2 Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
4 Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
6 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
7 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
9 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
12 (at your option) any later version.
14 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 GNU General Public License for more details.
20 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
21 along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
25 #include "libcli/security/security.h"
26 #include "auth/auth.h"
27 #include "auth/auth_sam.h"
28 #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
29 #include "dsdb/common/util.h"
30 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
31 #include "param/param.h"
32 #include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
33 #include "system/kerberos.h"
34 #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
36 #include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
37 #include "kdc/kdc-glue.h"
38 #include "kdc/db-glue.h"
40 #define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno) \
41 ((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) >> 16))
43 #define SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, krbtgt) \
44 ((krb5_kvno)((((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF) | \
45 ((((uint32_t)krbtgt) << 16) & 0xFFFF0000)))
47 enum samba_kdc_ent_type
48 { SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
49 SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
51 enum trust_direction {
53 INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
54 OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
57 static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
62 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
70 static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
76 gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
80 tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
88 static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, uint32_t userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
90 HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
92 /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
95 /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
100 /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
103 /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
104 if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
105 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
111 if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
112 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
117 if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
118 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
123 if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
124 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
130 /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
131 if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
134 if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
135 flags.locked_out = 1;
138 if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
143 UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
145 if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
149 /* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
152 if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
156 if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
157 flags.require_hwauth = 1;
159 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
160 flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
162 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION) {
164 * this is confusing...
166 * UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
171 * UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION
172 * => trusted_for_delegation
174 flags.trusted_for_delegation = 1;
176 if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
177 flags.forwardable = 1;
181 if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
182 flags.require_preauth = 0;
184 flags.require_preauth = 1;
190 static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
192 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex;
193 free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
197 static void samba_kdc_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
199 /* this function is called only from hdb_free_entry().
200 * Make sure we neutralize the destructor or we will
201 * get a double free later when hdb_free_entry() will
202 * try to call free_hdb_entry() */
203 talloc_set_destructor(entry_ex->ctx, NULL);
205 /* now proceed to free the talloc part */
206 talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
209 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
210 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
212 struct ldb_message *msg,
215 uint32_t userAccountControl,
216 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
217 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
219 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
220 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
221 struct samr_Password *hash;
222 const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
223 struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
224 struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
225 bool newer_keys = false;
226 struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
227 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
228 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
230 uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
231 int rodc_krbtgt_number = 0;
233 uint32_t supported_enctypes
234 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
235 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
238 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT || is_rodc) {
239 /* KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs) use AES */
240 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
241 } else if (userAccountControl & (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)) {
242 /* DCs and RODCs comptuer accounts use AES */
243 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
244 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT ||
245 (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY)) {
246 /* for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it
247 * supports, and this will vary between computers a
250 * likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported,
251 * to export into a keytab */
252 supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
255 /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
256 if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
257 supported_enctypes = ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5;
259 /* Otherwise, add in the default enc types */
260 supported_enctypes |= ENC_CRC32 | ENC_RSA_MD5 | ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
263 /* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */
265 rodc_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
267 if (rodc_krbtgt_number == -1) {
272 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
273 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
275 kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
277 kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, rodc_krbtgt_number);
279 entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
281 /* Get keys from the db */
283 hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
284 sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
286 /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
291 /* supplementalCredentials if present */
293 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
294 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
295 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
296 dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
301 if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
302 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
307 for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
308 if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
309 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
310 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
316 } else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
317 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
318 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
322 * we don't break here in hope to find
323 * a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
329 * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
330 * of supplementalCredentials
335 blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
341 /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
342 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
343 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
344 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
346 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
347 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
351 if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
353 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
354 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
358 if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
360 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
361 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
365 if (_pkb.version == 4) {
366 pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
367 allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
368 } else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
369 pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
370 allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
374 if (allocated_keys == 0) {
375 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
376 /* We are on an RODC, but don't have keys for this account. Signal this to the caller */
377 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
380 /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
381 * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
382 * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
386 /* allocate space to decode into */
387 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
388 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
389 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
394 if (hash && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) {
398 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
400 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
401 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
402 hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash),
408 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
409 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
413 for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
416 if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
418 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb4->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
425 if (pkb4->salt.string) {
428 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
430 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
431 if (key.salt == NULL) {
436 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
438 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
446 /* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
448 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
449 pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
450 pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
451 pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
453 if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
454 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
455 pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
468 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
469 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
472 for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
475 if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
477 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb3->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
484 if (pkb3->salt.string) {
487 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
489 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
490 if (key.salt == NULL) {
495 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
497 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
505 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
506 pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
507 pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
508 pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
519 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
520 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
526 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
528 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
529 free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
530 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
536 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
538 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
539 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
540 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
541 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
543 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
544 struct ldb_message *msg,
545 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
547 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
548 uint32_t userAccountControl;
549 uint32_t msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
551 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
552 krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
554 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
559 bool is_rodc = false;
560 struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
561 struct ldb_val computer_val;
562 const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
563 computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
564 computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
566 if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) {
570 if (!samAccountName) {
572 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
576 objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
578 if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
582 memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex));
584 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
590 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
591 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
592 p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
598 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
600 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
601 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
604 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
606 userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
608 msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed
609 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
610 "msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed",
614 * This brings in the lockout flag, block the account if not
615 * found. We need the weird UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE check because
616 * we do not want to fail open if the value is not returned,
617 * but 0 is a valid value (all OK)
619 if (msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed == UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
621 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: "
622 "no msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed present");
625 userAccountControl |= msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
628 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
629 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
630 krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
632 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
634 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
638 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
639 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
640 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
641 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
642 * we determine from our records */
644 /* this has to be with malloc() */
645 krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
648 /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
649 entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
651 /* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
652 * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
653 * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
654 * their probably patheticly insecure password) */
656 if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server
657 && lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
658 if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
659 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
663 if (flags & HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) {
664 /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
665 * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
666 * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
669 /* use 'whenCreated' */
670 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
671 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
672 krb5_make_principal(context,
673 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
674 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
676 entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
677 if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
679 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
683 /* use 'whenChanged' */
684 entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
685 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
686 krb5_make_principal(context,
687 &entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal,
688 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
692 /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
693 * virtue of being that particular RID */
694 status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
696 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
701 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
702 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
703 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
705 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
706 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
708 /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
709 * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
710 * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
711 * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
712 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
713 && principal->name.name_string.len == 2
714 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "kadmin") == 0)
715 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], "changepw") == 0)
716 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)) {
717 entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1;
719 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
720 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
721 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
722 } else if (is_rodc) {
723 /* The RODC krbtgt account is like the main krbtgt,
724 * but it does not have a changepw or kadmin
727 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
728 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
730 /* Also don't allow the RODC krbtgt to be a client (it should not be needed) */
731 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
732 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
733 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
735 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
736 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
737 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 0;
738 } else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
739 /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
740 * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
742 /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
743 * it could bypass the password restrictions */
744 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
746 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
747 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
750 NTTIME must_change_time
751 = samdb_result_force_password_change(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
753 if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
754 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
756 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
757 if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
761 *entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
764 acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
765 if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
766 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
768 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
769 if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
773 *entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
777 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
779 entry_ex->entry.max_life = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
780 if (entry_ex->entry.max_life == NULL) {
785 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
786 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime;
787 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT) {
788 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime;
790 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = MIN(kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
791 kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime);
794 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
795 if (entry_ex->entry.max_renew == NULL) {
800 *entry_ex->entry.max_renew = kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime;
802 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
804 /* Get keys from the db */
805 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, kdc_db_ctx, p, msg,
806 rid, is_rodc, userAccountControl,
809 /* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
813 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
814 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
815 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
819 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
820 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
821 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
822 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
826 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
827 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
831 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
835 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
836 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
838 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
845 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
846 * The kvno is what the remote client asked for
848 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
849 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
850 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
851 enum trust_direction direction,
852 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
855 struct ldb_message *msg,
856 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
858 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
859 const char *dnsdomain;
860 const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx);
861 DATA_BLOB password_utf16 = data_blob_null;
862 DATA_BLOB password_utf8 = data_blob_null;
863 struct samr_Password _password_hash;
864 const struct samr_Password *password_hash = NULL;
865 const struct ldb_val *password_val;
866 struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
867 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
869 uint32_t current_kvno;
870 uint32_t num_keys = 0;
871 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
872 int ret, trust_direction_flags;
874 struct AuthenticationInformationArray *auth_array;
875 uint32_t supported_enctypes = ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC;
877 if (dsdb_functional_level(kdc_db_ctx->samdb) >= DS_DOMAIN_FUNCTION_2008) {
878 supported_enctypes = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
879 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
883 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
889 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
890 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
891 p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
893 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
895 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
896 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
899 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
901 /* use 'whenCreated' */
902 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
903 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
904 krb5_make_principal(context,
905 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
906 realm, "kadmin", NULL);
908 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
909 if (entry_ex->entry.principal == NULL) {
910 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
915 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
917 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
922 * While we have copied the client principal, tests
923 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
924 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
925 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
926 * we determine from our records
929 krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
931 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
933 trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
935 if (direction == INBOUND) {
936 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
938 } else { /* OUTBOUND */
939 dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
941 realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
942 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
945 if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
946 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
947 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
951 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
952 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
953 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
954 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
960 /* we need to work out if we are going to use the current or
961 * the previous password hash.
962 * We base this on the kvno the client passes in. If the kvno
963 * passed in is equal to the current kvno in our database then
964 * we use the current structure. If it is the current kvno-1,
965 * then we use the previous substrucure.
968 /* first work out the current kvno */
970 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
971 if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
972 current_kvno = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
976 /* work out whether we will use the previous or current
978 if (password_blob.previous.count == 0) {
979 /* there is no previous password */
980 use_previous = false;
981 } else if (!(flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) ||
982 kvno == current_kvno) {
983 use_previous = false;
984 } else if ((kvno+1 == current_kvno) ||
985 (kvno == 255 && current_kvno == 0)) {
988 DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Request for unknown kvno %u - current kvno is %u\n",
989 kvno, current_kvno));
990 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
991 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
996 auth_array = &password_blob.previous;
998 auth_array = &password_blob.current;
1001 /* use the kvno the client specified, if available */
1002 if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1003 entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
1005 entry_ex->entry.kvno = current_kvno;
1008 for (i=0; i < auth_array->count; i++) {
1009 if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
1012 password_utf16 = data_blob_const(auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
1013 auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
1014 if (password_utf16.length == 0) {
1018 if (supported_enctypes & ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1019 mdfour(_password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
1020 if (password_hash == NULL) {
1023 password_hash = &_password_hash;
1026 if (!(supported_enctypes & (ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128|ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256))) {
1030 ok = convert_string_talloc(mem_ctx,
1031 CH_UTF16MUNGED, CH_UTF8,
1032 password_utf16.data,
1033 password_utf16.length,
1034 (void *)&password_utf8.data,
1035 &password_utf8.length);
1037 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1042 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
1045 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
1049 } else if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
1050 if (supported_enctypes & ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
1051 password_hash = &auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
1057 /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
1058 if (num_keys == 0) {
1059 DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": no usable key found\n"));
1060 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1061 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1065 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(num_keys, sizeof(Key));
1066 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
1067 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1072 if (password_utf8.length != 0) {
1074 krb5_const_principal salt_principal = principal;
1076 krb5_data cleartext_data;
1078 cleartext_data.data = password_utf8.data;
1079 cleartext_data.length = password_utf8.length;
1081 ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context,
1088 if (supported_enctypes & ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96) {
1089 ret = krb5_string_to_key_data_salt(context,
1090 ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
1095 krb5_free_salt(context, salt);
1099 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1100 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1103 if (supported_enctypes & ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96) {
1104 ret = krb5_string_to_key_data_salt(context,
1105 ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
1110 krb5_free_salt(context, salt);
1114 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1115 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1118 krb5_free_salt(context, salt);
1121 if (password_hash != NULL) {
1124 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
1125 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
1126 password_hash->hash,
1127 sizeof(password_hash->hash),
1133 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1134 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1137 entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
1138 entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
1139 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
1140 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
1141 entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
1143 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
1145 entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
1147 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
1149 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
1151 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
1152 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
1153 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1157 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
1158 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
1159 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
1160 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1164 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
1165 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
1169 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
1173 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
1174 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
1176 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
1183 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
1184 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1186 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
1187 struct ldb_message **pmsg)
1190 const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
1192 status = sam_get_results_trust(ldb_ctx,
1193 mem_ctx, realm, realm, attrs,
1195 if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
1197 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND)) {
1198 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1199 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1201 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: out of memory");
1205 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: %s", nt_errstr(status));
1210 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
1211 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1212 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1213 krb5_const_principal principal,
1215 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1216 struct ldb_message **msg) {
1218 char *principal_string;
1219 krb5_error_code ret;
1221 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
1227 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1228 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
1230 free(principal_string);
1231 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
1232 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1233 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1235 } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1242 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
1243 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1244 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1245 krb5_const_principal principal,
1247 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
1248 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1249 krb5_error_code ret;
1250 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1252 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1253 mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
1259 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1260 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
1262 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1266 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
1267 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1268 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1269 krb5_const_principal principal,
1272 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1274 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
1275 krb5_error_code ret;
1276 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1277 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1279 krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
1280 if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
1281 || (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
1283 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1286 /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
1288 if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)
1289 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1])) {
1290 /* us, or someone quite like us */
1291 /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
1292 * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
1296 unsigned int krbtgt_number;
1297 /* w2k8r2 sometimes gives us a kvno of 255 for inter-domain
1298 trust tickets. We don't yet know what this means, but we do
1299 seem to need to treat it as unspecified */
1300 if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1301 krbtgt_number = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno);
1302 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
1303 if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1304 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
1308 krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
1311 if (krbtgt_number == kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1312 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1313 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1314 krbtgt_attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1315 "(objectClass=user)");
1317 /* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
1318 * ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another
1319 * RODC if we are a read-write DC */
1320 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1321 &msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1323 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1324 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1327 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1328 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1329 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1330 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1331 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1332 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1333 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1334 } else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1335 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1336 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1337 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1338 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1339 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1340 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1344 * Windows seems to canonicalize the principal
1345 * in a TGS REP even if the client did not specify
1346 * the canonicalize flag.
1348 if (flags & (HDB_F_CANON|HDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ)) {
1349 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal);
1354 /* When requested to do so, ensure that the
1355 * both realm values in the principal are set
1356 * to the upper case, canonical realm */
1357 free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1358 alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
1359 if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) {
1361 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: strdup() failed!");
1364 principal = alloc_principal;
1367 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1368 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
1369 flags, realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1370 if (alloc_principal) {
1371 /* This is again copied in the message2entry call */
1372 krb5_free_principal(context, alloc_principal);
1375 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
1380 enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
1381 const char *realm = NULL;
1383 /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
1385 if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) {
1386 /* look for inbound trust */
1387 direction = INBOUND;
1388 realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1];
1389 } else if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) {
1390 /* look for outbound trust */
1391 direction = OUTBOUND;
1392 realm = principal->realm;
1394 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1395 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1396 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1397 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1398 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1401 /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
1403 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1405 realm, realm_dn, &msg);
1408 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1409 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1413 ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1414 principal, direction,
1415 realm_dn, flags, kvno, msg, entry_ex);
1417 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed for %s",
1418 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
1419 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: "
1420 "trust_message2entry failed for %s",
1421 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
1428 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
1429 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1430 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1431 krb5_const_principal principal,
1433 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1434 struct ldb_message **msg)
1436 krb5_error_code ret;
1437 if (principal->name.name_string.len >= 2) {
1438 /* 'normal server' case */
1441 struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
1442 char *principal_string;
1444 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
1445 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
1451 /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
1452 * in a different realm, so we should generate a
1453 * referral instead */
1454 nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1455 mem_ctx, principal_string,
1456 &user_dn, realm_dn);
1457 free(principal_string);
1459 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1460 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1463 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1465 msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1467 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1469 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1470 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1476 /* const char *realm; */
1477 /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
1478 *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1479 /* realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal); */
1481 /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referral */
1483 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ);
1486 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1487 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1491 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
1492 *realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1494 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1495 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
1496 ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ));
1497 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1498 DEBUG(3, ("Failed to find an entry for %s\n", short_princ));
1500 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1502 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1503 DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for %s - %s\n",
1504 short_princ, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1506 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1514 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
1515 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1516 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1517 krb5_const_principal principal,
1519 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1521 krb5_error_code ret;
1522 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1523 struct ldb_message *msg;
1525 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
1526 server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1531 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1532 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
1534 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1536 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
1542 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
1543 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1544 krb5_const_principal principal,
1547 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1549 krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1550 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1552 mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
1555 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1559 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
1560 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1561 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1563 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
1564 /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
1565 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
1566 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1568 /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
1569 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1570 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1572 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
1573 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
1574 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1578 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1582 struct samba_kdc_seq {
1585 struct ldb_message **msgs;
1586 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1589 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
1590 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1591 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1593 krb5_error_code ret;
1594 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1595 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1596 hdb_entry_ex entry_ex;
1597 memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex));
1600 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1603 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
1607 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
1611 if (priv->index < priv->count) {
1612 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1613 NULL, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
1614 HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA|HDB_F_GET_ANY,
1615 priv->realm_dn, priv->msgs[priv->index++], entry);
1617 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1622 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1624 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1630 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
1631 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1632 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1634 struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
1635 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1637 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
1638 krb5_error_code ret;
1639 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1644 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1647 priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
1650 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
1656 priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
1659 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
1663 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
1667 ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
1672 krb5_free_default_realm(context, realm);
1674 lret = dsdb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
1675 priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
1676 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1677 "(objectClass=user)");
1679 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1681 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1684 priv->count = res->count;
1685 priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
1688 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
1690 ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1694 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1696 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1701 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
1702 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1703 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1705 return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1708 /* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
1710 * This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
1713 samba_kdc_check_s4u2self(krb5_context context,
1714 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1715 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1716 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1718 krb5_error_code ret;
1719 krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
1720 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1721 struct ldb_message *msg;
1722 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1723 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1724 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1725 const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = {
1729 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self");
1733 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self: talloc_named() failed!");
1737 if (target_principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1738 /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
1739 if (target_principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
1740 ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
1741 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self: request for delegation to enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
1742 target_principal->name.name_string.len);
1743 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1746 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, target_principal->name.name_string.val[0],
1747 &enterprise_prinicpal);
1749 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1752 target_principal = enterprise_prinicpal;
1755 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal,
1756 delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1758 krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_prinicpal);
1761 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1765 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1766 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1768 /* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different
1769 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1771 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1772 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1773 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1776 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1780 /* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
1781 * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
1782 * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
1786 samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
1787 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1788 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1789 krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
1791 krb5_error_code ret;
1792 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1793 struct ldb_message *msg;
1794 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1795 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1796 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1797 const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
1801 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
1805 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1809 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1810 mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
1811 ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1814 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1818 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1819 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1821 /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
1822 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1824 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1825 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1826 return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
1829 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1834 * Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal
1838 samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy(krb5_context context,
1839 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1840 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1841 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1843 krb5_error_code ret;
1845 const char *client_dn = NULL;
1846 const char *target_principal_name = NULL;
1847 struct ldb_message_element *el;
1851 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1853 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy");
1857 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1858 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
1859 " talloc_named() failed!");
1863 client_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(p->msg->dn);
1869 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1870 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
1871 " ldb_dn_get_linearized() failed!");
1876 * The main heimdal code already checked that the target_principal
1877 * belongs to the same realm as the client.
1879 * So we just need the principal without the realm,
1880 * as that is what is configured in the "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo"
1883 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, target_principal,
1884 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &tmp);
1886 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1887 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1888 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
1889 " krb5_unparse_name() failed!");
1892 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] for target[%s]\n",
1895 target_principal_name = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, tmp);
1897 if (target_principal_name == NULL) {
1899 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1900 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
1901 " talloc_strdup() failed!");
1905 el = ldb_msg_find_element(p->msg, "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo");
1910 val = data_blob_string_const(target_principal_name);
1912 for (i=0; i<el->num_values; i++) {
1913 struct ldb_val *val1 = &val;
1914 struct ldb_val *val2 = &el->values[i];
1917 if (val1->length != val2->length) {
1921 cmp = strncasecmp((const char *)val1->data,
1922 (const char *)val2->data,
1936 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] allowed target[%s]\n",
1938 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1942 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1943 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] "
1944 "not allowed for delegation to target[%s]",
1946 target_principal_name);
1947 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1948 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1951 NTSTATUS samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx,
1952 struct samba_kdc_db_context **kdc_db_ctx_out)
1955 struct ldb_message *msg;
1956 struct auth_session_info *session_info;
1957 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
1958 /* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
1959 * authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to
1962 * In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
1963 * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
1966 kdc_db_ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_db_context);
1967 if (kdc_db_ctx == NULL) {
1968 return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
1970 kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx = base_ctx->ev_ctx;
1971 kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx = base_ctx->lp_ctx;
1973 /* get default kdc policy */
1974 lpcfg_default_kdc_policy(base_ctx->lp_ctx,
1975 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
1976 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime,
1977 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime);
1979 session_info = system_session(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
1980 if (session_info == NULL) {
1981 return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1984 /* Setup the link to LDB */
1985 kdc_db_ctx->samdb = samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx, base_ctx->ev_ctx,
1986 base_ctx->lp_ctx, session_info, 0);
1987 if (kdc_db_ctx->samdb == NULL) {
1988 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
1989 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1990 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1993 /* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */
1994 ldb_ret = samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, &kdc_db_ctx->rodc);
1995 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1996 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n",
1997 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1998 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1999 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2001 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
2002 int my_krbtgt_number;
2003 const char *secondary_keytab[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL };
2004 struct ldb_dn *account_dn;
2005 struct ldb_dn *server_dn = samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx);
2007 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n",
2008 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2009 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2010 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2013 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, server_dn,
2014 "serverReference", &account_dn);
2015 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2016 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n",
2017 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2018 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2019 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2022 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, account_dn,
2023 "msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn);
2024 talloc_free(account_dn);
2025 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2026 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n",
2027 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2028 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2029 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2032 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
2033 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
2035 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2036 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
2037 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2038 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
2039 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
2040 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
2041 ldb_strerror(ldb_ret)));
2042 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2043 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2045 my_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
2046 if (my_krbtgt_number == -1) {
2047 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n",
2048 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
2050 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2051 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2053 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = my_krbtgt_number;
2056 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
2057 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
2059 ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
2062 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2063 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
2065 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2066 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2067 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2068 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2070 kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn = talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, msg->dn);
2071 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
2074 *kdc_db_ctx_out = kdc_db_ctx;
2075 return NT_STATUS_OK;