2 Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
4 Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
6 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
7 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
9 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
12 (at your option) any later version.
14 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 GNU General Public License for more details.
20 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
21 along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
25 #include "system/time.h"
26 #include "../libds/common/flags.h"
27 #include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h"
28 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
29 #include "libcli/security/security.h"
30 #include "auth/auth.h"
31 #include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
32 #include "auth/auth_sam.h"
33 #include "../lib/util/util_ldb.h"
34 #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
35 #include "dsdb/common/util.h"
36 #include "librpc/ndr/libndr.h"
37 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
38 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/lsa.h"
39 #include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
40 #include "param/param.h"
41 #include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
42 #include "system/kerberos.h"
43 #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
45 #include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
46 #include "kdc/db-glue.h"
48 enum samba_kdc_ent_type
49 { SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
50 SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
52 enum trust_direction {
54 INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
55 OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
58 static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
63 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
70 static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
76 gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
80 tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
88 static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, int userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
90 HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
92 /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
95 /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
100 /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
103 /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
104 if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
105 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
111 if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
112 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
117 if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
118 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
123 if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
124 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
130 /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
131 if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
134 if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
138 if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
143 UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
145 if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
149 /* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
152 if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
156 if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
157 flags.require_hwauth = 1;
159 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
160 flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
162 if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
163 flags.forwardable = 1;
167 if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
168 flags.require_preauth = 0;
170 flags.require_preauth = 1;
176 static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
178 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex;
179 free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
183 static void samba_kdc_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
185 /* this function is called only from hdb_free_entry().
186 * Make sure we neutralize the destructor or we will
187 * get a double free later when hdb_free_entry() will
188 * try to call free_hdb_entry() */
189 talloc_set_destructor(entry_ex->ctx, NULL);
191 /* now proceed to free the talloc part */
192 talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
195 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
197 struct ldb_message *msg,
199 unsigned int userAccountControl,
200 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
201 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
203 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
204 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
205 struct samr_Password *hash;
206 const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
207 struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
208 struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
209 bool newer_keys = false;
210 struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
211 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
212 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
214 uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
216 /* Supported Enc for this entry */
217 uint32_t supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES; /* by default, we support all enc types */
219 /* However, if this is a TGS-REQ, then lock it down to a
220 * reasonable guess as to what the server can decode. The
221 * krbtgt is special - default to use what is stored for the KDC */
222 if (rid != DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
223 /* This is the standard set for a server that has not declared a msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes */
224 supported_enctypes = ENC_CRC32 | ENC_RSA_MD5 | ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
226 supported_enctypes = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
228 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
229 /* Be double-sure never to use DES here */
230 supported_enctypes &= ~(ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5);
234 case SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT:
235 case SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST:
236 /* Disallow krbtgt and trust tickets to be DES encrypted, it's just too dangerous */
237 supported_enctypes &= ~(ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5);
241 /* No further restrictions */
244 /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
245 if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
246 /* However, don't allow use of DES, if we were told not to by msDS-SupportedEncTypes */
247 supported_enctypes &= ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5;
250 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
251 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
253 entry_ex->entry.kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
255 /* Get keys from the db */
257 hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
258 sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
260 /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
265 /* supplementalCredentials if present */
267 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
268 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
269 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
270 dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
275 if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
276 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
281 for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
282 if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
283 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
284 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
290 } else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
291 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
292 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
296 * we don't break here in hope to find
297 * a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
303 * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
304 * of supplementalCredentials
309 blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
315 /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
316 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
317 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
318 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
320 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
321 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
325 if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
327 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
328 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
332 if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
334 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
335 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
339 if (_pkb.version == 4) {
340 pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
341 allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
342 } else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
343 pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
344 allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
348 if (allocated_keys == 0) {
349 /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
350 * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
351 * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
355 /* allocate space to decode into */
356 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
357 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
358 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
363 if (hash && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) {
367 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
369 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
370 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
371 hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash),
377 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
378 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
382 for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
385 if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
387 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb4->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
394 if (pkb4->salt.string) {
397 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
399 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
400 if (key.salt == NULL) {
405 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
407 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
415 /* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
417 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
418 pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
419 pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
420 pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
422 if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
423 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
424 pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
437 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
438 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
441 for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
444 if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
446 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb3->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
453 if (pkb3->salt.string) {
456 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
458 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
459 if (key.salt == NULL) {
464 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
466 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
474 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
475 pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
476 pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
477 pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
488 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
489 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
495 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
497 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
498 free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
499 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
505 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
507 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
508 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
509 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
510 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
511 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
512 struct ldb_message *msg,
513 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
515 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
516 unsigned int userAccountControl;
518 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
519 krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
520 char *realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
522 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
527 struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
528 struct ldb_val computer_val;
529 const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
530 computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
531 computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
533 if (!samAccountName) {
535 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
539 objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
541 if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
545 memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex));
549 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_strdup: out of memory");
553 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
559 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
560 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
561 p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
567 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
569 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
570 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
573 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
575 userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
578 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
579 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
580 krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, realm, samAccountName, NULL);
582 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
584 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
588 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
589 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
590 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
591 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
592 * we determine from our records */
594 /* this has to be with malloc() */
595 krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
598 /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
599 entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
601 /* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
602 * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
603 * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
604 * their probably patheticly insecure password) */
606 if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server
607 && lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
608 if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
609 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
614 /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
615 * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
616 * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
619 /* use 'whenCreated' */
620 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
621 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
622 krb5_make_principal(context,
623 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
624 realm, "kadmin", NULL);
626 entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
627 if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
629 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
633 /* use 'whenChanged' */
634 entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
635 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
636 krb5_make_principal(context,
637 &entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal,
638 realm, "kadmin", NULL);
642 /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
643 * virtue of being that particular RID */
644 status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
646 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
651 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
652 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
653 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
655 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
656 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
658 /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
659 * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
660 * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
661 * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
662 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
663 && principal->name.name_string.len == 2
664 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "kadmin") == 0)
665 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], "changepw") == 0)
666 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)) {
667 entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1;
669 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
670 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
671 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
672 } else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
673 /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
674 * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
676 /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
677 * it could bypass the password restrictions */
678 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
680 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
681 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
684 NTTIME must_change_time
685 = samdb_result_force_password_change(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
687 if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
688 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
690 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
691 if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
695 *entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
698 acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
699 if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
700 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
702 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
703 if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
707 *entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
711 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
713 entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
715 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
717 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
719 /* Get keys from the db */
720 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, p, msg,
721 rid, userAccountControl,
724 /* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
728 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
729 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
730 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
734 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
735 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
736 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
737 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
741 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
742 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
746 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
750 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
751 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
753 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
760 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
762 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
763 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
764 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
765 enum trust_direction direction,
766 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
767 struct ldb_message *msg,
768 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
770 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
771 const char *dnsdomain;
772 char *realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
773 DATA_BLOB password_utf16;
774 struct samr_Password password_hash;
775 const struct ldb_val *password_val;
776 struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
777 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
779 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
780 int ret, trust_direction_flags;
783 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
789 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
790 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
791 p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
793 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
795 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
796 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
799 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
801 /* use 'whenCreated' */
802 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
803 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
804 krb5_make_principal(context,
805 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
806 realm, "kadmin", NULL);
808 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
810 trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
812 if (direction == INBOUND) {
813 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
815 } else { /* OUTBOUND */
816 dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
819 realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
820 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
823 if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
828 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
829 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
830 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
835 entry_ex->entry.kvno = -1;
836 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
837 if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
838 entry_ex->entry.kvno = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
842 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
843 if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
844 password_utf16 = data_blob_const(password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
845 password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
846 /* In the future, generate all sorts of
847 * hashes, but for now we can't safely convert
848 * the random strings windows uses into
851 /* but as it is utf16 already, we can get the NT password/arcfour-hmac-md5 key */
852 mdfour(password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
854 } else if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
855 password_hash = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
860 if (i < password_blob.count) {
862 /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
863 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(1, sizeof(Key));
866 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
868 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
873 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
874 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
875 password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash),
878 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
879 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
882 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
884 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
886 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
890 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
891 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
892 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
893 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
894 * we determine from our records */
896 krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
897 entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
898 entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
899 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
900 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
901 entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
903 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
905 entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
907 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
909 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
911 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
912 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
913 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
917 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
918 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
919 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
920 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
924 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
925 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
929 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
933 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
934 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
936 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
943 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
946 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
947 struct ldb_message **pmsg)
952 const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
954 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
955 filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=trustedDomain)(|(flatname=%s)(trustPartner=%s)))", realm, realm);
959 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
963 lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &res,
964 ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx),
965 LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs, "%s", filter);
966 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
967 DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
968 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
969 } else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) {
970 DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count));
972 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
974 talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs);
975 *pmsg = res->msgs[0];
980 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
981 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
983 krb5_const_principal principal,
985 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
986 struct ldb_message **msg) {
988 char *principal_string;
991 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
997 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
998 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
1000 free(principal_string);
1001 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
1002 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1003 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1005 } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1012 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
1013 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1014 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1015 krb5_const_principal principal,
1016 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
1017 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1018 krb5_error_code ret;
1019 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1021 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1022 mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
1028 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1029 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
1030 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1034 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
1035 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1036 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1037 krb5_const_principal principal,
1038 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1040 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
1041 krb5_error_code ret;
1042 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1043 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1045 krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
1046 if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
1047 || (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
1049 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1052 /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
1054 if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)
1055 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1])) {
1057 /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
1058 * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
1064 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1065 &msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1067 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
1068 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
1069 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1070 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB!");
1071 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB!");
1072 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1073 } else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1074 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb));
1075 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb));
1076 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1079 realm_fixed = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
1082 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "strupper_talloc: out of memory");
1086 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal);
1091 free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1092 alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(realm_fixed);
1093 talloc_free(realm_fixed);
1094 if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) {
1096 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: strdup() failed!");
1099 principal = alloc_principal;
1101 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1102 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
1103 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1105 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
1110 enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
1111 const char *realm = NULL;
1113 /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
1115 if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) {
1116 /* look for inbound trust */
1117 direction = INBOUND;
1118 realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1];
1119 } else if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) {
1120 /* look for outbound trust */
1121 direction = OUTBOUND;
1122 realm = principal->realm;
1124 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1125 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1126 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1127 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1128 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1131 /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
1133 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1135 realm, realm_dn, &msg);
1138 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1139 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1143 ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1144 principal, direction,
1145 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1147 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed");
1154 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
1155 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1156 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1157 krb5_const_principal principal,
1159 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1160 struct ldb_message **msg)
1162 krb5_error_code ret;
1164 if (principal->name.name_string.len >= 2) {
1165 /* 'normal server' case */
1168 struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
1169 char *principal_string;
1171 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
1172 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
1178 /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
1179 * in a different realm, so we should generate a
1180 * referral instead */
1181 nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1182 mem_ctx, principal_string,
1183 &user_dn, realm_dn);
1184 free(principal_string);
1186 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1187 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1190 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1192 msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1193 attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN, "(objectClass=*)");
1194 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1195 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1200 char *filter = NULL;
1202 /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
1203 *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1204 realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
1206 /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referall */
1208 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ);
1211 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1212 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1216 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
1217 *realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1219 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
1220 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
1221 ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ));
1223 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1224 DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a entry for %s\n", filter));
1225 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1227 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1228 DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for for %s - %s\n",
1229 filter, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1230 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1237 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
1238 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1239 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1240 krb5_const_principal principal,
1241 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1243 krb5_error_code ret;
1244 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1245 struct ldb_message *msg;
1247 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
1248 server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1253 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1254 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
1255 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1257 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
1263 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
1264 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1265 krb5_const_principal principal,
1267 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1269 krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1270 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
1274 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1278 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
1279 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex);
1280 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1282 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
1283 /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
1284 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex);
1285 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1287 /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
1288 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex);
1289 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1291 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
1292 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex);
1293 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1297 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1301 struct samba_kdc_seq {
1304 struct ldb_message **msgs;
1305 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1308 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
1309 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1310 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1312 krb5_error_code ret;
1313 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1314 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1315 hdb_entry_ex entry_ex;
1316 memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex));
1319 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1322 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
1326 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
1330 if (priv->index < priv->count) {
1331 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1332 NULL, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
1333 priv->realm_dn, priv->msgs[priv->index++], entry);
1335 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1340 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1342 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1348 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
1349 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1350 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1352 struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
1353 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1355 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
1356 krb5_error_code ret;
1357 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1362 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1365 priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
1368 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
1374 priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
1377 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
1381 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
1385 ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
1391 lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
1392 priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
1393 "(objectClass=user)");
1395 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1397 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1400 priv->count = res->count;
1401 priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
1404 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
1406 ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1410 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1412 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1417 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
1418 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1419 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1421 return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1424 /* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
1426 * This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
1428 * This is shared between the constrained delegation and S4U2Self code.
1431 samba_kdc_check_identical_client_and_server(krb5_context context,
1432 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1433 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1434 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1436 krb5_error_code ret;
1437 krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
1438 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1439 struct ldb_message *msg;
1440 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1441 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1442 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1443 const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = {
1447 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation");
1451 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1455 if (target_principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1456 /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
1457 if (target_principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
1458 ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
1459 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation: request for delegation to enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
1460 target_principal->name.name_string.len);
1461 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1464 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, target_principal->name.name_string.val[0],
1465 &enterprise_prinicpal);
1467 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1470 target_principal = enterprise_prinicpal;
1473 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal,
1474 delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1476 krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_prinicpal);
1479 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1483 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1484 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1486 /* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different
1487 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1489 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1490 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1491 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1494 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1498 /* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
1499 * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
1500 * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
1504 samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
1505 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1506 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1507 krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
1509 krb5_error_code ret;
1510 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1511 struct ldb_message *msg;
1512 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1513 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1514 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1515 const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
1519 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
1523 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1527 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1528 mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
1529 ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1532 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1536 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1537 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1539 /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
1540 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1542 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1543 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1544 return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
1547 talloc_free(mem_ctx);