#include "airpdcap_system.h"
#include "airpdcap_int.h"
-#include "airpdcap_tkip.h"
-#include "airpdcap_ccmp.h"
#include "airpdcap_wep.h"
#include "airpdcap_sha1.h"
-#include "airpdcap_md5.h"
-#include "airpdcap_debug.h"
+#include "airpdcap_debug.h"
/* */
/******************************************************************************/
#define AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN 20
/* EAPOL definitions */
-/*!
-/brief
-Length of the EAPOL-Key key confirmation key (KCK) used to calculate MIC over EAPOL frame and validate an EAPOL packet (128 bits)
-*/
+/**
+ * Length of the EAPOL-Key key confirmation key (KCK) used to calculate
+ * MIC over EAPOL frame and validate an EAPOL packet (128 bits)
+ */
#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN 16
-/*!
-/brief
-Offset of the Key MIC in the EAPOL packet body
-*/
+/**
+ *Offset of the Key MIC in the EAPOL packet body
+ */
#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_OFFSET 77
-/*!
-/brief
-Maximum length of the EAPOL packet (it depends on the maximum MAC frame size)
-*/
+/**
+ * Maximum length of the EAPOL packet (it depends on the maximum MAC
+ * frame size)
+ */
#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_MAX_EAPOL_LEN 4095
-/*!
-/brief
-EAPOL Key Descriptor Version 1, used for all EAPOL-Key frames to and from a STA when neither the
-group nor pairwise ciphers are CCMP for Key Descriptor 1.
-/note
-Defined in 802.11i-2004, page 78
-*/
+/**
+ * EAPOL Key Descriptor Version 1, used for all EAPOL-Key frames to and
+ * from a STA when neither the group nor pairwise ciphers are CCMP for
+ * Key Descriptor 1.
+ * @note
+ * Defined in 802.11i-2004, page 78
+ */
#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_CCMP 1
-/*!
-/brief
-EAPOL Key Descriptor Version 2, used for all EAPOL-Key frames to and from a STA when either the
-pairwise or the group cipher is AES-CCMP for Key Descriptor 2.
-/note
-Defined in 802.11i-2004, page 78
-*/
+/**
+ * EAPOL Key Descriptor Version 2, used for all EAPOL-Key frames to and
+ * from a STA when either the pairwise or the group cipher is AES-CCMP
+ * for Key Descriptor 2.
+ * /note
+ * Defined in 802.11i-2004, page 78
+ */
#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP 2
/* */
/******************************************************************************/
extern "C" {
#endif
- /*!
- /brief
- It is a step of the PBKDF2 (specifically the PKCS #5 v2.0) defined in the RFC 2898 to derive a key (used as PMK in WPA)
-
- /param password
- [IN] pointer to a password (sequence of between 8 and 63 ASCII encoded characters)
-
- /param ssid
- [IN] pointer to the SSID string encoded in max 32 ASCII encoded characters
-
- /param iterations
- [IN] times to hash the password (4096 for WPA)
-
- /param count
- [IN] ???
-
- /param output
- [OUT] pointer to a preallocated buffer of AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN characters that will contain a part of the key
- */
- INT AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(
- const CHAR *password,
- const CHAR *ssid,
- const size_t ssidLength,
- const INT iterations,
- const INT count,
- UCHAR *output)
- ;
-
- /*!
- /brief
- It calculates the passphrase-to-PSK mapping reccomanded for use with RSNAs. This implementation uses the PBKDF2 method defined in the RFC 2898.
-
- /param password
- [IN] pointer to a password (sequence of between 8 and 63 ASCII encoded characters)
-
- /param ssid
- [IN] pointer to the SSID string encoded in max 32 ASCII encoded characters
-
- /param output
- [OUT] calculated PSK (to use as PMK in WPA)
-
- /note
- Described in 802.11i-2004, page 165
- */
- INT AirPDcapRsnaPwd2Psk(
- const CHAR *password,
- const CHAR *ssid,
- const size_t ssidLength,
- UCHAR *output)
- ;
-
- INT AirPDcapRsnaMng(
- UCHAR *decrypt_data,
- size_t *decrypt_len,
- PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
- AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
- INT offset,
- UINT8 fcsPresent)
- ;
-
- INT AirPDcapWepMng(
- PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
- UCHAR *decrypt_data,
- size_t *decrypt_len,
- PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
- AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
- INT offset,
- UINT8 fcsPresent)
- ;
-
- INT AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake(
- PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
- const UCHAR *data,
- AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
- PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
- INT offset)
- ;
- ;
- /*!
- /brief
- It checks whether the specified key is corrected or not.
- /note
- For a standard WEP key the length will be changed to the standard length, and the type changed in a generic WEP key.
-
- /param key
- [IN] pointer to the key to validate
-
- /return
- - TRUE: the key contains valid fields and values
- - FALSE: the key has some invalid field or value
- */
- INT AirPDcapValidateKey(
- PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key)
- ;
-
- INT AirPDcapRsnaMicCheck(
- UCHAR *eapol,
- const USHORT eapol_len,
- const UCHAR KCK[AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN],
- const USHORT key_ver)
- ;
-
- /*!
- /brief it gets the index of the Security Association structure for the specified BSSID and STA MAC address
- /param ctx
- [IN] pointer to the current context
- /param id
- [IN] id of the association (composed by BSSID and MAC of the station)
- /return
- - index of the Security Association structure if found
- - -1, if the specified addresses pair BSSID-STA MAC has not been found
- */
- INT AirPDcapGetSa(
- PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
- AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
- ;
-
- INT AirPDcapFreeSa(
- PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
- INT index) /* index of the structure to free */
- ;
-
- INT AirPDcapStoreSa(
- PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
- AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
- ;
-
- UCHAR * AirPDcapGetStaAddress(
- PAIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME frame)
- ;
-
- UCHAR * AirPDcapGetBssidAddress(
- PAIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME frame)
- ;
-
- void AirPDcapRsnaPrfX(
- AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
- const UCHAR pmk[32],
- const UCHAR snonce[32],
- const INT x, /* for TKIP 512, for CCMP 384 */
- UCHAR *ptk)
- ;
-
- INT AirPDcapAlgCrc32(
- UCHAR *buf,
- size_t nr,
- ULONG *cval)
- ;
+/**
+ * It is a step of the PBKDF2 (specifically the PKCS #5 v2.0) defined in
+ * the RFC 2898 to derive a key (used as PMK in WPA)
+ * @param password [IN] pointer to a password (sequence of between 8 and
+ * 63 ASCII encoded characters)
+ * @param ssid [IN] pointer to the SSID string encoded in max 32 ASCII
+ * encoded characters
+ * @param iterations [IN] times to hash the password (4096 for WPA)
+ * @param count [IN] ???
+ * @param output [OUT] pointer to a preallocated buffer of
+ * AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN characters that will contain a part of the key
+ */
+INT AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(
+ const CHAR *password,
+ const CHAR *ssid,
+ const size_t ssidLength,
+ const INT iterations,
+ const INT count,
+ UCHAR *output)
+ ;
+
+/**
+ * It calculates the passphrase-to-PSK mapping reccomanded for use with
+ * RSNAs. This implementation uses the PBKDF2 method defined in the RFC
+ * 2898.
+ * @param password [IN] pointer to a password (sequence of between 8 and
+ * 63 ASCII encoded characters)
+ * @param ssid [IN] pointer to the SSID string encoded in max 32 ASCII
+ * encoded characters
+ * @param output [OUT] calculated PSK (to use as PMK in WPA)
+ * @note
+ * Described in 802.11i-2004, page 165
+ */
+INT AirPDcapRsnaPwd2Psk(
+ const CHAR *password,
+ const CHAR *ssid,
+ const size_t ssidLength,
+ UCHAR *output)
+ ;
+
+INT AirPDcapRsnaMng(
+ UCHAR *decrypt_data,
+ size_t *decrypt_len,
+ PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
+ AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
+ INT offset,
+ UINT8 fcsPresent)
+ ;
+
+INT AirPDcapWepMng(
+ PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
+ UCHAR *decrypt_data,
+ size_t *decrypt_len,
+ PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
+ AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
+ INT offset,
+ UINT8 fcsPresent)
+ ;
+
+INT AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake(
+ PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
+ const UCHAR *data,
+ AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
+ PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
+ INT offset)
+ ;
+/**
+ * It checks whether the specified key is corrected or not.
+ * @note
+ * For a standard WEP key the length will be changed to the standard
+ * length, and the type changed in a generic WEP key.
+ * @param key [IN] pointer to the key to validate
+ * @return
+ * - TRUE: the key contains valid fields and values
+ * - FALSE: the key has some invalid field or value
+ */
+INT AirPDcapValidateKey(
+ PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key)
+ ;
+
+INT AirPDcapRsnaMicCheck(
+ UCHAR *eapol,
+ const USHORT eapol_len,
+ const UCHAR KCK[AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN],
+ const USHORT key_ver)
+ ;
+
+/**
+ * @param ctx [IN] pointer to the current context
+ * @param id [IN] id of the association (composed by BSSID and MAC of
+ * the station)
+ * @return
+ * - index of the Security Association structure if found
+ * - -1, if the specified addresses pair BSSID-STA MAC has not been found
+ */
+INT AirPDcapGetSa(
+ PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
+ AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
+ ;
+
+INT AirPDcapFreeSa(
+ PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
+ INT index) /* index of the structure to free */
+ ;
+
+INT AirPDcapStoreSa(
+ PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
+ AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
+ ;
+
+UCHAR * AirPDcapGetStaAddress(
+ PAIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME frame)
+ ;
+
+UCHAR * AirPDcapGetBssidAddress(
+ PAIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME frame)
+ ;
+
+void AirPDcapRsnaPrfX(
+ AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
+ const UCHAR pmk[32],
+ const UCHAR snonce[32],
+ const INT x, /* for TKIP 512, for CCMP 384 */
+ UCHAR *ptk)
+ ;
+
+INT AirPDcapAlgCrc32(
+ UCHAR *buf,
+ size_t nr,
+ ULONG *cval)
+ ;
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
- INT AirPDcapPacketProcess(
- PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
- const UCHAR *data,
- const size_t len,
- UCHAR *decrypt_data,
- size_t *decrypt_len,
- PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
- UINT8 fcsPresent,
- UINT8 radioTapPresent,
- UINT8 mngHandshake,
- UINT8 mngDecrypt)
- {
- size_t mac_header_len;
- UCHAR *address;
- AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID id;
- INT index;
- PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION sa;
- INT offset;
- UINT16 bodyLength;
+
+INT AirPDcapPacketProcess(
+ PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
+ const UCHAR *data,
+ const size_t len,
+ UCHAR *decrypt_data,
+ size_t *decrypt_len,
+ PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
+ UINT8 fcsPresent,
+ UINT8 radioTapPresent,
+ UINT8 mngHandshake,
+ UINT8 mngDecrypt)
+{
+ size_t mac_header_len;
+ UCHAR *address;
+ AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID id;
+ INT index;
+ PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION sa;
+ INT offset;
+ UINT16 bodyLength;
#ifdef _DEBUG
- CHAR msgbuf[255];
+ CHAR msgbuf[255];
#endif
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapPacketProcess");
-
- if (ctx==NULL) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapPacketProcess");
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
- }
- if (data==NULL || len==0) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "NULL data or length=0", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapPacketProcess");
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
- }
-
- if (radioTapPresent)
- offset=AIRPDCAP_RADIOTAP_HEADER_LEN;
- else
- offset=0;
-
- /* check if the packet is of data type */
- /* TODO consider packets send on an ad-hoc net (QoS) */
- if (AIRPDCAP_TYPE(data[offset])!=AIRPDCAP_TYPE_DATA) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "not data packet", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_DATA;
- }
-
- /* check correct packet size, to avoid wrong elaboration of encryption algorithms */
- mac_header_len=AIRPDCAP_HEADER_LEN(data[offset+1]);
- if (len < (UINT)(mac_header_len+AIRPDCAP_CRYPTED_DATA_MINLEN)) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "minimum length violated", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_WRONG_DATA_SIZE;
- }
-
- /* get BSSID */
- if ( (address=AirPDcapGetBssidAddress((PAIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME)(data+offset))) != NULL) {
- memcpy(id.bssid, address, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapPacketProcess");
+
+ if (ctx==NULL) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapPacketProcess");
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
+ }
+ if (data==NULL || len==0) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "NULL data or length=0", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapPacketProcess");
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ if (radioTapPresent)
+ offset=AIRPDCAP_RADIOTAP_HEADER_LEN;
+ else
+ offset=0;
+
+ /* check if the packet is of data type */
+ /* TODO consider packets send on an ad-hoc net (QoS) */
+ if (AIRPDCAP_TYPE(data[offset])!=AIRPDCAP_TYPE_DATA) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "not data packet", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* check correct packet size, to avoid wrong elaboration of encryption algorithms */
+ mac_header_len=AIRPDCAP_HEADER_LEN(data[offset+1]);
+ if (len < (UINT)(mac_header_len+AIRPDCAP_CRYPTED_DATA_MINLEN)) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "minimum length violated", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_WRONG_DATA_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ /* get BSSID */
+ if ( (address=AirPDcapGetBssidAddress((PAIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME)(data+offset))) != NULL) {
+ memcpy(id.bssid, address, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
#ifdef _DEBUG
- sprintf(msgbuf, "BSSID: %2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X\t", id.bssid[0],id.bssid[1],id.bssid[2],id.bssid[3],id.bssid[4],id.bssid[5]);
+ sprintf(msgbuf, "BSSID: %2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X\t", id.bssid[0],id.bssid[1],id.bssid[2],id.bssid[3],id.bssid[4],id.bssid[5]);
#endif
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", msgbuf, AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- } else {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "BSSID not found", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
- }
-
- /* get STA address */
- if ( (address=AirPDcapGetStaAddress((PAIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME)(data+offset))) != NULL) {
- memcpy(id.sta, address, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", msgbuf, AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ } else {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "BSSID not found", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* get STA address */
+ if ( (address=AirPDcapGetStaAddress((PAIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME)(data+offset))) != NULL) {
+ memcpy(id.sta, address, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
#ifdef _DEBUG
- sprintf(msgbuf, "ST_MAC: %2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X\t", id.sta[0],id.sta[1],id.sta[2],id.sta[3],id.sta[4],id.sta[5]);
+ sprintf(msgbuf, "ST_MAC: %2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X\t", id.sta[0],id.sta[1],id.sta[2],id.sta[3],id.sta[4],id.sta[5]);
#endif
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", msgbuf, AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- } else {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "SA not found", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
- }
-
- /* search for a cached Security Association for current BSSID and station MAC */
- if ((index=AirPDcapGetSa(ctx, &id))==-1) {
- /* create a new Security Association */
- if ((index=AirPDcapStoreSa(ctx, &id))==-1) {
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
- }
- }
-
- /* get the Security Association structure */
- sa=&ctx->sa[index];
-
- /* cache offset in the packet data (to scan encryption data) */
- offset+=AIRPDCAP_HEADER_LEN(data[offset+1]);
-
- /* check if data is encrypted (use the WEP bit in the Frame Control field) */
- if (AIRPDCAP_WEP(data[1])==0)
- {
- if (mngHandshake) {
- /* data is sent in cleartext, check if is an authentication message or end the process */
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Unencrypted data", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
-
- /* check if the packet as an LLC header and the packet is 802.1X authentication (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 24) */
- if (data[offset]==0xAA && /* DSAP=SNAP */
- data[offset+1]==0xAA && /* SSAP=SNAP */
- data[offset+2]==0x03 && /* Control field=Unnumbered frame */
- data[offset+3]==0x00 && /* Org. code=encaps. Ethernet */
- data[offset+4]==0x00 &&
- data[offset+5]==0x00 &&
- data[offset+6]==0x88 && /* Type: 802.1X authentication */
- data[offset+7]==0x8E) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Authentication: EAPOL packet", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
-
- /* skip LLC header */
- offset+=8;
-
- /* check the version of the EAPOL protocol used (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 24) */
- /* TODO EAPOL protocol version to check? */
- /*if (data[offset]!=2) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("EAPOL protocol version not recognized", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
- }*/
-
- /* check if the packet is a EAPOL-Key (0x03) (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 25) */
- if (data[offset+1]!=3) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Not EAPOL-Key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
- }
-
- /* get and check the body length (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 25) */
- bodyLength=ntohs(*(UINT16 *)(data+offset+2));
- if (((len-offset-4)!=bodyLength && !fcsPresent) || ((len-offset-8)!=bodyLength && fcsPresent)) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "EAPOL body not valid (wrong length)", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
- }
-
- /* skip EAPOL MPDU and go to the first byte of the body */
- offset+=4;
-
- /* check if the key descriptor type is valid (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 27) */
- if (/*data[offset]!=0x1 &&*/ /* RC4 Key Descriptor Type (deprecated) */
- data[offset]!=0x2 && /* IEEE 802.11 Key Descriptor Type */
- data[offset]!=0xFE) /* TODO what's this value??? */
- {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Not valid key descriptor type", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
- }
-
- /* start with descriptor body */
- offset+=1;
-
- /* manage the 4-way handshake to define the key */
- return AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake(ctx, data, sa, key, offset);
- } else {
- /* cleartext message, not authentication */
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "No authentication data", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_DATA_ENCRYPTED;
- }
- }
- } else {
- if (mngDecrypt) {
-
- if (decrypt_data==NULL)
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
-
- /* create new header and data to modify */
- *decrypt_len=len;
- memcpy(decrypt_data, data, *decrypt_len);
-
- /* encrypted data */
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Encrypted data", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
-
- if (fcsPresent)
- /* remove from next computation FCS */
- *decrypt_len-=4;
-
- /* check the Extension IV to distinguish between WEP encryption and WPA encryption */
- /* refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.2.1.2, pag.35 for WEP, */
- /* IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.3.2.2, pag. 45 for TKIP, */
- /* IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.3.3.2, pag. 57 for CCMP */
- if (AIRPDCAP_EXTIV(data[offset+3])==0) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "WEP encryption", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- return AirPDcapWepMng(ctx, decrypt_data, decrypt_len, key, sa, offset, fcsPresent);
- } else {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "TKIP or CCMP encryption", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- return AirPDcapRsnaMng(decrypt_data, decrypt_len, key, sa, offset, fcsPresent);
- }
- }
- }
-
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
- }
-
- INT AirPDcapSetKeys(
- PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
- AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM keys[],
- const size_t keys_nr)
- {
- INT i;
- INT success;
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapSetKeys");
-
- if (ctx==NULL || keys==NULL) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "NULL context or NULL keys array", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapSetKeys");
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (keys_nr>AIRPDCAP_MAX_KEYS_NR) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Keys number greater than maximum", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapSetKeys");
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* clean keys collection before setting new ones */
- AirPDcapCleanKeys(ctx);
-
- /* check and insert keys */
- for (i=0, success=0; i<(INT)keys_nr; i++) {
- if (AirPDcapValidateKey(keys+i)==TRUE) {
- if (keys[i].KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Set a WPA-PWD key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_4);
- AirPDcapRsnaPwd2Psk(keys[i].KeyData.Wpa.UserPwd.Passphrase, keys[i].KeyData.Wpa.UserPwd.Ssid, keys[i].KeyData.Wpa.UserPwd.SsidLen, keys[i].KeyData.Wpa.Psk);
- }
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", msgbuf, AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ } else {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "SA not found", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* search for a cached Security Association for current BSSID and station MAC */
+ if ((index=AirPDcapGetSa(ctx, &id))==-1) {
+ /* create a new Security Association */
+ if ((index=AirPDcapStoreSa(ctx, &id))==-1) {
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* get the Security Association structure */
+ sa=&ctx->sa[index];
+
+ /* cache offset in the packet data (to scan encryption data) */
+ offset+=AIRPDCAP_HEADER_LEN(data[offset+1]);
+
+ /* check if data is encrypted (use the WEP bit in the Frame Control field) */
+ if (AIRPDCAP_WEP(data[1])==0)
+ {
+ if (mngHandshake) {
+ /* data is sent in cleartext, check if is an authentication message or end the process */
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Unencrypted data", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+
+ /* check if the packet as an LLC header and the packet is 802.1X authentication (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 24) */
+ if (data[offset]==0xAA && /* DSAP=SNAP */
+ data[offset+1]==0xAA && /* SSAP=SNAP */
+ data[offset+2]==0x03 && /* Control field=Unnumbered frame */
+ data[offset+3]==0x00 && /* Org. code=encaps. Ethernet */
+ data[offset+4]==0x00 &&
+ data[offset+5]==0x00 &&
+ data[offset+6]==0x88 && /* Type: 802.1X authentication */
+ data[offset+7]==0x8E) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Authentication: EAPOL packet", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+
+ /* skip LLC header */
+ offset+=8;
+
+ /* check the version of the EAPOL protocol used (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 24) */
+ /* TODO EAPOL protocol version to check? */
+ /*if (data[offset]!=2) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("EAPOL protocol version not recognized", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
+ }*/
+
+ /* check if the packet is a EAPOL-Key (0x03) (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 25) */
+ if (data[offset+1]!=3) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Not EAPOL-Key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
+ }
+
+ /* get and check the body length (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 25) */
+ bodyLength=ntohs(*(UINT16 *)(data+offset+2));
+ if (((len-offset-4)!=bodyLength && !fcsPresent) || ((len-offset-8)!=bodyLength && fcsPresent)) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "EAPOL body not valid (wrong length)", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
+ }
+
+ /* skip EAPOL MPDU and go to the first byte of the body */
+ offset+=4;
+
+ /* check if the key descriptor type is valid (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 27) */
+ if (/*data[offset]!=0x1 &&*/ /* RC4 Key Descriptor Type (deprecated) */
+ data[offset]!=0x2 && /* IEEE 802.11 Key Descriptor Type */
+ data[offset]!=0xFE) /* TODO what's this value??? */
+ {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Not valid key descriptor type", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
+ }
+
+ /* start with descriptor body */
+ offset+=1;
+
+ /* manage the 4-way handshake to define the key */
+ return AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake(ctx, data, sa, key, offset);
+ } else {
+ /* cleartext message, not authentication */
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "No authentication data", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_DATA_ENCRYPTED;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (mngDecrypt) {
+
+ if (decrypt_data==NULL)
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
+
+ /* create new header and data to modify */
+ *decrypt_len=len;
+ memcpy(decrypt_data, data, *decrypt_len);
+
+ /* encrypted data */
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Encrypted data", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+
+ if (fcsPresent)
+ /* remove from next computation FCS */
+ *decrypt_len-=4;
+
+ /* check the Extension IV to distinguish between WEP encryption and WPA encryption */
+ /* refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.2.1.2, pag.35 for WEP, */
+ /* IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.3.2.2, pag. 45 for TKIP, */
+ /* IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.3.3.2, pag. 57 for CCMP */
+ if (AIRPDCAP_EXTIV(data[offset+3])==0) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "WEP encryption", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ return AirPDcapWepMng(ctx, decrypt_data, decrypt_len, key, sa, offset, fcsPresent);
+ } else {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "TKIP or CCMP encryption", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ return AirPDcapRsnaMng(decrypt_data, decrypt_len, key, sa, offset, fcsPresent);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
+}
+
+INT AirPDcapSetKeys(
+ PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
+ AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM keys[],
+ const size_t keys_nr)
+{
+ INT i;
+ INT success;
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapSetKeys");
+
+ if (ctx==NULL || keys==NULL) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "NULL context or NULL keys array", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapSetKeys");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (keys_nr>AIRPDCAP_MAX_KEYS_NR) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Keys number greater than maximum", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapSetKeys");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* clean keys collection before setting new ones */
+ AirPDcapCleanKeys(ctx);
+
+ /* check and insert keys */
+ for (i=0, success=0; i<(INT)keys_nr; i++) {
+ if (AirPDcapValidateKey(keys+i)==TRUE) {
+ if (keys[i].KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Set a WPA-PWD key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_4);
+ AirPDcapRsnaPwd2Psk(keys[i].KeyData.Wpa.UserPwd.Passphrase, keys[i].KeyData.Wpa.UserPwd.Ssid, keys[i].KeyData.Wpa.UserPwd.SsidLen, keys[i].KeyData.Wpa.Psk);
+ }
#ifdef _DEBUG
- else if (keys[i].KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Set a WPA-PMK key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_4);
- } else if (keys[i].KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Set a WEP key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_4);
- } else {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Set a key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_4);
- }
+ else if (keys[i].KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Set a WPA-PMK key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_4);
+ } else if (keys[i].KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Set a WEP key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_4);
+ } else {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Set a key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_4);
+ }
#endif
- ctx->keys[success].KeyType=keys[i].KeyType;
- memcpy(&ctx->keys[success].KeyData, &keys[i].KeyData, sizeof(keys[i].KeyData));
-
- success++;
- }
- }
-
- ctx->keys_nr=success;
-
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapSetKeys");
- return success;
- }
-
- INT AirPDcapCleanKeys(
- PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx)
- {
- INT i;
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapCleanKeys");
-
- if (ctx==NULL) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapCleanKeys", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapCleanKeys");
- return 0;
- }
-
-
for (i=0; i<AIRPDCAP_MAX_KEYS_NR; i++) {
- memset(&ctx->keys[i], 0, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
- }
-
- ctx->keys_nr=0;
-
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapCleanKeys", "Keys collection cleaned!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapCleanKeys");
-
- return i;
- }
-
- INT AirPDcapGetKeys(
- const PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
- AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM keys[],
- const size_t keys_nr)
- {
- UINT i;
- UINT j;
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapGetKeys");
-
- if (ctx==NULL) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapGetKeys", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapGetKeys");
- return 0;
- } else if (keys==NULL) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapGetKeys", "NULL keys array", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapGetKeys");
- return (INT)ctx->keys_nr;
- } else {
-
for (i=0, j=0; i<ctx->keys_nr && i<keys_nr && i<AIRPDCAP_MAX_KEYS_NR; i++) {
- keys[j].KeyType=ctx->keys[i].KeyType;
- memcpy(&keys[j].KeyData, &ctx->keys[i].KeyData, sizeof(keys[j].KeyData));
- j++;
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapGetKeys", "Got a key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- }
-
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapGetKeys");
- return j;
- }
- }
-
- INT AirPDcapInitContext(
- PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx)
- {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapInitContext");
-
- if (ctx==NULL) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapInitContext", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapInitContext");
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
- }
-
- AirPDcapCleanKeys(ctx);
-
- ctx->first_free_index=0;
- ctx->index=-1;
- ctx->last_stored_index=-1;
-
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapInitContext", "Context initialized!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapInitContext");
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
- }
-
- INT AirPDcapDestroyContext(
- PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx)
- {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapDestroyContext");
-
- if (ctx==NULL) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapDestroyContext", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapDestroyContext");
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
- }
-
- AirPDcapCleanKeys(ctx);
-
- ctx->first_free_index=0;
- ctx->index=-1;
- ctx->last_stored_index=-1;
-
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapDestroyContext", "Context destroyed!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapDestroyContext");
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
- }
+ ctx->keys[success].KeyType=keys[i].KeyType;
+ memcpy(&ctx->keys[success].KeyData, &keys[i].KeyData, sizeof(keys[i].KeyData));
+
+ success++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ctx->keys_nr=success;
+
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapSetKeys");
+ return success;
+}
+
+INT AirPDcapCleanKeys(
+ PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx)
+{
+ INT i;
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapCleanKeys");
+
+ if (ctx==NULL) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapCleanKeys", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapCleanKeys");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (i=0; i<AIRPDCAP_MAX_KEYS_NR; i++) {
+ memset(&ctx->keys[i], 0, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
+ }
+
+ ctx->keys_nr=0;
+
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapCleanKeys", "Keys collection cleaned!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapCleanKeys");
+
+ return i;
+}
+
+INT AirPDcapGetKeys(
+ const PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
+ AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM keys[],
+ const size_t keys_nr)
+{
+ UINT i;
+ UINT j;
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapGetKeys");
+
+ if (ctx==NULL) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapGetKeys", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapGetKeys");
+ return 0;
+ } else if (keys==NULL) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapGetKeys", "NULL keys array", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapGetKeys");
+ return (INT)ctx->keys_nr;
+ } else {
+ for (i=0, j=0; i<ctx->keys_nr && i<keys_nr && i<AIRPDCAP_MAX_KEYS_NR; i++) {
+ keys[j].KeyType=ctx->keys[i].KeyType;
+ memcpy(&keys[j].KeyData, &ctx->keys[i].KeyData, sizeof(keys[j].KeyData));
+ j++;
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapGetKeys", "Got a key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ }
+
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapGetKeys");
+ return j;
+ }
+}
+
+INT AirPDcapInitContext(
+ PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx)
+{
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapInitContext");
+
+ if (ctx==NULL) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapInitContext", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapInitContext");
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ AirPDcapCleanKeys(ctx);
+
+ ctx->first_free_index=0;
+ ctx->index=-1;
+ ctx->last_stored_index=-1;
+
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapInitContext", "Context initialized!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapInitContext");
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+INT AirPDcapDestroyContext(
+ PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx)
+{
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapDestroyContext");
+
+ if (ctx==NULL) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapDestroyContext", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapDestroyContext");
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ AirPDcapCleanKeys(ctx);
+
+ ctx->first_free_index=0;
+ ctx->index=-1;
+ ctx->last_stored_index=-1;
+
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapDestroyContext", "Context destroyed!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapDestroyContext");
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
+}
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
extern "C" {
#endif
- INT AirPDcapRsnaMng(
- UCHAR *decrypt_data,
- size_t *decrypt_len,
- PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
- AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
- INT offset,
- UINT8 fcsPresent)
- {
- INT ret_value;
- ULONG crc;
-
- if (sa->key==NULL) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "No key associated", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
- }
- if (sa->validKey==FALSE) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "Key not yet valid", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
- }
- if (sa->wpa.key_ver==1) {
- /* CCMP -> HMAC-MD5 is the EAPOL-Key MIC, RC4 is the EAPOL-Key encryption algorithm */
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "TKIP", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
-
- ret_value=AirPDcapTkipDecrypt(decrypt_data+offset, *decrypt_len-offset, decrypt_data+AIRPDCAP_TA_OFFSET, AIRPDCAP_GET_TK(sa->wpa.ptk));
- if (ret_value)
- return ret_value;
-
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "TKIP DECRYPTED!!!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- /* remove MIC (8bytes) and ICV (4bytes) from the end of packet */
- *decrypt_len-=12;
- } else {
- /* AES-CCMP -> HMAC-SHA1-128 is the EAPOL-Key MIC, AES wep_key wrap is the EAPOL-Key encryption algorithm */
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "CCMP", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
-
- ret_value=AirPDcapCcmpDecrypt(decrypt_data, (INT)*decrypt_len, AIRPDCAP_GET_TK(sa->wpa.ptk));
- if (ret_value)
- return ret_value;
-
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "CCMP DECRYPTED!!!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- /* remove MIC (8bytes) from the end of packet */
- *decrypt_len-=8;
- }
-
- /* remove protection bit */
- decrypt_data[1]&=0xBF;
-
- /* remove TKIP/CCMP header */
- offset=AIRPDCAP_HEADER_LEN(decrypt_data[1]);
- *decrypt_len-=8;
- memcpy(decrypt_data+offset, decrypt_data+offset+8, *decrypt_len-offset);
-
- if (fcsPresent) {
- /* calculate FCS */
- AirPDcapAlgCrc32(decrypt_data, *decrypt_len, &crc);
- *(unsigned long*)(decrypt_data+*decrypt_len)=crc;
-
- /* add FCS in packet */
- *decrypt_len+=4;
- }
-
- if (key!=NULL) {
- memcpy(key, sa->key, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
-
- if (sa->wpa.key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_CCMP)
- key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_TKIP;
- else if (sa->wpa.key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP)
- key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_CCMP;
- }
-
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
- }
-
- INT AirPDcapWepMng(
- PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
- UCHAR *decrypt_data,
- size_t *decrypt_len,
- PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
- AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
- INT offset,
- UINT8 fcsPresent)
- {
- UCHAR wep_key[AIRPDCAP_WEP_KEY_MAXLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN];
- size_t keylen;
- INT ret_value=1;
- ULONG crc;
- INT key_index;
- AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM *tmp_key;
- UINT8 useCache=FALSE;
-
- if (sa->key!=NULL)
- useCache=TRUE;
-
- for (key_index=0; key_index<(INT)ctx->keys_nr; key_index++) {
- /* use the cached one, or try all keys */
- if (!useCache) {
- tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
- } else {
- if (sa->key!=NULL && sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "Try cached WEP key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- tmp_key=sa->key;
- } else {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "Cached key is not valid, try another WEP key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
- }
- }
-
- /* obviously, try only WEP keys... */
- if (tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP)
- {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "Try WEP key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
-
- memset(wep_key, 0, sizeof(wep_key));
-
- /* Costruct the WEP seed: copy the IV in first 3 bytes and then the WEP key (refer to 802-11i-2004, 8.2.1.4.3, pag. 36) */
- memcpy(wep_key, decrypt_data+AIRPDCAP_HEADER_LEN(decrypt_data[1]), AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN);
- keylen=tmp_key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen;
- memcpy(wep_key+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN, tmp_key->KeyData.Wep.WepKey, keylen);
-
- ret_value=AirPDcapWepDecrypt(wep_key,
- keylen+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN,
- decrypt_data + (AIRPDCAP_HEADER_LEN(decrypt_data[1])+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_KIDLEN),
- *decrypt_len-(AIRPDCAP_HEADER_LEN(decrypt_data[1])+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_KIDLEN+AIRPDCAP_CRC_LEN));
-
- }
-
- if (!ret_value && tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP) {
- /* the tried key is the correct one, cached in the Security Association */
-
- sa->key=tmp_key;
-
- if (key!=NULL) {
- memcpy(key, &sa->key, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
- key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
- }
-
- break;
- } else {
- /* the cached key was not valid, try other keys */
-
- if (useCache==TRUE) {
- useCache=FALSE;
- key_index--;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (ret_value)
- return ret_value;
-
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "WEP DECRYPTED!!!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
-
- /* remove ICV (4bytes) from the end of packet */
- *decrypt_len-=4;
-
- /* remove protection bit */
- decrypt_data[1]&=0xBF;
-
- /* remove IC header */
- offset=AIRPDCAP_HEADER_LEN(decrypt_data[1]);
- *decrypt_len-=4;
- memcpy(decrypt_data+offset, decrypt_data+offset+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_KIDLEN, *decrypt_len-offset);
-
- if (fcsPresent) {
- /* calculate FCS and append it at the end of the decrypted packet */
- AirPDcapAlgCrc32(decrypt_data, *decrypt_len, &crc);
- *(unsigned long*)(decrypt_data+*decrypt_len)=crc;
-
- /* add FCS in packet */
- *decrypt_len += 4;
- }
-
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
- }
-
- /* Refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.5.3, pag. 85 */
- INT AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake(
- PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
- const UCHAR *data,
- AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
- PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
- INT offset)
- {
- AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM *tmp_key;
- INT key_index;
- INT ret_value=1;
- UCHAR useCache=FALSE;
- UCHAR eapol[AIRPDCAP_EAPOL_MAX_LEN];
- USHORT eapol_len;
-
- if (sa->key!=NULL)
- useCache=TRUE;
-
- /* a 4-way handshake packet use a Pairwise key type (IEEE 802.11i-2004, pg. 79) */
- if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY(data[offset+1])!=1) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Group/STAKey message (not used)", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
- }
-
- /* TODO timeouts? reauthentication? */
-
- /* TODO consider key-index */
-
- /* TODO considera Deauthentications */
-
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
-
- /* manage 4-way handshake packets; this step completes the 802.1X authentication process (IEEE 802.11i-2004, pag. 85) */
-
- /* message 1: Authenticator->Supplicant (Sec=0, Mic=0, Ack=1, Inst=0, Key=1(pairwise), KeyRSC=0, Nonce=ANonce, MIC=0) */
- if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_INST(data[offset+1])==0 &&
- AIRPDCAP_EAP_ACK(data[offset+1])==1 &&
- AIRPDCAP_EAP_MIC(data[offset])==0)
- {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 1", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
-
- /* On reception of Message 1, the Supplicant determines whether the Key Replay Counter field value has been */
- /* used before with the current PMKSA. If the Key Replay Counter field value is less than or equal to the current */
- /* local value, the Supplicant discards the message. */
- /* -> not checked, the Authenticator will be send another Message 1 (hopefully!) */
-
- /* save ANonce (from authenticator) to derive the PTK with the SNonce (from the 2 message) */
- memcpy(sa->wpa.nonce, data+offset+12, 32);
-
- /* get the Key Descriptor Version (to select algorithm used in decryption -CCMP or TKIP-) */
- sa->wpa.key_ver=AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1]);
-
- sa->handshake=1;
-
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
- }
-
- /* message 2|4: Supplicant->Authenticator (Sec=0|1, Mic=1, Ack=0, Inst=0, Key=1(pairwise), KeyRSC=0, Nonce=SNonce|0, MIC=MIC(KCK,EAPOL)) */
- if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_INST(data[offset+1])==0 &&
- AIRPDCAP_EAP_ACK(data[offset+1])==0 &&
- AIRPDCAP_EAP_MIC(data[offset])==1)
- {
- if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_SEC(data[offset])==0) {
-
- /* PATCH: some implementations set secure bit to 0 also in the 4th message */
- /* to recognize which message is this check if wep_key data lenght is 0 */
- /* in the 4th message */
- if (*(UINT16 *)(data+offset+92)!=0) {
- /* message 2 */
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 2", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
-
- /* On reception of Message 2, the Authenticator checks that the key replay counter corresponds to the */
- /* outstanding Message 1. If not, it silently discards the message. */
- /* If the calculated MIC does not match the MIC that the Supplicant included in the EAPOL-Key frame, */
- /* the Authenticator silently discards Message 2. */
- /* -> not checked; the Supplicant will send another message 2 (hopefully!) */
-
- /* now you can derive the PTK */
- for (key_index=0; key_index<(INT)ctx->keys_nr || sa->key!=NULL; key_index++) {
- /* use the cached one, or try all keys */
- if (!useCache) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Try WPA key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
- } else {
- /* there is a cached key in the security association, if it's a WPA key try it... */
- if (sa->key!=NULL &&
- sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD ||
- sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK ||
- sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Try cached WPA key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- tmp_key=sa->key;
- } else {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Cached key is of a wrong type, try WPA key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
- }
- }
-
- /* obviously, try only WPA keys... */
- if (tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD ||
- tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK ||
- tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK)
- {
- /* derive the PTK from the BSSID, STA MAC, PMK, SNonce, ANonce */
- AirPDcapRsnaPrfX(sa, /* authenticator nonce, bssid, station mac */
- tmp_key->KeyData.Wpa.Pmk, /* PMK */
- data+offset+12, /* supplicant nonce */
- 512,
- sa->wpa.ptk);
-
- /* verify the MIC (compare the MIC in the packet included in this message with a MIC calculated with the PTK) */
- eapol_len=(USHORT)(ntohs(*(UINT16 *)(data+offset-3))+4);
-
memcpy(eapol, &data[offset-5], (eapol_len<AIRPDCAP_EAPOL_MAX_LEN?eapol_len:AIRPDCAP_EAPOL_MAX_LEN));
- ret_value=AirPDcapRsnaMicCheck(eapol, /* eapol frame (header also) */
- eapol_len, /* eapol frame length */
- sa->wpa.ptk, /* Key Confirmation Key */
- AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1])); /* EAPOL-Key description version */
-
- /* If the MIC is valid, the Authenticator checks that the RSN information element bit-wise matches */
- /* that from the (Re)Association Request message. */
- /* i) TODO If these are not exactly the same, the Authenticator uses MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
- /* primitive to terminate the association. */
- /* ii) If they do match bit-wise, the Authenticator constructs Message 3. */
- }
-
- if (!ret_value &&
- (tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD ||
- tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK ||
- tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK))
- {
- /* the temporary key is the correct one, cached in the Security Association */
-
- sa->key=tmp_key;
-
- if (key!=NULL) {
- memcpy(key, &tmp_key, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
- if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1])==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_CCMP)
- key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_TKIP;
- else if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1])==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP)
- key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_CCMP;
- }
-
- break;
- } else {
- /* the cached key was not valid, try other keys */
-
- if (useCache==TRUE) {
- useCache=FALSE;
- key_index--;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (ret_value) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "handshake step failed", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- return ret_value;
- }
-
- sa->handshake=2;
-
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
- } else {
- /* message 4 */
-
- /* TODO "Note that when the 4-Way Handshake is first used Message 4 is sent in the clear." */
-
- /* TODO check MIC and Replay Counter */
- /* On reception of Message 4, the Authenticator verifies that the Key Replay Counter field value is one */
- /* that it used on this 4-Way Handshake; if it is not, it silently discards the message. */
- /* If the calculated MIC does not match the MIC that the Supplicant included in the EAPOL-Key frame, the */
- /* Authenticator silently discards Message 4. */
-
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 4 (patched)", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
-
- sa->handshake=4;
-
- sa->validKey=TRUE;
-
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
- }
- /* END OF PATCH */
- /* */
- } else {
- /* message 4 */
-
- /* TODO "Note that when the 4-Way Handshake is first used Message 4 is sent in the clear." */
-
- /* TODO check MIC and Replay Counter */
- /* On reception of Message 4, the Authenticator verifies that the Key Replay Counter field value is one */
- /* that it used on this 4-Way Handshake; if it is not, it silently discards the message. */
- /* If the calculated MIC does not match the MIC that the Supplicant included in the EAPOL-Key frame, the */
- /* Authenticator silently discards Message 4. */
-
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 4", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
-
- sa->handshake=4;
-
- sa->validKey=TRUE;
-
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
- }
- }
-
- /* message 3: Authenticator->Supplicant (Sec=1, Mic=1, Ack=1, Inst=0/1, Key=1(pairwise), KeyRSC=???, Nonce=ANonce, MIC=1) */
- if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_ACK(data[offset+1])==1 &&
- AIRPDCAP_EAP_MIC(data[offset])==1)
- {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 3", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
-
- /* On reception of Message 3, the Supplicant silently discards the message if the Key Replay Counter field */
- /* value has already been used or if the ANonce value in Message 3 differs from the ANonce value in Message 1. */
- /* -> not checked, the Authenticator will send another message 3 (hopefully!) */
-
- /* TODO check page 88 (RNS) */
-
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
- }
-
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
- }
-
- INT AirPDcapRsnaMicCheck(
- UCHAR *eapol,
- const USHORT eapol_len,
- const UCHAR KCK[AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN],
- const USHORT key_ver)
- {
- UCHAR mic[AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN];
- UCHAR c_mic[20]; /* MIC 16 byte, the HMAC-SHA1 use a buffer of 20 bytes */
-
- /* copy the MIC from the EAPOL packet */
- memcpy(mic, eapol+AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_OFFSET+4, AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN);
-
- /* set to 0 the MIC in the EAPOL packet (to calculate the MIC) */
- memset(eapol+AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_OFFSET+4, 0, AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN);
-
- if (key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_CCMP) {
- /* use HMAC-MD5 for the EAPOL-Key MIC */
- AirPDcapAlgHmacMd5((UCHAR *)KCK, AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN, eapol, eapol_len, c_mic);
- } else if (key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP) {
- /* use HMAC-SHA1-128 for the EAPOL-Key MIC */
- AirPDcapAlgHmacSha1(KCK, AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN, eapol, eapol_len, c_mic);
- } else
- /* key descriptor version not recognized */
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
-
- /* compare calculated MIC with the Key MIC and return result (0 means success) */
- return memcmp(mic, c_mic, AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN);
- }
-
- INT AirPDcapValidateKey(
- PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key)
- {
- size_t len;
- UCHAR ret=TRUE;
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapValidateKey");
-
- if (key==NULL) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapValidateKey", "NULL key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapValidateKey");
- return FALSE;
- }
-
- switch (key->KeyType) {
- case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP:
- /* check key size limits */
- len=key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen;
-
if (len<AIRPDCAP_WEP_KEY_MINLEN || len>AIRPDCAP_WEP_KEY_MAXLEN) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapValidateKey", "WEP key: key length not accepted", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- ret=FALSE;
- }
- break;
-
- case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP_40:
- /* set the standard length and use a generic WEP key type */
- key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen=AIRPDCAP_WEP_40_KEY_LEN;
- key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
- break;
-
- case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP_104:
- /* set the standard length and use a generic WEP key type */
- key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen=AIRPDCAP_WEP_104_KEY_LEN;
- key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
- break;
-
- case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD:
- /* check passphrase and SSID size limits */
- len=strlen(key->KeyData.Wpa.UserPwd.Passphrase);
-
if (len<AIRPDCAP_WPA_PASSPHRASE_MIN_LEN || len>AIRPDCAP_WPA_PASSPHRASE_MAX_LEN) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapValidateKey", "WPA-PWD key: passphrase length not accepted", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- ret=FALSE;
- }
-
- len=key->KeyData.Wpa.UserPwd.SsidLen;
-
if (len<AIRPDCAP_WPA_SSID_MIN_LEN || len>AIRPDCAP_WPA_SSID_MAX_LEN) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapValidateKey", "WPA-PWD key: ssid length not accepted", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- ret=FALSE;
- }
-
- break;
-
- case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK:
- break;
-
- case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK:
- break;
-
- default:
- ret=FALSE;
- }
-
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapValidateKey");
- return ret;
- }
-
- INT AirPDcapGetSa(
- PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
- AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
- {
- INT index;
-
- if (ctx->last_stored_index!=-1) {
- /* at least one association was stored */
- /* search for the association from last_stored_index to 0 (most recent added) */
- for (index=ctx->last_stored_index; index>=0; index--) {
- if (ctx->sa[index].used) {
- if (memcmp(id, &(ctx->sa[index].saId), sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID))==0) {
- ctx->index=index;
- return index;
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- return -1;
- }
-
- INT AirPDcapFreeSa(
- PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
- INT index) /* index of the structure to free */
- {
- /* set the structure as free (the reset will be done in AIRPDCAP_store_sta_info) */
- ctx->sa[index].used=0;
-
- /* set the first_free_index to avoid free blocks in the middle */
- if (index<ctx->first_free_index)
- ctx->first_free_index=index;
-
- /* decrement the last_stored_index if this was the last stored block */
- if (index==ctx->last_stored_index)
- ctx->last_stored_index--;
-
- /* if the list is empty, set the index */
- if (ctx->last_stored_index==-1)
- ctx->index=-1;
-
- return ctx->index;
- }
-
- INT AirPDcapStoreSa(
- PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
- AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
- {
- INT last_free;
-
- if (ctx->sa[ctx->first_free_index].used) {
- /* last addition was in the middle of the array (and the first_free_index was just incremented by 1) */
- /* search for a free space from the first_free_index to AIRPDCAP_STA_INFOS_NR (to avoid free blocks in */
- /* the middle) */
-
for (last_free=ctx->first_free_index; last_free<AIRPDCAP_MAX_SEC_ASSOCIATIONS_NR; last_free++)
- if (!ctx->sa[last_free].used)
- break;
-
- if (last_free>=AIRPDCAP_MAX_SEC_ASSOCIATIONS_NR) {
- /* there is no empty space available. FAILURE */
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* store first free space index */
- ctx->first_free_index=last_free;
- }
-
- /* use this info */
- ctx->index=ctx->first_free_index;
-
- /* reset the info structure */
- memset(ctx->sa+ctx->index, 0, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION));
-
- ctx->sa[ctx->index].used=1;
-
- /* set the info structure */
- memcpy(&(ctx->sa[ctx->index].saId), id, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID));
-
- /* increment by 1 the first_free_index (heuristic) */
- ctx->first_free_index++;
-
- /* set the last_stored_index if the added index is greater the the last_stored_index */
- if (ctx->index > ctx->last_stored_index)
- ctx->last_stored_index=ctx->index;
-
- return ctx->index;
- }
-
- UCHAR * AirPDcapGetStaAddress(
- PAIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME frame)
- {
- if (AIRPDCAP_TO_DS(frame->fc[1])==0) {
- if (AIRPDCAP_FROM_DS(frame->fc[1])==0)
- return NULL;
- else
- return frame->addr1;
- } else {
- if (AIRPDCAP_FROM_DS(frame->fc[1])==0)
- return frame->addr2;
- else
- return NULL;
- }
- }
-
- UCHAR * AirPDcapGetBssidAddress(
- PAIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME frame)
- {
- if (AIRPDCAP_TO_DS(frame->fc[1])==0) {
- if (AIRPDCAP_FROM_DS(frame->fc[1])==0)
- return frame->addr3;
- else
- return frame->addr2;
- } else {
- if (AIRPDCAP_FROM_DS(frame->fc[1])==0)
- return frame->addr1;
- else
- return NULL;
- }
- }
-
- /* Function used to derive the PTK. Refer to IEEE 802.11I-2004, pag. 74 */
- void AirPDcapRsnaPrfX(
- AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
- const UCHAR pmk[32],
- const UCHAR snonce[32],
- const INT x, /* for TKIP 512, for CCMP 384 */
- UCHAR *ptk)
- {
- UINT8 i;
- UCHAR R[100];
- INT offset=sizeof("Pairwise key expansion");
-
- memset(R, 0, 100);
-
- memcpy(R, "Pairwise key expansion", offset);
-
- /* Min(AA, SPA) || Max(AA, SPA) */
- if (memcmp(sa->saId.sta, sa->saId.bssid, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN) < 0)
- {
- memcpy(R + offset, sa->saId.sta, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
- memcpy(R + offset+AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN, sa->saId.bssid, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
- }
- else
- {
- memcpy(R + offset, sa->saId.bssid, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
- memcpy(R + offset+AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN, sa->saId.sta, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
- }
-
- offset+=AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN*2;
-
- /* Min(ANonce,SNonce) || Max(ANonce,SNonce) */
- if( memcmp(snonce, sa->wpa.nonce, 32) < 0 )
- {
- memcpy(R + offset, snonce, 32);
- memcpy(R + offset + 32, sa->wpa.nonce, 32);
- }
- else
- {
- memcpy(R + offset, sa->wpa.nonce, 32);
- memcpy(R + offset + 32, snonce, 32);
- }
-
- offset+=32*2;
-
- for(i = 0; i < (x+159)/160; i++)
- {
- R[offset] = i;
- AirPDcapAlgHmacSha1(pmk, 32, R, 100, ptk + i * 20);
- }
- }
-
- INT AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(
- const CHAR *password,
- const CHAR *ssid,
- const size_t ssidLength,
- const INT iterations,
- const INT count,
- UCHAR *output)
- {
- UCHAR digest[36], digest1[AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN];
- INT i, j;
-
- /* U1 = PRF(P, S || INT(i)) */
- memcpy(digest, ssid, ssidLength);
- digest[ssidLength] = (UCHAR)((count>>24) & 0xff);
- digest[ssidLength+1] = (UCHAR)((count>>16) & 0xff);
- digest[ssidLength+2] = (UCHAR)((count>>8) & 0xff);
- digest[ssidLength+3] = (UCHAR)(count & 0xff);
- AirPDcapAlgHmacSha1((UCHAR *)password, strlen(password), digest, ssidLength+4, digest1);
-
- /* output = U1 */
- memcpy(output, digest1, AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN);
- for (i = 1; i < iterations; i++) {
- /* Un = PRF(P, Un-1) */
- AirPDcapAlgHmacSha1((UCHAR *)password, strlen(password), digest1, AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN, digest);
-
- memcpy(digest1, digest, AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN);
- /* output = output xor Un */
- for (j = 0; j < AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN; j++) {
- output[j] ^= digest[j];
- }
- }
-
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
- }
-
- INT AirPDcapRsnaPwd2Psk(
- const CHAR *password,
- const CHAR *ssid,
- const size_t ssidLength,
- UCHAR *output)
- {
- UCHAR m_output[AIRPDCAP_WPA_PSK_LEN];
-
- memset(m_output, 0, AIRPDCAP_WPA_PSK_LEN);
-
- memset(m_output, 0, 40);
-
- AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(password, ssid, ssidLength, 4096, 1, m_output);
- AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(password, ssid, ssidLength, 4096, 2, &m_output[AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN]);
-
- memcpy(output, m_output, AIRPDCAP_WPA_PSK_LEN);
-
- return 0;
- }
-
- /**************************************************************************/
- /* The following code come from freeBSD and implements the AUTODIN II
- /* polynomial used by 802.11.
- /* It can be used to calculate multicast address hash indices.
- /* It assumes that the low order bits will be transmitted first,
- /* and consequently the low byte should be sent first when
- /* the crc computation is finished. The crc should be complemented
- /* before transmission.
- /* The variable corresponding to the macro argument "crc" should
- /* be an unsigned long and should be preset to all ones for Ethernet
- /* use. An error-free packet will leave 0xDEBB20E3 in the crc.
- /**************************************************************************/
- INT AirPDcapAlgCrc32(
- UCHAR *buf,
- size_t nr,
- ULONG *cval)
- {
- ULONG crc32_total = 0 ;
- ULONG crc = ~(ULONG)0;
- UCHAR *p ;
- size_t len;
-
- len = 0 ;
- crc32_total = ~crc32_total ;
-
- for(len += nr, p = buf; nr--; ++p)
- {
- CRC(crc, *p) ;
- CRC(crc32_total, *p) ;
- }
-
- *cval = ~crc ;
- crc32_total = ~crc32_total ;
-
- return 0;
- }
+INT AirPDcapRsnaMng(
+ UCHAR *decrypt_data,
+ size_t *decrypt_len,
+ PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
+ AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
+ INT offset,
+ UINT8 fcsPresent)
+{
+ INT ret_value;
+ ULONG crc;
+
+ if (sa->key==NULL) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "No key associated", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
+ }
+ if (sa->validKey==FALSE) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "Key not yet valid", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
+ }
+ if (sa->wpa.key_ver==1) {
+ /* CCMP -> HMAC-MD5 is the EAPOL-Key MIC, RC4 is the EAPOL-Key encryption algorithm */
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "TKIP", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+
+ ret_value=AirPDcapTkipDecrypt(decrypt_data+offset, *decrypt_len-offset, decrypt_data+AIRPDCAP_TA_OFFSET, AIRPDCAP_GET_TK(sa->wpa.ptk));
+ if (ret_value)
+ return ret_value;
+
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "TKIP DECRYPTED!!!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ /* remove MIC (8bytes) and ICV (4bytes) from the end of packet */
+ *decrypt_len-=12;
+ } else {
+ /* AES-CCMP -> HMAC-SHA1-128 is the EAPOL-Key MIC, AES wep_key wrap is the EAPOL-Key encryption algorithm */
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "CCMP", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+
+ ret_value=AirPDcapCcmpDecrypt(decrypt_data, (INT)*decrypt_len, AIRPDCAP_GET_TK(sa->wpa.ptk));
+ if (ret_value)
+ return ret_value;
+
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "CCMP DECRYPTED!!!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ /* remove MIC (8bytes) from the end of packet */
+ *decrypt_len-=8;
+ }
+
+ /* remove protection bit */
+ decrypt_data[1]&=0xBF;
+
+ /* remove TKIP/CCMP header */
+ offset=AIRPDCAP_HEADER_LEN(decrypt_data[1]);
+ *decrypt_len-=8;
+ memcpy(decrypt_data+offset, decrypt_data+offset+8, *decrypt_len-offset);
+
+ if (fcsPresent) {
+ /* calculate FCS */
+ AirPDcapAlgCrc32(decrypt_data, *decrypt_len, &crc);
+ *(unsigned long*)(decrypt_data+*decrypt_len)=crc;
+
+ /* add FCS in packet */
+ *decrypt_len+=4;
+ }
+
+ if (key!=NULL) {
+ memcpy(key, sa->key, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
+
+ if (sa->wpa.key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_CCMP)
+ key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_TKIP;
+ else if (sa->wpa.key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP)
+ key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_CCMP;
+ }
+
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+INT AirPDcapWepMng(
+ PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
+ UCHAR *decrypt_data,
+ size_t *decrypt_len,
+ PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
+ AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
+ INT offset,
+ UINT8 fcsPresent)
+{
+ UCHAR wep_key[AIRPDCAP_WEP_KEY_MAXLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN];
+ size_t keylen;
+ INT ret_value=1;
+ ULONG crc;
+ INT key_index;
+ AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM *tmp_key;
+ UINT8 useCache=FALSE;
+
+ if (sa->key!=NULL)
+ useCache=TRUE;
+
+ for (key_index=0; key_index<(INT)ctx->keys_nr; key_index++) {
+ /* use the cached one, or try all keys */
+ if (!useCache) {
+ tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
+ } else {
+ if (sa->key!=NULL && sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "Try cached WEP key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ tmp_key=sa->key;
+ } else {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "Cached key is not valid, try another WEP key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* obviously, try only WEP keys... */
+ if (tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP)
+ {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "Try WEP key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+
+ memset(wep_key, 0, sizeof(wep_key));
+
+ /* Costruct the WEP seed: copy the IV in first 3 bytes and then the WEP key (refer to 802-11i-2004, 8.2.1.4.3, pag. 36) */
+ memcpy(wep_key, decrypt_data+AIRPDCAP_HEADER_LEN(decrypt_data[1]), AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN);
+ keylen=tmp_key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen;
+ memcpy(wep_key+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN, tmp_key->KeyData.Wep.WepKey, keylen);
+
+ ret_value=AirPDcapWepDecrypt(wep_key,
+ keylen+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN,
+ decrypt_data + (AIRPDCAP_HEADER_LEN(decrypt_data[1])+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_KIDLEN),
+ *decrypt_len-(AIRPDCAP_HEADER_LEN(decrypt_data[1])+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_KIDLEN+AIRPDCAP_CRC_LEN));
+
+ }
+
+ if (!ret_value && tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP) {
+ /* the tried key is the correct one, cached in the Security Association */
+
+ sa->key=tmp_key;
+
+ if (key!=NULL) {
+ memcpy(key, &sa->key, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
+ key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
+ }
+
+ break;
+ } else {
+ /* the cached key was not valid, try other keys */
+
+ if (useCache==TRUE) {
+ useCache=FALSE;
+ key_index--;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ret_value)
+ return ret_value;
+
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "WEP DECRYPTED!!!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+
+ /* remove ICV (4bytes) from the end of packet */
+ *decrypt_len-=4;
+
+ /* remove protection bit */
+ decrypt_data[1]&=0xBF;
+
+ /* remove IC header */
+ offset=AIRPDCAP_HEADER_LEN(decrypt_data[1]);
+ *decrypt_len-=4;
+ memcpy(decrypt_data+offset, decrypt_data+offset+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_KIDLEN, *decrypt_len-offset);
+
+ if (fcsPresent) {
+ /* calculate FCS and append it at the end of the decrypted packet */
+ AirPDcapAlgCrc32(decrypt_data, *decrypt_len, &crc);
+ *(unsigned long*)(decrypt_data+*decrypt_len)=crc;
+
+ /* add FCS in packet */
+ *decrypt_len += 4;
+ }
+
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/* Refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.5.3, pag. 85 */
+INT AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake(
+ PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
+ const UCHAR *data,
+ AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
+ PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
+ INT offset)
+{
+ AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM *tmp_key;
+ INT key_index;
+ INT ret_value=1;
+ UCHAR useCache=FALSE;
+ UCHAR eapol[AIRPDCAP_EAPOL_MAX_LEN];
+ USHORT eapol_len;
+
+ if (sa->key!=NULL)
+ useCache=TRUE;
+
+ /* a 4-way handshake packet use a Pairwise key type (IEEE 802.11i-2004, pg. 79) */
+ if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY(data[offset+1])!=1) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Group/STAKey message (not used)", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
+ }
+
+ /* TODO timeouts? reauthentication? */
+
+ /* TODO consider key-index */
+
+ /* TODO considera Deauthentications */
+
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+
+ /* manage 4-way handshake packets; this step completes the 802.1X authentication process (IEEE 802.11i-2004, pag. 85) */
+
+ /* message 1: Authenticator->Supplicant (Sec=0, Mic=0, Ack=1, Inst=0, Key=1(pairwise), KeyRSC=0, Nonce=ANonce, MIC=0) */
+ if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_INST(data[offset+1])==0 &&
+ AIRPDCAP_EAP_ACK(data[offset+1])==1 &&
+ AIRPDCAP_EAP_MIC(data[offset])==0)
+ {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 1", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+
+ /* On reception of Message 1, the Supplicant determines whether the Key Replay Counter field value has been */
+ /* used before with the current PMKSA. If the Key Replay Counter field value is less than or equal to the current */
+ /* local value, the Supplicant discards the message. */
+ /* -> not checked, the Authenticator will be send another Message 1 (hopefully!) */
+
+ /* save ANonce (from authenticator) to derive the PTK with the SNonce (from the 2 message) */
+ memcpy(sa->wpa.nonce, data+offset+12, 32);
+
+ /* get the Key Descriptor Version (to select algorithm used in decryption -CCMP or TKIP-) */
+ sa->wpa.key_ver=AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1]);
+
+ sa->handshake=1;
+
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
+ }
+
+ /* message 2|4: Supplicant->Authenticator (Sec=0|1, Mic=1, Ack=0, Inst=0, Key=1(pairwise), KeyRSC=0, Nonce=SNonce|0, MIC=MIC(KCK,EAPOL)) */
+ if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_INST(data[offset+1])==0 &&
+ AIRPDCAP_EAP_ACK(data[offset+1])==0 &&
+ AIRPDCAP_EAP_MIC(data[offset])==1)
+ {
+ if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_SEC(data[offset])==0) {
+
+ /* PATCH: some implementations set secure bit to 0 also in the 4th message */
+ /* to recognize which message is this check if wep_key data lenght is 0 */
+ /* in the 4th message */
+ if (*(UINT16 *)(data+offset+92)!=0) {
+ /* message 2 */
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 2", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+
+ /* On reception of Message 2, the Authenticator checks that the key replay counter corresponds to the */
+ /* outstanding Message 1. If not, it silently discards the message. */
+ /* If the calculated MIC does not match the MIC that the Supplicant included in the EAPOL-Key frame, */
+ /* the Authenticator silently discards Message 2. */
+ /* -> not checked; the Supplicant will send another message 2 (hopefully!) */
+
+ /* now you can derive the PTK */
+ for (key_index=0; key_index<(INT)ctx->keys_nr || sa->key!=NULL; key_index++) {
+ /* use the cached one, or try all keys */
+ if (!useCache) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Try WPA key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
+ } else {
+ /* there is a cached key in the security association, if it's a WPA key try it... */
+ if (sa->key!=NULL &&
+ sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD ||
+ sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK ||
+ sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Try cached WPA key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ tmp_key=sa->key;
+ } else {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Cached key is of a wrong type, try WPA key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* obviously, try only WPA keys... */
+ if (tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD ||
+ tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK ||
+ tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK)
+ {
+ /* derive the PTK from the BSSID, STA MAC, PMK, SNonce, ANonce */
+ AirPDcapRsnaPrfX(sa, /* authenticator nonce, bssid, station mac */
+ tmp_key->KeyData.Wpa.Pmk, /* PMK */
+ data+offset+12, /* supplicant nonce */
+ 512,
+ sa->wpa.ptk);
+
+ /* verify the MIC (compare the MIC in the packet included in this message with a MIC calculated with the PTK) */
+ eapol_len=(USHORT)(ntohs(*(UINT16 *)(data+offset-3))+4);
+ memcpy(eapol, &data[offset-5], (eapol_len<AIRPDCAP_EAPOL_MAX_LEN?eapol_len:AIRPDCAP_EAPOL_MAX_LEN));
+ ret_value=AirPDcapRsnaMicCheck(eapol, /* eapol frame (header also) */
+ eapol_len, /* eapol frame length */
+ sa->wpa.ptk, /* Key Confirmation Key */
+ AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1])); /* EAPOL-Key description version */
+
+ /* If the MIC is valid, the Authenticator checks that the RSN information element bit-wise matches */
+ /* that from the (Re)Association Request message. */
+ /* i) TODO If these are not exactly the same, the Authenticator uses MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
+ /* primitive to terminate the association. */
+ /* ii) If they do match bit-wise, the Authenticator constructs Message 3. */
+ }
+
+ if (!ret_value &&
+ (tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD ||
+ tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK ||
+ tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK))
+ {
+ /* the temporary key is the correct one, cached in the Security Association */
+
+ sa->key=tmp_key;
+
+ if (key!=NULL) {
+ memcpy(key, &tmp_key, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
+ if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1])==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_CCMP)
+ key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_TKIP;
+ else if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1])==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP)
+ key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_CCMP;
+ }
+
+ break;
+ } else {
+ /* the cached key was not valid, try other keys */
+
+ if (useCache==TRUE) {
+ useCache=FALSE;
+ key_index--;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ret_value) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "handshake step failed", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ return ret_value;
+ }
+
+ sa->handshake=2;
+
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
+ } else {
+ /* message 4 */
+
+ /* TODO "Note that when the 4-Way Handshake is first used Message 4 is sent in the clear." */
+
+ /* TODO check MIC and Replay Counter */
+ /* On reception of Message 4, the Authenticator verifies that the Key Replay Counter field value is one */
+ /* that it used on this 4-Way Handshake; if it is not, it silently discards the message. */
+ /* If the calculated MIC does not match the MIC that the Supplicant included in the EAPOL-Key frame, the */
+ /* Authenticator silently discards Message 4. */
+
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 4 (patched)", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+
+ sa->handshake=4;
+
+ sa->validKey=TRUE;
+
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
+ }
+ /* END OF PATCH */
+ /* */
+ } else {
+ /* message 4 */
+
+ /* TODO "Note that when the 4-Way Handshake is first used Message 4 is sent in the clear." */
+
+ /* TODO check MIC and Replay Counter */
+ /* On reception of Message 4, the Authenticator verifies that the Key Replay Counter field value is one */
+ /* that it used on this 4-Way Handshake; if it is not, it silently discards the message. */
+ /* If the calculated MIC does not match the MIC that the Supplicant included in the EAPOL-Key frame, the */
+ /* Authenticator silently discards Message 4. */
+
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 4", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+
+ sa->handshake=4;
+
+ sa->validKey=TRUE;
+
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* message 3: Authenticator->Supplicant (Sec=1, Mic=1, Ack=1, Inst=0/1, Key=1(pairwise), KeyRSC=???, Nonce=ANonce, MIC=1) */
+ if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_ACK(data[offset+1])==1 &&
+ AIRPDCAP_EAP_MIC(data[offset])==1)
+ {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 3", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+
+ /* On reception of Message 3, the Supplicant silently discards the message if the Key Replay Counter field */
+ /* value has already been used or if the ANonce value in Message 3 differs from the ANonce value in Message 1. */
+ /* -> not checked, the Authenticator will send another message 3 (hopefully!) */
+
+ /* TODO check page 88 (RNS) */
+
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
+ }
+
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
+}
+
+INT AirPDcapRsnaMicCheck(
+ UCHAR *eapol,
+ const USHORT eapol_len,
+ const UCHAR KCK[AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN],
+ const USHORT key_ver)
+{
+ UCHAR mic[AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN];
+ UCHAR c_mic[20]; /* MIC 16 byte, the HMAC-SHA1 use a buffer of 20 bytes */
+
+ /* copy the MIC from the EAPOL packet */
+ memcpy(mic, eapol+AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_OFFSET+4, AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN);
+
+ /* set to 0 the MIC in the EAPOL packet (to calculate the MIC) */
+ memset(eapol+AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_OFFSET+4, 0, AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN);
+
+ if (key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_CCMP) {
+ /* use HMAC-MD5 for the EAPOL-Key MIC */
+ AirPDcapAlgHmacMd5((UCHAR *)KCK, AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN, eapol, eapol_len, c_mic);
+ } else if (key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP) {
+ /* use HMAC-SHA1-128 for the EAPOL-Key MIC */
+ AirPDcapAlgHmacSha1(KCK, AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN, eapol, eapol_len, c_mic);
+ } else
+ /* key descriptor version not recognized */
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
+
+ /* compare calculated MIC with the Key MIC and return result (0 means success) */
+ return memcmp(mic, c_mic, AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN);
+}
+
+INT AirPDcapValidateKey(
+ PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ UCHAR ret=TRUE;
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapValidateKey");
+
+ if (key==NULL) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapValidateKey", "NULL key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapValidateKey");
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ switch (key->KeyType) {
+case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP:
+ /* check key size limits */
+ len=key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen;
+ if (len<AIRPDCAP_WEP_KEY_MINLEN || len>AIRPDCAP_WEP_KEY_MAXLEN) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapValidateKey", "WEP key: key length not accepted", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ ret=FALSE;
+ }
+ break;
+
+case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP_40:
+ /* set the standard length and use a generic WEP key type */
+ key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen=AIRPDCAP_WEP_40_KEY_LEN;
+ key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
+ break;
+
+case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP_104:
+ /* set the standard length and use a generic WEP key type */
+ key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen=AIRPDCAP_WEP_104_KEY_LEN;
+ key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
+ break;
+
+case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD:
+ /* check passphrase and SSID size limits */
+ len=strlen(key->KeyData.Wpa.UserPwd.Passphrase);
+ if (len<AIRPDCAP_WPA_PASSPHRASE_MIN_LEN || len>AIRPDCAP_WPA_PASSPHRASE_MAX_LEN) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapValidateKey", "WPA-PWD key: passphrase length not accepted", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ ret=FALSE;
+ }
+
+ len=key->KeyData.Wpa.UserPwd.SsidLen;
+ if (len<AIRPDCAP_WPA_SSID_MIN_LEN || len>AIRPDCAP_WPA_SSID_MAX_LEN) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapValidateKey", "WPA-PWD key: ssid length not accepted", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ ret=FALSE;
+ }
+
+ break;
+
+case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK:
+ break;
+
+case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK:
+ break;
+
+default:
+ ret=FALSE;
+ }
+
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapValidateKey");
+ return ret;
+}
+
+INT AirPDcapGetSa(
+ PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
+ AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
+{
+ INT index;
+
+ if (ctx->last_stored_index!=-1) {
+ /* at least one association was stored */
+ /* search for the association from last_stored_index to 0 (most recent added) */
+ for (index=ctx->last_stored_index; index>=0; index--) {
+ if (ctx->sa[index].used) {
+ if (memcmp(id, &(ctx->sa[index].saId), sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID))==0) {
+ ctx->index=index;
+ return index;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+INT AirPDcapFreeSa(
+ PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
+ INT index) /* index of the structure to free */
+{
+ /* set the structure as free (the reset will be done in AIRPDCAP_store_sta_info) */
+ ctx->sa[index].used=0;
+
+ /* set the first_free_index to avoid free blocks in the middle */
+ if (index<ctx->first_free_index)
+ ctx->first_free_index=index;
+
+ /* decrement the last_stored_index if this was the last stored block */
+ if (index==ctx->last_stored_index)
+ ctx->last_stored_index--;
+
+ /* if the list is empty, set the index */
+ if (ctx->last_stored_index==-1)
+ ctx->index=-1;
+
+ return ctx->index;
+}
+
+INT AirPDcapStoreSa(
+ PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
+ AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
+{
+ INT last_free;
+
+ if (ctx->sa[ctx->first_free_index].used) {
+ /* last addition was in the middle of the array (and the first_free_index was just incremented by 1) */
+ /* search for a free space from the first_free_index to AIRPDCAP_STA_INFOS_NR (to avoid free blocks in */
+ /* the middle) */
+ for (last_free=ctx->first_free_index; last_free<AIRPDCAP_MAX_SEC_ASSOCIATIONS_NR; last_free++)
+ if (!ctx->sa[last_free].used)
+ break;
+
+ if (last_free>=AIRPDCAP_MAX_SEC_ASSOCIATIONS_NR) {
+ /* there is no empty space available. FAILURE */
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* store first free space index */
+ ctx->first_free_index=last_free;
+ }
+
+ /* use this info */
+ ctx->index=ctx->first_free_index;
+
+ /* reset the info structure */
+ memset(ctx->sa+ctx->index, 0, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION));
+
+ ctx->sa[ctx->index].used=1;
+
+ /* set the info structure */
+ memcpy(&(ctx->sa[ctx->index].saId), id, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID));
+
+ /* increment by 1 the first_free_index (heuristic) */
+ ctx->first_free_index++;
+
+ /* set the last_stored_index if the added index is greater the the last_stored_index */
+ if (ctx->index > ctx->last_stored_index)
+ ctx->last_stored_index=ctx->index;
+
+ return ctx->index;
+}
+
+UCHAR * AirPDcapGetStaAddress(
+ PAIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME frame)
+{
+ if (AIRPDCAP_TO_DS(frame->fc[1])==0) {
+ if (AIRPDCAP_FROM_DS(frame->fc[1])==0)
+ return NULL;
+ else
+ return frame->addr1;
+ } else {
+ if (AIRPDCAP_FROM_DS(frame->fc[1])==0)
+ return frame->addr2;
+ else
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+UCHAR * AirPDcapGetBssidAddress(
+ PAIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME frame)
+{
+ if (AIRPDCAP_TO_DS(frame->fc[1])==0) {
+ if (AIRPDCAP_FROM_DS(frame->fc[1])==0)
+ return frame->addr3;
+ else
+ return frame->addr2;
+ } else {
+ if (AIRPDCAP_FROM_DS(frame->fc[1])==0)
+ return frame->addr1;
+ else
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Function used to derive the PTK. Refer to IEEE 802.11I-2004, pag. 74 */
+void AirPDcapRsnaPrfX(
+ AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
+ const UCHAR pmk[32],
+ const UCHAR snonce[32],
+ const INT x, /* for TKIP 512, for CCMP 384 */
+ UCHAR *ptk)
+{
+ UINT8 i;
+ UCHAR R[100];
+ INT offset=sizeof("Pairwise key expansion");
+
+ memset(R, 0, 100);
+
+ memcpy(R, "Pairwise key expansion", offset);
+
+ /* Min(AA, SPA) || Max(AA, SPA) */
+ if (memcmp(sa->saId.sta, sa->saId.bssid, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN) < 0)
+ {
+ memcpy(R + offset, sa->saId.sta, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
+ memcpy(R + offset+AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN, sa->saId.bssid, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ memcpy(R + offset, sa->saId.bssid, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
+ memcpy(R + offset+AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN, sa->saId.sta, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
+ }
+
+ offset+=AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN*2;
+
+ /* Min(ANonce,SNonce) || Max(ANonce,SNonce) */
+ if( memcmp(snonce, sa->wpa.nonce, 32) < 0 )
+ {
+ memcpy(R + offset, snonce, 32);
+ memcpy(R + offset + 32, sa->wpa.nonce, 32);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ memcpy(R + offset, sa->wpa.nonce, 32);
+ memcpy(R + offset + 32, snonce, 32);
+ }
+
+ offset+=32*2;
+
+ for(i = 0; i < (x+159)/160; i++)
+ {
+ R[offset] = i;
+ AirPDcapAlgHmacSha1(pmk, 32, R, 100, ptk + i * 20);
+ }
+}
+
+INT AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(
+ const CHAR *password,
+ const CHAR *ssid,
+ const size_t ssidLength,
+ const INT iterations,
+ const INT count,
+ UCHAR *output)
+{
+ UCHAR digest[36], digest1[AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN];
+ INT i, j;
+
+ /* U1 = PRF(P, S || INT(i)) */
+ memcpy(digest, ssid, ssidLength);
+ digest[ssidLength] = (UCHAR)((count>>24) & 0xff);
+ digest[ssidLength+1] = (UCHAR)((count>>16) & 0xff);
+ digest[ssidLength+2] = (UCHAR)((count>>8) & 0xff);
+ digest[ssidLength+3] = (UCHAR)(count & 0xff);
+ AirPDcapAlgHmacSha1((UCHAR *)password, strlen(password), digest, ssidLength+4, digest1);
+
+ /* output = U1 */
+ memcpy(output, digest1, AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN);
+ for (i = 1; i < iterations; i++) {
+ /* Un = PRF(P, Un-1) */
+ AirPDcapAlgHmacSha1((UCHAR *)password, strlen(password), digest1, AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN, digest);
+
+ memcpy(digest1, digest, AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN);
+ /* output = output xor Un */
+ for (j = 0; j < AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN; j++) {
+ output[j] ^= digest[j];
+ }
+ }
+
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+INT AirPDcapRsnaPwd2Psk(
+ const CHAR *password,
+ const CHAR *ssid,
+ const size_t ssidLength,
+ UCHAR *output)
+{
+ UCHAR m_output[AIRPDCAP_WPA_PSK_LEN];
+
+ memset(m_output, 0, AIRPDCAP_WPA_PSK_LEN);
+
+ memset(m_output, 0, 40);
+
+ AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(password, ssid, ssidLength, 4096, 1, m_output);
+ AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(password, ssid, ssidLength, 4096, 2, &m_output[AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN]);
+
+ memcpy(output, m_output, AIRPDCAP_WPA_PSK_LEN);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/***************************************************************************/
+/* The following code come from freeBSD and implements the AUTODIN II */
+/* polynomial used by 802.11. */
+/* It can be used to calculate multicast address hash indices. */
+/* It assumes that the low order bits will be transmitted first, */
+/* and consequently the low byte should be sent first when */
+/* the crc computation is finished. The crc should be complemented */
+/* before transmission. */
+/* The variable corresponding to the macro argument "crc" should */
+/* be an unsigned long and should be preset to all ones for Ethernet */
+/* use. An error-free packet will leave 0xDEBB20E3 in the crc. */
+/***************************************************************************/
+INT AirPDcapAlgCrc32(
+ UCHAR *buf,
+ size_t nr,
+ ULONG *cval)
+{
+ ULONG crc32_total = 0 ;
+ ULONG crc = ~(ULONG)0;
+ UCHAR *p ;
+ size_t len;
+
+ len = 0 ;
+ crc32_total = ~crc32_total ;
+
+ for(len += nr, p = buf; nr--; ++p)
+ {
+ CRC(crc, *p) ;
+ CRC(crc32_total, *p) ;
+ }
+
+ *cval = ~crc ;
+ crc32_total = ~crc32_total ;
+
+ return 0;
+}
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
git.samba.org / jelmer / wireshark.git / commitdiff