--- /dev/null
+/*
+ Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+ endpoint server for the backupkey interface
+
+ Copyright (C) Matthieu Patou <mat@samba.org> 2010
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "rpc_server/dcerpc_server.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_backupkey.h"
+#include "dsdb/common/util.h"
+#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
+#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb_errors.h"
+#include "../lib/util/util_ldb.h"
+#include "param/param.h"
+#include "auth/session.h"
+#include "heimdal/lib/hx509/hx_locl.h"
+#include "heimdal/lib/hcrypto/rsa.h"
+#include "heimdal/lib/hcrypto/bn.h"
+#include "../lib/tsocket/tsocket.h"
+#include "../libcli/security/security.h"
+
+#define BACKUPKEY_MIN_VERSION 2
+#define BACKUPKEY_MAX_VERSION 3
+
+static const unsigned rsa_with_var_num[] = { 1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 1 };
+/* Equivalent to asn1_oid_id_pkcs1_rsaEncryption*/
+static const AlgorithmIdentifier _hx509_signature_rsa_with_var_num = {
+ { 7, discard_const_p(unsigned, rsa_with_var_num) }, NULL
+};
+
+static NTSTATUS set_lsa_secret(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct ldb_context *ldb,
+ const char *name,
+ const DATA_BLOB *secret)
+{
+ struct ldb_message *msg;
+ struct ldb_result *res;
+ struct ldb_dn *domain_dn;
+ struct ldb_dn *system_dn;
+ struct ldb_val val;
+ int ret;
+ char *name2;
+ struct timeval now = timeval_current();
+ NTTIME nt_now = timeval_to_nttime(&now);
+ const char *attrs[] = {
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ domain_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb);
+ if (!domain_dn) {
+ return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ msg = ldb_msg_new(mem_ctx);
+ if (msg == NULL) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This function is a lot like dcesrv_lsa_CreateSecret
+ * in the rpc_server/lsa directory
+ * The reason why we duplicate the effort here is that:
+ * * we want to keep the former function static
+ * * we want to avoid the burden of doing LSA calls
+ * when we can just manipulate the secrets directly
+ * * taillor the function to the particular needs of backup protocol
+ */
+
+ system_dn = samdb_search_dn(ldb, msg, domain_dn, "(&(objectClass=container)(cn=System))");
+ if (system_dn == NULL) {
+ talloc_free(msg);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ name2 = talloc_asprintf(msg, "%s Secret", name);
+ if (name2 == NULL) {
+ talloc_free(msg);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ ret = ldb_search(ldb, mem_ctx, &res, system_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs,
+ "(&(cn=%s)(objectclass=secret))",
+ ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, name2));
+
+ if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS || res->count != 0 ) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Secret %s already exists !\n", name2));
+ talloc_free(msg);
+ return NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_COLLISION;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We don't care about previous value as we are
+ * here only if the key didn't exists before
+ */
+
+ msg->dn = ldb_dn_copy(mem_ctx, system_dn);
+ if (msg->dn == NULL) {
+ talloc_free(msg);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+ if (!ldb_dn_add_child_fmt(msg->dn, "cn=%s", name2)) {
+ talloc_free(msg);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ ret = samdb_msg_add_string(ldb, mem_ctx, msg, "cn", name2);
+ if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ talloc_free(msg);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+ ret = samdb_msg_add_string(ldb, mem_ctx, msg, "objectClass", "secret");
+ if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ talloc_free(msg);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+ ret = samdb_msg_add_uint64(ldb, mem_ctx, msg, "priorSetTime", nt_now);
+ if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ talloc_free(msg);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+ val.data = secret->data;
+ val.length = secret->length;
+ ret = ldb_msg_add_value(msg, "currentValue", &val, NULL);
+ if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ talloc_free(msg);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+ ret = samdb_msg_add_uint64(ldb, mem_ctx, msg, "lastSetTime", nt_now);
+ if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ talloc_free(msg);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * create the secret with DSDB_MODIFY_RELAX
+ * otherwise dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/objectclass.c forbid
+ * the create of LSA secret object
+ */
+ ret = dsdb_add(ldb, msg, DSDB_MODIFY_RELAX);
+ if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ DEBUG(0,("Failed to create secret record %s: %s\n",
+ ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn),
+ ldb_errstring(ldb)));
+ talloc_free(msg);
+ return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ }
+
+ talloc_free(msg);
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/* This function is pretty much like dcesrv_lsa_QuerySecret */
+static NTSTATUS get_lsa_secret(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct ldb_context *ldb,
+ const char *name,
+ DATA_BLOB *secret)
+{
+ TALLOC_CTX *tmp_mem;
+ struct ldb_result *res;
+ struct ldb_dn *domain_dn;
+ struct ldb_dn *system_dn;
+ const struct ldb_val *val;
+ uint8_t *data;
+ const char *attrs[] = {
+ "currentValue",
+ NULL
+ };
+ int ret;
+
+ secret->data = NULL;
+ secret->length = 0;
+
+ domain_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb);
+ if (!domain_dn) {
+ return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ tmp_mem = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
+ if (tmp_mem == NULL) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ system_dn = samdb_search_dn(ldb, tmp_mem, domain_dn, "(&(objectClass=container)(cn=System))");
+ if (system_dn == NULL) {
+ talloc_free(tmp_mem);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ ret = ldb_search(ldb, mem_ctx, &res, system_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs,
+ "(&(cn=%s Secret)(objectclass=secret))",
+ ldb_binary_encode_string(tmp_mem, name));
+
+ if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS || res->count == 0) {
+ talloc_free(tmp_mem);
+ /*
+ * Important NOT to use NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
+ * as this return value is used to detect the case
+ * when we have the secret but without the currentValue
+ * (case RODC)
+ */
+ return NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ if (res->count > 1) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Secret %s collision\n", name));
+ talloc_free(tmp_mem);
+ return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_DB_CORRUPTION;
+ }
+
+ val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(res->msgs[0], "currentValue");
+ if (val == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * The secret object is here but we don't have the secret value
+ * The most common case is a RODC
+ */
+ talloc_free(tmp_mem);
+ return NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ data = val->data;
+ secret->data = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &data);
+ secret->length = val->length;
+
+ talloc_free(tmp_mem);
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static DATA_BLOB *reverse_and_get_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+ DATA_BLOB blob;
+ DATA_BLOB *rev = talloc(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB);
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ blob.length = BN_num_bytes(bn);
+ blob.data = talloc_array(mem_ctx, uint8_t, blob.length);
+
+ if (blob.data == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ BN_bn2bin(bn, blob.data);
+
+ rev->data = talloc_array(mem_ctx, uint8_t, blob.length);
+ if (rev->data == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ for(i=0; i < blob.length; i++) {
+ rev->data[i] = blob.data[blob.length - i -1];
+ }
+ rev->length = blob.length;
+ talloc_free(blob.data);
+ return rev;
+}
+
+static BIGNUM *reverse_and_get_bignum(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB *blob)
+{
+ BIGNUM *ret;
+ DATA_BLOB rev;
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ rev.data = talloc_array(mem_ctx, uint8_t, blob->length);
+ if (rev.data == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ for(i=0; i < blob->length; i++) {
+ rev.data[i] = blob->data[blob->length - i -1];
+ }
+ rev.length = blob->length;
+
+ ret = BN_bin2bn(rev.data, rev.length, NULL);
+ talloc_free(rev.data);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS get_pk_from_raw_keypair_params(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+ struct bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair *keypair,
+ hx509_private_key *pk)
+{
+ hx509_context hctx;
+ RSA *rsa;
+ struct hx509_private_key_ops *ops;
+
+ hx509_context_init(&hctx);
+ ops = hx509_find_private_alg(&_hx509_signature_rsa_with_var_num.algorithm);
+ if (ops == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Not supported algorithm\n"));
+ return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (_hx509_private_key_init(pk, ops, NULL) != 0) {
+ hx509_context_free(&hctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ rsa = RSA_new();
+ if (rsa ==NULL) {
+ hx509_context_free(&hctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ rsa->n = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->modulus));
+ if (rsa->n == NULL) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ hx509_context_free(&hctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+ rsa->d = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->private_exponent));
+ if (rsa->d == NULL) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ hx509_context_free(&hctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+ rsa->p = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->prime1));
+ if (rsa->p == NULL) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ hx509_context_free(&hctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+ rsa->q = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->prime2));
+ if (rsa->q == NULL) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ hx509_context_free(&hctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+ rsa->dmp1 = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->exponent1));
+ if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ hx509_context_free(&hctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+ rsa->dmq1 = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->exponent2));
+ if (rsa->dmq1 == NULL) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ hx509_context_free(&hctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+ rsa->iqmp = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->coefficient));
+ if (rsa->iqmp == NULL) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ hx509_context_free(&hctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+ rsa->e = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->public_exponent));
+ if (rsa->e == NULL) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ hx509_context_free(&hctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ _hx509_private_key_assign_rsa(*pk, rsa);
+
+ hx509_context_free(&hctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static WERROR get_and_verify_access_check(TALLOC_CTX *sub_ctx,
+ uint32_t version,
+ uint8_t *key_and_iv,
+ uint8_t *access_check,
+ uint32_t access_check_len,
+ struct dom_sid **access_sid)
+{
+ heim_octet_string iv;
+ heim_octet_string access_check_os;
+ hx509_crypto crypto;
+
+ DATA_BLOB blob_us;
+ uint32_t key_len;
+ uint32_t iv_len;
+ int res;
+ enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+ hx509_context hctx;
+
+ /* This one should not be freed */
+ const AlgorithmIdentifier *alg;
+
+ *access_sid = NULL;
+ switch (version) {
+ case 2:
+ key_len = 24;
+ iv_len = 8;
+ alg = hx509_crypto_des_rsdi_ede3_cbc();
+ break;
+
+ case 3:
+ key_len = 32;
+ iv_len = 16;
+ alg =hx509_crypto_aes256_cbc();
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+
+ hx509_context_init(&hctx);
+ res = hx509_crypto_init(hctx, NULL,
+ &(alg->algorithm),
+ &crypto);
+ hx509_context_free(&hctx);
+
+ if (res != 0) {
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+
+ res = hx509_crypto_set_key_data(crypto, key_and_iv, key_len);
+
+ iv.data = talloc_memdup(sub_ctx, key_len + key_and_iv, iv_len);
+ iv.length = iv_len;
+
+ if (res != 0) {
+ hx509_crypto_destroy(crypto);
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+
+ hx509_crypto_set_padding(crypto, HX509_CRYPTO_PADDING_NONE);
+ res = hx509_crypto_decrypt(crypto,
+ access_check,
+ access_check_len,
+ &iv,
+ &access_check_os);
+
+ if (res != 0) {
+ hx509_crypto_destroy(crypto);
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+
+ blob_us.data = access_check_os.data;
+ blob_us.length = access_check_os.length;
+
+ hx509_crypto_destroy(crypto);
+
+ if (version == 2) {
+ uint32_t hash_size = 20;
+ uint8_t hash[hash_size];
+ struct sha sctx;
+ struct bkrp_access_check_v2 uncrypted_accesscheckv2;
+
+ ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob_us, sub_ctx, &uncrypted_accesscheckv2,
+ (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_access_check_v2);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ /* Unable to unmarshall */
+ der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os);
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+ if (uncrypted_accesscheckv2.magic != 0x1) {
+ /* wrong magic */
+ der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os);
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+
+ SHA1_Init(&sctx);
+ SHA1_Update(&sctx, blob_us.data, blob_us.length - hash_size);
+ SHA1_Final(hash, &sctx);
+ der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os);
+ /*
+ * We free it after the sha1 calculation because blob.data
+ * point to the same area
+ */
+
+ if (memcmp(hash, uncrypted_accesscheckv2.hash, hash_size) != 0) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Wrong hash value in the access check in backup key remote protocol\n"));
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+ *access_sid = dom_sid_dup(sub_ctx, &(uncrypted_accesscheckv2.sid));
+ if (*access_sid == NULL) {
+ return WERR_NOMEM;
+ }
+ return WERR_OK;
+ }
+
+ if (version == 3) {
+ uint32_t hash_size = 64;
+ uint8_t hash[hash_size];
+ struct hc_sha512state sctx;
+ struct bkrp_access_check_v3 uncrypted_accesscheckv3;
+
+ ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob_us, sub_ctx, &uncrypted_accesscheckv3,
+ (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_access_check_v3);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ /* Unable to unmarshall */
+ der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os);
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+ if (uncrypted_accesscheckv3.magic != 0x1) {
+ /* wrong magic */
+ der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os);
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+
+ SHA512_Init(&sctx);
+ SHA512_Update(&sctx, blob_us.data, blob_us.length - hash_size);
+ SHA512_Final(hash, &sctx);
+ der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os);
+ /*
+ * We free it after the sha1 calculation because blob.data
+ * point to the same area
+ */
+
+ if (memcmp(hash, uncrypted_accesscheckv3.hash, hash_size) != 0) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Wrong hash value in the access check in backup key remote protocol\n"));
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+ *access_sid = dom_sid_dup(sub_ctx, &(uncrypted_accesscheckv3.sid));
+ if (*access_sid == NULL) {
+ return WERR_NOMEM;
+ }
+ return WERR_OK;
+ }
+
+ /* Never reached normally as we filtered at the switch / case level */
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+}
+
+static WERROR bkrp_do_uncrypt_client_wrap_key(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct bkrp_BackupKey *r,
+ struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx)
+{
+ struct bkrp_client_side_wrapped uncrypt_request;
+ DATA_BLOB blob;
+ enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+ char *guid_string;
+ char *cert_secret_name;
+ DATA_BLOB secret;
+ DATA_BLOB *uncrypted;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+
+ blob.data = r->in.data_in;
+ blob.length = r->in.data_in_len;
+
+ if (r->in.data_in_len == 0 || r->in.data_in == NULL) {
+ return WERR_INVALID_PARAM;
+ }
+
+ ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &uncrypt_request,
+ (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_client_side_wrapped);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ return WERR_INVALID_PARAM;
+ }
+
+ if (uncrypt_request.version < BACKUPKEY_MIN_VERSION) {
+ return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ if (uncrypt_request.version > BACKUPKEY_MAX_VERSION) {
+ return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ guid_string = GUID_string(mem_ctx, &uncrypt_request.guid);
+ if (guid_string == NULL) {
+ return WERR_NOMEM;
+ }
+
+ cert_secret_name = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx,
+ "BCKUPKEY_%s",
+ guid_string);
+ if (cert_secret_name == NULL) {
+ return WERR_NOMEM;
+ }
+
+ status = get_lsa_secret(mem_ctx,
+ ldb_ctx,
+ cert_secret_name,
+ &secret);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DEBUG(10, ("Error while fetching secret %s\n", cert_secret_name));
+ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status,NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND)) {
+ /* we do not have the real secret attribute */
+ return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ } else {
+ return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (secret.length != 0) {
+ hx509_context hctx;
+ struct bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair keypair;
+ hx509_private_key pk;
+ uint32_t i, res;
+ struct dom_sid *access_sid = NULL;
+ heim_octet_string reversed_secret;
+ heim_octet_string uncrypted_secret;
+ AlgorithmIdentifier alg;
+ struct dom_sid *caller_sid;
+ DATA_BLOB blob_us;
+ WERROR werr;
+
+ ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&secret, mem_ctx, &keypair, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("Unable to parse the ndr encoded cert in key %s\n", cert_secret_name));
+ return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ status = get_pk_from_raw_keypair_params(mem_ctx, &keypair, &pk);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ reversed_secret.data = talloc_array(mem_ctx, uint8_t,
+ uncrypt_request.encrypted_secret_len);
+ if (reversed_secret.data == NULL) {
+ _hx509_private_key_free(&pk);
+ return WERR_NOMEM;
+ }
+
+ /* The secret has to be reversed ... */
+ for(i=0; i< uncrypt_request.encrypted_secret_len; i++) {
+ uint8_t *reversed = (uint8_t *)reversed_secret.data;
+ uint8_t *uncrypt = uncrypt_request.encrypted_secret;
+ reversed[i] = uncrypt[uncrypt_request.encrypted_secret_len - 1 - i];
+ }
+ reversed_secret.length = uncrypt_request.encrypted_secret_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Let's try to decrypt the secret now that
+ * we have the private key ...
+ */
+ hx509_context_init(&hctx);
+ res = _hx509_private_key_private_decrypt(hctx, &reversed_secret,
+ &alg.algorithm, pk,
+ &uncrypted_secret);
+ hx509_context_free(&hctx);
+ _hx509_private_key_free(&pk);
+ if (res != 0) {
+ /* We are not able to decrypt the secret, looks like something is wrong */
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+ blob_us.data = uncrypted_secret.data;
+ blob_us.length = uncrypted_secret.length;
+
+ if (uncrypt_request.version == 2) {
+ struct bkrp_encrypted_secret_v2 uncrypted_secretv2;
+
+ ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob_us, mem_ctx, &uncrypted_secretv2,
+ (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_encrypted_secret_v2);
+ der_free_octet_string(&uncrypted_secret);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ /* Unable to unmarshall */
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+ if (uncrypted_secretv2.magic != 0x20) {
+ /* wrong magic */
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+
+ werr = get_and_verify_access_check(mem_ctx, 2,
+ uncrypted_secretv2.payload_key,
+ uncrypt_request.access_check,
+ uncrypt_request.access_check_len,
+ &access_sid);
+ if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(werr)) {
+ return werr;
+ }
+ uncrypted = talloc(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB);
+ if (uncrypted == NULL) {
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+
+ uncrypted->data = uncrypted_secretv2.secret;
+ uncrypted->length = uncrypted_secretv2.secret_len;
+ }
+ if (uncrypt_request.version == 3) {
+ struct bkrp_encrypted_secret_v3 uncrypted_secretv3;
+
+ ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob_us, mem_ctx, &uncrypted_secretv3,
+ (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_encrypted_secret_v3);
+
+ der_free_octet_string(&uncrypted_secret);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ /* Unable to unmarshall */
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (uncrypted_secretv3.magic1 != 0x30 ||
+ uncrypted_secretv3.magic2 != 0x6610 ||
+ uncrypted_secretv3.magic3 != 0x800e) {
+ /* wrong magic */
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+
+ werr = get_and_verify_access_check(mem_ctx, 3,
+ uncrypted_secretv3.payload_key,
+ uncrypt_request.access_check,
+ uncrypt_request.access_check_len,
+ &access_sid);
+ if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(werr)) {
+ return werr;
+ }
+
+ uncrypted = talloc(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB);
+ if (uncrypted == NULL) {
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+
+ uncrypted->data = uncrypted_secretv3.secret;
+ uncrypted->length = uncrypted_secretv3.secret_len;
+ }
+
+ caller_sid = &dce_call->conn->auth_state.session_info->security_token->sids[PRIMARY_USER_SID_INDEX];
+
+ if (!dom_sid_equal(caller_sid, access_sid)) {
+ talloc_free(uncrypted);
+ return WERR_INVALID_ACCESS;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Yeah if we are here all looks pretty good:
+ * - hash is ok
+ * - user sid is the same as the one in access check
+ * - we were able to decrypt the whole stuff
+ */
+ }
+
+ if (uncrypted->data == NULL) {
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* There is a magic value a the beginning of the data
+ * we can use an adhoc structure but as the
+ * parent structure is just an array of bytes it a lot of work
+ * work just prepending 4 bytes
+ */
+ *(r->out.data_out) = talloc_zero_array(mem_ctx, uint8_t, uncrypted->length + 4);
+ W_ERROR_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(*(r->out.data_out));
+ memcpy(4+*(r->out.data_out), uncrypted->data, uncrypted->length);
+ *(r->out.data_out_len) = uncrypted->length + 4;
+
+ return WERR_OK;
+}
+
+static WERROR create_heimdal_rsa_key(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, hx509_context *hctx,
+ hx509_private_key *pk, RSA **_rsa)
+{
+ BIGNUM *pub_expo;
+ RSA *rsa;
+ int ret;
+ uint8_t *p0, *p;
+ size_t len;
+ int bits = 2048;
+
+ *_rsa = NULL;
+
+ pub_expo = BN_new();
+ if(pub_expo == NULL) {
+ return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* set the public expo to 65537 like everyone */
+ BN_set_word(pub_expo, 0x10001);
+
+ rsa = RSA_new();
+ if(rsa == NULL) {
+ BN_free(pub_expo);
+ return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ ret = RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, pub_expo, NULL);
+ if(ret != 1) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ BN_free(pub_expo);
+ return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ BN_free(pub_expo);
+
+ len = i2d_RSAPrivateKey(rsa, NULL);
+ if (len < 1) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ p0 = p = talloc_array(ctx, uint8_t, len);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ len = i2d_RSAPrivateKey(rsa, &p);
+ if (len < 1) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ talloc_free(p0);
+ return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * To dump the key we can use :
+ * rk_dumpdata("h5lkey", p0, len);
+ */
+ ret = _hx509_parse_private_key(*hctx, &_hx509_signature_rsa_with_var_num ,
+ p0, len, HX509_KEY_FORMAT_DER, pk);
+ memset(p0, 0, len);
+ talloc_free(p0);
+ if (ret !=0) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ *_rsa = rsa;
+ return WERR_OK;
+}
+
+static WERROR self_sign_cert(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, hx509_context *hctx, hx509_request *req,
+ time_t lifetime, hx509_private_key *private_key,
+ hx509_cert *cert, DATA_BLOB *guidblob)
+{
+ SubjectPublicKeyInfo spki;
+ hx509_name subject = NULL;
+ hx509_ca_tbs tbs;
+ struct heim_bit_string uniqueid;
+ int ret;
+
+ uniqueid.data = talloc_memdup(ctx, guidblob->data, guidblob->length);
+ /* uniqueid is a bit string in which each byte represent 1 bit (1 or 0)
+ * so as 1 byte is 8 bits we need to provision 8 times more space as in the
+ * blob
+ */
+ uniqueid.length = 8 * guidblob->length;
+
+ memset(&spki, 0, sizeof(spki));
+
+ ret = _hx509_request_get_name(*hctx, *req, &subject);
+ if (ret !=0) {
+ talloc_free(uniqueid.data);
+ return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ ret = _hx509_request_get_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(*hctx, *req, &spki);
+ if (ret !=0) {
+ talloc_free(uniqueid.data);
+ hx509_name_free(&subject);
+ return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ ret = hx509_ca_tbs_init(*hctx, &tbs);
+ if (ret !=0) {
+ talloc_free(uniqueid.data);
+ hx509_name_free(&subject);
+ free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki);
+ return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ ret = hx509_ca_tbs_set_spki(*hctx, tbs, &spki);
+ if (ret !=0) {
+ talloc_free(uniqueid.data);
+ hx509_name_free(&subject);
+ free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki);
+ return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ ret = hx509_ca_tbs_set_subject(*hctx, tbs, subject);
+ if (ret !=0) {
+ talloc_free(uniqueid.data);
+ hx509_name_free(&subject);
+ free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki);
+ hx509_ca_tbs_free(&tbs);
+ return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ ret = hx509_ca_tbs_set_ca(*hctx, tbs, 1);
+ if (ret !=0) {
+ talloc_free(uniqueid.data);
+ hx509_name_free(&subject);
+ free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki);
+ hx509_ca_tbs_free(&tbs);
+ return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ ret = hx509_ca_tbs_set_notAfter_lifetime(*hctx, tbs, lifetime);
+ if (ret !=0) {
+ talloc_free(uniqueid.data);
+ hx509_name_free(&subject);
+ free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki);
+ hx509_ca_tbs_free(&tbs);
+ return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ ret = hx509_ca_tbs_set_unique(*hctx, tbs, &uniqueid, &uniqueid);
+ if (ret !=0) {
+ talloc_free(uniqueid.data);
+ hx509_name_free(&subject);
+ free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki);
+ hx509_ca_tbs_free(&tbs);
+ return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ ret = hx509_ca_sign_self(*hctx, tbs, *private_key, cert);
+ if (ret !=0) {
+ talloc_free(uniqueid.data);
+ hx509_name_free(&subject);
+ free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki);
+ hx509_ca_tbs_free(&tbs);
+ return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ hx509_name_free(&subject);
+ free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki);
+ hx509_ca_tbs_free(&tbs);
+
+ return WERR_OK;
+}
+
+static WERROR create_req(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, hx509_context *hctx, hx509_request *req,
+ hx509_private_key *signer,RSA **rsa, const char *dn)
+{
+ int ret;
+ SubjectPublicKeyInfo key;
+
+ hx509_name name;
+ WERROR w_err;
+
+ w_err = create_heimdal_rsa_key(ctx, hctx, signer, rsa);
+ if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(w_err)) {
+ return w_err;
+ }
+
+ _hx509_request_init(*hctx, req);
+ ret = hx509_parse_name(*hctx, dn, &name);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ RSA_free(*rsa);
+ _hx509_private_key_free(signer);
+ _hx509_request_free(req);
+ hx509_name_free(&name);
+ return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ ret = _hx509_request_set_name(*hctx, *req, name);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ RSA_free(*rsa);
+ _hx509_private_key_free(signer);
+ _hx509_request_free(req);
+ hx509_name_free(&name);
+ return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ hx509_name_free(&name);
+
+ ret = _hx509_private_key2SPKI(*hctx, *signer, &key);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ RSA_free(*rsa);
+ _hx509_private_key_free(signer);
+ _hx509_request_free(req);
+ return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ ret = _hx509_request_set_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(*hctx, *req, &key);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ RSA_free(*rsa);
+ _hx509_private_key_free(signer);
+ free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&key);
+ _hx509_request_free(req);
+ return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&key);
+
+ return WERR_OK;
+}
+
+/* Return an error when we fail to generate a certificate */
+static WERROR generate_bkrp_cert(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx, const char *dn)
+{
+
+ struct heim_octet_string data;
+ WERROR w_err;
+ RSA *rsa;
+ hx509_context hctx;
+ hx509_private_key pk;
+ hx509_request req;
+ hx509_cert cert;
+ DATA_BLOB blob;
+ DATA_BLOB blobkeypair;
+ DATA_BLOB *tmp;
+ int ret;
+ bool ok = true;
+ struct GUID guid = GUID_random();
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ char *secret_name;
+ struct bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair keypair;
+ enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+ uint32_t nb_days_validity = 365;
+
+ DEBUG(0, ("Trying to generate a certificate\n"));
+ hx509_context_init(&hctx);
+ w_err = create_req(ctx, &hctx, &req, &pk, &rsa, dn);
+ if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(w_err)) {
+ hx509_context_free(&hctx);
+ return w_err;
+ }
+
+ status = GUID_to_ndr_blob(&guid, ctx, &blob);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ hx509_context_free(&hctx);
+ _hx509_private_key_free(&pk);
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+
+ w_err = self_sign_cert(ctx, &hctx, &req, nb_days_validity, &pk, &cert, &blob);
+ if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(w_err)) {
+ _hx509_private_key_free(&pk);
+ hx509_context_free(&hctx);
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+
+ ret = hx509_cert_binary(hctx, cert, &data);
+ if (ret !=0) {
+ hx509_cert_free(cert);
+ _hx509_private_key_free(&pk);
+ hx509_context_free(&hctx);
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+
+ keypair.cert.data = talloc_memdup(ctx, data.data, data.length);
+ keypair.cert.length = data.length;
+
+ /*
+ * Heimdal's bignum are big endian and the
+ * structure expect it to be in little endian
+ * so we reverse the buffer to make it work
+ */
+ tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx, rsa->e);
+ if (tmp == NULL) {
+ ok = false;
+ } else {
+ keypair.public_exponent = *tmp;
+ SMB_ASSERT(tmp->length <= 4);
+ /*
+ * The value is now in little endian but if can happen that the length is
+ * less than 4 bytes.
+ * So if we have less than 4 bytes we pad with zeros so that it correctly
+ * fit into the structure.
+ */
+ if (tmp->length < 4) {
+ /*
+ * We need the expo to fit 4 bytes
+ */
+ keypair.public_exponent.data = talloc_zero_array(ctx, uint8_t, 4);
+ memcpy(keypair.public_exponent.data, tmp->data, tmp->length);
+ keypair.public_exponent.length = 4;
+ }
+ }
+
+ tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->d);
+ if (tmp == NULL) {
+ ok = false;
+ } else {
+ keypair.private_exponent = *tmp;
+ }
+
+ tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->n);
+ if (tmp == NULL) {
+ ok = false;
+ } else {
+ keypair.modulus = *tmp;
+ }
+
+ tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->p);
+ if (tmp == NULL) {
+ ok = false;
+ } else {
+ keypair.prime1 = *tmp;
+ }
+
+ tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->q);
+ if (tmp == NULL) {
+ ok = false;
+ } else {
+ keypair.prime2 = *tmp;
+ }
+
+ tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->dmp1);
+ if (tmp == NULL) {
+ ok = false;
+ } else {
+ keypair.exponent1 = *tmp;
+ }
+
+ tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->dmq1);
+ if (tmp == NULL) {
+ ok = false;
+ } else {
+ keypair.exponent2 = *tmp;
+ }
+
+ tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->iqmp);
+ if (tmp == NULL) {
+ ok = false;
+ } else {
+ keypair.coefficient = *tmp;
+ }
+
+ /* One of the keypair allocation was wrong */
+ if (ok == false) {
+ der_free_octet_string(&data);
+ hx509_cert_free(cert);
+ _hx509_private_key_free(&pk);
+ hx509_context_free(&hctx);
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+ keypair.certificate_len = keypair.cert.length;
+ DEBUG(0, ("Len of priv key: %d pub_expo: %d\n", keypair.private_exponent.length, keypair.public_exponent.length));
+ ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(&blobkeypair, ctx, &keypair, (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ der_free_octet_string(&data);
+ hx509_cert_free(cert);
+ _hx509_private_key_free(&pk);
+ hx509_context_free(&hctx);
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+
+ secret_name = talloc_asprintf(ctx, "BCKUPKEY_%s", GUID_string(ctx, &guid));
+ if (secret_name == NULL) {
+ der_free_octet_string(&data);
+ hx509_cert_free(cert);
+ _hx509_private_key_free(&pk);
+ hx509_context_free(&hctx);
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return WERR_OUTOFMEMORY;
+ }
+
+ status = set_lsa_secret(ctx, ldb_ctx, secret_name, &blobkeypair);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Failed to save the secret %s\n", secret_name));
+ }
+ talloc_free(secret_name);
+
+ GUID_to_ndr_blob(&guid, ctx, &blob);
+ status = set_lsa_secret(ctx, ldb_ctx, "BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED", &blob);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Failed to save the secret BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED\n"));
+ }
+
+ der_free_octet_string(&data);
+ hx509_cert_free(cert);
+ _hx509_private_key_free(&pk);
+ hx509_context_free(&hctx);
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return WERR_OK;
+}
+
+static WERROR bkrp_do_retreive_client_wrap_key(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct bkrp_BackupKey *r ,struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx)
+{
+ struct GUID guid;
+ char *guid_string;
+ DATA_BLOB secret;
+ enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+
+ /*
+ * here we basicaly need to return our certificate
+ * search for lsa secret BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED first
+ */
+
+ status = get_lsa_secret(mem_ctx,
+ ldb_ctx,
+ "BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED",
+ &secret);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DEBUG(10, ("Error while fetching secret BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED\n"));
+ if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND)) {
+ /* Ok we can be in this case if there was no certs */
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx;
+ char *dn = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "CN=%s.%s",
+ lpcfg_netbios_name(lp_ctx),
+ lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
+
+ WERROR werr = generate_bkrp_cert(mem_ctx, dce_call, ldb_ctx, dn);
+ if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(werr)) {
+ return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+ status = get_lsa_secret(mem_ctx,
+ ldb_ctx,
+ "BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED",
+ &secret);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ /* Ok we really don't manage to get this certs ...*/
+ DEBUG(0, ("Unable to locate BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED after cert generation\n"));
+ return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* In theory we should NEVER reach this point as it
+ should only appear in a rodc server */
+ /* we do not have the real secret attribute */
+ return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (secret.length != 0) {
+ char *cert_secret_name;
+
+ status = GUID_from_ndr_blob(&secret, &guid);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ guid_string = GUID_string(mem_ctx, &guid);
+ if (guid_string == NULL) {
+ /* We return file not found because the client
+ * expect this error
+ */
+ return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ cert_secret_name = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx,
+ "BCKUPKEY_%s",
+ guid_string);
+ status = get_lsa_secret(mem_ctx,
+ ldb_ctx,
+ cert_secret_name,
+ &secret);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ if (secret.length != 0) {
+ struct bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair keypair;
+ ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&secret, mem_ctx, &keypair,
+ (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+ *(r->out.data_out_len) = keypair.cert.length;
+ *(r->out.data_out) = talloc_memdup(mem_ctx, keypair.cert.data, keypair.cert.length);
+ W_ERROR_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(*(r->out.data_out));
+ return WERR_OK;
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(10, ("No or broken secret called %s\n", cert_secret_name));
+ return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(10, ("No secret BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED\n"));
+ return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ return WERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+}
+
+WERROR dcesrv_bkrp_BackupKey (struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct bkrp_BackupKey *r)
+{
+ WERROR error = WERR_INVALID_PARAM;
+ struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx;
+ bool is_rodc;
+ const char *addr = "unknown";
+ /* At which level we start to add more debug of what is done in the protocol */
+ int debuglevel =4;
+
+ if (DEBUGLEVEL >= debuglevel) {
+ const struct tsocket_address *remote_address;
+ remote_address = dcesrv_connection_get_remote_address(dce_call->conn);
+ if (tsocket_address_is_inet(remote_address, "ip")) {
+ addr = tsocket_address_inet_addr_string(remote_address, mem_ctx);
+ W_ERROR_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(addr);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (lpcfg_server_role(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx) != ROLE_DOMAIN_CONTROLLER) {
+ return WERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ if (!dce_call->conn->auth_state.auth_info ||
+ dce_call->conn->auth_state.auth_info->auth_level != DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
+ DCESRV_FAULT(DCERPC_FAULT_ACCESS_DENIED);
+ }
+
+ ldb_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, dce_call->event_ctx,
+ dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx,
+ system_session(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx), 0);
+
+ if (samdb_rodc(ldb_ctx, &is_rodc) != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ talloc_unlink(mem_ctx, ldb_ctx);
+ return WERR_INVALID_PARAM;
+ }
+
+ if (!is_rodc) {
+ if(strncasecmp(GUID_string(mem_ctx, r->in.guidActionAgent),
+ BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID, strlen(BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID)) == 0) {
+ DEBUG(debuglevel, ("Client %s requested to decrypt a client side wrapped secret\n", addr));
+ error = bkrp_do_uncrypt_client_wrap_key(dce_call, mem_ctx, r, ldb_ctx);
+ }
+
+ if (strncasecmp(GUID_string(mem_ctx, r->in.guidActionAgent),
+ BACKUPKEY_RETRIEVE_BACKUP_KEY_GUID, strlen(BACKUPKEY_RETRIEVE_BACKUP_KEY_GUID)) == 0) {
+ DEBUG(debuglevel, ("Client %s requested certificate for client wrapped secret\n", addr));
+ error = bkrp_do_retreive_client_wrap_key(dce_call, mem_ctx, r, ldb_ctx);
+ }
+ }
+ /*else: I am a RODC so I don't handle backup key protocol */
+
+ talloc_unlink(mem_ctx, ldb_ctx);
+ return error;
+}
+
+/* include the generated boilerplate */
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_backupkey_s.c"
git.samba.org / ddiss / samba.git / commitdiff