struct {
DATA_BLOB signing_key;
} smb2_channel;
+
+ /*
+ * this should be a short term hack
+ * until the upper layers have implemented
+ * re-authentication.
+ */
+ bool disconnect_expired;
};
struct smbXcli_tcon {
return conn->protocol;
}
+bool smbXcli_conn_nt_smbs_supported(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
+{
+ if (conn->protocol >= PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ if (smb1cli_conn_capabilities(conn) & CAP_NT_SMBS) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+bool smbXcli_conn_use_status32(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
+{
+ if (conn->protocol >= PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ if (smb1cli_conn_capabilities(conn) & CAP_STATUS32) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+bool smbXcli_conn_use_large_files(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
+{
+ if (conn->protocol >= PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ if (smb1cli_conn_capabilities(conn) & CAP_LARGE_FILES) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
bool smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
{
if (conn->protocol >= PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
goto fail;
}
- ev = tevent_context_init(frame);
+ ev = samba_tevent_context_init(frame);
if (ev == NULL) {
goto fail;
}
uint8_t *hdr;
uint8_t cmd;
uint32_t wct_ofs;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ size_t min_size = MIN_SMB_SIZE;
- buflen = smb_len_nbt(buf);
+ buflen = smb_len_tcp(buf);
taken = 0;
hdr = buf + NBT_HDR_SIZE;
- if (buflen < MIN_SMB_SIZE) {
+ status = smb1cli_pull_raw_error(hdr);
+ if (NT_STATUS_IS_ERR(status)) {
+ /*
+ * This is an ugly hack to support OS/2
+ * which skips the byte_count in the DATA block
+ * on some error responses.
+ *
+ * See bug #9096
+ */
+ min_size -= sizeof(uint16_t);
+ }
+
+ if (buflen < min_size) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
}
size_t needed;
/*
- * we need at least WCT and BCC
+ * we need at least WCT
*/
- needed = sizeof(uint8_t) + sizeof(uint16_t);
+ needed = sizeof(uint8_t);
if (len < needed) {
DEBUG(10, ("%s: %d bytes left, expected at least %d\n",
__location__, (int)len, (int)needed));
goto inval;
}
+ if ((num_iov == 1) &&
+ (len == needed) &&
+ NT_STATUS_IS_ERR(status))
+ {
+ /*
+ * This is an ugly hack to support OS/2
+ * which skips the byte_count in the DATA block
+ * on some error responses.
+ *
+ * See bug #9096
+ */
+ iov_tmp = talloc_realloc(mem_ctx, iov, struct iovec,
+ num_iov + 2);
+ if (iov_tmp == NULL) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(iov);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+ iov = iov_tmp;
+ cur = &iov[num_iov];
+ num_iov += 2;
+
+ cur[0].iov_len = 0;
+ cur[0].iov_base = hdr + (wct_ofs + sizeof(uint8_t));
+ cur[1].iov_len = 0;
+ cur[1].iov_base = cur[0].iov_base;
+
+ taken += needed;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * we need at least BCC
+ */
+ needed += sizeof(uint16_t);
+ if (len < needed) {
+ DEBUG(10, ("%s: %d bytes left, expected at least %d\n",
+ __location__, (int)len, (int)needed));
+ goto inval;
+ }
+
/*
* Now we check if the specified bytes are there
*/
uint16_t mid;
bool oplock_break;
uint8_t *inhdr = inbuf + NBT_HDR_SIZE;
- size_t len = smb_len_nbt(inbuf);
+ size_t len = smb_len_tcp(inbuf);
struct iovec *iov = NULL;
int num_iov = 0;
struct tevent_req **chain = NULL;
cmd = CVAL(inhdr, HDR_COM);
status = smb1cli_pull_raw_error(inhdr);
+ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NETWORK_SESSION_EXPIRED) &&
+ (state->session != NULL) && state->session->disconnect_expired)
+ {
+ /*
+ * this should be a short term hack
+ * until the upper layers have implemented
+ * re-authentication.
+ */
+ return status;
+ }
+
if (state->smb1.chained_requests == NULL) {
if (num_iov != 3) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
|| (talloc_array_length(conn->pending) != 0));
}
+bool smbXcli_conn_dfs_supported(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
+{
+ if(conn->protocol >= PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
+ return (smb2cli_conn_server_capabilities(conn) & SMB2_CAP_DFS);
+ }
+
+ return (smb1cli_conn_capabilities(conn) & CAP_DFS);
+}
+
uint32_t smb2cli_conn_server_capabilities(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
{
return conn->smb2.server.capabilities;
struct smbXcli_session *s;
uint64_t uid;
struct iovec tf_iov[2];
+ size_t enc_len;
NTSTATUS status;
if (len < SMB2_TF_HDR_SIZE) {
taken += tf_len;
hdr = first_hdr + taken;
- len = IVAL(tf, SMB2_TF_MSG_SIZE);
+ enc_len = IVAL(tf, SMB2_TF_MSG_SIZE);
uid = BVAL(tf, SMB2_TF_SESSION_ID);
+ if (len < SMB2_TF_HDR_SIZE + enc_len) {
+ DEBUG(10, ("%d bytes left, expected at least %d\n",
+ (int)len,
+ (int)(SMB2_TF_HDR_SIZE + enc_len)));
+ goto inval;
+ }
+
s = conn->sessions;
for (; s; s = s->next) {
if (s->smb2->session_id != uid) {
tf_iov[0].iov_base = (void *)tf;
tf_iov[0].iov_len = tf_len;
tf_iov[1].iov_base = (void *)hdr;
- tf_iov[1].iov_len = len;
+ tf_iov[1].iov_len = enc_len;
status = smb2_signing_decrypt_pdu(s->smb2->decryption_key,
conn->protocol,
return status;
}
- verified_buflen = taken + len;
+ verified_buflen = taken + enc_len;
+ len = enc_len;
}
/*
}
}
+ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NETWORK_SESSION_EXPIRED) &&
+ (session != NULL) && session->disconnect_expired)
+ {
+ /*
+ * this should be a short term hack
+ * until the upper layers have implemented
+ * re-authentication.
+ */
+ return status;
+ }
+
smbXcli_req_unset_pending(req);
/*
if (server_security_mode & NEGOTIATE_SECURITY_SIGNATURES_ENABLED) {
server_signing = "supported";
server_allowed = true;
+ } else if (conn->mandatory_signing) {
+ /*
+ * We have mandatory signing as client
+ * lets assume the server will look at our
+ * FLAGS2_SMB_SECURITY_SIGNATURES_REQUIRED
+ * flag in the session setup
+ */
+ server_signing = "not announced";
+ server_allowed = true;
}
if (server_security_mode & NEGOTIATE_SECURITY_SIGNATURES_REQUIRED) {
server_signing = "required";
status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
goto fail;
}
- ev = tevent_context_init(frame);
+ ev = samba_tevent_context_init(frame);
if (ev == NULL) {
goto fail;
}
return session;
}
+struct smbXcli_session *smbXcli_session_copy(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct smbXcli_session *src)
+{
+ struct smbXcli_session *session;
+
+ session = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct smbXcli_session);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ session->smb2 = talloc_zero(session, struct smb2cli_session);
+ if (session->smb2 == NULL) {
+ talloc_free(session);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ session->conn = src->conn;
+ *session->smb2 = *src->smb2;
+ session->smb2_channel = src->smb2_channel;
+ session->disconnect_expired = src->disconnect_expired;
+
+ DLIST_ADD_END(src->conn->sessions, session, struct smbXcli_session *);
+ talloc_set_destructor(session, smbXcli_session_destructor);
+
+ return session;
+}
+
+
NTSTATUS smbXcli_session_application_key(struct smbXcli_session *session,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
DATA_BLOB *key)
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
+void smbXcli_session_set_disconnect_expired(struct smbXcli_session *session)
+{
+ session->disconnect_expired = true;
+}
+
uint16_t smb1cli_session_current_id(struct smbXcli_session *session)
{
return session->smb1.session_id;
git.samba.org / obnox / samba / samba-obnox.git / blobdiff