2 Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
4 Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
6 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
7 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
9 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
12 (at your option) any later version.
14 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 GNU General Public License for more details.
20 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
21 along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
25 #include "system/time.h"
26 #include "../libds/common/flags.h"
27 #include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h"
28 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
29 #include "libcli/security/security.h"
30 #include "auth/auth.h"
31 #include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
32 #include "auth/auth_sam.h"
33 #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
34 #include "dsdb/common/util.h"
35 #include "librpc/ndr/libndr.h"
36 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
37 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/lsa.h"
38 #include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
39 #include "param/param.h"
40 #include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
41 #include "system/kerberos.h"
42 #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
44 #include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
45 #include "kdc/db-glue.h"
46 #include "kdc/kdc-policy.h"
48 enum samba_kdc_ent_type
49 { SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
50 SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
52 enum trust_direction {
54 INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
55 OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
58 static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
63 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
70 static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
76 gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
80 tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
88 static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, uint32_t userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
90 HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
92 /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
95 /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
100 /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
103 /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
104 if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
105 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
111 if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
112 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
117 if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
118 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
123 if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
124 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
130 /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
131 if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
134 if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
138 if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
143 UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
145 if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
149 /* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
152 if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
156 if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
157 flags.require_hwauth = 1;
159 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
160 flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
162 if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
163 flags.forwardable = 1;
167 if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
168 flags.require_preauth = 0;
170 flags.require_preauth = 1;
176 static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
178 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex;
179 free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
183 static void samba_kdc_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
185 /* this function is called only from hdb_free_entry().
186 * Make sure we neutralize the destructor or we will
187 * get a double free later when hdb_free_entry() will
188 * try to call free_hdb_entry() */
189 talloc_set_destructor(entry_ex->ctx, NULL);
191 /* now proceed to free the talloc part */
192 talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
195 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
196 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
198 struct ldb_message *msg,
201 uint32_t userAccountControl,
202 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
203 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
205 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
206 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
207 struct samr_Password *hash;
208 const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
209 struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
210 struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
211 bool newer_keys = false;
212 struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
213 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
214 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
216 uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
217 int rodc_krbtgt_number = 0;
218 uint32_t supported_enctypes
219 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
220 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
223 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT || is_rodc) {
224 /* KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs) use AES */
225 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
226 } else if (userAccountControl & (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)) {
227 /* DCs and RODCs comptuer accounts use AES */
228 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
229 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT ||
230 (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY)) {
231 /* for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it
232 * supports, and this will vary between computers a
235 * likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported,
236 * to export into a keytab */
237 supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
240 /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
241 if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
242 supported_enctypes = ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5;
244 /* Otherwise, add in the default enc types */
245 supported_enctypes |= ENC_CRC32 | ENC_RSA_MD5 | ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
248 /* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */
250 rodc_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
252 if (rodc_krbtgt_number == -1) {
258 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
259 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
261 entry_ex->entry.kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
263 entry_ex->entry.kvno |= (rodc_krbtgt_number << 16);
266 /* Get keys from the db */
268 hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
269 sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
271 /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
276 /* supplementalCredentials if present */
278 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
279 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
280 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
281 dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
286 if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
287 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
292 for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
293 if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
294 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
295 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
301 } else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
302 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
303 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
307 * we don't break here in hope to find
308 * a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
314 * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
315 * of supplementalCredentials
320 blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
326 /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
327 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
328 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
329 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
331 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
332 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
336 if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
338 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
339 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
343 if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
345 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
346 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
350 if (_pkb.version == 4) {
351 pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
352 allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
353 } else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
354 pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
355 allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
359 if (allocated_keys == 0) {
360 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
361 /* We are on an RODC, but don't have keys for this account. Signal this to the caller */
362 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
365 /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
366 * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
367 * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
371 /* allocate space to decode into */
372 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
373 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
374 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
379 if (hash && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) {
383 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
385 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
386 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
387 hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash),
393 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
394 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
398 for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
401 if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
403 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb4->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
410 if (pkb4->salt.string) {
413 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
415 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
416 if (key.salt == NULL) {
421 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
423 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
431 /* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
433 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
434 pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
435 pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
436 pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
438 if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
439 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
440 pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
453 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
454 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
457 for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
460 if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
462 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb3->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
469 if (pkb3->salt.string) {
472 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
474 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
475 if (key.salt == NULL) {
480 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
482 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
490 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
491 pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
492 pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
493 pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
504 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
505 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
511 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
513 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
514 free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
515 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
521 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
523 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
524 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
525 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
526 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
528 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
529 struct ldb_message *msg,
530 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
532 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
533 uint32_t userAccountControl;
535 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
536 krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
538 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
543 bool is_rodc = false;
544 struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
545 struct ldb_val computer_val;
546 const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
547 computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
548 computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
550 if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) {
554 if (!samAccountName) {
556 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
560 objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
562 if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
566 memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex));
568 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
574 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
575 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
576 p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
582 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
584 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
585 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
588 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
590 userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
593 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
594 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
595 krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
597 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
599 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
603 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
604 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
605 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
606 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
607 * we determine from our records */
609 /* this has to be with malloc() */
610 krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
613 /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
614 entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
616 /* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
617 * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
618 * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
619 * their probably patheticly insecure password) */
621 if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server
622 && lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
623 if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
624 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
628 if (flags & HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) {
629 /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
630 * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
631 * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
634 /* use 'whenCreated' */
635 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
636 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
637 krb5_make_principal(context,
638 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
639 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
641 entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
642 if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
644 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
648 /* use 'whenChanged' */
649 entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
650 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
651 krb5_make_principal(context,
652 &entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal,
653 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
657 /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
658 * virtue of being that particular RID */
659 status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
661 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
666 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
667 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
668 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
670 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
671 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
673 /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
674 * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
675 * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
676 * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
677 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
678 && principal->name.name_string.len == 2
679 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "kadmin") == 0)
680 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], "changepw") == 0)
681 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)) {
682 entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1;
684 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
685 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
686 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
687 } else if (is_rodc) {
688 /* The RODC krbtgt account is like the main krbtgt,
689 * but it does not have a changepw or kadmin
692 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
693 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
695 /* Also don't allow the RODC krbtgt to be a client (it should not be needed) */
696 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
697 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
698 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
700 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
701 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
702 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 0;
703 } else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
704 /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
705 * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
707 /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
708 * it could bypass the password restrictions */
709 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
711 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
712 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
715 NTTIME must_change_time
716 = samdb_result_force_password_change(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
718 if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
719 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
721 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
722 if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
726 *entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
729 acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
730 if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
731 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
733 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
734 if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
738 *entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
742 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
744 entry_ex->entry.max_life = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
745 if (entry_ex->entry.max_life == NULL) {
750 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
751 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = nt_time_to_unix(kdc_db_ctx->policy.service_tkt_lifetime);
752 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT) {
753 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = nt_time_to_unix(kdc_db_ctx->policy.user_tkt_lifetime);
755 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = MIN(nt_time_to_unix(kdc_db_ctx->policy.service_tkt_lifetime),
756 nt_time_to_unix(kdc_db_ctx->policy.user_tkt_lifetime));
759 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
760 if (entry_ex->entry.max_renew == NULL) {
765 *entry_ex->entry.max_renew = nt_time_to_unix(kdc_db_ctx->policy.user_tkt_renewaltime);
767 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
769 /* Get keys from the db */
770 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, kdc_db_ctx, p, msg,
771 rid, is_rodc, userAccountControl,
774 /* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
778 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
779 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
780 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
784 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
785 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
786 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
787 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
791 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
792 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
796 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
800 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
801 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
803 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
810 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
812 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
813 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
814 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
815 enum trust_direction direction,
816 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
817 struct ldb_message *msg,
818 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
820 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
821 const char *dnsdomain;
822 const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx);
823 DATA_BLOB password_utf16;
824 struct samr_Password password_hash;
825 const struct ldb_val *password_val;
826 struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
827 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
829 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
830 int ret, trust_direction_flags;
833 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
839 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
840 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
841 p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
843 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
845 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
846 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
849 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
851 /* use 'whenCreated' */
852 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
853 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
854 krb5_make_principal(context,
855 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
856 realm, "kadmin", NULL);
858 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
860 trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
862 if (direction == INBOUND) {
863 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
865 } else { /* OUTBOUND */
866 dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
868 realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
869 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
872 if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
877 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
878 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
879 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
884 entry_ex->entry.kvno = -1;
885 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
886 if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
887 entry_ex->entry.kvno = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
891 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
892 if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
893 password_utf16 = data_blob_const(password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
894 password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
895 /* In the future, generate all sorts of
896 * hashes, but for now we can't safely convert
897 * the random strings windows uses into
900 /* but as it is utf16 already, we can get the NT password/arcfour-hmac-md5 key */
901 mdfour(password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
903 } else if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
904 password_hash = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
909 if (i < password_blob.count) {
911 /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
912 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(1, sizeof(Key));
915 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
917 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
922 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
923 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
924 password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash),
927 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
928 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
931 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
933 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
935 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
939 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
940 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
941 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
942 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
943 * we determine from our records */
945 krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
946 entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
947 entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
948 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
949 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
950 entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
952 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
954 entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
956 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
958 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
960 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
961 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
962 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
966 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
967 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
968 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
969 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
973 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
974 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
978 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
982 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
983 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
985 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
992 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
995 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
996 struct ldb_message **pmsg)
1000 char *filter = NULL;
1001 const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
1003 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
1004 filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=trustedDomain)(|(flatname=%s)(trustPartner=%s)))", realm, realm);
1008 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
1012 lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &res,
1013 ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx),
1014 LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs, "%s", filter);
1015 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1016 DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
1017 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1018 } else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) {
1019 DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count));
1021 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1023 talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs);
1024 *pmsg = res->msgs[0];
1029 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
1030 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1031 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1032 krb5_const_principal principal,
1034 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1035 struct ldb_message **msg) {
1037 char *principal_string;
1038 krb5_error_code ret;
1040 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
1046 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1047 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
1049 free(principal_string);
1050 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
1051 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1052 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1054 } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1061 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
1062 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1063 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1064 krb5_const_principal principal,
1066 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
1067 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1068 krb5_error_code ret;
1069 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1071 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1072 mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
1078 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1079 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
1081 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1085 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
1086 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1087 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1088 krb5_const_principal principal,
1090 uint32_t krbtgt_number,
1091 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1093 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
1094 krb5_error_code ret;
1095 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1096 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1098 krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
1099 if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
1100 || (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
1102 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1105 /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
1107 if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)
1108 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1])) {
1109 /* us, or someone quite like us */
1110 /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
1111 * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
1116 if (krbtgt_number == kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1117 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1118 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1120 "(objectClass=user)");
1122 /* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
1123 * ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another
1124 * RODC if we are a read-write DC */
1125 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1126 &msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1128 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
1129 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1132 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1133 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1134 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1135 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1136 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1137 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1138 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1139 } else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1140 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1141 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1142 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1143 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1144 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1145 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1148 if (flags & HDB_F_CANON) {
1149 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal);
1154 /* When requested to do so, ensure that the
1155 * both realm values in the principal are set
1156 * to the upper case, canonical realm */
1157 free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1158 alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
1159 if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) {
1161 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: strdup() failed!");
1164 principal = alloc_principal;
1167 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1168 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
1169 flags, realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1170 if (flags & HDB_F_CANON) {
1171 /* This is again copied in the message2entry call */
1172 krb5_free_principal(context, alloc_principal);
1175 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
1180 enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
1181 const char *realm = NULL;
1183 /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
1185 if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) {
1186 /* look for inbound trust */
1187 direction = INBOUND;
1188 realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1];
1189 } else if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) {
1190 /* look for outbound trust */
1191 direction = OUTBOUND;
1192 realm = principal->realm;
1194 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1195 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1196 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1197 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1198 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1201 /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
1203 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1205 realm, realm_dn, &msg);
1208 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1209 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1213 ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1214 principal, direction,
1215 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1217 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed");
1224 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
1225 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1226 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1227 krb5_const_principal principal,
1229 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1230 struct ldb_message **msg)
1232 krb5_error_code ret;
1233 if (principal->name.name_string.len >= 2) {
1234 /* 'normal server' case */
1237 struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
1238 char *principal_string;
1240 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
1241 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
1247 /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
1248 * in a different realm, so we should generate a
1249 * referral instead */
1250 nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1251 mem_ctx, principal_string,
1252 &user_dn, realm_dn);
1253 free(principal_string);
1255 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1256 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1259 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1261 msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1262 attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN, "(objectClass=*)");
1263 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1264 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1269 char *filter = NULL;
1272 /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
1273 *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1274 realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
1276 /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referall */
1278 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ);
1281 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1282 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1286 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
1287 *realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1289 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
1290 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
1291 ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ));
1293 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1294 DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a entry for %s\n", filter));
1295 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1297 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1298 DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for for %s - %s\n",
1299 filter, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1300 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1307 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
1308 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1309 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1310 krb5_const_principal principal,
1312 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1314 krb5_error_code ret;
1315 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1316 struct ldb_message *msg;
1318 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
1319 server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1324 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1325 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
1327 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1329 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
1335 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
1336 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1337 krb5_const_principal principal,
1340 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1342 krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1343 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1344 unsigned int krbtgt_number;
1345 if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1346 krbtgt_number = kvno >> 16;
1347 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
1348 if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1349 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
1353 krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
1356 mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
1359 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1363 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
1364 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1365 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1367 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
1368 /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
1369 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, krbtgt_number, entry_ex);
1370 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1372 /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
1373 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1374 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1376 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
1377 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, krbtgt_number, entry_ex);
1378 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1382 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1386 struct samba_kdc_seq {
1389 struct ldb_message **msgs;
1390 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1393 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
1394 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1395 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1397 krb5_error_code ret;
1398 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1399 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1400 hdb_entry_ex entry_ex;
1401 memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex));
1404 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1407 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
1411 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
1415 if (priv->index < priv->count) {
1416 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1417 NULL, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
1418 HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA|HDB_F_GET_ANY,
1419 priv->realm_dn, priv->msgs[priv->index++], entry);
1421 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1426 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1428 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1434 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
1435 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1436 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1438 struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
1439 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1441 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
1442 krb5_error_code ret;
1443 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1448 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1451 priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
1454 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
1460 priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
1463 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
1467 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
1471 ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
1477 lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
1478 priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
1479 "(objectClass=user)");
1481 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1483 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1486 priv->count = res->count;
1487 priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
1490 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
1492 ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1496 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1498 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1503 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
1504 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1505 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1507 return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1510 /* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
1512 * This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
1514 * This is shared between the constrained delegation and S4U2Self code.
1517 samba_kdc_check_identical_client_and_server(krb5_context context,
1518 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1519 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1520 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1522 krb5_error_code ret;
1523 krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
1524 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1525 struct ldb_message *msg;
1526 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1527 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1528 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1529 const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = {
1533 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation");
1537 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1541 if (target_principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1542 /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
1543 if (target_principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
1544 ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
1545 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation: request for delegation to enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
1546 target_principal->name.name_string.len);
1547 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1550 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, target_principal->name.name_string.val[0],
1551 &enterprise_prinicpal);
1553 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1556 target_principal = enterprise_prinicpal;
1559 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal,
1560 delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1562 krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_prinicpal);
1565 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1569 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1570 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1572 /* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different
1573 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1575 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1576 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1577 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1580 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1584 /* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
1585 * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
1586 * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
1590 samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
1591 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1592 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1593 krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
1595 krb5_error_code ret;
1596 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1597 struct ldb_message *msg;
1598 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1599 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1600 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1601 const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
1605 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
1609 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1613 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1614 mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
1615 ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1618 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1622 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1623 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1625 /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
1626 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1628 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1629 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1630 return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
1633 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1637 NTSTATUS samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx,
1638 struct samba_kdc_db_context **kdc_db_ctx_out)
1641 struct ldb_message *msg;
1642 struct auth_session_info *session_info;
1643 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
1644 /* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
1645 * authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to
1648 * In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
1649 * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
1652 kdc_db_ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_db_context);
1653 if (kdc_db_ctx == NULL) {
1654 return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
1656 kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx = base_ctx->ev_ctx;
1657 kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx = base_ctx->lp_ctx;
1659 kdc_get_policy(base_ctx->lp_ctx, NULL, &kdc_db_ctx->policy);
1661 session_info = system_session(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
1662 if (session_info == NULL) {
1663 return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1666 /* Setup the link to LDB */
1667 kdc_db_ctx->samdb = samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx, base_ctx->ev_ctx,
1668 base_ctx->lp_ctx, session_info, 0);
1669 if (kdc_db_ctx->samdb == NULL) {
1670 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
1671 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1672 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1675 /* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */
1676 ldb_ret = samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, &kdc_db_ctx->rodc);
1677 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1678 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n",
1679 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1680 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1681 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1683 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
1684 int my_krbtgt_number;
1685 const char *secondary_keytab[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL };
1686 struct ldb_dn *account_dn;
1687 struct ldb_dn *server_dn = samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx);
1689 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n",
1690 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1691 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1692 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1695 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, server_dn,
1696 "serverReference", &account_dn);
1697 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1698 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n",
1699 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1700 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1701 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1704 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, account_dn,
1705 "msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn);
1706 talloc_free(account_dn);
1707 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1708 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n",
1709 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1710 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1711 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1714 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
1715 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1718 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
1719 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1720 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
1721 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
1722 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
1723 ldb_strerror(ldb_ret)));
1724 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1725 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1727 my_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
1728 if (my_krbtgt_number == -1) {
1729 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n",
1730 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
1732 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1733 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1735 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = my_krbtgt_number;
1738 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
1739 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
1740 &msg, NULL, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1742 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
1743 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
1745 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1746 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1747 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1748 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1750 kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn = talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, msg->dn);
1751 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
1754 *kdc_db_ctx_out = kdc_db_ctx;
1755 return NT_STATUS_OK;