<li><a href="/samba/history/">Release Notes</a>
<li class="navSub">
<ul>
+ <li><a href="samba-4.17.4.html">samba-4.17.4</a></li>
<li><a href="samba-4.17.3.html">samba-4.17.3</a></li>
<li><a href="samba-4.17.2.html">samba-4.17.2</a></li>
<li><a href="samba-4.17.1.html">samba-4.17.1</a></li>
<li><a href="samba-4.17.0.html">samba-4.17.0</a></li>
+ <li><a href="samba-4.16.8.html">samba-4.16.8</a></li>
<li><a href="samba-4.16.7.html">samba-4.16.7</a></li>
<li><a href="samba-4.16.6.html">samba-4.16.6</a></li>
<li><a href="samba-4.16.5.html">samba-4.16.5</a></li>
<li><a href="samba-4.16.2.html">samba-4.16.2</a></li>
<li><a href="samba-4.16.1.html">samba-4.16.1</a></li>
<li><a href="samba-4.16.0.html">samba-4.16.0</a></li>
+ <li><a href="samba-4.15.13.html">samba-4.15.13</a></li>
<li><a href="samba-4.15.12.html">samba-4.15.12</a></li>
<li><a href="samba-4.15.11.html">samba-4.15.11</a></li>
<li><a href="samba-4.15.10.html">samba-4.15.10</a></li>
--- /dev/null
+<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN"
+ "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
+<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+<head>
+<title>Samba 4.15.13 - Release Notes</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<H2>Samba 4.15.13 Available for Download</H2>
+<p>
+<a href="https://download.samba.org/pub/samba/stable/samba-4.15.13.tar.gz">Samba 4.15.13 (gzipped)</a><br>
+<a href="https://download.samba.org/pub/samba/stable/samba-4.15.13.tar.asc">Signature</a>
+</p>
+<p>
+<a href="https://download.samba.org/pub/samba/patches/samba-4.15.12-4.15.13.diffs.gz">Patch (gzipped) against Samba 4.15.12</a><br>
+<a href="https://download.samba.org/pub/samba/patches/samba-4.15.12-4.15.13.diffs.asc">Signature</a>
+</p>
+<p>
+<pre>
+ ===============================
+ Release Notes for Samba 4.15.13
+ December 15, 2022
+ ===============================
+
+
+This is the latest stable release of the Samba 4.15 release series.
+It also contains security changes in order to address the following defects:
+
+o CVE-2022-37966: This is the Samba CVE for the Windows Kerberos
+ RC4-HMAC Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
+ disclosed by Microsoft on Nov 8 2022.
+
+ A Samba Active Directory DC will issue weak rc4-hmac
+ session keys for use between modern clients and servers
+ despite all modern Kerberos implementations supporting
+ the aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 cipher.
+
+ On Samba Active Directory DCs and members
+ 'kerberos encryption types = legacy' would force
+ rc4-hmac as a client even if the server supports
+ aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 and/or aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96.
+
+ https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-37966.html
+
+o CVE-2022-37967: This is the Samba CVE for the Windows
+ Kerberos Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
+ disclosed by Microsoft on Nov 8 2022.
+
+ A service account with the special constrained
+ delegation permission could forge a more powerful
+ ticket than the one it was presented with.
+
+ https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-37967.html
+
+o CVE-2022-38023: The "RC4" protection of the NetLogon Secure channel uses the
+ same algorithms as rc4-hmac cryptography in Kerberos,
+ and so must also be assumed to be weak.
+
+ https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-38023.html
+
+o CVE-2022-45141: Since the Windows Kerberos RC4-HMAC Elevation of Privilege
+ Vulnerability was disclosed by Microsoft on Nov 8 2022
+ and per RFC8429 it is assumed that rc4-hmac is weak,
+
+ Vulnerable Samba Active Directory DCs will issue rc4-hmac
+ encrypted tickets despite the target server supporting
+ better encryption (eg aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96).
+
+ https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-45141.html
+
+Note that there are several important behavior changes
+included in this release, which may cause compatibility problems
+interacting with system still expecting the former behavior.
+Please read the advisories of CVE-2022-37966,
+CVE-2022-37967 and CVE-2022-38023 carefully!
+
+samba-tool got a new 'domain trust modify' subcommand
+-----------------------------------------------------
+
+This allows "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes" to be changed
+on trustedDomain objects. Even against remote DCs (including Windows)
+using the --local-dc-ipaddress= (and other --local-dc-* options).
+See 'samba-tool domain trust modify --help' for further details.
+
+smb.conf changes
+----------------
+
+ Parameter Name Description Default
+ -------------- ----------- -------
+ allow nt4 crypto Deprecated no
+ allow nt4 crypto:COMPUTERACCOUNT New
+ kdc default domain supported enctypes New (see manpage)
+ kdc supported enctypes New (see manpage)
+ kdc force enable rc4 weak session keys New No
+ reject md5 clients New Default, Deprecated Yes
+ reject md5 servers New Default, Deprecated Yes
+ server schannel Deprecated Yes
+ server schannel require seal New, Deprecated Yes
+ server schannel require seal:COMPUTERACCOUNT New
+ winbind sealed pipes Deprecated Yes
+
+Changes since 4.15.12
+---------------------
+
+o Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
+ * BUG 15219: Heimdal session key selection in AS-REQ examines wrong entry.
+ * BUG 15237: CVE-2022-37966.
+ * BUG 15258: filter-subunit is inefficient with large numbers of knownfails.
+
+o Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
+ * BUG 15240: CVE-2022-38023.
+
+o Luke Howard <lukeh@padl.com>
+ * BUG 15197: Windows 11 22H2 and Samba-AD 4.15 Kerberos login issue.
+
+o Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+ * BUG 13135: The KDC logic arround msDs-supportedEncryptionTypes differs from
+ Windows.
+ * BUG 15203: CVE-2022-42898 [SECURITY] krb5_pac_parse() buffer parsing
+ vulnerability.
+ * BUG 15219: Heimdal session key selection in AS-REQ examines wrong entry
+ * BUG 15237: CVE-2022-37966.
+ * BUG 15240: CVE-2022-38023.
+
+o Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
+ * BUG 15237: CVE-2022-37966.
+
+o Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
+ * BUG 14929: CVE-2022-44640 [SECURITY] Upstream Heimdal free of
+ user-controlled pointer in FAST.
+ * BUG 15197: Windows 11 22H2 and Samba-AD 4.15 Kerberos login issue.
+ * BUG 15219: Heimdal session key selection in AS-REQ examines wrong entry.
+ * BUG 15231: CVE-2022-37967.
+ * BUG 15237: CVE-2022-37966.
+
+o Nicolas Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
+ * BUG 15214: CVE-2022-45141.
+ * BUG 15237: CVE-2022-37966.
+
+o Nicolas Williams <nico@twosigma.com>
+ * BUG 14929: CVE-2022-44640 [SECURITY] Upstream Heimdal free of
+ user-controlled pointer in FAST.
+
+
+</pre>
+</p>
+</body>
+</html>
--- /dev/null
+<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN"
+ "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
+<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+<head>
+<title>Samba 4.16.8 - Release Notes</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<H2>Samba 4.16.8 Available for Download</H2>
+<p>
+<a href="https://download.samba.org/pub/samba/stable/samba-4.16.8.tar.gz">Samba 4.16.8 (gzipped)</a><br>
+<a href="https://download.samba.org/pub/samba/stable/samba-4.16.8.tar.asc">Signature</a>
+</p>
+<p>
+<a href="https://download.samba.org/pub/samba/patches/samba-4.16.7-4.16.8.diffs.gz">Patch (gzipped) against Samba 4.16.7</a><br>
+<a href="https://download.samba.org/pub/samba/patches/samba-4.16.7-4.16.8.diffs.asc">Signature</a>
+</p>
+<p>
+<pre>
+ ==============================
+ Release Notes for Samba 4.16.8
+ December 15, 2022
+ ==============================
+
+
+This is the latest stable release of the Samba 4.16 release series.
+It also contains security changes in order to address the following defects
+
+o CVE-2022-37966: This is the Samba CVE for the Windows Kerberos
+ RC4-HMAC Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
+ disclosed by Microsoft on Nov 8 2022.
+
+ A Samba Active Directory DC will issue weak rc4-hmac
+ session keys for use between modern clients and servers
+ despite all modern Kerberos implementations supporting
+ the aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 cipher.
+
+ On Samba Active Directory DCs and members
+ 'kerberos encryption types = legacy' would force
+ rc4-hmac as a client even if the server supports
+ aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 and/or aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96.
+
+ https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-37966.html
+
+o CVE-2022-37967: This is the Samba CVE for the Windows
+ Kerberos Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
+ disclosed by Microsoft on Nov 8 2022.
+
+ A service account with the special constrained
+ delegation permission could forge a more powerful
+ ticket than the one it was presented with.
+
+ https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-37967.html
+
+o CVE-2022-38023: The "RC4" protection of the NetLogon Secure channel uses the
+ same algorithms as rc4-hmac cryptography in Kerberos,
+ and so must also be assumed to be weak.
+
+ https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-38023.html
+
+Note that there are several important behavior changes
+included in this release, which may cause compatibility problems
+interacting with system still expecting the former behavior.
+Please read the advisories of CVE-2022-37966,
+CVE-2022-37967 and CVE-2022-38023 carefully!
+
+samba-tool got a new 'domain trust modify' subcommand
+-----------------------------------------------------
+
+This allows "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes" to be changed
+on trustedDomain objects. Even against remote DCs (including Windows)
+using the --local-dc-ipaddress= (and other --local-dc-* options).
+See 'samba-tool domain trust modify --help' for further details.
+
+smb.conf changes
+----------------
+
+ Parameter Name Description Default
+ -------------- ----------- -------
+ allow nt4 crypto Deprecated no
+ allow nt4 crypto:COMPUTERACCOUNT New
+ kdc default domain supported enctypes New (see manpage)
+ kdc supported enctypes New (see manpage)
+ kdc force enable rc4 weak session keys New No
+ reject md5 clients New Default, Deprecated Yes
+ reject md5 servers New Default, Deprecated Yes
+ server schannel Deprecated Yes
+ server schannel require seal New, Deprecated Yes
+ server schannel require seal:COMPUTERACCOUNT New
+ winbind sealed pipes Deprecated Yes
+
+Changes since 4.16.7
+--------------------
+
+o Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+ * BUG 15224: pam_winbind uses time_t and pointers assuming they are of the
+ same size.
+
+o Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
+ * BUG 14929: CVE-2022-44640 [SECURITY] Upstream Heimdal free of
+ user-controlled pointer in FAST.
+ * BUG 15219: Heimdal session key selection in AS-REQ examines wrong entry.
+ * BUG 15237: CVE-2022-37966.
+ * BUG 15258: filter-subunit is inefficient with large numbers of knownfails.
+
+o Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
+ * BUG 15240: CVE-2022-38023.
+ * BUG 15252: smbd allows setting FILE_ATTRIBUTE_TEMPORARY on directories.
+
+o Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+ * BUG 13135: The KDC logic arround msDs-supportedEncryptionTypes differs from
+ Windows.
+ * BUG 14611: CVE-2021-20251 [SECURITY] Bad password count not incremented
+ atomically.
+ * BUG 15203: CVE-2022-42898 [SECURITY] krb5_pac_parse() buffer parsing
+ vulnerability.
+ * BUG 15219: Heimdal session key selection in AS-REQ examines wrong entry.
+ * BUG 15230: Memory leak in snprintf replacement functions.
+ * BUG 15237: CVE-2022-37966.
+ * BUG 15240: CVE-2022-38023.
+ * BUG 15253: RODC doesn't reset badPwdCount reliable via an RWDC
+ (CVE-2021-20251 regression).
+
+o Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
+ * BUG 15224: pam_winbind uses time_t and pointers assuming they are of the
+ same size.
+
+o Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
+ * BUG 15237: CVE-2022-37966.
+ * BUG 15243: %U for include directive doesn't work for share listing
+ (netshareenum).
+ * BUG 15257: Stack smashing in net offlinejoin requestodj.
+
+o Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
+ * BUG 15197: Windows 11 22H2 and Samba-AD 4.15 Kerberos login issue.
+ * BUG 15219: Heimdal session key selection in AS-REQ examines wrong entry.
+ * BUG 15231: CVE-2022-37967.
+ * BUG 15237: CVE-2022-37966.
+
+o Nicolas Williams <nico@twosigma.com>
+ * BUG 14929: CVE-2022-44640 [SECURITY] Upstream Heimdal free of
+ user-controlled pointer in FAST.
+
+
+</pre>
+</p>
+</body>
+</html>
--- /dev/null
+<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN"
+ "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
+<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+<head>
+<title>Samba 4.17.4 - Release Notes</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<H2>Samba 4.17.4 Available for Download</H2>
+<p>
+<a href="https://download.samba.org/pub/samba/stable/samba-4.17.4.tar.gz">Samba 4.17.4 (gzipped)</a><br>
+<a href="https://download.samba.org/pub/samba/stable/samba-4.17.4.tar.asc">Signature</a>
+</p>
+<p>
+<a href="https://download.samba.org/pub/samba/patches/samba-4.17.3-4.17.4.diffs.gz">Patch (gzipped) against Samba 4.17.3</a><br>
+<a href="https://download.samba.org/pub/samba/patches/samba-4.17.3-4.17.4.diffs.asc">Signature</a>
+</p>
+<p>
+<pre>
+ ==============================
+ Release Notes for Samba 4.17.4
+ December 15, 2022
+ ==============================
+
+
+This is the latest stable release of the Samba 4.17 release series.
+It also contains security changes in order to address the following defects:
+
+
+o CVE-2022-37966: This is the Samba CVE for the Windows Kerberos
+ RC4-HMAC Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
+ disclosed by Microsoft on Nov 8 2022.
+
+ A Samba Active Directory DC will issue weak rc4-hmac
+ session keys for use between modern clients and servers
+ despite all modern Kerberos implementations supporting
+ the aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 cipher.
+
+ On Samba Active Directory DCs and members
+ 'kerberos encryption types = legacy' would force
+ rc4-hmac as a client even if the server supports
+ aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 and/or aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96.
+
+ https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-37966.html
+
+o CVE-2022-37967: This is the Samba CVE for the Windows
+ Kerberos Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
+ disclosed by Microsoft on Nov 8 2022.
+
+ A service account with the special constrained
+ delegation permission could forge a more powerful
+ ticket than the one it was presented with.
+
+ https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-37967.html
+
+o CVE-2022-38023: The "RC4" protection of the NetLogon Secure channel uses the
+ same algorithms as rc4-hmac cryptography in Kerberos,
+ and so must also be assumed to be weak.
+
+ https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-38023.html
+
+Note that there are several important behavior changes
+included in this release, which may cause compatibility problems
+interacting with system still expecting the former behavior.
+Please read the advisories of CVE-2022-37966,
+CVE-2022-37967 and CVE-2022-38023 carefully!
+
+samba-tool got a new 'domain trust modify' subcommand
+-----------------------------------------------------
+
+This allows "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes" to be changed
+on trustedDomain objects. Even against remote DCs (including Windows)
+using the --local-dc-ipaddress= (and other --local-dc-* options).
+See 'samba-tool domain trust modify --help' for further details.
+
+smb.conf changes
+----------------
+
+ Parameter Name Description Default
+ -------------- ----------- -------
+ allow nt4 crypto Deprecated no
+ allow nt4 crypto:COMPUTERACCOUNT New
+ kdc default domain supported enctypes New (see manpage)
+ kdc supported enctypes New (see manpage)
+ kdc force enable rc4 weak session keys New No
+ reject md5 clients New Default, Deprecated Yes
+ reject md5 servers New Default, Deprecated Yes
+ server schannel Deprecated Yes
+ server schannel require seal New, Deprecated Yes
+ server schannel require seal:COMPUTERACCOUNT New
+ winbind sealed pipes Deprecated Yes
+
+Changes since 4.17.3
+--------------------
+
+o Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+ * BUG 15224: pam_winbind uses time_t and pointers assuming they are of the
+ same size.
+
+o Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
+ * BUG 14929: CVE-2022-44640 [SECURITY] Upstream Heimdal free of
+ user-controlled pointer in FAST.
+ * BUG 15219: Heimdal session key selection in AS-REQ examines wrong entry.
+ * BUG 15237: CVE-2022-37966.
+ * BUG 15258: filter-subunit is inefficient with large numbers of knownfails.
+
+o Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
+ * BUG 15240: CVE-2022-38023.
+ * BUG 15252: smbd allows setting FILE_ATTRIBUTE_TEMPORARY on directories.
+
+o Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+ * BUG 13135: The KDC logic arround msDs-supportedEncryptionTypes differs from
+ Windows.
+ * BUG 14611: CVE-2021-20251 [SECURITY] Bad password count not incremented
+ atomically.
+ * BUG 15203: CVE-2022-42898 [SECURITY] krb5_pac_parse() buffer parsing
+ vulnerability.
+ * BUG 15206: libnet: change_password() doesn't work with
+ dcerpc_samr_ChangePasswordUser4().
+ * BUG 15219: Heimdal session key selection in AS-REQ examines wrong entry.
+ * BUG 15230: Memory leak in snprintf replacement functions.
+ * BUG 15237: CVE-2022-37966.
+ * BUG 15240: CVE-2022-38023.
+ * BUG 15253: RODC doesn't reset badPwdCount reliable via an RWDC
+ (CVE-2021-20251 regression).
+
+o Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
+ * BUG 15224: pam_winbind uses time_t and pointers assuming they are of the
+ same size.
+
+o Anoop C S <anoopcs@samba.org>
+ * BUG 15198: Prevent EBADF errors with vfs_glusterfs.
+
+o Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
+ * BUG 15237: CVE-2022-37966.
+ * BUG 15243: %U for include directive doesn't work for share listing
+ (netshareenum).
+ * BUG 15257: Stack smashing in net offlinejoin requestodj.
+
+o Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
+ * BUG 15197: Windows 11 22H2 and Samba-AD 4.15 Kerberos login issue.
+ * BUG 15219: Heimdal session key selection in AS-REQ examines wrong entry.
+ * BUG 15231: CVE-2022-37967.
+ * BUG 15237: CVE-2022-37966.
+
+o Nicolas Williams <nico@twosigma.com>
+ * BUG 14929: CVE-2022-44640 [SECURITY] Upstream Heimdal free of
+ user-controlled pointer in FAST.
+
+
+
+</pre>
+</p>
+</body>
+</html>
<td><em>Details</em></td>
</tr>
+ <tr>
+ <td>15 December 2022</td>
+ <td>
+ Please see bug reports in <a href="https://bugzilla.samba.org">the Samba Bugzilla</a>.
+ </td>
+ <td>CVE-2022-37966, CVE-2022-37967, CVE-2022-38023 and CVE-2022-45141.
+ Please see announcements for details.
+ </td>
+ <td>All versions of Samba prior to 4.15.13, 4.16.8, 4.17.4.</td>
+ <td>
+<a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-38023">CVE-2022-38023</a>,
+<a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-37966">CVE-2022-37966</a>,
+<a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-37967">CVE-2022-37967</a>,
+<a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-45141">CVE-2022-45141</a>.
+ </td>
+ <td>
+<a href="/samba/security/CVE-2022-38023.html">Announcement</a>,
+<a href="/samba/security/CVE-2022-37966.html">Announcement</a>,
+<a href="/samba/security/CVE-2022-37967.html">Announcement</a>,
+<a href="/samba/security/CVE-2022-45141.html">Announcement</a>.
+ </td>
+ </tr>
+
<tr>
<td>15 November 2022</td>
<td><a href="/samba/ftp/patches/security/samba-4.17.3-security-2022-11-15.patch">
--- /dev/null
+<!-- BEGIN: posted_news/20221215-161202.4.15.13.body.html -->
+<h5><a name="4.15.13">15 December 2022</a></h5>
+<p class=headline>Samba 4.17.4, 4.16.8 and 4.15.13 Security Releases are available for Download</p>
+<p>
+This are the latest stable releases.
+They also contain security changes in order to address
+<a href="/samba/security/CVE-2022-38023.html">CVE-2022-38023</a>,
+<a href="/samba/security/CVE-2022-37966.html">CVE-2022-37966</a>,
+<a href="/samba/security/CVE-2022-37967.html">CVE-2022-37967</a> and
+<a href="/samba/security/CVE-2022-45141.html">CVE-2022-45141</a>.
+
+</p>
+<p>
+The uncompressed tarball has been signed using GnuPG (ID AA99442FB680B620).
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The Samba 4.17.4 source code can be <a href="https://download.samba.org/pub/samba/stable/samba-4.17.4.tar.gz">downloaded now</a>.
+A <a href="https://download.samba.org/pub/samba/patches/samba-4.17.3-4.17.4.diffs.gz">patch against Samba 4.17.3</a> is also available.
+See <a href="https://www.samba.org/samba/history/samba-4.17.4.html">the release notes for more info</a>.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The Samba 4.16.8 source code can be <a href="https://download.samba.org/pub/samba/stable/samba-4.16.8.tar.gz">downloaded now</a>.
+A <a href="https://download.samba.org/pub/samba/patches/samba-4.16.7-4.16.8.diffs.gz">patch against Samba 4.16.7</a> is also available.
+See <a href="https://www.samba.org/samba/history/samba-4.16.8.html">the release notes for more info</a>.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The Samba 4.15.13 source code can be <a href="https://download.samba.org/pub/samba/stable/samba-4.15.13.tar.gz">downloaded now</a>.
+A <a href="https://download.samba.org/pub/samba/patches/samba-4.15.12-4.15.13.diffs.gz">patch against Samba 4.15.12</a> is also available.
+See <a href="https://www.samba.org/samba/history/samba-4.15.13.html">the release notes for more info</a>.
+</p>
+<!-- END: posted_news/20221215-161202.4.15.13.body.html -->
--- /dev/null
+<!-- BEGIN: posted_news/20221215-161202.4.15.13.headline.html -->
+<li> 15 December 2022 <a href="#4.17.4">Samba 4.17.4, 4.16.8 and 4.15.13 Security Releases are available for Download</a></li>
+<!-- END: posted_news/20221215-161202.4.15.13.headline.html -->
--- /dev/null
+<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN"
+ "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
+<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+
+<head>
+<title>Samba - Security Announcement Archive</title>
+</head>
+
+<body>
+
+ <H2>CVE-2022-37966.html:</H2>
+
+<p>
+<pre>
+===========================================================
+== Subject: rc4-hmac Kerberos session keys issued
+== to modern servers
+==
+== CVE ID#: CVE-2022-37966
+==
+== Versions: All versions of Samba using Kerberos
+==
+== Summary: This is the Samba CVE for the Windows Kerberos
+== RC4-HMAC Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
+== disclosed by Microsoft on Nov 8 2022.
+==
+== A Samba Active Directory DC will issue weak rc4-hmac
+== session keys for use between modern clients and servers
+== despite all modern Kerberos implementations supporting
+== the aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 cipher.
+==
+== On Samba Active Directory DCs and members
+== 'kerberos encryption types = legacy' would force
+== rc4-hmac as a client even if the server supports
+== aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 and/or aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96.
+===========================================================
+
+===========
+Description
+===========
+
+Kerberos, the trusted third party authentication system at the heart
+of Active Directory, issues a session key known to the target server
+and the client, encrypted to both services in a TGS-REP.
+
+The key algorithm chosen for here is then used for the subsequent
+signed or encrypted connection (eg GSSAPI secured LDAP or DCE/RPC).
+
+The kerberos rc4-hmac (also known as arcfour-hmac-md5) cipher is weak,
+as the checksum is calculated as HMAC-MD5(MD5(DATA), KEY) meaning that
+an active attacker knowing the plaintext data could create a different
+chosen DATA, with the same MD5 checksum, and substitute it into an
+signed but un-encrypted data stream without being detected.
+(Encrypted connections, which are more typical, are not impacted).
+
+Because of the earlier MD5 step, the protection of the HMAC is
+bypassed and an attacker does not need to know the key.
+
+For successful communication, the session key needs to be of a
+type understood by all parties.
+
+Traditionally it was assumed that the administrator would provision
+the strongest long term key possible for the software on the Kerberos
+target, so this long-term key list was also used as the set of
+possible session keys.
+
+This is a reasonable assumption where regular updates to
+msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes are made, however if this is not
+updated, the default has been the rc4-hmac (arcfour-hmac-md5) cipher
+introduced in Active Directory in Windows 2000.
+
+It is not possible to, without specific testing, update
+msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes to include the AES cipher bits
+arbitrarily (the target may not have AES keys in the keytab, or may
+have the wrong salt), but it is reasonable in 2022 to assert that all
+Kerberos client and server software support the aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 cipher.
+
+After this update, the fallback for an unspecified
+msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes (either no value or explicit "0")
+becomes "rc4-hmac, aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96-sk" by default.
+The fallback value can be controlled by the
+"kdc default domain supported enctypes" smb.conf option if required.
+
+aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96-sk (bit 0x20 in msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes)
+is a non-IETF keytype name with the behaviour that regardless of the
+ticket key encryption type selected (for example rc4-hmac, being the
+insecure algorithm being avoided, Samba does not support DES),
+that aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 and aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 session
+keys can still be negotiated.
+
+However, the ticket itself will still be encrypted with rc4-hmac. The
+preferred solution is in the Workaround below.
+
+Note that after this update, the fallback for an unspecified
+msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes (either no value or explicit "0")
+for trustedDomain objects are changed in an incompatible way!
+The fallback is now aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 instead of
+rc4-hmac! It is therefor recommended to explicitly set the value
+on both sides of the trust before or immediately after the
+update. See more details in the Workaround below.
+
+==================
+Patch Availability
+==================
+
+Patches addressing both these issues have been posted to:
+
+ https://www.samba.org/samba/security/
+
+Additionally, Samba 4.15.13, 4.16.8 and 4.17.4 have been issued
+as security releases to correct the defect. Samba administrators are
+advised to upgrade to these releases or apply the patch as soon
+as possible.
+
+==================
+CVSSv3 calculation
+==================
+
+CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (8.1)
+
+It is noted that this score matches Microsoft's for the same issue.
+
+Despite this value, please note that this attack requires:
+ * that the connection not be encrypted, only signed
+ * that an active attacker obtains a plaintext value of the packet
+ * and can find another plaintext value with the same MD5 checksum and
+ replace it undetected.
+
+============================
+Workaround and long-term fix
+============================
+
+After confirming a valid key of aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 is present in
+the target service keytab setting msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes to
+(base 10) 16 on that service's account in LDAP will avoid using
+rc4-hmac entirely. AES256 support can also be set in Active Directory
+Users and computers.
+
+In some situations winbindd (as AD DC or AD domain member),
+as well as tools like 'net' generate/use a custom krb5.conf file.
+Using the option "kerberos encryption types = legacy" will
+force rc4-hmac and disable aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 and
+aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 support. In 2022 there's no longer
+any reason to use "kerberos encryption types = legacy"!
+Also inspect your global /etc/krb5.conf and make sure it
+doesn't disable aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96.
+
+For trusted domains you should explicitly configure the
+use of aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 support, either via the Windows GUI or
+the newly added 'samba-tool domain trust modify --use-aes-keys'.
+For legacy trusts against Windows 2000/2003 domains you need to force
+rc4-hmac using 'samba-tool domain trust modify --no-aes-keys'.
+Against remote DCs (including Windows) you can use the --local-dc-ipaddress=
+and other --local-dc-* options. See 'samba-tool domain trust modify --help'
+for further details.
+Note that already cached rc4-hmac cross-realm tickets may no longer
+work after switching to aes, which may cause temporary problems.
+Setting a 1 hour ticket lifetime may reduce the problems:
+ kdc:user_ticket_lifetime = 1
+
+=======
+Credits
+=======
+
+Originally reported to Microsoft by Tom Tervoort with Secura
+https://www.secura.com/ and released as CVE-2022-37966.
+
+Advisory written by Andrew Bartlett of Catalyst and the Samba Team.
+
+Patches provided by Joseph Sutton of Catalyst and the Samba Team.
+
+==========================================================
+== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
+== The Samba Team
+==========================================================
+
+
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
\ No newline at end of file
--- /dev/null
+<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN"
+ "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
+<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+
+<head>
+<title>Samba - Security Announcement Archive</title>
+</head>
+
+<body>
+
+ <H2>CVE-2022-37967.html:</H2>
+
+<p>
+<pre>
+===========================================================
+== Subject: Kerberos constrained delegation ticket
+== forgery possible against Samba AD DC
+==
+== CVE ID#: CVE-2022-37967
+==
+== Versions: All versions of the Samba AD DC
+==
+== Summary: This is the Samba CVE for the Windows
+== Kerberos Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
+== disclosed by Microsoft on Nov 8 2022[1].
+==
+== A service account with the special constrained
+== delegation permission could forge a more powerful
+== ticket than the one it was presented with.
+===========================================================
+
+===========
+Description
+===========
+
+Kerberos constrained delegation, known also as S4U2Proxy, requires
+that the intermediate service present to the KDC a valid Kerberos
+ticket (including the PAC) obtained by the user as evidence that they
+had authenticated, so that a new ticket can be issued for the target
+server.
+
+The Kerberos PAC is signed in multiple stages, but the important
+protection of the SID list (list of user groups) in the PAC is done
+first with the server's key, and then with the krbtgt key over that
+result.
+
+However the rc4-hmac cipher as implemented in Kerberos is weak in
+2022, for two reasons:
+ * The implementation in Kerberos is HMAC-MD5(MD5(DATA),KEY), meaning
+ that the attack on the PAC can be done using the chosen-prefix
+ techinques for MD5 without knowing the key
+
+ * The intermediate server knows its own password (the key used in the
+ HMAC-MD5 step) and can set it to arbitrary values.
+
+It is therefore feasible to brute force a new server checksum that
+matches the value already signed by the krbtgt key, but including a
+privileged group in the PAC.
+
+==================
+Patch Availability
+==================
+
+Patches addressing both these issues have been posted to:
+
+ https://www.samba.org/samba/security/
+
+Additionally, Samba 4.15.13, 4.16.8 and 4.17.4 have been issued
+as security releases to correct the defect. Samba administrators are
+advised to upgrade to these releases or apply the patch as soon
+as possible.
+
+==================
+CVSSv3 calculation
+==================
+
+CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (7.2)
+
+====================
+Workaround and notes
+====================
+
+This issue can be worked around by disable delegation for services
+that are not fully trusted, or securing these services to the same
+standard as the DC itself.
+
+Note that this patch introduces a flag day, there is no partial
+rollout of this feature (unlike KrbtgtFullPacSignature in Microsoft
+Windows[2]), so service tickets issued prior to the update will be
+rejected as evidence tickets for Kerberos constrained delegation.
+
+While Kerberos constrained delegation (S4U2Proxy) is not a often-used
+feature with Samba AD DCs, setting a 1 hour ticket lifetime:
+
+ kdc:service_ticket_lifetime = 1
+
+and waiting for any existing tickets to expire would reduce the number
+of tickets that are not accepted. Also ensure all DCs are upgraded
+around the same time, as if a ticket is issued by a pre-upgrade DC it
+will not be accepted by a new DC for Kerberos constrained Delegation.
+
+==========
+References
+==========
+
+[1] https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-37967
+[2] https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5020805-how-to-manage-kerberos-protocol-changes-related-to-cve-2022-37967-997e9acc-67c5-48e1-8d0d-190269bf4efb
+
+=======
+Credits
+=======
+
+Originally reported to Microsoft by Tom Tervoort of Secura.
+
+Advisory written by Andrew Bartlett of Catalyst and the Samba Team.
+
+Patches provided by Joseph Sutton of Catalyst and the Samba Team.
+
+==========================================================
+== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
+== The Samba Team
+==========================================================
+
+
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
\ No newline at end of file
--- /dev/null
+<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN"
+ "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
+<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+
+<head>
+<title>Samba - Security Announcement Archive</title>
+</head>
+
+<body>
+
+ <H2>CVE-2022-38023.html:</H2>
+
+<p>
+<pre>
+===========================================================
+== Subject: RC4/HMAC-MD5 NetLogon Secure Channel is weak and should be avoided
+==
+== CVE ID#: CVE-2022-38023
+==
+== Versions: All versions of Samba
+==
+== Summary: The "RC4" protection of the NetLogon Secure channel uses the
+== same algorithms as rc4-hmac cryptography in Kerberos,
+== and so must also be assumed to be weak.
+===========================================================
+
+===========
+Description
+===========
+
+This is Samba's response to Microsoft's CVE-2022-38023[1][2].
+
+Following RFC8429 and as has been published for CVE-2022-3938, rc4-hmac
+(also known as arcfour-hmac-md5) cryptography in Kerberos is weak,
+then it follows that the RC4 mode in the NETLOGON Secure Channel
+(DCE/RPC bulk encryption) is also weak, as they are the same cipher
+(essentially).
+
+The weakness on NetLogon Secure channel is that the secure checksum is
+calculated as HMAC-MD5(MD5(DATA),KEY), meaning that an active attacker
+knowing the plaintext data could create a different chosen DATA, with
+the same MD5 checksum, and substitute it into the data stream without
+being detected.
+
+Therefore we must disable this cipher.
+
+In this patch we achive this by setting 'reject md5 clients = yes' and
+'reject md5 servers = yes' by default.
+
+Thankfully this cipher is unused by most modern member servers,
+including Windows 7 / Windows 2008R2 and later, as well as
+Samba 4.0 and later, however public documentation suggests[1]
+that NetApp ONTAP still uses RC4 (HMAC-MD5).
+
+The following smb.conf:
+
+ reject md5 clients = yes # the new default
+ server reject md5 schannel:TRICERATOPS$ = no
+ server reject md5 schannel:GREYWACKE$ = no
+
+will allow only "TRICERATOPS$" and "GREYWACKE$" to use RC4 (HMAC-MD5)
+crypography.
+
+If you really need to support legacy DES based clients, it is now
+also possible to allow them explicitly:
+
+ allow nt4 crypto = no # the default
+ reject md5 clients = yes # the new default
+ allow nt4 crypto:NT4CLIENT$ = yes
+ server reject md5 schannel:NT4CLIENT$ = no
+
+Additionally we extend default to requiring a full encrypted NETLOGON
+secure channel.
+
+Encryption of the secure channel not only provides overall privacy
+(particularly against attacks on the individually encrypted elements
+within the NETLOGON protocol), it also strengthens the RC4 (HMAC-MD5)
+cipher.
+
+Clients that do not support NETLOGON Secure Channel encryption can be
+exempted in a similar way.
+
+The following smb.conf:
+
+ server schannel require seal = yes # the default
+ server schannel require seal:TRICERATOPS$ = no
+ server schannel require seal:GREYWACKE$ = no
+
+will allow only "TRICERATOPS$" and "GREYWACKE$" to avoid encrypted
+schannel and operate with signing-only schannel.
+
+For clients without any netlogon "sign or seal" transport protection
+you will need something like this:
+
+ server schannel = yes # the default
+ server schannel require seal = yes # the default
+ server require schannel:NT4CLIENT$ = no
+ server schannel require seal:NT4CLIENT$ = no
+
+==================
+Patch Availability
+==================
+
+Patches addressing both these issues have been posted to:
+
+ https://www.samba.org/samba/security/
+
+Additionally, Samba 4.15.13, 4.16.8 and 4.17.4 have been issued
+as security releases to correct the defect. Samba administrators are
+advised to upgrade to these releases or apply the patch as soon
+as possible.
+
+==================
+CVSSv3 calculation
+==================
+
+CVSS:v3.1:AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (8.1)
+
+Despite this value, please note that this attack requires:
+ * that the connection not be encrypted (which is the default)
+ * that an active attacker obtains a plaintext value of a packet in the NetLogon Secure Channel
+ * and can find another plaintext value with the same MD5 checksum and
+ replace it undetected.
+
+====================
+Workaround and notes
+====================
+
+Setting 'reject md5 clients = yes' (on DCs) and 'reject md5 servers = yes'
+(on DCs and member servers) will avoid this vulnerable protocol,
+but this will reject legacy clients which have worked before.
+
+'winbind sealed pipes = yes' should also be kept at its default value!
+
+Regarding the encryption requirement, thankfully Samba addressed
+SamLogon NTLM session key disclosure issue in CVE-2016-2111.
+
+In preparation of the update to the new Samba version on an AD DC
+would could try to identify legacy clients from (JSON) audit logs
+(if configured). You can find domain member servers that use
+AES (HMAC-SHA256) vs RC4 (HMAC-MD5) via the passwordType
+element.
+
+Note that un-important keys have been dropped for brevity:
+
+{
+ "type": "Authentication",
+ "Authentication": {
+ "remoteAddress": "ipv4:10.53.57.29:37589",
+ "serviceDescription": "NETLOGON",
+ "authDescription": "ServerAuthenticate",
+ "clientAccount": "LOCALADMEMBER$",
+ "becameSid": "S-1-5-21-626540054-1513162547-2555510494-1114",
+ "passwordType": "HMAC-SHA256"
+ }
+}
+
+{
+ "type": "Authentication",
+ "Authentication": {
+ "remoteAddress": "ipv4:10.53.57.11:37767",
+ "serviceDescription": "NETLOGON",
+ "authDescription": "ServerAuthenticate",
+ "clientAccount": "SAMLOGONTEST$",
+ "becameSid": "S-1-5-21-626540054-1513162547-2555510494-1115",
+ "passwordType": "HMAC-MD5"
+ }
+}
+
+With that information you could pre-add lines like this to
+your smb.conf:
+
+ server reject md5 schannel:SAMLOGONTEST$ = no
+
+
+As alternative or in addition you could explicitly configure
+the insecure (former) defaults for a short grace period (of a few days):
+
+ reject md5 clients = no
+ server schannel require seal = no
+
+Subsequently monitor the log files for messages containing the strings
+"CVE-2022-38023" or "CVE-2020-1472", they contain indications for
+missing explicit per client configuration lines. You should
+copy those lines to your smb.conf on a regular basis.
+After some time, when those messages are no longer logged,
+it is safe to remove the insecure (former) defaults and leave
+the new defaults in place. See 'man smb.conf' for more details.
+
+Even with the new secure defaults it is useful to monitor the
+log files in order to identify clients, which are now rejected.
+
+
+==========
+References
+==========
+
+[1] https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-38023
+[2] https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5021130-how-to-manage-the-netlogon-protocol-changes-related-to-cve-2022-38023-46ea3067-3989-4d40-963c-680fd9e8ee25
+[3] https://kb.netapp.com/Advice_and_Troubleshooting/Data_Storage_Software/ONTAP_OS/Microsoft_Security_Advisory%3A_CVE-2020-1472_impact_on_NetApp_appliance_running_CIFS_NFS_utilizing_Netlogon_servers
+
+=======
+Credits
+=======
+
+Microsoft reported this issue at
+https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-38023
+
+Patches provided by Stefan Metzmacher of SerNet and the Samba team.
+
+Advisory written by Andrew Bartlett of Catalyst and the Samba Team.
+
+==========================================================
+== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
+== The Samba Team
+==========================================================
+
+
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
\ No newline at end of file
--- /dev/null
+<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN"
+ "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
+<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+
+<head>
+<title>Samba - Security Announcement Archive</title>
+</head>
+
+<body>
+
+ <H2>CVE-2022-45141.html:</H2>
+
+<p>
+<pre>
+===========================================================
+== Subject: Samba AD DC using Heimdal can be forced to
+== issue rc4-hmac encrypted Kerberos tickets
+==
+== CVE ID#: CVE-2022-45141
+==
+== Versions: Heimdal builds of the Samba AD DC prior to Samba 4.16
+==
+== Summary: Since the Windows Kerberos RC4-HMAC Elevation of Privilege
+== Vulnerability was disclosed by Microsoft on Nov 8 2022
+== and per RFC8429 it is assumed that rc4-hmac is weak,
+==
+== Vulnerable Samba Active Directory DCs will issue rc4-hmac
+== encrypted tickets despite the target server supporting
+== better encryption (eg aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96).
+===========================================================
+
+===========
+Description
+===========
+
+Kerberos, the trusted third party authentication system at the heart
+of Active Directory, issues a ticket using a key known to the target server
+but nobody else, returned to the client in a TGS-REP.
+
+This key needs to be of a type understood only by the KDC and target server.
+
+However, due to a coding error subsequently addressed in all recent
+Heimdal versions and so fixed with Samba 4.16 (which imports Heimdal
+8.0pre), the (attacking) client would be given the opportunity to
+select the encryption type, and so obtain a ticket encrypted with
+rc4-hmac, that it could attack offline.
+
+This is possible unless rc4-hmac is totally removed from the server's
+account, by removing the unicodePwd attribute, but this will break
+other aspects of the server's operation in the domain (NETLOGON in
+particular).
+
+==================
+Patch Availability
+==================
+
+Patches addressing both these issues have been posted to:
+
+ https://www.samba.org/samba/security/
+
+Additionally, Samba 4.15.13 has been issued as security releases to correct the
+defect. Samba administrators are advised to upgrade to these releases or apply
+the patch as soon as possible.
+
+==================
+CVSSv3 calculation
+==================
+
+CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (8.1)
+
+================
+(not) Workaround
+================
+
+Setting msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes is not a workaround for this issue.
+
+=======
+Credits
+=======
+
+Originally reported by Joseph Sutton of Catalyst and the Samba Team.
+
+Advisory written by Andrew Bartlett of Catalyst and the Samba Team.
+
+Patches by Nicolas Williams were identified and backported by Joseph Sutton of Catalyst and the Samba Team.
+
+==========================================================
+== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
+== The Samba Team
+==========================================================
+
+
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
\ No newline at end of file
git.samba.org / samba-web.git / commitdiff