signing_key,
iov[0].iov_base = state->length_hdr;
iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(state->length_hdr);
+ if (encryption_key != NULL) {
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ size_t buflen = nbt_len - SMB2_TF_HDR_SIZE;
+ uint8_t *buf;
+ int vi;
+
+ buf = talloc_array(iov, uint8_t, buflen);
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We copy the buffers before encrypting them,
+ * this is at least currently needed for the
+ * to keep state->smb2.hdr.
+ *
+ * Also the callers may expect there buffers
+ * to be const.
+ */
+ for (vi = tf_iov + 1; vi < num_iov; vi++) {
+ struct iovec *v = &iov[vi];
+ const uint8_t *o = (const uint8_t *)v->iov_base;
+
+ memcpy(buf, o, v->iov_len);
+ v->iov_base = (void *)buf;
+ buf += v->iov_len;
+ }
+
+ status = smb2_signing_encrypt_pdu(*encryption_key,
+ state->conn->protocol,
+ &iov[tf_iov], num_iov - tf_iov);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ return status;
+ }
+ }
+
if (state->conn->dispatch_incoming == NULL) {
state->conn->dispatch_incoming = smb2cli_conn_dispatch_incoming;
}
int num_iov = 0;
size_t taken = 0;
uint8_t *first_hdr = buf;
+ size_t verified_buflen = 0;
+ uint8_t *tf = NULL;
+ size_t tf_len = 0;
iov = talloc_array(mem_ctx, struct iovec, num_iov);
if (iov == NULL) {
}
while (taken < buflen) {
- uint8_t *tf = NULL;
- size_t tf_len = 0;
size_t len = buflen - taken;
uint8_t *hdr = first_hdr + taken;
struct iovec *cur;
uint16_t body_size;
struct iovec *iov_tmp;
+ if (verified_buflen > taken) {
+ len = verified_buflen - taken;
+ } else {
+ tf = NULL;
+ tf_len = 0;
+ }
+
if (len < 4) {
DEBUG(10, ("%d bytes left, expected at least %d\n",
(int)len, 4));
struct smbXcli_session *s;
uint64_t uid;
struct iovec tf_iov[2];
+ size_t enc_len;
NTSTATUS status;
if (len < SMB2_TF_HDR_SIZE) {
taken += tf_len;
hdr = first_hdr + taken;
- len = IVAL(tf, SMB2_TF_MSG_SIZE);
+ enc_len = IVAL(tf, SMB2_TF_MSG_SIZE);
uid = BVAL(tf, SMB2_TF_SESSION_ID);
+ if (len < SMB2_TF_HDR_SIZE + enc_len) {
+ DEBUG(10, ("%d bytes left, expected at least %d\n",
+ (int)len,
+ (int)(SMB2_TF_HDR_SIZE + enc_len)));
+ goto inval;
+ }
+
s = conn->sessions;
for (; s; s = s->next) {
if (s->smb2->session_id != uid) {
tf_iov[0].iov_base = (void *)tf;
tf_iov[0].iov_len = tf_len;
tf_iov[1].iov_base = (void *)hdr;
- tf_iov[1].iov_len = len;
+ tf_iov[1].iov_len = enc_len;
status = smb2_signing_decrypt_pdu(s->smb2->decryption_key,
conn->protocol,
TALLOC_FREE(iov);
return status;
}
+
+ verified_buflen = taken + enc_len;
+ len = enc_len;
}
/*
if (next_command_ofs > full_size) {
goto inval;
}
- if (tf && next_command_ofs < len) {
- goto inval;
- }
full_size = next_command_ofs;
}
if (body_size < 2) {
uint32_t new_credits;
struct smbXcli_session *session = NULL;
const DATA_BLOB *signing_key = NULL;
+ bool was_encrypted = false;
new_credits = conn->smb2.cur_credits;
new_credits += credits;
}
}
+ if (cur[0].iov_len == SMB2_TF_HDR_SIZE) {
+ const uint8_t *tf = (const uint8_t *)cur[0].iov_base;
+ uint64_t uid = BVAL(tf, SMB2_TF_SESSION_ID);
+
+ /*
+ * If the response was encrypted in a SMB2_TRANSFORM
+ * pdu, which belongs to the correct session,
+ * we do not need to do signing checks
+ *
+ * It could be the session the response belongs to
+ * or the session that was used to encrypt the
+ * SMB2_TRANSFORM request.
+ */
+ if ((session && session->smb2->session_id == uid) ||
+ (state->smb2.encryption_session_id == uid)) {
+ signing_key = NULL;
+ was_encrypted = true;
+ }
+ }
+
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_USER_SESSION_DELETED)) {
/*
* if the server returns NT_STATUS_USER_SESSION_DELETED
* propagate the NT_STATUS_USER_SESSION_DELETED
* status to the caller.
*/
+ state->smb2.signing_skipped = true;
signing_key = NULL;
- } else if (state->smb2.should_encrypt) {
- if (cur[0].iov_len != SMB2_TF_HDR_SIZE) {
+ }
+
+ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER)) {
+ /*
+ * if the server returns
+ * NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER
+ * the response might not be encrypted.
+ */
+ if (state->smb2.should_encrypt && !was_encrypted) {
+ state->smb2.signing_skipped = true;
+ signing_key = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (state->smb2.should_encrypt && !was_encrypted) {
+ if (!state->smb2.signing_skipped) {
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
}
}
}
+ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NETWORK_SESSION_EXPIRED) &&
+ (session != NULL) && session->disconnect_expired)
+ {
+ /*
+ * this should be a short term hack
+ * until the upper layers have implemented
+ * re-authentication.
+ */
+ return status;
+ }
+
smbXcli_req_unset_pending(req);
/*
if (server_security_mode & NEGOTIATE_SECURITY_SIGNATURES_ENABLED) {
server_signing = "supported";
server_allowed = true;
+ } else if (conn->mandatory_signing) {
+ /*
+ * We have mandatory signing as client
+ * lets assume the server will look at our
+ * FLAGS2_SMB_SECURITY_SIGNATURES_REQUIRED
+ * flag in the session setup
+ */
+ server_signing = "not announced";
+ server_allowed = true;
}
if (server_security_mode & NEGOTIATE_SECURITY_SIGNATURES_REQUIRED) {
server_signing = "required";
status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
goto fail;
}
- ev = tevent_context_init(frame);
+ ev = samba_tevent_context_init(frame);
if (ev == NULL) {
goto fail;
}
return session;
}
+struct smbXcli_session *smbXcli_session_copy(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct smbXcli_session *src)
+{
+ struct smbXcli_session *session;
+
+ session = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct smbXcli_session);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ session->smb2 = talloc_zero(session, struct smb2cli_session);
+ if (session->smb2 == NULL) {
+ talloc_free(session);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ session->conn = src->conn;
+ *session->smb2 = *src->smb2;
+ session->smb2_channel = src->smb2_channel;
+ session->disconnect_expired = src->disconnect_expired;
+
+ DLIST_ADD_END(src->conn->sessions, session, struct smbXcli_session *);
+ talloc_set_destructor(session, smbXcli_session_destructor);
+
+ return session;
+}
+
+
NTSTATUS smbXcli_session_application_key(struct smbXcli_session *session,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
DATA_BLOB *key)
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
+void smbXcli_session_set_disconnect_expired(struct smbXcli_session *session)
+{
+ session->disconnect_expired = true;
+}
+
uint16_t smb1cli_session_current_id(struct smbXcli_session *session)
{
return session->smb1.session_id;
* return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
*/
data_blob_clear_free(&session->smb1.application_key);
+ session->smb1.protected_key = false;
}
if (_session_key.length == 0) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
+ session->smb1.protected_key = false;
+
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS smb1cli_session_protect_session_key(struct smbXcli_session *session)
+{
+ if (session->smb1.protected_key) {
+ /* already protected */
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ if (session->smb1.application_key.length != 16) {
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
+ }
+
+ smb_key_derivation(session->smb1.application_key.data,
+ session->smb1.application_key.length,
+ session->smb1.application_key.data);
+
+ session->smb1.protected_key = true;
+
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
git.samba.org / obnox / samba / samba-obnox.git / blobdiff