2 * Copyright (c) 1997-2008 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
3 * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
17 * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
18 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
19 * without specific prior written permission.
21 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
22 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
23 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
24 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
25 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
26 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
27 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
28 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
29 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
30 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
37 * return the realm of a krbtgt-ticket or NULL
41 get_krbtgt_realm(const PrincipalName *p)
43 if(p->name_string.len == 2
44 && strcmp(p->name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) == 0)
45 return p->name_string.val[1];
51 * The KDC might add a signed path to the ticket authorization data
52 * field. This is to avoid server impersonating clients and the
53 * request constrained delegation.
55 * This is done by storing a KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT with a single
56 * entry of type KRB5SignedPath.
59 static krb5_error_code
60 find_KRB5SignedPath(krb5_context context,
61 const AuthorizationData *ad,
64 AuthorizationData child;
68 if (ad == NULL || ad->len == 0)
69 return KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
73 if (ad->val[pos].ad_type != KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT)
74 return KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
76 ret = decode_AuthorizationData(ad->val[pos].ad_data.data,
77 ad->val[pos].ad_data.length,
81 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "Failed to decode "
82 "IF_RELEVANT with %d", ret);
87 free_AuthorizationData(&child);
88 return KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
91 if (child.val[0].ad_type != KRB5_AUTHDATA_SIGNTICKET) {
92 free_AuthorizationData(&child);
93 return KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
97 ret = der_copy_octet_string(&child.val[0].ad_data, data);
98 free_AuthorizationData(&child);
103 _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(krb5_context context,
104 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
105 hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
106 krb5_enctype enctype,
107 krb5_principal client,
108 krb5_const_principal server,
109 krb5_principals principals,
115 krb5_crypto crypto = NULL;
118 if (server && principals) {
119 ret = add_Principals(principals, server);
125 KRB5SignedPathData spd;
128 spd.authtime = tkt->authtime;
129 spd.delegated = principals;
130 spd.method_data = NULL;
132 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(KRB5SignedPathData, data.data, data.length,
136 if (data.length != size)
137 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
142 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &krbtgt->entry, enctype, &key);
144 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &key->key, 0, &crypto);
152 * Fill in KRB5SignedPath
156 sp.delegated = principals;
157 sp.method_data = NULL;
159 ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, crypto, KRB5_KU_KRB5SIGNEDPATH, 0,
160 data.data, data.length, &sp.cksum);
161 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
166 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(KRB5SignedPath, data.data, data.length, &sp, &size, ret);
167 free_Checksum(&sp.cksum);
170 if (data.length != size)
171 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
175 * Add IF-RELEVANT(KRB5SignedPath) to the last slot in
176 * authorization data field.
179 ret = _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(context, tkt,
180 KRB5_AUTHDATA_SIGNTICKET, &data);
181 krb5_data_free(&data);
186 static krb5_error_code
187 check_KRB5SignedPath(krb5_context context,
188 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
189 hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
192 krb5_principals *delegated,
197 krb5_crypto crypto = NULL;
202 ret = find_KRB5SignedPath(context, tkt->authorization_data, &data);
204 KRB5SignedPathData spd;
208 ret = decode_KRB5SignedPath(data.data, data.length, &sp, NULL);
209 krb5_data_free(&data);
214 spd.authtime = tkt->authtime;
215 spd.delegated = sp.delegated;
216 spd.method_data = sp.method_data;
218 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(KRB5SignedPathData, data.data, data.length,
221 free_KRB5SignedPath(&sp);
224 if (data.length != size)
225 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
229 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &krbtgt->entry, sp.etype, &key);
231 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &key->key, 0, &crypto);
234 free_KRB5SignedPath(&sp);
238 ret = krb5_verify_checksum(context, crypto, KRB5_KU_KRB5SIGNEDPATH,
239 data.data, data.length,
241 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
244 free_KRB5SignedPath(&sp);
245 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
246 "KRB5SignedPath not signed correctly, not marking as signed");
250 if (delegated && sp.delegated) {
252 *delegated = malloc(sizeof(*sp.delegated));
253 if (*delegated == NULL) {
254 free_KRB5SignedPath(&sp);
258 ret = copy_Principals(*delegated, sp.delegated);
260 free_KRB5SignedPath(&sp);
266 free_KRB5SignedPath(&sp);
278 static krb5_error_code
279 check_PAC(krb5_context context,
280 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
281 const krb5_principal client_principal,
282 hdb_entry_ex *client,
283 hdb_entry_ex *server,
284 hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
285 const EncryptionKey *server_key,
286 const EncryptionKey *krbtgt_check_key,
287 const EncryptionKey *krbtgt_sign_key,
292 AuthorizationData *ad = tkt->authorization_data;
296 if (ad == NULL || ad->len == 0)
299 for (i = 0; i < ad->len; i++) {
300 AuthorizationData child;
302 if (ad->val[i].ad_type != KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT)
305 ret = decode_AuthorizationData(ad->val[i].ad_data.data,
306 ad->val[i].ad_data.length,
310 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "Failed to decode "
311 "IF_RELEVANT with %d", ret);
314 for (j = 0; j < child.len; j++) {
316 if (child.val[j].ad_type == KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC) {
321 ret = krb5_pac_parse(context,
322 child.val[j].ad_data.data,
323 child.val[j].ad_data.length,
325 free_AuthorizationData(&child);
329 ret = krb5_pac_verify(context, pac, tkt->authtime,
331 krbtgt_check_key, NULL);
333 krb5_pac_free(context, pac);
337 ret = _kdc_pac_verify(context, client_principal,
338 client, server, krbtgt, &pac, &signed_pac);
340 krb5_pac_free(context, pac);
345 * Only re-sign PAC if we could verify it with the PAC
346 * function. The no-verify case happens when we get in
347 * a PAC from cross realm from a Windows domain and
348 * that there is no PAC verification function.
352 ret = _krb5_pac_sign(context, pac, tkt->authtime,
354 server_key, krbtgt_sign_key, rspac);
356 krb5_pac_free(context, pac);
361 free_AuthorizationData(&child);
370 static krb5_error_code
371 check_tgs_flags(krb5_context context,
372 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
373 KDC_REQ_BODY *b, const EncTicketPart *tgt, EncTicketPart *et)
375 KDCOptions f = b->kdc_options;
378 if(!tgt->flags.invalid || tgt->starttime == NULL){
379 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
380 "Bad request to validate ticket");
381 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
383 if(*tgt->starttime > kdc_time){
384 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
385 "Early request to validate ticket");
386 return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV;
389 et->flags.invalid = 0;
390 }else if(tgt->flags.invalid){
391 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
392 "Ticket-granting ticket has INVALID flag set");
393 return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_INVALID;
397 if(!tgt->flags.forwardable){
398 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
399 "Bad request for forwardable ticket");
400 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
402 et->flags.forwardable = 1;
405 if(!tgt->flags.forwardable){
406 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
407 "Request to forward non-forwardable ticket");
408 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
410 et->flags.forwarded = 1;
411 et->caddr = b->addresses;
413 if(tgt->flags.forwarded)
414 et->flags.forwarded = 1;
417 if(!tgt->flags.proxiable){
418 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
419 "Bad request for proxiable ticket");
420 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
422 et->flags.proxiable = 1;
425 if(!tgt->flags.proxiable){
426 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
427 "Request to proxy non-proxiable ticket");
428 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
431 et->caddr = b->addresses;
436 if(f.allow_postdate){
437 if(!tgt->flags.may_postdate){
438 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
439 "Bad request for post-datable ticket");
440 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
442 et->flags.may_postdate = 1;
445 if(!tgt->flags.may_postdate){
446 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
447 "Bad request for postdated ticket");
448 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
451 *et->starttime = *b->from;
452 et->flags.postdated = 1;
453 et->flags.invalid = 1;
454 }else if(b->from && *b->from > kdc_time + context->max_skew){
455 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Ticket cannot be postdated");
456 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE;
460 if(!tgt->flags.renewable || tgt->renew_till == NULL){
461 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
462 "Bad request for renewable ticket");
463 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
465 et->flags.renewable = 1;
466 ALLOC(et->renew_till);
467 _kdc_fix_time(&b->rtime);
468 *et->renew_till = *b->rtime;
472 if(!tgt->flags.renewable || tgt->renew_till == NULL){
473 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
474 "Request to renew non-renewable ticket");
475 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
477 old_life = tgt->endtime;
479 old_life -= *tgt->starttime;
481 old_life -= tgt->authtime;
482 et->endtime = *et->starttime + old_life;
483 if (et->renew_till != NULL)
484 et->endtime = min(*et->renew_till, et->endtime);
488 /* checks for excess flags */
489 if(f.request_anonymous && !config->allow_anonymous){
490 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
491 "Request for anonymous ticket");
492 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
499 * Determine if constrained delegation is allowed from this client to this server
502 static krb5_error_code
503 check_constrained_delegation(krb5_context context,
504 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
506 hdb_entry_ex *client,
507 krb5_const_principal server)
509 const HDB_Ext_Constrained_delegation_acl *acl;
513 /* if client delegates to itself, that ok */
514 if (krb5_principal_compare(context, client->entry.principal, server) == TRUE)
517 if (clientdb->hdb_check_constrained_delegation) {
518 ret = clientdb->hdb_check_constrained_delegation(context, clientdb, client, server);
522 ret = hdb_entry_get_ConstrainedDelegACL(&client->entry, &acl);
524 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
529 for (i = 0; i < acl->len; i++) {
530 if (krb5_principal_compare(context, server, &acl->val[i]) == TRUE)
534 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
536 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
537 "Bad request for constrained delegation");
542 * Determine if s4u2self is allowed from this client to this server
544 * For example, regardless of the principal being impersonated, if the
545 * 'client' and 'server' are the same, then it's safe.
548 static krb5_error_code
549 check_s4u2self(krb5_context context,
550 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
552 hdb_entry_ex *client,
553 krb5_const_principal server)
557 /* if client does a s4u2self to itself, that ok */
558 if (krb5_principal_compare(context, client->entry.principal, server) == TRUE)
561 if (clientdb->hdb_check_s4u2self) {
562 ret = clientdb->hdb_check_s4u2self(context, clientdb, client, server);
566 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
575 static krb5_error_code
576 verify_flags (krb5_context context,
577 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
578 const EncTicketPart *et,
581 if(et->endtime < kdc_time){
582 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Ticket expired (%s)", pstr);
583 return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED;
585 if(et->flags.invalid){
586 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Ticket not valid (%s)", pstr);
587 return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV;
596 static krb5_error_code
597 fix_transited_encoding(krb5_context context,
598 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
599 krb5_boolean check_policy,
600 const TransitedEncoding *tr,
602 const char *client_realm,
603 const char *server_realm,
604 const char *tgt_realm)
606 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
607 char **realms, **tmp;
608 unsigned int num_realms;
611 switch (tr->tr_type) {
612 case DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS:
616 * Allow empty content of type 0 because that is was Microsoft
617 * generates in their TGT.
619 if (tr->contents.length == 0)
621 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
622 "Transited type 0 with non empty content");
623 return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
625 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
626 "Unknown transited type: %u", tr->tr_type);
627 return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
630 ret = krb5_domain_x500_decode(context,
637 krb5_warn(context, ret,
638 "Decoding transited encoding");
641 if(strcmp(client_realm, tgt_realm) && strcmp(server_realm, tgt_realm)) {
642 /* not us, so add the previous realm to transited set */
643 if (num_realms + 1 > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*realms)) {
647 tmp = realloc(realms, (num_realms + 1) * sizeof(*realms));
653 realms[num_realms] = strdup(tgt_realm);
654 if(realms[num_realms] == NULL){
660 if(num_realms == 0) {
661 if(strcmp(client_realm, server_realm))
662 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
663 "cross-realm %s -> %s", client_realm, server_realm);
667 for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++)
668 l += strlen(realms[i]) + 2;
672 for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++) {
674 strlcat(rs, ", ", l);
675 strlcat(rs, realms[i], l);
677 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
678 "cross-realm %s -> %s via [%s]",
679 client_realm, server_realm, rs);
684 ret = krb5_check_transited(context, client_realm,
686 realms, num_realms, NULL);
688 krb5_warn(context, ret, "cross-realm %s -> %s",
689 client_realm, server_realm);
692 et->flags.transited_policy_checked = 1;
694 et->transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
695 ret = krb5_domain_x500_encode(realms, num_realms, &et->transited.contents);
697 krb5_warn(context, ret, "Encoding transited encoding");
699 for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++)
706 static krb5_error_code
707 tgs_make_reply(krb5_context context,
708 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
710 krb5_const_principal tgt_name,
711 const EncTicketPart *tgt,
712 const krb5_keyblock *replykey,
714 const EncryptionKey *serverkey,
715 const krb5_keyblock *sessionkey,
717 AuthorizationData *auth_data,
718 hdb_entry_ex *server,
719 krb5_principal server_principal,
720 const char *server_name,
721 hdb_entry_ex *client,
722 krb5_principal client_principal,
723 hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
724 krb5_enctype krbtgt_etype,
726 const krb5_data *rspac,
727 const METHOD_DATA *enc_pa_data,
734 KDCOptions f = b->kdc_options;
738 memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
739 memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et));
740 memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek));
743 rep.msg_type = krb_tgs_rep;
745 et.authtime = tgt->authtime;
746 _kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
747 et.endtime = min(tgt->endtime, *b->till);
749 *et.starttime = kdc_time;
751 ret = check_tgs_flags(context, config, b, tgt, &et);
755 /* We should check the transited encoding if:
756 1) the request doesn't ask not to be checked
757 2) globally enforcing a check
758 3) principal requires checking
759 4) we allow non-check per-principal, but principal isn't marked as allowing this
760 5) we don't globally allow this
763 #define GLOBAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK \
764 (config->trpolicy == TRPOLICY_ALWAYS_CHECK)
765 #define GLOBAL_ALLOW_PER_PRINCIPAL \
766 (config->trpolicy == TRPOLICY_ALLOW_PER_PRINCIPAL)
767 #define GLOBAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK \
768 (config->trpolicy == TRPOLICY_ALWAYS_HONOUR_REQUEST)
770 /* these will consult the database in future release */
771 #define PRINCIPAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK(P) 0
772 #define PRINCIPAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK(P) 0
774 ret = fix_transited_encoding(context, config,
775 !f.disable_transited_check ||
776 GLOBAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK ||
777 PRINCIPAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK(server) ||
778 !((GLOBAL_ALLOW_PER_PRINCIPAL &&
779 PRINCIPAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK(server)) ||
780 GLOBAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK),
781 &tgt->transited, &et,
782 krb5_principal_get_realm(context, client_principal),
783 krb5_principal_get_realm(context, server->entry.principal),
784 krb5_principal_get_realm(context, krbtgt->entry.principal));
788 copy_Realm(&server_principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
789 _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname, server_principal);
790 copy_Realm(&tgt_name->realm, &rep.crealm);
792 if (f.request_anonymous)
793 _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname (&rep.cname);
796 copy_PrincipalName(&tgt_name->name, &rep.cname);
797 rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
801 et.caddr = tgt->caddr;
805 life = et.endtime - *et.starttime;
806 if(client && client->entry.max_life)
807 life = min(life, *client->entry.max_life);
808 if(server->entry.max_life)
809 life = min(life, *server->entry.max_life);
810 et.endtime = *et.starttime + life;
812 if(f.renewable_ok && tgt->flags.renewable &&
813 et.renew_till == NULL && et.endtime < *b->till &&
814 tgt->renew_till != NULL)
816 et.flags.renewable = 1;
817 ALLOC(et.renew_till);
818 *et.renew_till = *b->till;
822 renew = *et.renew_till - et.authtime;
823 if(client && client->entry.max_renew)
824 renew = min(renew, *client->entry.max_renew);
825 if(server->entry.max_renew)
826 renew = min(renew, *server->entry.max_renew);
827 *et.renew_till = et.authtime + renew;
831 *et.renew_till = min(*et.renew_till, *tgt->renew_till);
832 *et.starttime = min(*et.starttime, *et.renew_till);
833 et.endtime = min(et.endtime, *et.renew_till);
836 *et.starttime = min(*et.starttime, et.endtime);
838 if(*et.starttime == et.endtime){
839 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID;
842 if(et.renew_till && et.endtime == *et.renew_till){
844 et.renew_till = NULL;
845 et.flags.renewable = 0;
848 et.flags.pre_authent = tgt->flags.pre_authent;
849 et.flags.hw_authent = tgt->flags.hw_authent;
850 et.flags.anonymous = tgt->flags.anonymous;
851 et.flags.ok_as_delegate = server->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate;
855 * No not need to filter out the any PAC from the
856 * auth_data since it's signed by the KDC.
858 ret = _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(context, &et,
859 KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC, rspac);
867 /* XXX check authdata */
869 if (et.authorization_data == NULL) {
870 et.authorization_data = calloc(1, sizeof(*et.authorization_data));
871 if (et.authorization_data == NULL) {
873 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
877 for(i = 0; i < auth_data->len ; i++) {
878 ret = add_AuthorizationData(et.authorization_data, &auth_data->val[i]);
880 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
885 /* Filter out type KRB5SignedPath */
886 ret = find_KRB5SignedPath(context, et.authorization_data, NULL);
888 if (et.authorization_data->len == 1) {
889 free_AuthorizationData(et.authorization_data);
890 free(et.authorization_data);
891 et.authorization_data = NULL;
893 AuthorizationData *ad = et.authorization_data;
894 free_AuthorizationDataElement(&ad->val[ad->len - 1]);
900 ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context, sessionkey, &et.key);
903 et.crealm = tgt->crealm;
904 et.cname = tgt_name->name;
907 /* MIT must have at least one last_req */
909 ek.last_req.val = calloc(1, sizeof(*ek.last_req.val));
910 if (ek.last_req.val == NULL) {
916 ek.authtime = et.authtime;
917 ek.starttime = et.starttime;
918 ek.endtime = et.endtime;
919 ek.renew_till = et.renew_till;
920 ek.srealm = rep.ticket.realm;
921 ek.sname = rep.ticket.sname;
923 _kdc_log_timestamp(context, config, "TGS-REQ", et.authtime, et.starttime,
924 et.endtime, et.renew_till);
926 /* Don't sign cross realm tickets, they can't be checked anyway */
928 char *r = get_krbtgt_realm(&ek.sname);
930 if (r == NULL || strcmp(r, ek.srealm) == 0) {
931 ret = _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(context,
944 if (enc_pa_data->len) {
945 rep.padata = calloc(1, sizeof(*rep.padata));
946 if (rep.padata == NULL) {
950 ret = copy_METHOD_DATA(enc_pa_data, rep.padata);
955 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, et.key.keytype) != 0
956 && _kdc_is_weak_exception(server->entry.principal, et.key.keytype))
958 krb5_enctype_enable(context, et.key.keytype);
963 /* It is somewhat unclear where the etype in the following
964 encryption should come from. What we have is a session
965 key in the passed tgt, and a list of preferred etypes
966 *for the new ticket*. Should we pick the best possible
967 etype, given the keytype in the tgt, or should we look
968 at the etype list here as well? What if the tgt
969 session key is DES3 and we want a ticket with a (say)
970 CAST session key. Should the DES3 etype be added to the
971 etype list, even if we don't want a session key with
973 ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config,
974 &rep, &et, &ek, et.key.keytype,
976 serverkey, 0, replykey, rk_is_subkey,
979 krb5_enctype_disable(context, et.key.keytype);
983 free_TransitedEncoding(&et.transited);
988 if(et.authorization_data) {
989 free_AuthorizationData(et.authorization_data);
990 free(et.authorization_data);
992 free_LastReq(&ek.last_req);
993 memset(et.key.keyvalue.data, 0, et.key.keyvalue.length);
994 free_EncryptionKey(&et.key);
998 static krb5_error_code
999 tgs_check_authenticator(krb5_context context,
1000 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1001 krb5_auth_context ac,
1003 const char **e_text,
1006 krb5_authenticator auth;
1010 krb5_error_code ret;
1013 krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator(context, ac, &auth);
1014 if(auth->cksum == NULL){
1015 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "No authenticator in request");
1016 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM;
1020 * according to RFC1510 it doesn't need to be keyed,
1021 * but according to the latest draft it needs to.
1025 !krb5_checksum_is_keyed(context, auth->cksum->cksumtype)
1028 !krb5_checksum_is_collision_proof(context, auth->cksum->cksumtype)) {
1029 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Bad checksum type in authenticator: %d",
1030 auth->cksum->cksumtype);
1031 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM;
1035 /* XXX should not re-encode this */
1036 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(KDC_REQ_BODY, buf, buf_size, b, &len, ret);
1038 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1039 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REQ-BODY: %s", msg);
1040 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1043 if(buf_size != len) {
1045 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
1046 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
1047 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1050 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto);
1052 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1054 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
1055 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1058 ret = krb5_verify_checksum(context,
1060 KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM,
1065 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
1067 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1068 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1069 "Failed to verify authenticator checksum: %s", msg);
1070 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1073 free_Authenticator(auth);
1083 find_rpath(krb5_context context, Realm crealm, Realm srealm)
1085 const char *new_realm = krb5_config_get_string(context,
1096 need_referral(krb5_context context, krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1097 const KDCOptions * const options, krb5_principal server,
1098 krb5_realm **realms)
1102 if(!options->canonicalize && server->name.name_type != KRB5_NT_SRV_INST)
1105 if (server->name.name_string.len == 1)
1106 name = server->name.name_string.val[0];
1107 else if (server->name.name_string.len > 1)
1108 name = server->name.name_string.val[1];
1112 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Searching referral for %s", name);
1114 return _krb5_get_host_realm_int(context, name, FALSE, realms) == 0;
1117 static krb5_error_code
1118 tgs_parse_request(krb5_context context,
1119 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1121 const PA_DATA *tgs_req,
1122 hdb_entry_ex **krbtgt,
1123 krb5_enctype *krbtgt_etype,
1124 krb5_ticket **ticket,
1125 const char **e_text,
1127 const struct sockaddr *from_addr,
1130 AuthorizationData **auth_data,
1131 krb5_keyblock **replykey,
1135 krb5_error_code ret;
1136 krb5_principal princ;
1137 krb5_auth_context ac = NULL;
1138 krb5_flags ap_req_options;
1139 krb5_flags verify_ap_req_flags;
1142 krb5_keyblock *subkey = NULL;
1150 memset(&ap_req, 0, sizeof(ap_req));
1151 ret = krb5_decode_ap_req(context, &tgs_req->padata_value, &ap_req);
1153 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1154 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to decode AP-REQ: %s", msg);
1155 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1159 if(!get_krbtgt_realm(&ap_req.ticket.sname)){
1160 /* XXX check for ticket.sname == req.sname */
1161 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PA-DATA is not a ticket-granting ticket");
1162 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; /* ? */
1166 _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
1168 ap_req.ticket.sname,
1169 ap_req.ticket.realm);
1171 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, princ, HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT, ap_req.ticket.enc_part.kvno, NULL, krbtgt);
1173 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1175 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, princ, &p);
1177 p = "<unparse_name failed>";
1178 krb5_free_principal(context, princ);
1179 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Ticket-granting ticket account %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", p);
1184 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1186 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, princ, &p);
1188 p = "<unparse_name failed>";
1189 krb5_free_principal(context, princ);
1190 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1191 "Ticket-granting ticket not found in database: %s", msg);
1192 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1195 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
1199 if(ap_req.ticket.enc_part.kvno &&
1200 *ap_req.ticket.enc_part.kvno != (*krbtgt)->entry.kvno){
1203 ret = krb5_unparse_name (context, princ, &p);
1204 krb5_free_principal(context, princ);
1206 p = "<unparse_name failed>";
1207 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1208 "Ticket kvno = %d, DB kvno = %d (%s)",
1209 *ap_req.ticket.enc_part.kvno,
1210 (*krbtgt)->entry.kvno,
1214 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER;
1218 *krbtgt_etype = ap_req.ticket.enc_part.etype;
1220 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &(*krbtgt)->entry,
1221 ap_req.ticket.enc_part.etype, &tkey);
1223 char *str = NULL, *p = NULL;
1225 krb5_enctype_to_string(context, ap_req.ticket.enc_part.etype, &str);
1226 krb5_unparse_name(context, princ, &p);
1227 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1228 "No server key with enctype %s found for %s",
1229 str ? str : "<unknown enctype>",
1230 p ? p : "<unparse_name failed>");
1233 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER;
1237 if (b->kdc_options.validate)
1238 verify_ap_req_flags = KRB5_VERIFY_AP_REQ_IGNORE_INVALID;
1240 verify_ap_req_flags = 0;
1242 ret = krb5_verify_ap_req2(context,
1247 verify_ap_req_flags,
1250 KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH);
1252 krb5_free_principal(context, princ);
1254 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1255 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to verify AP-REQ: %s", msg);
1256 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1261 krb5_authenticator auth;
1263 ret = krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator(context, ac, &auth);
1265 *csec = malloc(sizeof(**csec));
1266 if (*csec == NULL) {
1267 krb5_free_authenticator(context, &auth);
1268 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "malloc failed");
1271 **csec = auth->ctime;
1272 *cusec = malloc(sizeof(**cusec));
1273 if (*cusec == NULL) {
1274 krb5_free_authenticator(context, &auth);
1275 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "malloc failed");
1278 **cusec = auth->cusec;
1279 krb5_free_authenticator(context, &auth);
1283 ret = tgs_check_authenticator(context, config,
1284 ac, b, e_text, &(*ticket)->ticket.key);
1286 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1290 usage = KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_DAT_SUBKEY;
1293 ret = krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey(context, ac, &subkey);
1295 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1296 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1297 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to get remote subkey: %s", msg);
1298 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1302 usage = KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_DAT_SESSION;
1305 ret = krb5_auth_con_getkey(context, ac, &subkey);
1307 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1308 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1309 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to get session key: %s", msg);
1310 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1315 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1316 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1317 "Failed to get key for enc-authorization-data");
1318 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; /* ? */
1324 if (b->enc_authorization_data) {
1327 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, subkey, 0, &crypto);
1329 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1330 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1331 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
1332 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1335 ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context,
1338 b->enc_authorization_data,
1340 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
1342 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1343 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1344 "Failed to decrypt enc-authorization-data");
1345 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; /* ? */
1349 if (*auth_data == NULL) {
1350 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1351 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; /* ? */
1354 ret = decode_AuthorizationData(ad.data, ad.length, *auth_data, NULL);
1356 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1359 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to decode authorization data");
1360 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; /* ? */
1365 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1368 free_AP_REQ(&ap_req);
1373 static krb5_error_code
1374 build_server_referral(krb5_context context,
1375 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1376 krb5_crypto session,
1377 krb5_const_realm referred_realm,
1378 const PrincipalName *true_principal_name,
1379 const PrincipalName *requested_principal,
1382 PA_ServerReferralData ref;
1383 krb5_error_code ret;
1388 memset(&ref, 0, sizeof(ref));
1390 if (referred_realm) {
1391 ALLOC(ref.referred_realm);
1392 if (ref.referred_realm == NULL)
1394 *ref.referred_realm = strdup(referred_realm);
1395 if (*ref.referred_realm == NULL)
1398 if (true_principal_name) {
1399 ALLOC(ref.true_principal_name);
1400 if (ref.true_principal_name == NULL)
1402 ret = copy_PrincipalName(true_principal_name, ref.true_principal_name);
1406 if (requested_principal) {
1407 ALLOC(ref.requested_principal_name);
1408 if (ref.requested_principal_name == NULL)
1410 ret = copy_PrincipalName(requested_principal,
1411 ref.requested_principal_name);
1416 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ServerReferralData,
1417 data.data, data.length,
1419 free_PA_ServerReferralData(&ref);
1422 if (data.length != size)
1423 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
1425 ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context, session,
1426 KRB5_KU_PA_SERVER_REFERRAL,
1427 data.data, data.length,
1433 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncryptedData,
1434 outdata->data, outdata->length,
1436 free_EncryptedData(&ed);
1439 if (outdata->length != size)
1440 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
1444 free_PA_ServerReferralData(&ref);
1445 krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOMEM, "malloc: out of memory");
1449 static krb5_error_code
1450 tgs_build_reply(krb5_context context,
1451 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1454 hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
1455 krb5_enctype krbtgt_etype,
1456 const krb5_keyblock *replykey,
1458 krb5_ticket *ticket,
1461 const char **e_text,
1462 AuthorizationData **auth_data,
1463 const struct sockaddr *from_addr)
1465 krb5_error_code ret;
1466 krb5_principal cp = NULL, sp = NULL;
1467 krb5_principal client_principal = NULL;
1468 krb5_principal krbtgt_principal = NULL;
1469 char *spn = NULL, *cpn = NULL;
1470 hdb_entry_ex *server = NULL, *client = NULL, *s4u2self_impersonated_client = NULL;
1471 HDB *clientdb, *s4u2self_impersonated_clientdb;
1472 krb5_realm ref_realm = NULL;
1473 EncTicketPart *tgt = &ticket->ticket;
1474 krb5_principals spp = NULL;
1475 const EncryptionKey *ekey;
1476 krb5_keyblock sessionkey;
1480 hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt_out = NULL;
1482 METHOD_DATA enc_pa_data;
1487 EncTicketPart adtkt;
1494 memset(&sessionkey, 0, sizeof(sessionkey));
1495 memset(&adtkt, 0, sizeof(adtkt));
1496 krb5_data_zero(&rspac);
1497 memset(&enc_pa_data, 0, sizeof(enc_pa_data));
1502 if(b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey){
1508 if(b->additional_tickets == NULL ||
1509 b->additional_tickets->len == 0){
1510 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; /* ? */
1511 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1512 "No second ticket present in request");
1515 t = &b->additional_tickets->val[0];
1516 if(!get_krbtgt_realm(&t->sname)){
1517 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1518 "Additional ticket is not a ticket-granting ticket");
1519 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1522 _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context, &p, t->sname, t->realm);
1523 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, p,
1524 HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT, t->enc_part.kvno,
1526 krb5_free_principal(context, p);
1528 if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
1529 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1532 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &uu->entry,
1533 t->enc_part.etype, &uukey);
1535 _kdc_free_ent(context, uu);
1536 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */
1539 ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(context, t, &uukey->key, &adtkt, 0);
1540 _kdc_free_ent(context, uu);
1544 ret = verify_flags(context, config, &adtkt, spn);
1552 _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context, &sp, *s, r);
1553 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn);
1556 _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context, &cp, tgt->cname, tgt->crealm);
1557 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, cp, &cpn);
1560 unparse_flags (KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options),
1561 asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
1562 opt_str, sizeof(opt_str));
1564 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1565 "TGS-REQ %s from %s for %s [%s]",
1566 cpn, from, spn, opt_str);
1568 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1569 "TGS-REQ %s from %s for %s", cpn, from, spn);
1576 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, sp, HDB_F_GET_SERVER | HDB_F_CANON,
1577 NULL, NULL, &server);
1579 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1580 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", sp);
1583 const char *new_rlm, *msg;
1587 if ((req_rlm = get_krbtgt_realm(&sp->name)) != NULL) {
1589 new_rlm = find_rpath(context, tgt->crealm, req_rlm);
1591 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "krbtgt for realm %s "
1592 "not found, trying %s",
1594 krb5_free_principal(context, sp);
1596 krb5_make_principal(context, &sp, r,
1597 KRB5_TGS_NAME, new_rlm, NULL);
1598 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn);
1604 ref_realm = strdup(new_rlm);
1608 } else if(need_referral(context, config, &b->kdc_options, sp, &realms)) {
1609 if (strcmp(realms[0], sp->realm) != 0) {
1610 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1611 "Returning a referral to realm %s for "
1612 "server %s that was not found",
1614 krb5_free_principal(context, sp);
1616 krb5_make_principal(context, &sp, r, KRB5_TGS_NAME,
1618 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn);
1624 ref_realm = strdup(realms[0]);
1626 krb5_free_host_realm(context, realms);
1629 krb5_free_host_realm(context, realms);
1631 msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1632 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1633 "Server not found in database: %s: %s", spn, msg);
1634 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1635 if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
1636 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1640 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, cp, HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | HDB_F_CANON,
1641 NULL, &clientdb, &client);
1642 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1643 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "client %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", cp);
1646 const char *krbtgt_realm, *msg;
1649 * If the client belongs to the same realm as our krbtgt, it
1650 * should exist in the local database.
1655 krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context,
1656 krbtgt->entry.principal, 1);
1658 if(strcmp(krb5_principal_get_realm(context, cp), krbtgt_realm) == 0) {
1659 if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
1660 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1661 kdc_log(context, config, 1, "Client no longer in database: %s",
1666 msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1667 kdc_log(context, config, 1, "Client not found in database: %s", msg);
1668 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1672 * Select enctype, return key and kvno.
1678 if(b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey) {
1681 for(i = 0; i < b->etype.len; i++)
1682 if (b->etype.val[i] == adtkt.key.keytype)
1684 if(i == b->etype.len) {
1685 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1686 "Addition ticket have not matching etypes");
1687 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1688 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
1691 etype = b->etype.val[i];
1696 ret = _kdc_find_etype(context, server,
1697 b->etype.val, b->etype.len, &skey);
1699 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1700 "Server (%s) has no support for etypes", spn);
1704 etype = skey->key.keytype;
1705 kvno = server->entry.kvno;
1708 ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, etype, &sessionkey);
1714 * Check that service is in the same realm as the krbtgt. If it's
1715 * not the same, it's someone that is using a uni-directional trust
1720 * Validate authoriation data
1723 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &krbtgt->entry,
1724 krbtgt_etype, &tkey_check);
1726 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1727 "Failed to find key for krbtgt PAC check");
1731 /* Now refetch the primary krbtgt, and get the current kvno (the
1732 * sign check may have been on an old kvno, and the server may
1733 * have been an incoming trust) */
1734 ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &krbtgt_principal,
1735 krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context,
1736 krbtgt->entry.principal,
1739 krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context,
1740 krbtgt->entry.principal,
1743 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1744 "Failed to generate krbtgt principal");
1748 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, krbtgt_principal, HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT, NULL, NULL, &krbtgt_out);
1749 krb5_free_principal(context, krbtgt_principal);
1751 krb5_error_code ret2;
1753 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, krbtgt->entry.principal, &tpn);
1754 ret2 = krb5_unparse_name(context, krbtgt->entry.principal, &tpn2);
1755 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1756 "Request with wrong krbtgt: %s, %s not found in our database",
1757 (ret == 0) ? tpn : "<unknown>", (ret2 == 0) ? tpn2 : "<unknown>");
1762 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
1766 /* The first realm is the realm of the service, the second is
1767 * krbtgt/<this>/@REALM component of the krbtgt DN the request was
1768 * encrypted to. The redirection via the krbtgt_out entry allows
1769 * the DB to possibly correct the case of the realm (Samba4 does
1770 * this) before the strcmp() */
1771 if (strcmp(krb5_principal_get_realm(context, server->entry.principal),
1772 krb5_principal_get_realm(context, krbtgt_out->entry.principal)) != 0) {
1774 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, krbtgt_out->entry.principal, &tpn);
1775 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1776 "Request with wrong krbtgt: %s",
1777 (ret == 0) ? tpn : "<unknown>");
1780 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
1783 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &krbtgt_out->entry,
1784 krbtgt_etype, &tkey_sign);
1786 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1787 "Failed to find key for krbtgt PAC signature");
1791 ret = check_PAC(context, config, cp,
1792 client, server, krbtgt, ekey, &tkey_check->key, &tkey_sign->key,
1793 tgt, &rspac, &signedpath);
1795 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1796 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1797 "Verify PAC failed for %s (%s) from %s with %s",
1798 spn, cpn, from, msg);
1799 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1803 /* also check the krbtgt for signature */
1804 ret = check_KRB5SignedPath(context,
1812 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1813 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1814 "KRB5SignedPath check failed for %s (%s) from %s with %s",
1815 spn, cpn, from, msg);
1816 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1824 client_principal = cp;
1827 const PA_DATA *sdata;
1830 sdata = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_FOR_USER);
1835 char *selfcpn = NULL;
1838 ret = decode_PA_S4U2Self(sdata->padata_value.data,
1839 sdata->padata_value.length,
1842 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to decode PA-S4U2Self");
1846 ret = _krb5_s4u2self_to_checksumdata(context, &self, &datack);
1850 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &tgt->key, 0, &crypto);
1852 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1853 free_PA_S4U2Self(&self);
1854 krb5_data_free(&datack);
1855 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
1856 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1860 ret = krb5_verify_checksum(context,
1862 KRB5_KU_OTHER_CKSUM,
1866 krb5_data_free(&datack);
1867 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
1869 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1870 free_PA_S4U2Self(&self);
1871 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1872 "krb5_verify_checksum failed for S4U2Self: %s", msg);
1873 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1877 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
1881 free_PA_S4U2Self(&self);
1885 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client_principal, &selfcpn);
1889 /* If we were about to put a PAC into the ticket, we better fix it to be the right PAC */
1892 krb5_data_free(&rspac);
1893 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, client_principal, HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | HDB_F_CANON,
1894 NULL, &s4u2self_impersonated_clientdb, &s4u2self_impersonated_client);
1899 * If the client belongs to the same realm as our krbtgt, it
1900 * should exist in the local database.
1904 if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
1905 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1906 msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1907 kdc_log(context, config, 1, "S2U4Self principal to impersonate %s not found in database: %s", cpn, msg);
1908 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1911 ret = _kdc_pac_generate(context, s4u2self_impersonated_client, &p);
1913 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
1918 ret = _krb5_pac_sign(context, p, ticket->ticket.authtime,
1919 s4u2self_impersonated_client->entry.principal,
1920 ekey, &tkey_sign->key,
1922 krb5_pac_free(context, p);
1924 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
1932 * Check that service doing the impersonating is
1933 * requesting a ticket to it-self.
1935 ret = check_s4u2self(context, config, clientdb, client, sp);
1937 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "S4U2Self: %s is not allowed "
1938 "to impersonate to service "
1939 "(tried for user %s to service %s)",
1946 * If the service isn't trusted for authentication to
1947 * delegation, remove the forward flag.
1950 if (client->entry.flags.trusted_for_delegation) {
1951 str = "[forwardable]";
1953 b->kdc_options.forwardable = 0;
1956 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "s4u2self %s impersonating %s to "
1957 "service %s %s", cpn, selfcpn, spn, str);
1963 * Constrained delegation
1967 && b->additional_tickets != NULL
1968 && b->additional_tickets->len != 0
1969 && b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey == 0)
1971 int ad_signedpath = 0;
1977 * Require that the KDC have issued the service's krbtgt (not
1978 * self-issued ticket with kimpersonate(1).
1981 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1982 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1983 "Constrained delegation done on service ticket %s/%s",
1988 t = &b->additional_tickets->val[0];
1990 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
1991 t->enc_part.etype, &clientkey);
1993 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */
1997 ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(context, t, &clientkey->key, &adtkt, 0);
1999 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2000 "failed to decrypt ticket for "
2001 "constrained delegation from %s to %s ", cpn, spn);
2005 /* check that ticket is valid */
2006 if (adtkt.flags.forwardable == 0) {
2007 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2008 "Missing forwardable flag on ticket for "
2009 "constrained delegation from %s to %s ", cpn, spn);
2010 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
2014 ret = check_constrained_delegation(context, config, clientdb,
2017 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2018 "constrained delegation from %s to %s not allowed",
2023 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
2030 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client_principal, &str);
2034 ret = verify_flags(context, config, &adtkt, str);
2041 * Check that the KDC issued the user's ticket.
2043 ret = check_KRB5SignedPath(context,
2050 if (ret == 0 && !ad_signedpath)
2051 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
2053 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
2054 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2055 "KRB5SignedPath check from service %s failed "
2056 "for delegation to %s for client %s "
2057 "from %s failed with %s",
2058 spn, str, cpn, from, msg);
2059 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
2064 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "constrained delegation for %s "
2065 "from %s to %s", str, cpn, spn);
2073 ret = kdc_check_flags(context, config,
2080 if((b->kdc_options.validate || b->kdc_options.renew) &&
2081 !krb5_principal_compare(context,
2082 krbtgt->entry.principal,
2083 server->entry.principal)){
2084 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Inconsistent request.");
2085 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
2089 /* check for valid set of addresses */
2090 if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context, config, tgt->caddr, from_addr)) {
2091 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
2092 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Request from wrong address");
2097 * If this is an referral, add server referral data to the
2104 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2105 "Adding server referral to %s", ref_realm);
2107 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &sessionkey, 0, &crypto);
2111 ret = build_server_referral(context, config, crypto, ref_realm,
2112 NULL, s, &pa.padata_value);
2113 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
2115 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2116 "Failed building server referral");
2119 pa.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_SERVER_REFERRAL;
2121 ret = add_METHOD_DATA(&enc_pa_data, &pa);
2122 krb5_data_free(&pa.padata_value);
2124 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2125 "Add server referral METHOD-DATA failed");
2134 ret = tgs_make_reply(context,
2162 krb5_data_free(&rspac);
2163 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &sessionkey);
2165 _kdc_free_ent(context, krbtgt_out);
2167 _kdc_free_ent(context, server);
2169 _kdc_free_ent(context, client);
2170 if(s4u2self_impersonated_client)
2171 _kdc_free_ent(context, s4u2self_impersonated_client);
2173 if (client_principal && client_principal != cp)
2174 krb5_free_principal(context, client_principal);
2176 krb5_free_principal(context, cp);
2178 krb5_free_principal(context, sp);
2181 free_METHOD_DATA(&enc_pa_data);
2183 free_EncTicketPart(&adtkt);
2193 _kdc_tgs_rep(krb5_context context,
2194 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
2198 struct sockaddr *from_addr,
2201 AuthorizationData *auth_data = NULL;
2202 krb5_error_code ret;
2204 const PA_DATA *tgs_req;
2206 hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt = NULL;
2207 krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
2208 const char *e_text = NULL;
2209 krb5_enctype krbtgt_etype = ETYPE_NULL;
2211 krb5_keyblock *replykey = NULL;
2212 int rk_is_subkey = 0;
2213 time_t *csec = NULL;
2216 if(req->padata == NULL){
2217 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED; /* XXX ??? */
2218 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2219 "TGS-REQ from %s without PA-DATA", from);
2223 tgs_req = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_TGS_REQ);
2225 if(tgs_req == NULL){
2226 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
2228 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2229 "TGS-REQ from %s without PA-TGS-REQ", from);
2232 ret = tgs_parse_request(context, config,
2233 &req->req_body, tgs_req,
2244 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2245 "Failed parsing TGS-REQ from %s", from);
2249 ret = tgs_build_reply(context,
2264 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2265 "Failed building TGS-REP to %s", from);
2270 if (datagram_reply && data->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) {
2271 krb5_data_free(data);
2272 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG;
2273 e_text = "Reply packet too large";
2278 krb5_free_keyblock(context, replykey);
2279 if(ret && ret != HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE && data->data == NULL){
2280 krb5_mk_error(context,
2294 krb5_free_ticket(context, ticket);
2296 _kdc_free_ent(context, krbtgt);
2299 free_AuthorizationData(auth_data);