If the caller passes O_DIRECTORY we just try to chdir() to smb_fname
directly, not to the parent directory.
The security check in check_reduced_name() will continue to work, but
this fixes the case of an open() for a previous version of a
subdirectory that contains snapshopt.
Eg:
[share]
path = /shares/test
vfs objects = shadow_copy2
shadow:snapdir = .snapshots
shadow:snapdirseverywhere = yes
Directory tree with fake snapshots:
$ tree -a /shares/test/
/shares/test/
├── dir
│ ├── file
│ └── .snapshots
│ └── @GMT-2017.07.04-04.30.12
│ └── file
├── dir2
│ └── file
├── file
├── .snapshots
│ └── @GMT-2001.01.01-00.00.00
│ ├── dir2
│ │ └── file
│ └── file
└── testfsctl.dat
./bin/smbclient -U slow%x //localhost/share -c 'ls @GMT-2017.07.04-04.30.12/dir/*'
NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND listing \@GMT-2017.07.04-04.30.12\dir\*
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12885
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
char *parent_dir = NULL;
struct smb_filename parent_dir_fname = {0};
const char *final_component = NULL;
+ bool is_directory = false;
+ bool ok;
- if (!parent_dirname(talloc_tos(),
- smb_fname->base_name,
- &parent_dir,
- &final_component)) {
- goto out;
+#ifdef O_DIRECTORY
+ if (flags & O_DIRECTORY) {
+ is_directory = true;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (is_directory) {
+ parent_dir = talloc_strdup(talloc_tos(), smb_fname->base_name);
+ if (parent_dir == NULL) {
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ final_component = ".";
+ } else {
+ ok = parent_dirname(talloc_tos(),
+ smb_fname->base_name,
+ &parent_dir,
+ &final_component);
+ if (!ok) {
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ goto out;
+ }
}
parent_dir_fname = (struct smb_filename) { .base_name = parent_dir };