2 * Copyright (c) 1997-2008 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
3 * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
17 * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
18 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
19 * without specific prior written permission.
21 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
22 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
23 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
24 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
25 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
26 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
27 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
28 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
29 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
30 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
37 * return the realm of a krbtgt-ticket or NULL
41 get_krbtgt_realm(const PrincipalName *p)
43 if(p->name_string.len == 2
44 && strcmp(p->name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) == 0)
45 return p->name_string.val[1];
51 * The KDC might add a signed path to the ticket authorization data
52 * field. This is to avoid server impersonating clients and the
53 * request constrained delegation.
55 * This is done by storing a KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT with a single
56 * entry of type KRB5SignedPath.
59 static krb5_error_code
60 find_KRB5SignedPath(krb5_context context,
61 const AuthorizationData *ad,
64 AuthorizationData child;
68 if (ad == NULL || ad->len == 0)
69 return KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
73 if (ad->val[pos].ad_type != KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT)
74 return KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
76 ret = decode_AuthorizationData(ad->val[pos].ad_data.data,
77 ad->val[pos].ad_data.length,
81 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "Failed to decode "
82 "IF_RELEVANT with %d", ret);
87 free_AuthorizationData(&child);
88 return KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
91 if (child.val[0].ad_type != KRB5_AUTHDATA_SIGNTICKET) {
92 free_AuthorizationData(&child);
93 return KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
97 ret = der_copy_octet_string(&child.val[0].ad_data, data);
98 free_AuthorizationData(&child);
103 _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(krb5_context context,
104 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
105 hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
106 krb5_enctype enctype,
107 krb5_principal client,
108 krb5_const_principal server,
109 krb5_principals principals,
115 krb5_crypto crypto = NULL;
118 if (server && principals) {
119 ret = add_Principals(principals, server);
125 KRB5SignedPathData spd;
128 spd.authtime = tkt->authtime;
129 spd.delegated = principals;
130 spd.method_data = NULL;
132 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(KRB5SignedPathData, data.data, data.length,
136 if (data.length != size)
137 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
142 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &krbtgt->entry, enctype, &key);
144 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &key->key, 0, &crypto);
152 * Fill in KRB5SignedPath
156 sp.delegated = principals;
157 sp.method_data = NULL;
159 ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, crypto, KRB5_KU_KRB5SIGNEDPATH, 0,
160 data.data, data.length, &sp.cksum);
161 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
166 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(KRB5SignedPath, data.data, data.length, &sp, &size, ret);
167 free_Checksum(&sp.cksum);
170 if (data.length != size)
171 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
175 * Add IF-RELEVANT(KRB5SignedPath) to the last slot in
176 * authorization data field.
179 ret = _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(context, tkt,
180 KRB5_AUTHDATA_SIGNTICKET, &data);
181 krb5_data_free(&data);
186 static krb5_error_code
187 check_KRB5SignedPath(krb5_context context,
188 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
189 hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
192 krb5_principals *delegated,
197 krb5_crypto crypto = NULL;
202 ret = find_KRB5SignedPath(context, tkt->authorization_data, &data);
204 KRB5SignedPathData spd;
208 ret = decode_KRB5SignedPath(data.data, data.length, &sp, NULL);
209 krb5_data_free(&data);
214 spd.authtime = tkt->authtime;
215 spd.delegated = sp.delegated;
216 spd.method_data = sp.method_data;
218 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(KRB5SignedPathData, data.data, data.length,
221 free_KRB5SignedPath(&sp);
224 if (data.length != size)
225 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
229 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &krbtgt->entry, sp.etype, &key);
231 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &key->key, 0, &crypto);
234 free_KRB5SignedPath(&sp);
238 ret = krb5_verify_checksum(context, crypto, KRB5_KU_KRB5SIGNEDPATH,
239 data.data, data.length,
241 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
244 free_KRB5SignedPath(&sp);
245 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
246 "KRB5SignedPath not signed correctly, not marking as signed");
250 if (delegated && sp.delegated) {
252 *delegated = malloc(sizeof(*sp.delegated));
253 if (*delegated == NULL) {
254 free_KRB5SignedPath(&sp);
258 ret = copy_Principals(*delegated, sp.delegated);
260 free_KRB5SignedPath(&sp);
266 free_KRB5SignedPath(&sp);
278 static krb5_error_code
279 check_PAC(krb5_context context,
280 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
281 const krb5_principal client_principal,
282 hdb_entry_ex *client,
283 hdb_entry_ex *server,
284 hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
285 const EncryptionKey *server_key,
286 const EncryptionKey *krbtgt_check_key,
287 const EncryptionKey *krbtgt_sign_key,
292 AuthorizationData *ad = tkt->authorization_data;
296 if (ad == NULL || ad->len == 0)
299 for (i = 0; i < ad->len; i++) {
300 AuthorizationData child;
302 if (ad->val[i].ad_type != KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT)
305 ret = decode_AuthorizationData(ad->val[i].ad_data.data,
306 ad->val[i].ad_data.length,
310 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "Failed to decode "
311 "IF_RELEVANT with %d", ret);
314 for (j = 0; j < child.len; j++) {
316 if (child.val[j].ad_type == KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC) {
321 ret = krb5_pac_parse(context,
322 child.val[j].ad_data.data,
323 child.val[j].ad_data.length,
325 free_AuthorizationData(&child);
329 ret = krb5_pac_verify(context, pac, tkt->authtime,
331 krbtgt_check_key, NULL);
333 krb5_pac_free(context, pac);
337 ret = _kdc_pac_verify(context, client_principal,
338 client, server, krbtgt, &pac, &signed_pac);
340 krb5_pac_free(context, pac);
345 * Only re-sign PAC if we could verify it with the PAC
346 * function. The no-verify case happens when we get in
347 * a PAC from cross realm from a Windows domain and
348 * that there is no PAC verification function.
352 ret = _krb5_pac_sign(context, pac, tkt->authtime,
354 server_key, krbtgt_sign_key, rspac);
356 krb5_pac_free(context, pac);
361 free_AuthorizationData(&child);
370 static krb5_error_code
371 check_tgs_flags(krb5_context context,
372 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
373 KDC_REQ_BODY *b, const EncTicketPart *tgt, EncTicketPart *et)
375 KDCOptions f = b->kdc_options;
378 if(!tgt->flags.invalid || tgt->starttime == NULL){
379 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
380 "Bad request to validate ticket");
381 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
383 if(*tgt->starttime > kdc_time){
384 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
385 "Early request to validate ticket");
386 return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV;
389 et->flags.invalid = 0;
390 }else if(tgt->flags.invalid){
391 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
392 "Ticket-granting ticket has INVALID flag set");
393 return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_INVALID;
397 if(!tgt->flags.forwardable){
398 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
399 "Bad request for forwardable ticket");
400 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
402 et->flags.forwardable = 1;
405 if(!tgt->flags.forwardable){
406 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
407 "Request to forward non-forwardable ticket");
408 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
410 et->flags.forwarded = 1;
411 et->caddr = b->addresses;
413 if(tgt->flags.forwarded)
414 et->flags.forwarded = 1;
417 if(!tgt->flags.proxiable){
418 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
419 "Bad request for proxiable ticket");
420 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
422 et->flags.proxiable = 1;
425 if(!tgt->flags.proxiable){
426 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
427 "Request to proxy non-proxiable ticket");
428 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
431 et->caddr = b->addresses;
436 if(f.allow_postdate){
437 if(!tgt->flags.may_postdate){
438 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
439 "Bad request for post-datable ticket");
440 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
442 et->flags.may_postdate = 1;
445 if(!tgt->flags.may_postdate){
446 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
447 "Bad request for postdated ticket");
448 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
451 *et->starttime = *b->from;
452 et->flags.postdated = 1;
453 et->flags.invalid = 1;
454 }else if(b->from && *b->from > kdc_time + context->max_skew){
455 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Ticket cannot be postdated");
456 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE;
460 if(!tgt->flags.renewable || tgt->renew_till == NULL){
461 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
462 "Bad request for renewable ticket");
463 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
465 et->flags.renewable = 1;
466 ALLOC(et->renew_till);
467 _kdc_fix_time(&b->rtime);
468 *et->renew_till = *b->rtime;
472 if(!tgt->flags.renewable || tgt->renew_till == NULL){
473 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
474 "Request to renew non-renewable ticket");
475 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
477 old_life = tgt->endtime;
479 old_life -= *tgt->starttime;
481 old_life -= tgt->authtime;
482 et->endtime = *et->starttime + old_life;
483 if (et->renew_till != NULL)
484 et->endtime = min(*et->renew_till, et->endtime);
488 /* checks for excess flags */
489 if(f.request_anonymous && !config->allow_anonymous){
490 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
491 "Request for anonymous ticket");
492 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
499 * Determine if constrained delegation is allowed from this client to this server
502 static krb5_error_code
503 check_constrained_delegation(krb5_context context,
504 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
506 hdb_entry_ex *client,
507 krb5_const_principal server)
509 const HDB_Ext_Constrained_delegation_acl *acl;
513 /* if client delegates to itself, that ok */
514 if (krb5_principal_compare(context, client->entry.principal, server) == TRUE)
517 if (clientdb->hdb_check_constrained_delegation) {
518 ret = clientdb->hdb_check_constrained_delegation(context, clientdb, client, server);
522 ret = hdb_entry_get_ConstrainedDelegACL(&client->entry, &acl);
524 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
529 for (i = 0; i < acl->len; i++) {
530 if (krb5_principal_compare(context, server, &acl->val[i]) == TRUE)
534 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
536 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
537 "Bad request for constrained delegation");
542 * Determine if s4u2self is allowed from this client to this server
544 * For example, regardless of the principal being impersonated, if the
545 * 'client' and 'server' are the same, then it's safe.
548 static krb5_error_code
549 check_s4u2self(krb5_context context,
550 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
552 hdb_entry_ex *client,
553 krb5_const_principal server)
557 /* if client does a s4u2self to itself, that ok */
558 if (krb5_principal_compare(context, client->entry.principal, server) == TRUE)
561 if (clientdb->hdb_check_s4u2self) {
562 ret = clientdb->hdb_check_s4u2self(context, clientdb, client, server);
566 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
575 static krb5_error_code
576 verify_flags (krb5_context context,
577 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
578 const EncTicketPart *et,
581 if(et->endtime < kdc_time){
582 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Ticket expired (%s)", pstr);
583 return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED;
585 if(et->flags.invalid){
586 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Ticket not valid (%s)", pstr);
587 return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV;
596 static krb5_error_code
597 fix_transited_encoding(krb5_context context,
598 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
599 krb5_boolean check_policy,
600 const TransitedEncoding *tr,
602 const char *client_realm,
603 const char *server_realm,
604 const char *tgt_realm)
606 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
607 char **realms, **tmp;
608 unsigned int num_realms;
611 switch (tr->tr_type) {
612 case DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS:
616 * Allow empty content of type 0 because that is was Microsoft
617 * generates in their TGT.
619 if (tr->contents.length == 0)
621 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
622 "Transited type 0 with non empty content");
623 return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
625 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
626 "Unknown transited type: %u", tr->tr_type);
627 return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
630 ret = krb5_domain_x500_decode(context,
637 krb5_warn(context, ret,
638 "Decoding transited encoding");
641 if(strcmp(client_realm, tgt_realm) && strcmp(server_realm, tgt_realm)) {
642 /* not us, so add the previous realm to transited set */
643 if (num_realms + 1 > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*realms)) {
647 tmp = realloc(realms, (num_realms + 1) * sizeof(*realms));
653 realms[num_realms] = strdup(tgt_realm);
654 if(realms[num_realms] == NULL){
660 if(num_realms == 0) {
661 if(strcmp(client_realm, server_realm))
662 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
663 "cross-realm %s -> %s", client_realm, server_realm);
667 for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++)
668 l += strlen(realms[i]) + 2;
672 for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++) {
674 strlcat(rs, ", ", l);
675 strlcat(rs, realms[i], l);
677 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
678 "cross-realm %s -> %s via [%s]",
679 client_realm, server_realm, rs);
684 ret = krb5_check_transited(context, client_realm,
686 realms, num_realms, NULL);
688 krb5_warn(context, ret, "cross-realm %s -> %s",
689 client_realm, server_realm);
692 et->flags.transited_policy_checked = 1;
694 et->transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
695 ret = krb5_domain_x500_encode(realms, num_realms, &et->transited.contents);
697 krb5_warn(context, ret, "Encoding transited encoding");
699 for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++)
706 static krb5_error_code
707 tgs_make_reply(krb5_context context,
708 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
710 krb5_const_principal tgt_name,
711 const EncTicketPart *tgt,
712 const krb5_keyblock *replykey,
714 const EncryptionKey *serverkey,
715 const krb5_keyblock *sessionkey,
717 AuthorizationData *auth_data,
718 hdb_entry_ex *server,
719 krb5_principal server_principal,
720 const char *server_name,
721 hdb_entry_ex *client,
722 krb5_principal client_principal,
723 hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
724 krb5_enctype krbtgt_etype,
726 const krb5_data *rspac,
727 const METHOD_DATA *enc_pa_data,
734 KDCOptions f = b->kdc_options;
738 memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
739 memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et));
740 memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek));
743 rep.msg_type = krb_tgs_rep;
745 et.authtime = tgt->authtime;
746 _kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
747 et.endtime = min(tgt->endtime, *b->till);
749 *et.starttime = kdc_time;
751 ret = check_tgs_flags(context, config, b, tgt, &et);
755 /* We should check the transited encoding if:
756 1) the request doesn't ask not to be checked
757 2) globally enforcing a check
758 3) principal requires checking
759 4) we allow non-check per-principal, but principal isn't marked as allowing this
760 5) we don't globally allow this
763 #define GLOBAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK \
764 (config->trpolicy == TRPOLICY_ALWAYS_CHECK)
765 #define GLOBAL_ALLOW_PER_PRINCIPAL \
766 (config->trpolicy == TRPOLICY_ALLOW_PER_PRINCIPAL)
767 #define GLOBAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK \
768 (config->trpolicy == TRPOLICY_ALWAYS_HONOUR_REQUEST)
770 /* these will consult the database in future release */
771 #define PRINCIPAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK(P) 0
772 #define PRINCIPAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK(P) 0
774 ret = fix_transited_encoding(context, config,
775 !f.disable_transited_check ||
776 GLOBAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK ||
777 PRINCIPAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK(server) ||
778 !((GLOBAL_ALLOW_PER_PRINCIPAL &&
779 PRINCIPAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK(server)) ||
780 GLOBAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK),
781 &tgt->transited, &et,
782 krb5_principal_get_realm(context, client_principal),
783 krb5_principal_get_realm(context, server->entry.principal),
784 krb5_principal_get_realm(context, krbtgt->entry.principal));
788 copy_Realm(&server_principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
789 _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname, server_principal);
790 copy_Realm(&tgt_name->realm, &rep.crealm);
792 if (f.request_anonymous)
793 _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname (&rep.cname);
796 copy_PrincipalName(&tgt_name->name, &rep.cname);
797 rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
801 et.caddr = tgt->caddr;
805 life = et.endtime - *et.starttime;
806 if(client && client->entry.max_life)
807 life = min(life, *client->entry.max_life);
808 if(server->entry.max_life)
809 life = min(life, *server->entry.max_life);
810 et.endtime = *et.starttime + life;
812 if(f.renewable_ok && tgt->flags.renewable &&
813 et.renew_till == NULL && et.endtime < *b->till &&
814 tgt->renew_till != NULL)
816 et.flags.renewable = 1;
817 ALLOC(et.renew_till);
818 *et.renew_till = *b->till;
822 renew = *et.renew_till - et.authtime;
823 if(client && client->entry.max_renew)
824 renew = min(renew, *client->entry.max_renew);
825 if(server->entry.max_renew)
826 renew = min(renew, *server->entry.max_renew);
827 *et.renew_till = et.authtime + renew;
831 *et.renew_till = min(*et.renew_till, *tgt->renew_till);
832 *et.starttime = min(*et.starttime, *et.renew_till);
833 et.endtime = min(et.endtime, *et.renew_till);
836 *et.starttime = min(*et.starttime, et.endtime);
838 if(*et.starttime == et.endtime){
839 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID;
842 if(et.renew_till && et.endtime == *et.renew_till){
844 et.renew_till = NULL;
845 et.flags.renewable = 0;
848 et.flags.pre_authent = tgt->flags.pre_authent;
849 et.flags.hw_authent = tgt->flags.hw_authent;
850 et.flags.anonymous = tgt->flags.anonymous;
851 et.flags.ok_as_delegate = server->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate;
855 * No not need to filter out the any PAC from the
856 * auth_data since it's signed by the KDC.
858 ret = _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(context, &et,
859 KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC, rspac);
867 /* XXX check authdata */
869 if (et.authorization_data == NULL) {
870 et.authorization_data = calloc(1, sizeof(*et.authorization_data));
871 if (et.authorization_data == NULL) {
873 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
877 for(i = 0; i < auth_data->len ; i++) {
878 ret = add_AuthorizationData(et.authorization_data, &auth_data->val[i]);
880 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
885 /* Filter out type KRB5SignedPath */
886 ret = find_KRB5SignedPath(context, et.authorization_data, NULL);
888 if (et.authorization_data->len == 1) {
889 free_AuthorizationData(et.authorization_data);
890 free(et.authorization_data);
891 et.authorization_data = NULL;
893 AuthorizationData *ad = et.authorization_data;
894 free_AuthorizationDataElement(&ad->val[ad->len - 1]);
900 ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context, sessionkey, &et.key);
903 et.crealm = tgt->crealm;
904 et.cname = tgt_name->name;
907 /* MIT must have at least one last_req */
909 ek.last_req.val = calloc(1, sizeof(*ek.last_req.val));
910 if (ek.last_req.val == NULL) {
916 ek.authtime = et.authtime;
917 ek.starttime = et.starttime;
918 ek.endtime = et.endtime;
919 ek.renew_till = et.renew_till;
920 ek.srealm = rep.ticket.realm;
921 ek.sname = rep.ticket.sname;
923 _kdc_log_timestamp(context, config, "TGS-REQ", et.authtime, et.starttime,
924 et.endtime, et.renew_till);
926 /* Don't sign cross realm tickets, they can't be checked anyway */
928 char *r = get_krbtgt_realm(&ek.sname);
930 if (r == NULL || strcmp(r, ek.srealm) == 0) {
931 ret = _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(context,
944 if (enc_pa_data->len) {
945 rep.padata = calloc(1, sizeof(*rep.padata));
946 if (rep.padata == NULL) {
950 ret = copy_METHOD_DATA(enc_pa_data, rep.padata);
955 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, et.key.keytype) != 0
956 && _kdc_is_weak_exception(server->entry.principal, et.key.keytype))
958 krb5_enctype_enable(context, et.key.keytype);
963 /* It is somewhat unclear where the etype in the following
964 encryption should come from. What we have is a session
965 key in the passed tgt, and a list of preferred etypes
966 *for the new ticket*. Should we pick the best possible
967 etype, given the keytype in the tgt, or should we look
968 at the etype list here as well? What if the tgt
969 session key is DES3 and we want a ticket with a (say)
970 CAST session key. Should the DES3 etype be added to the
971 etype list, even if we don't want a session key with
973 ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config,
974 &rep, &et, &ek, et.key.keytype,
976 serverkey, 0, replykey, rk_is_subkey,
979 krb5_enctype_disable(context, et.key.keytype);
983 free_TransitedEncoding(&et.transited);
988 if(et.authorization_data) {
989 free_AuthorizationData(et.authorization_data);
990 free(et.authorization_data);
992 free_LastReq(&ek.last_req);
993 memset(et.key.keyvalue.data, 0, et.key.keyvalue.length);
994 free_EncryptionKey(&et.key);
998 static krb5_error_code
999 tgs_check_authenticator(krb5_context context,
1000 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1001 krb5_auth_context ac,
1003 const char **e_text,
1006 krb5_authenticator auth;
1010 krb5_error_code ret;
1013 krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator(context, ac, &auth);
1014 if(auth->cksum == NULL){
1015 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "No authenticator in request");
1016 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM;
1020 * according to RFC1510 it doesn't need to be keyed,
1021 * but according to the latest draft it needs to.
1025 !krb5_checksum_is_keyed(context, auth->cksum->cksumtype)
1028 !krb5_checksum_is_collision_proof(context, auth->cksum->cksumtype)) {
1029 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Bad checksum type in authenticator: %d",
1030 auth->cksum->cksumtype);
1031 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM;
1035 /* XXX should not re-encode this */
1036 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(KDC_REQ_BODY, buf, buf_size, b, &len, ret);
1038 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1039 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REQ-BODY: %s", msg);
1040 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1043 if(buf_size != len) {
1045 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
1046 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
1047 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1050 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto);
1052 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1054 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
1055 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1058 ret = krb5_verify_checksum(context,
1060 KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM,
1065 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
1067 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1068 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1069 "Failed to verify authenticator checksum: %s", msg);
1070 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1073 free_Authenticator(auth);
1083 find_rpath(krb5_context context, Realm crealm, Realm srealm)
1085 const char *new_realm = krb5_config_get_string(context,
1096 need_referral(krb5_context context, krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1097 const KDCOptions * const options, krb5_principal server,
1098 krb5_realm **realms)
1102 if(!options->canonicalize && server->name.name_type != KRB5_NT_SRV_INST)
1105 if (server->name.name_string.len == 1)
1106 name = server->name.name_string.val[0];
1107 else if (server->name.name_string.len > 1)
1108 name = server->name.name_string.val[1];
1112 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Searching referral for %s", name);
1114 return _krb5_get_host_realm_int(context, name, FALSE, realms) == 0;
1117 static krb5_error_code
1118 tgs_parse_request(krb5_context context,
1119 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1121 const PA_DATA *tgs_req,
1122 hdb_entry_ex **krbtgt,
1123 krb5_enctype *krbtgt_etype,
1124 krb5_ticket **ticket,
1125 const char **e_text,
1127 const struct sockaddr *from_addr,
1130 AuthorizationData **auth_data,
1131 krb5_keyblock **replykey,
1135 krb5_error_code ret;
1136 krb5_principal princ;
1137 krb5_auth_context ac = NULL;
1138 krb5_flags ap_req_options;
1139 krb5_flags verify_ap_req_flags;
1142 krb5_keyblock *subkey = NULL;
1150 memset(&ap_req, 0, sizeof(ap_req));
1151 ret = krb5_decode_ap_req(context, &tgs_req->padata_value, &ap_req);
1153 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1154 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to decode AP-REQ: %s", msg);
1155 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1159 if(!get_krbtgt_realm(&ap_req.ticket.sname)){
1160 /* XXX check for ticket.sname == req.sname */
1161 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PA-DATA is not a ticket-granting ticket");
1162 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; /* ? */
1166 _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
1168 ap_req.ticket.sname,
1169 ap_req.ticket.realm);
1171 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, princ, HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT, ap_req.ticket.enc_part.kvno, NULL, krbtgt);
1173 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1175 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, princ, &p);
1177 p = "<unparse_name failed>";
1178 krb5_free_principal(context, princ);
1179 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Ticket-granting ticket account %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", p);
1184 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1186 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, princ, &p);
1188 p = "<unparse_name failed>";
1189 krb5_free_principal(context, princ);
1190 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1191 "Ticket-granting ticket not found in database: %s", msg);
1192 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1195 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
1199 if(ap_req.ticket.enc_part.kvno &&
1200 *ap_req.ticket.enc_part.kvno != (*krbtgt)->entry.kvno){
1203 ret = krb5_unparse_name (context, princ, &p);
1204 krb5_free_principal(context, princ);
1206 p = "<unparse_name failed>";
1207 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1208 "Ticket kvno = %d, DB kvno = %d (%s)",
1209 *ap_req.ticket.enc_part.kvno,
1210 (*krbtgt)->entry.kvno,
1214 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER;
1218 *krbtgt_etype = ap_req.ticket.enc_part.etype;
1220 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &(*krbtgt)->entry,
1221 ap_req.ticket.enc_part.etype, &tkey);
1223 char *str = NULL, *p = NULL;
1225 krb5_enctype_to_string(context, ap_req.ticket.enc_part.etype, &str);
1226 krb5_unparse_name(context, princ, &p);
1227 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1228 "No server key with enctype %s found for %s",
1229 str ? str : "<unknown enctype>",
1230 p ? p : "<unparse_name failed>");
1233 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER;
1237 if (b->kdc_options.validate)
1238 verify_ap_req_flags = KRB5_VERIFY_AP_REQ_IGNORE_INVALID;
1240 verify_ap_req_flags = 0;
1242 ret = krb5_verify_ap_req2(context,
1247 verify_ap_req_flags,
1250 KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH);
1252 krb5_free_principal(context, princ);
1254 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1255 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to verify AP-REQ: %s", msg);
1256 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1261 krb5_authenticator auth;
1263 ret = krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator(context, ac, &auth);
1265 *csec = malloc(sizeof(**csec));
1266 if (*csec == NULL) {
1267 krb5_free_authenticator(context, &auth);
1268 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "malloc failed");
1271 **csec = auth->ctime;
1272 *cusec = malloc(sizeof(**cusec));
1273 if (*cusec == NULL) {
1274 krb5_free_authenticator(context, &auth);
1275 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "malloc failed");
1278 **cusec = auth->cusec;
1279 krb5_free_authenticator(context, &auth);
1283 ret = tgs_check_authenticator(context, config,
1284 ac, b, e_text, &(*ticket)->ticket.key);
1286 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1290 usage = KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_DAT_SUBKEY;
1293 ret = krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey(context, ac, &subkey);
1295 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1296 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1297 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to get remote subkey: %s", msg);
1298 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1302 usage = KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_DAT_SESSION;
1305 ret = krb5_auth_con_getkey(context, ac, &subkey);
1307 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1308 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1309 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to get session key: %s", msg);
1310 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1315 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1316 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1317 "Failed to get key for enc-authorization-data");
1318 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; /* ? */
1324 if (b->enc_authorization_data) {
1327 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, subkey, 0, &crypto);
1329 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1330 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1331 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
1332 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1335 ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context,
1338 b->enc_authorization_data,
1340 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
1342 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1343 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1344 "Failed to decrypt enc-authorization-data");
1345 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; /* ? */
1349 if (*auth_data == NULL) {
1350 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1351 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; /* ? */
1354 ret = decode_AuthorizationData(ad.data, ad.length, *auth_data, NULL);
1356 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1359 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to decode authorization data");
1360 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; /* ? */
1365 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1368 free_AP_REQ(&ap_req);
1373 static krb5_error_code
1374 build_server_referral(krb5_context context,
1375 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1376 krb5_crypto session,
1377 krb5_const_realm referred_realm,
1378 const PrincipalName *true_principal_name,
1379 const PrincipalName *requested_principal,
1382 PA_ServerReferralData ref;
1383 krb5_error_code ret;
1388 memset(&ref, 0, sizeof(ref));
1390 if (referred_realm) {
1391 ALLOC(ref.referred_realm);
1392 if (ref.referred_realm == NULL)
1394 *ref.referred_realm = strdup(referred_realm);
1395 if (*ref.referred_realm == NULL)
1398 if (true_principal_name) {
1399 ALLOC(ref.true_principal_name);
1400 if (ref.true_principal_name == NULL)
1402 ret = copy_PrincipalName(true_principal_name, ref.true_principal_name);
1406 if (requested_principal) {
1407 ALLOC(ref.requested_principal_name);
1408 if (ref.requested_principal_name == NULL)
1410 ret = copy_PrincipalName(requested_principal,
1411 ref.requested_principal_name);
1416 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ServerReferralData,
1417 data.data, data.length,
1419 free_PA_ServerReferralData(&ref);
1422 if (data.length != size)
1423 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
1425 ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context, session,
1426 KRB5_KU_PA_SERVER_REFERRAL,
1427 data.data, data.length,
1433 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncryptedData,
1434 outdata->data, outdata->length,
1436 free_EncryptedData(&ed);
1439 if (outdata->length != size)
1440 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
1444 free_PA_ServerReferralData(&ref);
1445 krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOMEM, "malloc: out of memory");
1449 static krb5_error_code
1450 tgs_build_reply(krb5_context context,
1451 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1454 hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
1455 krb5_enctype krbtgt_etype,
1456 const krb5_keyblock *replykey,
1458 krb5_ticket *ticket,
1461 const char **e_text,
1462 AuthorizationData **auth_data,
1463 const struct sockaddr *from_addr)
1465 krb5_error_code ret;
1466 krb5_principal cp = NULL, sp = NULL;
1467 krb5_principal client_principal = NULL;
1468 krb5_principal krbtgt_principal = NULL;
1469 char *spn = NULL, *cpn = NULL;
1470 hdb_entry_ex *server = NULL, *client = NULL, *s4u2self_impersonated_client = NULL;
1471 HDB *clientdb, *s4u2self_impersonated_clientdb;
1472 krb5_realm ref_realm = NULL;
1473 EncTicketPart *tgt = &ticket->ticket;
1474 krb5_principals spp = NULL;
1475 const EncryptionKey *ekey;
1476 krb5_keyblock sessionkey;
1480 hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt_out = NULL;
1482 METHOD_DATA enc_pa_data;
1487 EncTicketPart adtkt;
1494 memset(&sessionkey, 0, sizeof(sessionkey));
1495 memset(&adtkt, 0, sizeof(adtkt));
1496 krb5_data_zero(&rspac);
1497 memset(&enc_pa_data, 0, sizeof(enc_pa_data));
1502 if(b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey){
1508 if(b->additional_tickets == NULL ||
1509 b->additional_tickets->len == 0){
1510 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; /* ? */
1511 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1512 "No second ticket present in request");
1515 t = &b->additional_tickets->val[0];
1516 if(!get_krbtgt_realm(&t->sname)){
1517 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1518 "Additional ticket is not a ticket-granting ticket");
1519 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1522 _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context, &p, t->sname, t->realm);
1523 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, p,
1524 HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT, t->enc_part.kvno,
1526 krb5_free_principal(context, p);
1528 if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
1529 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1532 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &uu->entry,
1533 t->enc_part.etype, &uukey);
1535 _kdc_free_ent(context, uu);
1536 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */
1539 ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(context, t, &uukey->key, &adtkt, 0);
1540 _kdc_free_ent(context, uu);
1544 ret = verify_flags(context, config, &adtkt, spn);
1552 _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context, &sp, *s, r);
1553 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn);
1556 _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context, &cp, tgt->cname, tgt->crealm);
1557 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, cp, &cpn);
1560 unparse_flags (KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options),
1561 asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
1562 opt_str, sizeof(opt_str));
1564 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1565 "TGS-REQ %s from %s for %s [%s]",
1566 cpn, from, spn, opt_str);
1568 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1569 "TGS-REQ %s from %s for %s", cpn, from, spn);
1576 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, sp, HDB_F_GET_SERVER | HDB_F_CANON,
1577 NULL, NULL, &server);
1579 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1580 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", sp);
1583 const char *new_rlm, *msg;
1587 if ((req_rlm = get_krbtgt_realm(&sp->name)) != NULL) {
1589 new_rlm = find_rpath(context, tgt->crealm, req_rlm);
1591 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "krbtgt for realm %s "
1592 "not found, trying %s",
1594 krb5_free_principal(context, sp);
1596 krb5_make_principal(context, &sp, r,
1597 KRB5_TGS_NAME, new_rlm, NULL);
1598 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn);
1604 ref_realm = strdup(new_rlm);
1608 } else if(need_referral(context, config, &b->kdc_options, sp, &realms)) {
1609 if (strcmp(realms[0], sp->realm) != 0) {
1610 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1611 "Returning a referral to realm %s for "
1612 "server %s that was not found",
1614 krb5_free_principal(context, sp);
1616 krb5_make_principal(context, &sp, r, KRB5_TGS_NAME,
1618 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn);
1624 ref_realm = strdup(realms[0]);
1626 krb5_free_host_realm(context, realms);
1629 krb5_free_host_realm(context, realms);
1631 msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1632 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1633 "Server not found in database: %s: %s", spn, msg);
1634 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1635 if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
1636 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1641 * Select enctype, return key and kvno.
1647 if(b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey) {
1650 for(i = 0; i < b->etype.len; i++)
1651 if (b->etype.val[i] == adtkt.key.keytype)
1653 if(i == b->etype.len) {
1654 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1655 "Addition ticket have not matching etypes");
1656 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1657 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
1660 etype = b->etype.val[i];
1665 ret = _kdc_find_etype(context, server,
1666 b->etype.val, b->etype.len, &skey);
1668 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1669 "Server (%s) has no support for etypes", spn);
1673 etype = skey->key.keytype;
1674 kvno = server->entry.kvno;
1677 ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, etype, &sessionkey);
1683 * Check that service is in the same realm as the krbtgt. If it's
1684 * not the same, it's someone that is using a uni-directional trust
1689 * Validate authoriation data
1692 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &krbtgt->entry,
1693 krbtgt_etype, &tkey_check);
1695 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1696 "Failed to find key for krbtgt PAC check");
1700 /* Now refetch the primary krbtgt, and get the current kvno (the
1701 * sign check may have been on an old kvno, and the server may
1702 * have been an incoming trust) */
1703 ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &krbtgt_principal,
1704 krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context,
1705 krbtgt->entry.principal,
1708 krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context,
1709 krbtgt->entry.principal,
1712 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1713 "Failed to generate krbtgt principal");
1717 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, krbtgt_principal, HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT, NULL, NULL, &krbtgt_out);
1718 krb5_free_principal(context, krbtgt_principal);
1720 krb5_error_code ret2;
1722 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, krbtgt->entry.principal, &tpn);
1723 ret2 = krb5_unparse_name(context, krbtgt->entry.principal, &tpn2);
1724 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1725 "Request with wrong krbtgt: %s, %s not found in our database",
1726 (ret == 0) ? tpn : "<unknown>", (ret2 == 0) ? tpn2 : "<unknown>");
1731 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
1735 /* The first realm is the realm of the service, the second is
1736 * krbtgt/<this>/@REALM component of the krbtgt DN the request was
1737 * encrypted to. The redirection via the krbtgt_out entry allows
1738 * the DB to possibly correct the case of the realm (Samba4 does
1739 * this) before the strcmp() */
1740 if (strcmp(krb5_principal_get_realm(context, server->entry.principal),
1741 krb5_principal_get_realm(context, krbtgt_out->entry.principal)) != 0) {
1743 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, krbtgt_out->entry.principal, &tpn);
1744 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1745 "Request with wrong krbtgt: %s",
1746 (ret == 0) ? tpn : "<unknown>");
1749 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
1752 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &krbtgt_out->entry,
1753 krbtgt_etype, &tkey_sign);
1755 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1756 "Failed to find key for krbtgt PAC signature");
1760 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, cp, HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | HDB_F_CANON,
1761 NULL, &clientdb, &client);
1762 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1763 /* This is OK, we are just trying to find out if they have
1764 * been disabled or deleted in the meantime, missing secrets
1767 const char *krbtgt_realm, *msg;
1770 * If the client belongs to the same realm as our krbtgt, it
1771 * should exist in the local database.
1775 krbtgt_realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, krbtgt_out->entry.principal);
1777 if(strcmp(krb5_principal_get_realm(context, cp), krbtgt_realm) == 0) {
1778 if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
1779 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1780 kdc_log(context, config, 1, "Client no longer in database: %s",
1785 msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1786 kdc_log(context, config, 1, "Client not found in database: %s", msg);
1787 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1790 ret = check_PAC(context, config, cp,
1791 client, server, krbtgt, ekey, &tkey_check->key, &tkey_sign->key,
1792 tgt, &rspac, &signedpath);
1794 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1795 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1796 "Verify PAC failed for %s (%s) from %s with %s",
1797 spn, cpn, from, msg);
1798 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1802 /* also check the krbtgt for signature */
1803 ret = check_KRB5SignedPath(context,
1811 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1812 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1813 "KRB5SignedPath check failed for %s (%s) from %s with %s",
1814 spn, cpn, from, msg);
1815 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1823 client_principal = cp;
1826 const PA_DATA *sdata;
1829 sdata = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_FOR_USER);
1834 char *selfcpn = NULL;
1837 ret = decode_PA_S4U2Self(sdata->padata_value.data,
1838 sdata->padata_value.length,
1841 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to decode PA-S4U2Self");
1845 ret = _krb5_s4u2self_to_checksumdata(context, &self, &datack);
1849 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &tgt->key, 0, &crypto);
1851 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1852 free_PA_S4U2Self(&self);
1853 krb5_data_free(&datack);
1854 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
1855 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1859 ret = krb5_verify_checksum(context,
1861 KRB5_KU_OTHER_CKSUM,
1865 krb5_data_free(&datack);
1866 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
1868 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1869 free_PA_S4U2Self(&self);
1870 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1871 "krb5_verify_checksum failed for S4U2Self: %s", msg);
1872 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1876 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
1880 free_PA_S4U2Self(&self);
1884 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client_principal, &selfcpn);
1888 /* If we were about to put a PAC into the ticket, we better fix it to be the right PAC */
1891 krb5_data_free(&rspac);
1892 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, client_principal, HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | HDB_F_CANON,
1893 NULL, &s4u2self_impersonated_clientdb, &s4u2self_impersonated_client);
1898 * If the client belongs to the same realm as our krbtgt, it
1899 * should exist in the local database.
1903 if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
1904 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1905 msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1906 kdc_log(context, config, 1, "S2U4Self principal to impersonate %s not found in database: %s", cpn, msg);
1907 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1910 ret = _kdc_pac_generate(context, s4u2self_impersonated_client, &p);
1912 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
1917 ret = _krb5_pac_sign(context, p, ticket->ticket.authtime,
1918 s4u2self_impersonated_client->entry.principal,
1919 ekey, &tkey_sign->key,
1921 krb5_pac_free(context, p);
1923 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
1931 * Check that service doing the impersonating is
1932 * requesting a ticket to it-self.
1934 ret = check_s4u2self(context, config, clientdb, client, sp);
1936 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "S4U2Self: %s is not allowed "
1937 "to impersonate to service "
1938 "(tried for user %s to service %s)",
1945 * If the service isn't trusted for authentication to
1946 * delegation, remove the forward flag.
1949 if (client->entry.flags.trusted_for_delegation) {
1950 str = "[forwardable]";
1952 b->kdc_options.forwardable = 0;
1955 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "s4u2self %s impersonating %s to "
1956 "service %s %s", cpn, selfcpn, spn, str);
1962 * Constrained delegation
1966 && b->additional_tickets != NULL
1967 && b->additional_tickets->len != 0
1968 && b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey == 0)
1970 int ad_signedpath = 0;
1976 * Require that the KDC have issued the service's krbtgt (not
1977 * self-issued ticket with kimpersonate(1).
1980 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1981 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1982 "Constrained delegation done on service ticket %s/%s",
1987 t = &b->additional_tickets->val[0];
1989 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
1990 t->enc_part.etype, &clientkey);
1992 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */
1996 ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(context, t, &clientkey->key, &adtkt, 0);
1998 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1999 "failed to decrypt ticket for "
2000 "constrained delegation from %s to %s ", cpn, spn);
2004 /* check that ticket is valid */
2005 if (adtkt.flags.forwardable == 0) {
2006 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2007 "Missing forwardable flag on ticket for "
2008 "constrained delegation from %s to %s ", cpn, spn);
2009 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
2013 ret = check_constrained_delegation(context, config, clientdb,
2016 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2017 "constrained delegation from %s to %s not allowed",
2022 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
2029 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client_principal, &str);
2033 ret = verify_flags(context, config, &adtkt, str);
2040 * Check that the KDC issued the user's ticket.
2042 ret = check_KRB5SignedPath(context,
2049 if (ret == 0 && !ad_signedpath)
2050 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
2052 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
2053 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2054 "KRB5SignedPath check from service %s failed "
2055 "for delegation to %s for client %s "
2056 "from %s failed with %s",
2057 spn, str, cpn, from, msg);
2058 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
2063 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "constrained delegation for %s "
2064 "from %s to %s", str, cpn, spn);
2072 ret = kdc_check_flags(context, config,
2079 if((b->kdc_options.validate || b->kdc_options.renew) &&
2080 !krb5_principal_compare(context,
2081 krbtgt->entry.principal,
2082 server->entry.principal)){
2083 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Inconsistent request.");
2084 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
2088 /* check for valid set of addresses */
2089 if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context, config, tgt->caddr, from_addr)) {
2090 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
2091 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Request from wrong address");
2096 * If this is an referral, add server referral data to the
2103 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2104 "Adding server referral to %s", ref_realm);
2106 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &sessionkey, 0, &crypto);
2110 ret = build_server_referral(context, config, crypto, ref_realm,
2111 NULL, s, &pa.padata_value);
2112 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
2114 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2115 "Failed building server referral");
2118 pa.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_SERVER_REFERRAL;
2120 ret = add_METHOD_DATA(&enc_pa_data, &pa);
2121 krb5_data_free(&pa.padata_value);
2123 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2124 "Add server referral METHOD-DATA failed");
2133 ret = tgs_make_reply(context,
2161 krb5_data_free(&rspac);
2162 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &sessionkey);
2164 _kdc_free_ent(context, krbtgt_out);
2166 _kdc_free_ent(context, server);
2168 _kdc_free_ent(context, client);
2169 if(s4u2self_impersonated_client)
2170 _kdc_free_ent(context, s4u2self_impersonated_client);
2172 if (client_principal && client_principal != cp)
2173 krb5_free_principal(context, client_principal);
2175 krb5_free_principal(context, cp);
2177 krb5_free_principal(context, sp);
2180 free_METHOD_DATA(&enc_pa_data);
2182 free_EncTicketPart(&adtkt);
2192 _kdc_tgs_rep(krb5_context context,
2193 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
2197 struct sockaddr *from_addr,
2200 AuthorizationData *auth_data = NULL;
2201 krb5_error_code ret;
2203 const PA_DATA *tgs_req;
2205 hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt = NULL;
2206 krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
2207 const char *e_text = NULL;
2208 krb5_enctype krbtgt_etype = ETYPE_NULL;
2210 krb5_keyblock *replykey = NULL;
2211 int rk_is_subkey = 0;
2212 time_t *csec = NULL;
2215 if(req->padata == NULL){
2216 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED; /* XXX ??? */
2217 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2218 "TGS-REQ from %s without PA-DATA", from);
2222 tgs_req = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_TGS_REQ);
2224 if(tgs_req == NULL){
2225 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
2227 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2228 "TGS-REQ from %s without PA-TGS-REQ", from);
2231 ret = tgs_parse_request(context, config,
2232 &req->req_body, tgs_req,
2243 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2244 "Failed parsing TGS-REQ from %s", from);
2248 ret = tgs_build_reply(context,
2263 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2264 "Failed building TGS-REP to %s", from);
2269 if (datagram_reply && data->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) {
2270 krb5_data_free(data);
2271 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG;
2272 e_text = "Reply packet too large";
2277 krb5_free_keyblock(context, replykey);
2278 if(ret && ret != HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE && data->data == NULL){
2279 krb5_mk_error(context,
2293 krb5_free_ticket(context, ticket);
2295 _kdc_free_ent(context, krbtgt);
2298 free_AuthorizationData(auth_data);